Pakistan's Sabres at War
By Robert JacksonAt the beginning of 1954, the Royal Pakistan Air Force (RPAF) had been in existence for less than seven years. There could, however, be no doubt about its skill and professionalism. It was organized and trained by Royal Air Force personnel on secondment, and its first three commanders-in-chief were senior RAF officers: Air Vice Marshal A.L.A. Perry-Keene, AVM R.L.R. Atcherley, and AVM L.W. Cannon. While the first who laid the foundations of this small, highly-trained air arm, it was AVM Cannon who reorganized and revitalized the structure of the RPAF, instituting long-term policies to cover future expansion, recruitment and training.
What the RPAF lacked was modern equipment. Its sole jet fighter squadron was equipped with the Vickers Supermarine Attacker, thirty-six of which were delivered in 1951, and three squadrons operated piston-engined Hawker Fury fighter-bombers. Although the Attacker performed reasonably well in RPAF service, it suffered from a number of technical problems, the most serious of which involved the undercarriage, and several aircraft were lost in landing accidents.
It was the Korean War, and growing communist influence and aggression in other Far Eastern theatre, that gave impetus to the military re-equipment programme in Pakistan. To provide collective security in South-East Asia, the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was formed 1954, the member nations being Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States. It was also envisaged that Pakistan would be a signatory to the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), based on the former Baghdad Pact, when this came into being later in the 1950s, although CENTO was an economic organization rather than a military one.
On 19 May 1954, as a preliminary to its participation in SEATO, Pakistan signed a Mutual Defence Assistance Pact with the United States. The result was an almost immediate influx of American military equipment and the secondment of a US Military Advisory Group, which began to switch the RPAF to American methods of training and organization. A quantity of North American T-6G Texan trainers was supplied to the RPAF College at Risalpur, and the first of fifteen Lockheed T-33A jet trainers was delivered to No. 2 (Fighter Conversion) Squadron at Mauripur where they replaced Hawker Furies and some earlier Tempest IIs, inherited, inherited from British India at the time of Partition in 1947.
As far as combat aircraft were concerned, it was proposed to establish an operational element, by the end of 1957, of four day fighter Wings, each with two squadrons of twelve F-86F Sabres, plus one Sabre for the Wing leader and one T-33A per Wing. Alfa Wing (Nos. 18 and 19 Squadrons) was to be based at Mauripur; Bravo Wing (Nos. 11 and 15 Squadrons) at Peshawar; Cocoa Wing (Nos. 16 and 17 Squadrons) at Sargodha; and Delta Wing (Nos. 5 and 14 Squadrons at Samungli.
During the transition period, the RPAF was still commanded by a RAF officer, AV-M A.W.B. MacDonald, who succeeded AV-M Cannon in June 1955. Deliveries of F-86Fs to operational units began later that year, the first squadrons to re-equip being Nos. 5 and 14 Squadrons. By the end of 1956 No. 11 Squadron had exchanged its attackers for Sabres, and four more squadrons, Nos. 15, 16, 17 and 18, had been formed as planned. No. 19 Squadron formed at a later date. The initial nucleus of RPAF Sabre pilots trained in the United States; thereafter, all jet conversion was undertaken by No. 2 (Fighter Conversion) Squadron at Mauripur, where, after 200-220 hours on the T-6G at Risalpur, pilots flew eighty hours on the T-33A during the first three months of the course and fifty hours on the Sabre during the last three months.
On 26 March 1956, Pakistan was proclaimed an Islamic Republic and the Air Force dropped its 'Royal' prefix. By 23 July 1957, when the fist Pakistani C-in-C, Air Marshal M. Asghar Khan, assumed command, the fighter strength of the PAF had doubled. Only one unit retained piston-engined equipment, this was No. 9 Squadron, which continued to operate Hawker Furies for police duties on the North-West Frontier until it converted to Lockheed F-104A Starfighters in 1960.
In the early 1960s, notwithstanding the fact that relations with India were fast deteriorating, Pakistan's main area of concern was the North-West Frontier with Afghanistan, which had been receiving military equipment - including modern jet aircraft - from the Soviet Union. Early in 1965, the Royal Afghan Air Force (RAAF) possessed six squadrons of MiG-17s, with another squadron working up on MiG-21s, and the PAF Sabres flew regular border patrols ready to counter any potential air threat. But when a show of force finally came, it was between Pakistan and India.
