The Eternal City, Data Ki Nagri

The enemy got exasperated and instead of using his third battalion, 3 Jat as planned, Switched it also on the main road. This attack came in at 0800 hours and was again stopped but it was felt that the thin screen of the Dograi had successfully accomplished its task. This company of 3 Baluch was, therefore, pulled back at about 0900 hours. At about the same time Pakistan Air Force (PAF) joined in the shoot and came out of it with a heavy bag of tanks, trucks and large clusters of men. The place was in shambles. The front companies were running back, the rear companies were being pushed and goaded forward. The supply service and the engineers who had been kept unduly too far forward by the Indians with the hope of their being used for providing additional crossings over the river Ravi, provided excellent game to the gallant pilots of PAF. The Indians had permitted thousands of Jan Singhis to get into lorries and trucks commandeered in Amritsar, ant to follow the Army into Lahore, for shopping at will. Foreigners reaching Pakistan after the war have given a description of the traffic jams created as a result of these civilians trying to run back to safety, in their transport, when they saw the army in front being plastered by PAF.

The enemy realized the importance of Batapur bridge and inspite of the heavy losses that his forward troops had sustained he was putting in attack after attack on it. The artillery on both sides was pounding the area all around it. The bridge was still intact and was not blown until midnight 6/7 September. Enemy tanks were hardly six hundred yards away. A few vehicles from the Indian side strayed across and were all immobilized on the road. They proved very useful later on. They provided cover to the defenders in moving about in the vicinity of the bridge. The artillery and small arms dual continued throughout the major part of the day. The enemy had committed all the three battalions of the leading brigade. The night was spent by our troops in digging in and replenishing and by the enemy in reconnoitering for a likely crossing over BRB canal.

The new formation brought forward by the Indians was 50 Indian Para Brigade. It arrived on the evening of 7 September and went into attack against B company of 3 Baluch same night. This company had tenaciously kept the far bank of BRB under control and although it had hardly about 50 men on the other side, yet these devoted men kept the Para Brigade away from them. The Indian Infantry never came to grips with our men. They were the attackers. It was up to them to get into a dog fight and force the issue. The previous day's experience of coming forward boldly and dampened their spirits. They invariably shelled the positions for two hours before every attack. The moment the barrage lifted the Indian army would get up, shout, "jai Hind" and "Charge" from a distance of 300 to 400 yards and immediately the Pakistan artillery opened up or the small arm fire was brought on them, they would hug the ground. The performance would be repeated and the wireless message could be intercepted saying "heavy casualties - falling back". At the other end some commander could be heard shouting, "You ---------- go forward". The Indians on this front, however, did not relish going forward, little knowing that the move backwards would be equally costly. The Indians changed over to night attacks, on the next night, but even the cover of darkness did not provide enough security. Early in the morning on 8 September the enemy was seen with drawing and were hastened backwards by a few bursts of MMG and LMGs. One could not afford to waste ammunition on harmless enemy homeward bound.

The Indian commander, on this front, now calculated the economics of killing Pakistani soldiers in terms of rupees, and felt that considering the family pension and children's allowances to be paid to the families of the dead it was cheaper to confine to artillery shelling. It was also safer method of passing the day. It kept both sides busy and helped in filling up the pages of situation reports giving laudatory details og imaginary counter attacks by Pakistani beaten back by the brave Sena. These, however, to their discomfort were not all to be imaginary. The GOC was instructed by the C-in-C to probe forward with the small striking force at his disposal. This he did on * September. It meant crossing the BRB canal.

