The Air War of '71 Revisited
(Continued from Previous Page)On 14 December, the highest gallantry award in the Indian Air Force (the Prem Vir Chakar) was awarded to Flying Officer Nirmaljit Singh Sedhen of No. 18 Gnat Squadron. He was shot down by Flight Lieutenant Salim Beg Mirza during an epic battle in full view of the people of the Srinagar Valley. On this fateful mission, Wing Commander Changezi had led an attack on Srinagar airfield with a formation of four F-86s and two escorts comprising Flight Lieutenant Saleem and Flight Lieutenant Abdul Rahim Yousefzai. All PAF aircraft returned safely after the mission.
Air Transport Operations
The small but effective Air Transport fleet of C-130s operated on war footing throughout the year. On 30 January 1971, the Indians staged the drama of the hijacking of an Indian Airline Fokker (F-27) to Pakistan. Using the incident as a pretext, over-flight rights of all Pakistani aircraft over Indian territory were cancelled. India had succeeded in making the transportation of troops and ammunition to East Pakistan difficult. The aircraft now had to night stop at Drigh Road (Karachi) and route via Colombo. PIA Boeings were also placed at the disposal of PAF to supplement the transportation of troops.
Versatile Roles in East Pakistan
Realizing the law and order situation in East Pakistan, in the month of May 1971, one C-130 was permanently positioned in East Pakistan while its crew was rotated every three months. The highly versatile C-130s were employed in nearly all possible roles. They were used for crucially needed tactical airlift, airborne assault, evacuation of casualties and even the tanker role.
Assault Operations at Lal Munir Hat/Sylhet Airfields. There were numerous episodes of valour and grit and harrowing tales of escape and evasion but the most daring were the recapture of Lal Munir Hat and Sylhet airfields. After Shaikh Mujibur Rahman declared independence on 25 March 1971, the Mukti Bahini took over the control of Lal Munir Hat and Sylhet airfields. Their recapture was essential for the Army to regain control of the lost territory. This was achieved by launching very daring Air Landed Assaults on 3 April to recapture Lal Munir Hat and on 8 April to regain Sylhet. Both missions were very hazardous and had to be meticulously planned and boldly executed since the C-130 is a sitting duck to ground fire. For the initial assaults, two C-130s were employed, one flown by Squadron Leader N. A. Khan with Flying Officer Zubair as his co-pilot and Flight Lieutenant Ashraf as the Navigator. The other C-130 was flown by Wing Commander Yousuf. Both aircraft approached low-level over the river, flying over hostile territory and loaded with commandos of the elite Special Services Group carrying only small arms. As they approached the airfield, to their dismay they discovered portions of the runway blocked with logs strewn by insurgents. The first C-130 managed to land and while its engines were running, the troops fanned out to occupy the area. Some Commandos cleared the runway. Within minutes the C-130 was airborne while the second C-130 which had been circling overhead, keeping vigil, now landed to off-load its measure of troops. Within no time, both C-130s were on their way, egressing at tree-top level on the same perilous route to continue their vital support to the army. Subsequent missions were flown to secure the airfields. After the control of the Pakistan Army was established, mercy missions were flown on the return flight to evacuate Dhaka's non- Bengali civilians whose lives were threatened. On 18 April, as many as 200 passengers were air-lifted in one sortie since the evacuees had surrounded the aircraft and would not leave. The C-130s flew a total of 125 missions in support of the ground troops between April and October 1971. This entailed over 300 hours of flying under the most hazardous and strenuous conditions, without losing a single aircraft.