In February 1965, Indian forces occupied the northern part of the Rann of Kutch, a desolate area of disputed salt flats on the Indo-Pakistan border to the south. During the weeks that followed there were several skirmishes between rival armoured forces, which ended late in April after a flurry of diplomatic activity. Air power - apart from light observation aircraft and helicopters - played no part in these actions, both sides at this stage being eager to avoid escalation, but the Sabre force was brought to alert status and the aircraft ordered to their wartime dispersals, together with the PAF's small force Martin B-57 jet bombers.
There were several cross-border incursions, however, by Indian aircraft, and on 24 April 1965 a section of Sabres was scrambled to intercept a radar contact fifty miles inside Pakistani territory and apparently heading for Karachi. The contact turned out to be an IAF Dassault Ouragan, whose pilot lowered his flaps and undercarriage when the Sabres made a warning pass and came down near the village of Jangshahi, wiping off his landing gear in the process. It transpired that the Ouragan pilot, Flt. Lt. Rana Sikka of No. 51 Auxiliary Squadron (IAF), had got lost in poor visibility and strayed across the border by mistake.
In July 1965, command of the PAF was assumed by Air Marshal M. Nur Khan. His appointment came at a times when the Pakistan Government was actively pursuing a plan to infiltrate the disputed province of Kashmir with some 8,000 guerrilla and regular forces, and he at once realized that, once this action had been taken, nothing short of full PAF commitment would become necessary. An Intelligence assessment of the IAF's war plan indicated that the Indians would seek first of all to neutralize the PAF, then undertake a sustained interdiction campaign against Pakistani communications and war industry, with petrol, oil and lubricant facilities high on the list of target priorities.
The biggest problem confronting the PAF, which was heavily outnumbered, was to deploy its forces so that the requirements of air defence and battlefield air superiority could be adequately met. It was finally decided to concentrate almost the whole of the Sabre force in the Sargodha-Peshawar area, assigning only one squadron to the defence of Karachi; this would result in the maximum economy of force and also place the Sabres within comfortable reach of the battle area. Combat air patrols (CAPs) were to be flown be elements of three aircraft, one F-104 Starfighter and two F-86Fs, all armed with Sidewinder AAMs; the F-104 would provide top cover. As the PAF has 100 Sabres and only ten Starfighters, the number of CAPs would be limited, but the arrangement was judged to be adequate. In any case, only twenty-two Sabres were as yet equipped to carry the Sidewinder.
The majority of the Sabre force was assigned to attacks on Indian forward airfields, the first scheduled to take place just before sunset on the first day of hostilities. The object was to inflict the maximum amount of damage, at the same time ensuring that nightfall would limit the Indian response. Further airfield attacks were to take place at sunrise, pressure being maintained by the PAF's B-57 force during the night. Because of the range involved - Sargodha was more than 120 miles from the Indian frontier - and the need to carry external fuel tanks to permit sufficient time over target, no rockets would be carried; attacks would be made with guns only. Twelve Sabres would be assigned to each target, the whole force crossing the Indian border simultaneously.
On 31 August 1965, the eve of the Pakistani offensive into Kashmir (Operation Grand Slam), the serviceability state of the PAF's Sabre force was high, only eight of the 100 aircraft being out of the line for repair and overhaul. Of the ninety-two serviceable aircraft, thirty - including the Sidewinder-equipped Sabres - were with Nos. 5, 11 and 15 Squadrons at Sargodha in the Punjab, alongside the F-104s of No. 9 Squadron; No. 19 was at Peshawar with fourteen aircraft; and Nos. 16, 17 and 18 were at Mauripur with thirty-six aircraft, although Nos. 17 and 18 Squadrons would quickly re-deploy to Sargodha in support of the airfield attack effort; and No. 14 Squadron was at Tezgaon, near Dhaka in East Pakistan, with twelve aircraft.
