Morning Tea that never reached Kasur

most democratic fashion. The infantry all along could be seen advancing under cover of artillery fire and escorted by tanks. The moment the artillery barrage was lifted the infantry would get up, shout "Jai Hind" three times, as if asking the Pakistani soldiers to open fire. The moment the Pakistanis opened fire the Indians would fall to the ground, repeat the performance two or three times and then having sent the usual messages of being stopped by heavy fire, they would oblige by providing an excellent target when retreating.

The time had reached when the battle had, according to plan, to be carried into enemy territory. The enemy attack had been stopped, his armour blunted and the momentum of his advance broken. Now was the time to give him a little taste of his own prescription. The Indians continued attacking during the night, particularly on Bedian, Punwan, and Ballanwala but were thrown back in every place. Indian night attacks were no different from the day attacks. There may have been another difference from the point of view of enemy forward troops. They escaped, due to the observance of wireless silence, the nerve wrecking coaxing and unprintable language of their higher headquarters which must have been a great relief.

11 Division had been given 5 Armoured Brigade for the limited offensive operations planned for this sector. There could be no question of a major offensive. The Indians had not yet committed their 1 Indian Armoured Division and the infantry compliment of 1 Indian Corps. On 4 September the papers captured from one of the dispatch riders had confirmed the presence of 1 Indian Armoured Division in the vicinity of Samba and as a result Pakistan High Command, did not wish to tie up its armour in the relatively untankable country beyond Khem Karan and yet it was not desirable to completely ignore offensive operation from this direction, into East Punjab. While the Indian attack had not yet sufficiently developed against Sialkot, it was profitable to utilize the brief period and inflict as much casualties on the Indian Army as possible.

By mid day on 7 September, 21 Infantry Brigade had returned to 11 Division after being released by GHQ from the special task for which it had been detailed earlier.

The bridgehead necessary for launching 5 Armoured Brigade was ready by the evening of 7 September. It had necessitated the construction of the bridge on the Ruhi Nala. The bridge so close to the front and under constant enemy air attacks was a difficult task, but it proved what determined troops can do. Pakistan Engineers rose to the occasion and did a very good job of it. 1 FF less one coy and one squadron of 6 Lancers (Divisional Armoured Regiment) crossed over when the Indian Air Force was most active, but at the same time most inefficient. By the evening Khem Karan had been reached and the bridgehead established successfully. The enemy suffered heavily both in men and equipment and a number of Indian prisoners fell into the bag of 1 FF. The equal distribution of Indian armour to its various brigades and battalions may have sounded well as an exercise in simple arithmetic but in defending Khem Karan, it proved most disastrous to the Indians.

The next day 21 Infantry Brigade commanded by Brig. Sahib Dad and 5 Armoured brigade moved into the bridgehead. 4 Armoured brigade, the other formation of 1 Armoured Division was also to come into the bridgehead, the moment mopping up operation in Khem Karan had been completed. The Indians tried to divert the attention of Pakistanis from Khem Karan by an attack on Bedian and the adjacent villages. The brunt again, but they stood their ground firmly and threw back the Indians with very heavy casualties on both occasions.

C-in-C Pakistan Army Gen. Mohammad Musa visiting Khem Karan after its capture. Gen. Abdul Hamid Khan and Brig. Sahib Dad Khan are on his right and left.

The Indians were in desperate position. Khem Karan, a historical town, and a flourishing trade center, with a large population was threatened by Pakistan. The would be visitors who two days earlier had promised their men the morning cup of tea, their Chhota Hazri, in Kasur were Tank/Infantry combined attack. The din of battle, the artillery on both sides pounding the confined space on the Northern outskirts of the town and the cries of wounded and dying were beyond imagination. The orders were being shouted in clear by the Indian commanders. The language at times was unprintable, but this does happen with inexperienced small men in high positions. The Indian troops fought well on this day. The stakes were high and the fear of war being carried into their own home had shaken them out of the over confident attitude of the previous day. Inspite of the greater determination shown by the Indians and their overwhelming superiority, the Pakistani troops stood their ground. At about 0900 hours, 8 September, it appeared that the Indian attack had spent all its vigor but before the Indians could dig in where they stood, 6 Lancers and 5 FF, commanded by Lt. Col. M. Mumtaz Khan, on one axis and 1 FF less one Coy and a squadron of 15 Lancers under command on the other axis went into attack. The scene was superb. Never before had an army in spick and span uniforms, meant for the victory parade been disillusioned in such a manner. The well-coordinated attack of armour and infantry threw them back. The coordination of the defenses on 11 Infantry Division front had been meticulously gone into by the GOC and his staff. The GOC, who made full use of his helicopters, was always found to be near whichever sector the fighting was severest. This helped him in being ahead of the Indians at every step. The Indian Army had a good proportion of their best fighting material on this front but, they were pitched against men who were fighting for a cause. Once thrown back they were unable to reassemble and reorganize. They were however, lucky. The high sugar-cane and cotton crops gave them cover from the Pakistani pursuers. Khem Karan had fallen into Pakistani hands by 0900 hours and the advance continued.