War-Time Offensive Missions (C-130)
After the successful and enterprising employment of the C-130s for the carpet bombing role in the 1965 Indo-Pak War, the PAF used these vulnerable but potential equivalent of heavy bombers again in the 1971 War. Of the 9 successful bombing missions launched by the C-130s, the most accomplished one was the attack on Jaisalmer on the night of 5/6 December. Flight Lieutenant Mir Alam, along with his navigator Flight Lieutenant Wajid and Co-Pilot Flying Officer Riffat Jameel were detailed for this mission. As the aircraft was being loaded with the ‘mix bag’ of 500-pounder bombs with delay fuses of 30 seconds up to 72 hours, only 35 of a possible 25 were loaded. When Mianwali was raided by IAF Canberras, Mir Alam decided to press on with only 35 bombs to expedite his take-off but the ATC told him to switch off and take shelter. The C-130 crew knew that as long as the C-130 remained on ground, even a shrapnel could ignite the bombs and blow up the whole base. Undeterred by the on-coming raid, Mir Alam took-off as the AAA guns of Mianwali were declared ‘free’ to shoot down the attacking IAF Canberras. Making a safe egress, the C-130 set course for its target. Approaching from the IP (Initial Point), the crew were lucky to spot the airfield quite by chance because of the moonlight (the position of Jaisalmer airfield had been marked erroneously on the maps and a B-57 had missed the target a day earlier because of this error). Mir Alam pulled up the nose of the aircraft as the Navigator gave the green light for the bombs to be released. Indian AAA opened up simultaneously and the whole sky appeared to be lit up. After successfully dropping the load of bombs, the loadmaster reported huge fires on the ground from the exploding bombs. The captain asked the Navigator for the course to steer to return home. He was told to steer on a westerly heading and wait for a couple of minutes. It transpired that Flight Lieutenant Wajid had not prepared a flight plan for the return flight. Overwhelmed by the intelligence briefings of Jaisalmer being defended by over 200 Shilka guns and SAM batteries, the Navigator had actually considered it a foregone conclusion that it was a one way mission. The success of the mission was reported by Wing Commander Fatmi and his crew returning from another mission on a C-130 the same night. An IAF HF-24 pilot shot down and taken POW a few days later also reported:
"The B-57 formation raid on Jaisalmer on the night of 5/6 December was highly successful, over 200 casualties had occurred, two hangars and a fuel dump were destroyed and the fires burnt for two days"
Flight Lieutenants Mir Alam and Wajid and Flying Officer Riffat Jameel were awarded Sitara-e-Jurat for their valour.
The Land Battles
The Air Chief had acquired a clear understanding of how the Air Force was expected to support the Army once operations on the frontiers opened. Pakistan’s holding corps, divisions and independent brigades were well-balanced except 18 division which had too large an area of responsibility a 560-mile front from Rahimyar Khan to Badin in the South.
PAF Air Headquarters had emphasized that whenever any offensive Operations were intended by 18 Division, the PAF should be given a specified notice so as to enable it to activate the nearby Jacobabad air base and to deploy aircraft there in accordance with the contingency plan. Just before the war started, and unknown to the PAF, 18 Division was given an unscheduled task to prepare for a two-brigade offensive to capture Ramgarh.
In the event, none of the holding formations, except 18 Division in the south and 8 Armoured Brigade Group in Shakargarh salient, got into the kind of tight corner which required massive emergency air support to avoid a catastrophe. Table-2 summarizes the air support provided to the main Army formations during the war.
In the Chamb-Jaurian Sector, Major General Ifthikhar’s 23 Division captured Chamb by 8 December after several bravely fought actions. PAF Sabres form Peshawar were called in to support this Division and assisted in softening enemy defences on both banks of the Tawi River. The following day, F-86s and F-6s from Murid and Sargodha also joined in and destroyed 18 medium guns and an ammunition dump. PAF fighters providing cover to Pak troops in this area met fierce opposition. On 10 December, Wing Commander Moin-ur-Rub and Flight Lieutenant Taloot patrolling in F-86Es intercepted 2 Su-7s and shot them down over Jaurian. At the same place on the same day, a pair of F-86Fs led by Squadron Leader Aslam Chaudhry with Flight Lieutenant Rahim Yousefzai as his wingman engaged 6 Indian Hunters. The leader was apparently cornered by the IAF fighters and was declared missing while his wingman managed to fight his way out after claiming one Hunter.
In the early hours of 5 December, during a convoy interdiction mission in the same area, Squadron Leader Israr Quresh's T-6G Harvard was hit by enemy ground fire and a shell fractured the pilot’s right arm. Profusely bleeding, the pilot flew the aircraft back with his left hand and landed safely. The World War II vintage prop-engined trainers were pressed into service and performed satisfactorily in the assigned role of enemy convoys at night.