It was anticipated that once the fighting in Kashmir began, there would be an immediate challenge to any Pakistani bid for air superiority from the Indian Air Force's (IAF) Hawker Hunter F. Mk 56 fighters, whose performance was superior to that of the F-86F in most respects. The IAF had 118 Hunters, divided between four squadrons, and two of these - Nos. 7 and 27 Squadrons - were based close to the disputed Kashmir border at Halwara, south of Amritsar. When hostilities opened on 1 September [1965], however, the first Indian aircraft to be committed to attacks on advancing Pakistani armour were Canberra B(I) 58 bombers, de Havilland Vampires and Dassault Ouragans.
1965 Indo-Pakistan Air War
The first contact between the opposing air forces came in the late afternoon of 1 September [1965], when a section of two Sabres flown by Sqn. Ldr. Sarfaraz Rafiqui, OC No. 5 Squadron, and Flt. Lt. Imtiaz Bhatti, No. 15 Squadron, intercepted a small force of Vampires and Canberras over the battle area. Two Vampires were quickly destroyed by Sqn. Ldr. Sarfaraz Rafiqui, and the other two by his wingman. There were no further actions on that day; nor were there any on 2 September [1965], when no sightings of Indian aircraft were reported.
The PAF's airfield attack plan was now postponed, and from first light on 2 September [1965] part of the Sabre force was employed in attacking Indian strongpoints in the Jaurian area with 2.75 inch rockets, twenty-eight of which were carried by each aircraft. Attacks were also made on Indian columns, the PAF pilots claiming the destruction of four tanks and about twenty soft-skinned vehicles. During the course of the day, ten Sabres of No. 17 Squadron were re-deployed from Mauripur to Sargodha to strengthen the ground-attack force.
On the morning of 3 September [1965], PAF Sabres had their first encounter with a modern IAF combat type, the Hawker Siddeley Gnat lightweight fighter. Two Sabres and an F-104, all armed with Sidewinders, were on CAP from Sargodha when four Gnats climbed past the Sabres. The latter led by Flt. Lt. Yusaf Khan, turned after the Indian aircraft, but Khan's wingman, Flg. Off. Butt, was forced to break off when one of his drop tanks refused to jettison. Khan obtained missile tone on a Gnat, but then his Sabre was hit by three 30mm cannon shells from another Gnat which had got on his tail. Butt's obstinate fuel tank at last fell away and he returned to rejoin his leader, the two Sabres engaging the Gnats - which now numbered six - in a turning fight down to less than 1,500 feet. Then the CAP F-104 arrived from high altitude, and although it could not match the Sabres and Gnats in a turning battle its pilot made several high-speed passes at the Indian fighters, causing them to break away and head for friendly territory. One of the Gnats was intercepted by a second Starfighter and landed on a disused PAF airfield at Pasrur, where it was later captured intact; its pilot claimed to have experienced technical trouble. Meanwhile, Flt. Lt. Khan nursed his damaged F-86F back to Sargodha, where he made a tricky landing without the use of brakes.
On 4 September [1965] the emphasis was once again on ground support operations, three flights of four Sabres - two armed with rockets and the third with napalms - attacking Indian artillery positions and convoys. It was during these operations that the Sabre force suffered its first loss when the aircraft flown by Flg. Off. N.M. Butt, who had taken part in the action against the Gnats the day before, was hit shortly after making an attack on an Indian HQ near Jammu. Butt ejected and landed safely near friendly troops. Butt at first believed that he had been shot down by AA fire, but it later transpired that an Indian aircraft, possibly a Gnat, had been responsible. The PAF also mounted thirty-four CAP sorties on 4 September [1965], but although Pakistani radar stations tracked numerous Indian aircraft - including some identified as MiG-21s by their speed - there were no engagements.
In the early hours of 6 September [1965], following a day of relative quiet that saw only sixteen sorties flown by PAF Sabres, the Indian Army launched a major offensive towards Lahore, supported diversionary attacks, and the war began in earnest. The offensive was supported by substantial numbers of Indian aircraft, but their attacks were uncoordinated and there was little evidence of a coherent air/ground plan of action. For the first time, PAF pilots began to encounter Dassault Mystere IVA fighter-bombers, the Vampires having been withdrawn from operations following their mauling of 1 September [1965]. One Mystere was shot down by a Sidewinder launched by a CAP F-104 early on the 6th.