The striking force, 22 Infantry Brigade composed of four companies of Infantry and 23 Cavalry less one squadron crossed over at Ravi Siphon early in the morning on * September. The force was being commanded by Brig. A Qayyum Sher. The infantry compliment consisted of 18 Baluch less two companies and 15 FF less two companies. After crossing over the force had to go along the East bank of BRB canal as the area on the other side was marshy for at least 6 miles. The move was most risky and precarious. The bridge over BRB canal having been blown up, there was no other approach to the enemy positions. Going along for miles . on the raised far bank of BRB, was like carrying a demonstration on the parade ground in full view of the enemy. The enemy could not have gotten a better target but knowing their inaccurate strafing and rocketing in the undertaking was worth the risk. The impossible also at time produces surprise and it did. The enemy succeeded in knocking out two of the leading tanks but only at the final stage just before the leading elements were getting into the open ground. The crew of both these tanks under the command of Risaldar Ghulam Ali, continued firing although their tanks were on fire. This helped the rear elements to push forward and fan out into the open. By 0839 hours the East bank of BRB canal up to Bhaini bridge had been cleared. The enemy, inspite of artillery and air support and well dug in positions, could not stand the forceful and determined attack of this small force and did not even stay long enough to face the bayonet charge. A few were helped by the cover afforded by high crops and were able to disappear behind them. The Indians who fought fairly stubbornly on other occasions appear to have been surprised by this very limited offensive of Pakistan at a time when they were still hopeful of entering Lahore triumphantly.

The abandended Jeep bearing Divisional Flag and starts belonged to Major General Narinjan parsad, Commander 25 Indian Diviosion.

A little time was spent on consolidating the position opposite where once Bhaini bridge stood and soon the advance was resumed. D Coy 18 Baluch, again led the attack supported by A and B squadron of 23 Cavalry. By 13 hours the forward elements had cut the road Lahore-Wagah at mile stone 13 thus covering a distance of 12 miles in approximately 9 hours, a feat of no mean performance considering the amount of air attacks they had to face on the way and had the full blast of 15 Indian Divisional Artillery being directed against them all the time. The enemy withdrew in such a hurry that the jeep of 25 Indian Division Commander, Major General Narinjan Parshad was left behind with the flaf flying. The enemy did not halt until he was well beyond Wagah but there were not enough troops to pursue them and then establish new defensive position on an extended front. The operation of going up to Wagah was discussed but dropped with a heavy heart.

On the evening of 8 September, 16 Punjab less two companies and one company 8 Punjab, were placed under command 22 Infantry Brigade. The third company of 18 Baluch which was previously guarding various bridges elsewhere returned to the battalion as an addition to the force.

Limited operations were taken in hand on 10 September to clear up enemy positions in the vicinity of G.T. Road but except air activity and intense artillery fire from both sides nothing important took place on this day. As our troops had not followed up, the Indians started creeping back from 11 September onward.

On 12 September the enemy put in a counter attack against positions held by 16 Punjab and 18 Baluch, The attack was not allowed to build up and was repulsed by artillery concentration even before it could really start. The artillery was as usual brought down extremely accurate fire and dispersed the enemy when they had hardly left the start line.

Between 14 and 16 September the enemy put in a number of attacks, Most of these were against 16 Punjab and 18 Baluch but they were all repulsed. During these period 18 Baluch laid a very successful ambush in which apart from killing a good number of enemy they captured 10 prisoners who all belonged to the Garhwal Regiment. The enemy was in a better position from manpower point of view. These attacks used to be all of a battalion strength and in practically all these cases a fresh battalion was put in each time.

The C-in-C General Mohammad Musa visited the Lahore front on 16th and discussed the situation with GOC and other senior commanders. Incidentally he used the airport at Walton when the Indians were claiming they controlled the air space above Lahore.

16 Punjab and 18 Baluch positions were again attacked on night 18/19 September but both the attacks were successfully repulsed. A few prisoners were taken and then enemy left behind a large amount of arms and equipment before falling back to the original positions. On 20 September the men cheered Pakistan Air Force chasing Indian Air Force Hunters over the battle area. Two hinters were brought down by PAF on that day in that area.

16 Punjab and 18 Baluch had now been in the thick of battle for twelve consecutive days and subjected to about two attacks every day in addition to incessant artillery fire. The severest attack came on the night of 21/22 September.

The successive attacking echelons made it appear if it was one continuous attack. The attacks were however, repulsed continued during the day on 22 September also. The Indians put in a battalion on each side of the road in pre dawn attack. These two battalions were stopped but a third battalion had put in a right hook and managed to get to Dograi, through the gap between the left company of 16 Punjab and the right company of 12 Punjab. This fact was known to 16 Punjab which happened to be right in front of Dograi itself, and they happened to be cut off from the rear suffered heavy casualties including their CO Lt. Col Golwala who being severly wounded was taken prisoner. The cease fire next day intervened before a counter attack could be launched to recapture Dograi.