The largest number of air support sorties (206) were flown in the Shakargarh area when a grave situation developed against Major General Malik’s 8 Division after its first night’s success in capturing the Dharam enclave on the Ravi. A strong multi-directional attack had been launched by the Indian Army across the Ravi and from Samba in the North, to capture. Shakargarh and deeper objectives, but the PAF’s timely intervention effectively frustrated this Indian move.
Meanwhile, 8 Division continued to fight local actions successfully, inflicting casualites on enemy troops who managed to advance through some gaps in the Pakistani minefields. In this area, the PAF’s F-6s and F-86s from Sargodha, Murid, Peshawar and Risalewala provided extensive battlefield support and interdiction with guns, rocket and bombs along with Mirage photo recce whenever requested. During the period 7-17 December, the PAF attacked three bridging attempts across the river, effectively disrupting the bridging operations and in the process destroying or disabling 56 tanks, 114 vehicles and several troop concentrations in the bulge, as well as in the surrounding areas of Samba, Jassar and Dera Baba Nanak.
Air engagements over these areas occurred frequently. On 7 December, Flight Lieutenants Atiq and Mushaf in their F-6s met 4 Su-7s and downed one each. On 8 December, enemy AAA claimed Flight Lieutenant Fazal Elahi’s F-86 and he was killed. On 11 December, Wing Commander Ali Imam Bokhari, Squadron Leader Cecil Chaudhry and Flight Lieutenant Momin Arif in 3 F-86s were pitted against 5 Su-7s. Bokhari shot down one and damaged another while Cecil shot down one Su-7. It was poetic justice. A day earlier, Cecil’s aircraft had been hit by AAA and he had ejected in enemy territory close to the Indo-Pak border. His formation had enabled him to make good his escape to the safety of the Pakistan troops by continuously strafing the area. The incessant barrage from the F-86Es' Browning guns kept the Indian troops at bay and they could not venture to capture Cecil. Within hours he was back to his base and exactly 24 hours later, he exacted his revenge by shooting down an Su-7 at approximately the same spot.
In the last encounter over this area, Squadron Leader Salim Gauhar in an F-86 spotted a light observation aircraft and shot it down. In the Sialkot area, Major-General Abid Zahid’s 15 Division lost Pukhlian salient on the night of 3/4 December because it was held too lightly, mostly by Rangers. After that they kept the enemy at bay. The PAF was asked for 6 sorties of interdiction but lost an F-6 to enemy flak on 7 December. Flight Lieutenant Wajid Ali was taken POW.
In the Narowal sector, where the Indians had made an incursion, on the morning of 13 December, Group Captain Sajjad Haider and Flight Lieutenant Zulfiqar Shah were on cockpit standby in their Mirages. Sajjad Haider, affentionately known as 'Nosey Haider', the commander of the celebrated No. 19 Squadron in the 1965 Indo-Pak War and leader of the acclaimed Pathankot strike was commanding the Flying Wing at Sargodha. His seniority did not deter him from leading from the front. Throughout the war he had been guiding and leading the various squadrons under his command with valour and grit but had remained devoid of a kill. On this fateful morning the pair were scrambled to intercept a pair of IAF Hunters engaged in interdiction of our lines of communication in the Sector. Up as a flash, the pair were vectored to the area. Sajjad Haider spotted his opposite number and carefully positioning himself, fired a missile and saw the Hunter being hit. In the meanwhile Flight Lieutenant Zulfiqar sighted the other Hunter. Group Captain Haider directed his No. 2 to go after the other enemy aircraft. Flight Lieutenant Zulfiqar gave chase and the Hunter dived below to about 20-30 feet above the ground but Zulfiqar got him in his gun sight. As he raised the pipper; he let go a burst of two seconds. It was like air to ground strafing. There was no element of side ways error and he saw the bullet rip through the Hunter from one end to the other. It had no chance. Incidently, Zulfiqar saw puffs of AAA fire and realized that he had penetrated deep into enemy territory. He saw the Kathua hills approaching, so he pulled up and turned back to safety.
In the Lahore Sector, 10 Division commanded by Major-General Naqvi fought several successful tactical actions. The Division used only 7 sorties of close support and battlefield interdiction. In the Kasur sector, Major-General Majid’s 11 Division began its limited operation on 3 December and captured the important Hussainiwala enclave. The Indian Army’s subsequent attempts to retake Hussainiwala failed despite IAF assistance. The PAF’s F-86s and Mirages flew 37 sorties in support of this Brigade and accounted for several vehicles and an ammunition dump, apart from a number of enemy troops.