Later in the morning, Sabres carried out rocket attacks on Indian armoured columns advancing towards Lahore. From noon on 6 September [1965], a state of open war existed between India and Pakistan, and it was now decided to implement the planned series of air strikes on Indian Air Force bases. The decision was not taken without some misgivings, because the attacks were certain to attract large-scale IAF retaliation. One major concern was aircraft availability; the threat of IAF strikes meant that a high proportion of the Sabre force would have to be assigned to air defence, and there were fears that the number available for the strikes against Indian airfields and their associated radar facilities would not be adequate. To alleviate the situation, twelve Sabres of No. 18 Squadron flew to Sargodha from Mauripur, but they arrived late in the afternoon and four of them had to be taken out of the line so that various defects could be rectified. Apart from this, some of the Sargodha F-86Fs had been carrying out further ground attack missions during the afternoon and were still returning to base; it would take time to refuel and re-arm them.
The only force fully prepared to go on schedule was at Peshawar, where eight Sabres of No. 19 Squadron - which so far had been committed only to air defence tasks - were standing by to take-off for their assigned target, the IAF airfield at Pathankot. When it was decided that the attack was to go ahead as planned, the Peshawar force got airborne on schedule at 16:15 hours; the problem was that the Sargodha Sabres were nowhere near ready, so that the original plan involving a simultaneous border crossing by the whole Sabre force in order to achieve maximum surprise was severely disrupted.
The eight pilots of No. 19 Squadron, led by Sqn. Ldr. S.S. Haider, were briefed to cross into Indian territory at 32,000 feet and then descend to low level twenty miles from the target. Two-Sidewinder-armed Sabres were to provide top cover at 15,000 feet. The airfield attack would be made using guns only, each aircraft carrying 1,800 rounds of armour-piercing and incendiary ammunition, and each pilot was to make two passes.
The Sabre pilots arrived at Pathankot to find a number of aircraft dispersed in blast pens around the airfield perimeter; these were attacked and various installations strafed, including the control tower. After the attack the pilots claimed the destruction of nine MiG-21s, five Mystere IVAs and a Fairchild C-119 transport; in fact no MiGs were present, but the C-119 and several Mysteres were definitely destroyed. All the Sabres recovered safely to the nearest PAF airfield, which was Sargodha. No opposition was encountered apart from some light AA.
Meanwhile, the strike from Sargodha had been dogged by misfortune. Only eight Sabres could be mustered to attack the two IAF airfields at Adampur and Halwara, and shortly before take-off this number was further reduced to six when two of the aircraft became unserviceable. Consequently, only three Sabres of No. 11 Squadron set out for Adampur, headed by the CO, Sqn. Ldr. M. M. Alam, while the three aircraft of No. 5 Squadron led by Sqn. Ldr. S.A. Rafiqui, made for Halwara.
Flying at low level across the Punjab, the small Adampur force met with trouble a few seconds short of its Initial Point at Taran Taran, south of Amritsar, when the Sabres were engaged by four Hunters. A low-level, low-speed turning fight developed; Alam fired at the No. 4 Hunter, which flicked into the ground and exploded, although this may have been the result of the Indian pilot losing control. The combat tightened up even further as the opposing pilots lowered their flaps in frantic endeavours to get on one anothers' tails; at this speed and height the Sabre was marginally more manoeuvrable than the Hunter and Alam succeeded in shooting down a second aircraft. Two more Hunters were claimed as damaged by the other two Sabre pilots, Sqn. Ldr. A.U. Ahmed and Flt. Lt. S.A.A. Hatmi.
With no prospect now of attacking Adampur in the gathering dusk, and the danger that more Indian fighters might shortly arrive, Alam called off the mission and the pilots made their exits from the combat area at low level. On the way home the Sabre flight encountered another pair of Hunters and fired at one of them with inconclusive results.
A couple of minutes later, Alam's flight made visual contact with the three Sabres of No. 5 Squadron, which had just crossed the border en route for Halwara, and they were called up over the R/T with a warning that Indian fighters were up in strength. As it turned out, Sqn. Ldr. Rafiqui's aircraft reached the target area without meeting any opposition; their problem was that they were unable to locate Halwara in the gathering darkness.
