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The Indian Elephant comes to a Grinding
halt at Chawinda
Sialkot sector had always been upper most in the minds of Pakistan. Across it,
lays the State of Jammu and Kashmir, which in addition to the outright
injustice of the case and India usurping it forcefully, it posed a direct
threat to the innermost areas of Pakistan. Any threat based on Kashmir would
come at right angles to the threat from India itself there by weakening
defenses facing India and could not be anything but a source of great anxiety
to Pakistan. As far as India was concerned, Kashmir was ideally suited as a
jumping ground to attack Pakistan. The military build up during the last few
years under the assumed threat from China had given India a good excuse, if she
needed one, to build up the strength in Kashmir to unusually large six
divisions. Indian infantry brigades in Kashmir have the habit of having up to
seven infantry battalions as a measure of solace and over insurance.
Pakistan could not afford to keep more than one medium size infantry division
in this sector. 15 Infantry Division containing 7 Infantry Battalion only was
placed in Sialkot. Its armour compliment consisted of 25 cavalry and two tank
delivery units. The division was commanded by Brig. Sardar Mohammad Ismail
Khan.
The Indian garrison opposite to this small force was 26 Indian Division with
four oversize brigades and two armoured regiments. It had been anticipated that
the enemy could launch a three pronged attack from the following directions;
Dera Baba Nanak, Samba and Jammu. The areas of responsibility of the brigades
of 15 Infantry Division were as a result as follows:
6 Armoured Division commanded by Maj. General Abrar Hussain, which in fact was
no more than an Armoured Brigade, was placed in Daska area to be used as
required. It had under it, two Armoured Regiments and one Infantry Battalion.
The Guides Cavalry, 22 Cavalry and 14 FF with proportionate supporting arms and
services.
The Indian build up in early September opposite 15 Division was substantial.
The Indians had brought in three infantry divisions including one oversize
mountain division and their crack 1 Indian Armoured Division. The details of
these were to be known as fighting developed. The Indian plan in this sector
unfolded itself gradually and was most unrealistic. It had neither taken the
capabilities of the Indian soldiers into account not had been fair in assessing
the fighting qualities of Pakistan Army. It smelt of Hyderabad Police Station.
General Chaudhuri had decided to attack with one strong division at Suchetgarh
and a brigade at Jassar. He knew the strength of both 15 Infantry Division and
6 Armoured Division and expected the armoured division with its armoured
regiments to be equally divided between the two garrisons at Jassar and
Sialkot. The attack having been launched on 6 September would in the opinion of
Indian C-in-C, draw the whole Pakistan Army in this sector of these two corner
points. When Pakistan garrison was fully sucked into these two extreme corners
and was committed completely the main attack from Samba would roll down the
plains lead by Indian Armoured Division. According to General Chaudhuri there
would be nothing to stop this mighty force, not even a section of infantry. The
garrisons at Jassar and Sialkot would be too committed to extricate themselves
and even if they tried to fall back to interfere in the main attack they would
be only following the Indian divisions and would never be permitted to
re-establish any worthwhile defensive line. General Chaudhuri's optimism was
really infectious. It permeated down to the brigade commanders' level but no
further. The lower levels have to be more realistic. They are too far near the
ground and they are the ones who have to capture ground and hold it or give it
away. To them higher planning and lines across the map mean little. When it
came to that level the situation looked different but more of that later.
As planned by India, the first place that took the brunt of Indian attack in
this sector was Jassar. 3 Punjab was holding the brigade and a part of it was
across it, in the little Pakistani enclave across the river Ravi. The Indians
started shelling at 0315 hours, a quarter of an hour earlier than they crossed
the border in other places. An hour later the attack came in, led by one
infantry battalion and the Indians succeeded in securing foothold in the
enclave. 3 Punjab put in a counter attack at 1000 hours on 6 September and had
thrown back the Indians by 1200 hours. Simultaneously 4 FF cleared the Indian
enclave on West bank of the river. There does not appear to have been much
resistance to this action. The lack of enthusiasm on the part of Indians to
defend their position on the right bank of Ravi was a clear indication that the
Indian attack against Jassar was merely a feint. If they had meant to invade
Pakistan from this direction in earnest, it would have been easier for them to
build up across the river, by making use of the enclave as initial brigade
head.
The artillery compliments of 15 Infantry Division, which had earlier helped 10
Infantry Brigade, in Chhamb and Jurian also returned during night 6/7 September
and the position, became more reassuring.
The Indians were to continue giving the impression that the attack on Jassar
was in real earnest. Between 0300 and 0630 hours on 7 September, but put in
three attacks supported by massive artillery support and tanks. They succeeded
in capturing the far end of the bridge eventually. The bridge as a result was
blown up at 0800 hours the same day. The troops on the far end were ordered to
swim to home side as it was not considered advisable to leave a few unsupported
companies across the river. The Indians throughout the day, continued to try to
enlarge their gains along the bridge but all their attempts were foiled.
26 Indian Division advancing along the main Sialkot-Jammu road did not make any
headway on 6 and 7 September.
14 Indian Infantry Division rolled down across the wide stretch Charwah-Bajra
Garhi on the night of 7/8 September. The attack started at 2330 hours. 3 FF
fought delaying action and gradually fell back to the main defensive line
around Phillorah. 3 FF was holding area Gadgor and adjoining villages. Although
vastly outnumbered the battalion stood the most intense shelling and kept to
its positions. A few platoon localities exchanged hands once but were
immediately recaptured. The fight for every inch of the territory had started.
It was like a cyclone. Waves clashing with waves and creating an uproar in the
dark but few Pakistani soldiers stood steadfast. Attack after attack was coming
and yet the thin line stood firm like a wall of steel.
The unit was ordered to fall back to Chawinda early in the morning on 8
September. By then, they were in danger of being cut off. They did so at first
light. By the morning of 8 September the enemy with elements of 1 Indian
Armoured Division had captured Maharajke, Charwa, Chobara, Gadgor and Phillorah
villages.
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