The most significant action occurred in the area of 105 Brigade Group led by Brigadier Amir Hamza where an imaginative and courageous assault on Suleimanki succeeded magnificently. It was in this battle that the brigade commander earned a HJ and one of his officers, Major Shabbir Sharif, the highest gallantry award of Nishan-e-Haider. The PAF’s contribution was in the form of 50 F-86 sorties from Rafiqui which attacked Indian bunkers, troop concentrations and aircraft overhead during which Flight Lieutenant Imtiaz Bhatti shot down a Hunter over Suleimanki-Fazilka area on 7 December.
On 14 December, Flight Lieutenant Aamer Ali Sharieff, in an epic air battle over Nainkot shot down a superior aircraft, the much acclaimed MiG-21, with his F-6.
The debacle facing 18 Division’s attack against Ramgarh was not due to bad luck. When the Air Chief learnt of this impending attack on 4 December, he advised GHQ that the area was out of reach of PAF both from Sargodha and Karachi in close vicinity. It took only 4 of the 6 Hunters based at Jaisalmer to destroy or disable most of the Pakistan tanks on 5 and 6 December.
It goes to the credit of the PAF that it played a decisive role in preventing the enemy advance in the Chor-Nagar Parkar sector. Composite formations of T-33, F-86 and B-57s were flown during the day to attack the Indian forces advancing toward Hyderabad. Nearly 150 sorties were flown and Masroor based pilots claimed 20 tanks, 63 vehicles, 5 trains, 3 bulk fuel stores and an ammunition dump. Additionally, PAF shot down 3 enemy aircraft in the sector. On the final day of the war, the last aerial encounter turned out to be a dogfight between a MiG-21 and the relatively slow and much older F-86 Sabre. The F-86 flown by Flight Lieutenant Maqsood Amir emerged as the victor and the Indian MiG-21 Pilot Flight Lieutenant Tejwant Singh, who ejected after being hit, was taken prisoner.
Acts of Valour by PAF Airmen. The invisible wingmen of PAF, its technicians and airmen deserve special praise. They worked non-stop to arm, refuel and turn-around the aircraft for its next mission in record time. They worked tirelessly and were the main force behind the success of the aerial encounters. Though the list is countless but three who merit special mentions are:-
Junior Technician Muhammad Latif: During the fateful air raid on PAF Murid on 8 December, in which 5 F-86s on air defence alert were exposed to enemy air attacks, realizing that our pilots strapped to their seats were exposed to grave danger, Muhammad Latif disregarded personal safety, ran up to each aircraft ad helped the pilots to unstrap and take cover. He managed to help each one of them but in the process he was fatally wounded by enemy fire and attained Shahadat. For his outstanding courage and devotion to duty, he was awarded Tamgha-e-Jurat.
Leading Aircraftman Muhammad Azam Nasir: During an enemy air raid on PAF Chandar, instead of taking shelter, he proudly faced the Indian bomber with a G-3 rifle and kept on firing at the attacking aircraft. A bomb fell within 6 yards of where he stood and Azam Nasir attained martyrdom. For his outstanding courage and devotion to duty he was awarded Tamgha-e-Jurat.
Corporal Technician Syed Shaukat Ali: While a POW in India he conducted himself in an upright and fearless manner. He twice tried to escape from the POW camp. In the second attempt he received fatal bullet injuries; even then he pounced on the armed guard in a bid to prevent him from firing at his colleague Corporal Technician Nawab. For his outstanding and excellent performance he was awarded the Tamgha-e-Jurat.
In Support of the Navy
In 1971, all the PAF could do in support of the Navy was to provide daytime strikes against ships at sea and that too only up to 250 miles. Despite making it clear to Maritime Headquarters, the first mission the Navy demanded of the PAF was a night strike against enemy ships 270 miles out at sea. Even then the PAF did its best to help out to the limits of its means and capacity. Every night, PAF B-57s and F-86s were tasked at PN’s request to search and destroy Osa missile boats. They flew at different heights and in different patterns, they improvised imaginative techniques to utilize their onboard equipment and all the knowledge that they possessed to try and locate the elusive boats, but to no avail; they just did not have the right equipment. PAF had all the sympathy for PN in its loss of two ships on the second night of the war.