As they circled at low level, vainly trying to find the objective, Rafiqui sighted two Hunters at twelve o'clock high and decided to attack them. Covered by his Nos. 2 and 3, Flt. Lt. Cecil Choudhry and Flt. Lt. Yunus Hussain, Rafiqui closed on the lead Hunter and shot it down. As the other aircraft broke sharply away six more Hunters appeared, closing rapidly from port and starboard; Rafiqui turned behind the first pair and fired a short burst at one of them, then his guns jammed. Choudhry, meanwhile, engaged a second pair of Hunters, hitting one in the port wing; it pulled up steeply and the pilot ejected. The other used its superior acceleration to disengage.
Choudhry, who was down to less than 200 feet, was then attacked by two more Hunters, both of which passed underneath him. The Indian No. 2 misjudged his height and hit the ground with his wingtip, his aircraft exploding. By virtue of some magnificent low-speed flying, Choudhry caused another attacking Hunter to overshoot and fired at it; the Hunter exploded. Looking round, he saw a Sabre and a Hunter sparring with one another in a scissors manoeuvre; a moment later the Hunter burst into flames and went down.
The successful pilot was Yunus Hussain. There was no sign of Rafiqui, so Choudhry and Hussain set out for home. As they did so they were attacked by two more Hunters from six o'clock high, and one of them shot Hussain down in flames. Choudhry, harassed by the two Hunters and two more which came up to join the unequal fight, stayed at low level and gradually worked his way towards the border; the Hunters lost him in the shadows. On reaching Lahore he climbed to 20,000 feet and headed for Sargodha, expecting his fuel to run out several miles short of base. In fact, he was on his final approach to land when the engine flamed out, and he was able to make a successful dead-stick landing, the sole survivor of the No. 5 Squadron effort.
The anticipated IAF response came just before midnight. During the next four and a half hours at least fourteen Canberras penetrated Pakistan air space, heading for the airfields at Rawalpindi and Sargodha. The Canberras, which were operating out of Agra, attacked in stream from 30,000 feet, dropping either six 1,000 lb HE bombs or a single 4,000 lb bomb. Bombs fell near both targets but caused no damage to military installations; in fact, many failed to explode. Three F-104s made abortive attempts to intercept the bombers; two F-86s were also scrambled from Mauripur and one of these crashed shortly after take-off, killing its pilot.
The first IAF daylight attack on Sargodha, mounted by six Mysteres IVAs soon after sunrise, took the defences by surprise but failed completely to exploit this advantage. The Mysteres made a single ragged pass over the airfield, firing their underwing rockets and cannon indiscriminately, and failed to hit any of the 80-odd aircraft on the base, including four Sabres and two F-104s on the Operational Readiness Platform at the end of the runway. One Mystere was shot down by light AA and another by a CAP Starfighter several miles south-east of the airfield. The Starfighter was itself engaged by a second Mystere, whose pilot, showing considerable skill and courage, pressed home his attack and hit the F-104 with cannon fire, damaging its controls. The PAF pilot ejected safely.
Soon afterwards, six Hunters were reported to be approaching Sargodha at low level. Four F-86s and one F-104 were already airborne, having been scrambled on CAP after the first attack; with the Starfighter providing top cover, the Sabres intercepted the Hunters as they were running in towards Sargodha. The Sabre leader, Sqn. Ldr. M.M. Alam, and his No.2, Flg. Off. M. Akbar, pursued the Hunters across the airfield and closed on the rearmost pair as the turned eastward. Alam fired two Sidewinders at them; one of the missiles fell away harmlessly, but the other appeared to have damaged the second low-flying Hunter, whose pilot pulled up and ejected. v With the other Sabre pair orbiting some distance away to the south-west, Alam and his wingman continued their pursuit of the remaining Hunters, catching up with them just beyond the Chenab River. Seeing the threat, the Indian pilot broke left in line astern, putting the Sabres in an excellent position to turn in behind them. What followed was one of the most remarkable achievements in the history of air combat. In less than 30 seconds, firing in short bursts while pulling up to 5g in the turn, Sqn. Ldr. Alam destroyed four Hunters. At close range, the combination of the Sabre's A-4 radar ranging gunsight and battery of six 0.50 inch machine guns proved very effective. One burst punctured a Hunter's fuel tanks and the second ignited the escaping kerosene, and that was that. Only one Hunter escaped. As on the previous day, Alam - a highly experienced pilot with about 1,400 hours on the type - had exploited the Sabre's low-speed turning qualities to the full. The Hunter pilots, instead of breaking in opposite directions and drawing the Sabres to higher altitude, had tried to match their attacker's manoeuvrability, and had paid for their mistake with their lives.