The move of 6 Lancers was so brilliant an execution of advance forward that the infantry which was being impeded due to the need of clearing small pockets, snipers and odd MMG nests hidden in crops, could not keep pace with armour. 6 Lancers under Lt. Col. Shahzad Gul by 1700 hours had captured Valtoha Railway station at a distance of 12 miles from Khem Karan. It was magnificent piece if work. The enemy echelons, all along the route had been taken by surprise. The Indian contention that Major General Gurbakhsh Singh, 4 Indian Mountain Divisional Commander had pull back his men would be acceptable, if in the process the Indians had not lost over 1200 killed and a much larger number in wounded. The amount of equipment and stacks of ammunition left lying by the fleeing Indians belies this explanation of the Indian High Command. It was debacle of the worst type and should be accepted as such. If the pulling back had been according to plans the braver elements of the Indian Army would not have stayed behind in small pockets. These small groups deserve all the praise and recognition that can fall to the lot of brave soldiers. They stood their ground until eliminated. As Lt. General Kaul has said,

"The C-in-C got cold feet and decided, while the battle of Khem Karan was still in progress to take up an alternate position, several miles in the rear which would have meant giving up some well known and vital places and areas." (Kaul op. Cit. P478)

The advance of 24 Cavalry in the center had also been successful, though not to be the same extent as the right hook by 6 Lancers. 24 Cavalry had crossed the line of Asal Utter , at a distance of 8 miles from Khem Karan. If the Indian contention of pulling back to trap Pakistanis was correct, then Chima and not Valtoha should have been allowed to fall and there would have been no talk of falling back to Beas.

The commander 5 Armoured brigade, appears to have made a mistake in gauging the extent to which the Indians had been beaten and demoralized. It did not occur to him that there was no fight left in the Indians opposite his two regiments. He ordered them to leaguer back in front of Khem Karan for the night. They had to come all the way from the territory they had captured, with the dint of their courage and in the face of very strong opposition. To fall back without adequate reasons is never acceptable to a soldier. We can only imagine the feelings of those officers and men who were being told to come back. They obeyed the order but with a feeling of disappointment.

The next day, 9 September, 5 Armoured brigade undertook the same task as on the previous day. In addition 4 Armoured Brigade got ready to out in an attack from the left with the task of cutting off Road Khem Karan-Bihikiwind at milestone 32, thus cutting off Chima from the left.

6 Lancers had much less opposition today than on the previous day and were able to advance up to Valtoha R.S. again. 24 Cavalry on their left went a little beyond the limit of previous day's advance but were once again held up at Chima. The Indians in the mean time had made copious use of mines during the hours of undisturbed darkness and were in fact within well defended localities.

The brigade commander again for the second day in succession recalled both the Regiments for leaguer back to Khem Karan at sun set.

10 September dawned with another diversionary dawn attack on Bedian, but was repulsed, as usual with even heavier losses to the enemy.

4 Armoured Brigade was to put in the left hook today (10 September). 4 cavalry with Lt. Col. Mohammad Nazir in command was leading the unit. They put up an excellent performance. Brushing aside all oppositions. They put in left hook and reached their objective at 1700 hours, but in the meantime contact with 4 Armoured Brigade Headquarters and supporting infantry battalion, 10 FF had been lost. The regiment had lost a large number of tanks on the way due to soft nature of the ground. And enemy action. The high sugar crops gave excellent cover to RR and other small parties who had been unable to withdraw or had decided to fight to the last. It was only due to the dauntless spirit of the officers and men of 4 cavalry that they succeeded in reaching their objective. They had, however, run out of petrol and were very low on ammunition by then. Contact with the