The PAF flew 35 missions on B-57s, F-86s, F-104s and T-33s in PN’s support besides making 127 sorties available to the Navy for visual reconnaissance.
Some missions did achieve a high measure of success. On the night of 5/6 December, a B-57 piloted by Flight Lieutenant Shabbir struck Okha harbour putting its fuel tanks on fire, and scoring direct hit on a ammunition dump and the missile boat jetty. The fire burnt for several days. The fire menace of missile boats attacks on Pakistani Naval installations ceased thereafter. On 10 December, F-104s attacked Okha again. Its leader, Wing Commander Arif Iqbal shot down an Indian Naval Alize aircraft.
Critical Analysis: Through the immoral Indian aggression against East Pakistan succeeded resoundingly. Defeat is a perpetual orphan and many egos and reputations had to be protected by finding alternative reasons for failure in battle. Air forces of most countries have a major role to perform in war in support of their armies and navies. This sometimes leads to an elemental human tendency to ‘reward’ the supporting arm with the scapegoat role. Some aspects requiring critical analysis are discussed below :-
Failure to Retaliate in the West: Eventual defeat in East Pakistan was almost certainly a consequence of West Pakistan’s failure to launch a timely and hard hitting offensive into Indian territory.
Living in David's Shadow. An unrealistically powerful image of the PAF had been created after the 1965 War. Although the PAF had paid a heavy toll by losing some of its best fliers in the 1965 war, yet in 1971 too it was well-prepared, well-trained and well-led. Although the majority of the PAF’s hierarchy tried to dispel this dangerous notion both within the air force and without, the David and Goliath illusion gained favour and the notion took root that PAF would always be on call ‘anytime, anywhere’ to relieve imminent misadventures on land and at sea.
Denudation of East Pakistani Element. The PAF, like its sister services had suddenly been dinuded of some 30% (East Pakistani element) of its technical manpower. This factor degenerated PAF ‘s strength which already faced a 1:4 ratio of strength vis-a-vis the IAF.
Advantage to IAF through defectors. The East Pakistani defectors to India provided them a major advantage by pinpointing exact locations of various PAF radar, their pickup envelopes, the gaps and blind spots. Relocation of PAF radar could not be achieved without compromising their performance. IAF pilots fully exploited this vital information and initial raiders sneaked up to their targets undetected. PAF had to mount continuous CAP to plug the gaps.
Air Defence Operations. The grossly deficient radar cover in West Pakistan provided low level surveillance only to the few main air bases. There were only 5 low-looking radar against a projected requirement of nearly 50. Although it was PAF’s clear victory over to the interdiction strategy, the IAF changeover from airfield strikes to interdiction of the rail/road system proved all the more frustrating for the PAF due to its radar deficiency.
Diminutive Pre-emptive Strike. Despite the effects caused by the PAF, pre-emptive strikes against the IAF airfields as conceded by Air Chief Marshal P C Lal, the pre-emptive strikes launched by PAF on 3 December by about 36 aircraft were unable to create the effects it had aimed at. This was no pre-emptive strike such as the Israelis launched in 1967. Twelve days had passed since the Indian invasion of East Pakistan, so the IAF was expecting an attack on the Western front. It was thus prepared for such an eventuality. Most of its aircraft were placed in concrete revetments and dispersed over a large number of airfields, many of which were beyond the range of PAF aircraft. During the strike it was discovered that Awantipura airfield had been abandoned and obstructed by the enemy. With the wisdom of hindsight it can be said that better results could have been expected if the ‘pre-emptive’ strike had been launched sooner and with a greater number of aircraft.
Air Effort Generation and Force Viability. In 1965, the PAF fought with 9 squadrons in the Western theatre while in 1971 with 10-1/4 (squadrons) . Though the conflict was shorter by a third, the air operations in the two theatres were twice as intensive. The average rate of sorties per day was 201 in 1971 versus 107 in 1965. The PAF flew 46% more air support for the Army and Navy, and launched 34% more air defence sorties than in 1965. The IAF flew 7,546 sorties on all types of aircraft, including those against East Pakistan. This compares with 3,027 sorties by the PAF in both theatres. For an Air Force possessing only 22% of its adversary’s combat aircraft, the PAF’s ability to generate this vastly superior rate of air effort speaks very high of its combat and maintenance crew. An overall comparison of different types of missions flown during the two wars is shown in Table 3.