The third attack on Sargodha came at 09.45, when four Mysteres evaded the F-86/F-104 CAP and attacked the airfield with rockets and cannon fire. One Sabre was destroyed and some installations damaged; the Indian aircraft escaped unharmed. The final daylight attack of 7 September [1965], again by four Mysteres, was made late in the afternoon. No damage was caused to the airfield, and on this occasion one Mystere was shot down by ground fire and another by a CAP Sabre flown by Flt. Lt. A.H. Malik, who destroyed it with a Sidewinder.
Meanwhile, 1,000 miles away in East Pakistan, the twelve Sabres of No. 14 Squadron at Tezgaon had begun their own war. As part of the PAF's airfield attack plan, the squadron was briefed to hit the IAF base at Kalaikunda, about 220 miles away and 60 miles to the east of Calcutta. On the night of 6/7 September [1965], Canberras from this airfield penetrated as far as Dhakka and dropped a number of bombs, causing light damage and a few casualties, and at first light a Sabre CAP was ordered up to search for Indian Canberras and Hunters which were reported to be attacking Chittagong airfield and the new international airport at Kurmitola, north of Dhakka. While orbiting over the capital under very low cloud, the pilot of one of the Sabres, Flt. Lt. Aziz, lost control and dived into the ground, losing his life.
The attack on Kalaikunda was carried out by five Sabres, whose pilots found fourteen Canberras drawn up on the tarmac and three Hunters parked on the ORP. During the strike the pilots claimed the destruction of ten Canberras, with two more and two Hunters damaged, and although this claim may have been exaggerated the attack undoubtedly caused much damage. A second strike, by four Sabres, was mounted four hours later and was intercepted by nine Hunters, one of which shot down the F-86 flown by Flg. Off. Afzal Khan. The other three Sabres returned to base safely.
In the west, while the Sargodha F-86 squadrons had been pre-occupied with air defence throughout the day, No. 19 Squadron at Peshawar had been tasked with armed reconnaissance and close support. In the late afternoon, four Sabres led by Sqn. Ldr. Haider strafed Srinagar airfield through intense AA fire, destroying two C-47 Dakotas and a DHC Caribou. A second attack, again led by Haider, was made against Pathankot airfield by five Sabres, but no worthwhile targets could be discerned in the gathering dusk and the mission proved abortive.
Following its losses in daylight attacks on 7 September [1965], the IAF's offensive against PAF airfields was carried out entirely by night-flying Canberras. These operations were helped by the fact that the PAF had no night-fighters as such; the best it could do was to put up its F-104s and those aircraft of the Sabre force which were modified to carry Sidewinder AAMs and hope that ground radar could put them somewhere in the vicinity of a target. The PAF pilots' task was not made easier by the Canberra's Orange Putter tail warning radar, which alerted the crew when an F-104's AI radar was locked on and enabled them to take evasive action.
Having no AI radar, the PAF Sabre pilots who tried to intercept the elusive Canberras relied entirely on GCI and the infra-red homing unit of the Sidewinder AAM. If the pilot heard the missile tone, indicating that the seeker head was activated, it meant that GCI had placed him a couple of miles or less astern of his target; all he could do then was launch his missiles blind.
At best it was an unsatisfactory method, but on the night of 14/15 September, Flt. Lt. Cecil Choudhry used it successfully to intercept a Canberra over Lahore. The Indian aircraft was flying at 31,000 feet, cruising at 0.7M, and GCI placed Choudhry behind it. He acquired the first missile tone as he pulled up through 30,000 feet, searching vainly for the Canberra's contrails in the moonlight, and launched a Sidewinder. After a long wait he saw a missile self-destruct, and he knew he had missed. His second AAM, however, found its target, and although he did not see the Canberra go down, it was later confirmed to have crashed by All-India Radio. One other Canberra was shot down at night, on 21/22 September [1965], by an F-104.