IAF Sortie Generation Rate. The IAF Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Air Command, Air Marshal M. M. Engineer, boasted in his Order-of -the Day issued on 18 December 1971, that his airforce had flown "more than 3000 sorties" in the 15 days of war which comes to an average of 200 sorties per day. However, according to conservative Western estimates, which are much lower than the PAF estimates of the Indian Air Force strength, the Indians had more than 600 combat aircraft . A force of this size should have enabled the Indians to launch upward of 1200 sorties per day. Given an allowance that a portion of the total IAF strength was engaged in East Pakistan, the actual air effort that the IAF claims to have put up during the war against Pakistan in the West was only a fraction of its capabilities. No better vindication of the PAF concept of operation is possible.
Award of Kills. The basis of the award was stringent. Each claim had to be confirmed by either gun-camera film or an identifiable wreckage. The renowned American test pilot Brigadier-General Charles E. "Chuck" Yeager who was at that time, the US Defence Representative to Pakistan and who volunteered to join PAF’s helicopter teams documenting downed IAF aircraft, says in his autobiography:
". . . the Pakistanis scored a three-to-one kill ratio, knocking out 102 Russian-made Indian jets and loosing 34 airplanes of their own (including the F-86s self destroyed by No. 14 Sqn.). I am certain about the figures because I went out several times a day in a chopper and counted the (IAF) wrecks below. I counted the wrecks on Pakistani soil, documented them by serial numbers, identified the components such as engines, rocket pods, and new equipment on newer airplanes like the Su-7 and the MiG-21J, their latest supersonic fighter. The PAF did not claim any aircraft that may have been destroyed during strikes against enemy airfields except the 5 which were clearly visible on gun-camera film. The PAF, nevertheless, admitted to its loss of 6 F-86s and 1 B-57 during IAF attacks against PAF bases. In East Pakistan, the gallant 14 Squadron and Dhaka’s valiant AAA gunners shot down 28 IAF aircraft. Without Redemption. The PAF had successfully accomplished the first difficult phase of its task: repelling a four times larger force’s assault against itself while providing substantial air support to the Pak Army everywhere. The culmination of the airforce mission now remained to be enacted. Plans were set for a fresh concentrated assault on pre-selected IAF airfields as a prelude to establishing control of the air over the area of General Tikka’s offensive; this would have led to the final and most crucial phase of the PAF’s contribution: massive direct support and battle field interdiction to sustain the momentum of that offensive, while retaining control of the air overhead. But the offensive did not materialize despite a last attempt by Air Marshal Rahim Khan on the evening before the cease fire, to persuade the President to "Let Tikka go’. Thus it came to pass that the Pakistan Army, chafing on the battlefield, and the PAF poised at its bases, were both denied their most powerful act of reprisal - for want of a timely decision!
In the atmosphere of national rage and humiliation that prevailed after the defeat and surrender in East Pakistan, it was difficult for the PAF to derive any real comfort from an acknowledgment that it had acquitted itself honourably during those last fateful days. This recognition came, befittingly enough form the army C-in-C in a letter to the Air Chief dated 1 January 1972:
". . . I wish the Army was in a position to exploit the excellent favorable air situation that was made possible by your small yet hard hitting Air Force . . ."
General Manekshaw’s Admission
An Indian news daily, the Indian Express of 1 February, 1972, reporting on a lunch reception by the Press Association in honour of the three Services Chiefs, their Chief of Army Staff, General S. H. F. J. Manekshaw, who having paid tributes to the Indian Armed forces said, ". . . an impression has been created that the Pakistanis had not fought well. They fought extremely well, if they had not, India would not have suffered heavy casualties."
Conclusion
Today, after more than 25 years of the heroic-in-action-but-futile-in-result war, let us pause and ponder. Let us pay homage to those valiant sons of the soil who laid down their lives in the defence of their motherland and those who lived to tell the tales of valour and indomitable courage. Let us seek solace in the words of the Holy Prophet, may peace and blessings of Allah be on him and his progeny:
Mine is to seek and strive; its fulfillment rests with Allah, the Almighty.
