The Eternal City, Data Ki Nagri

The threat of Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri, the Prime Minister of India had come true. India had chosen and found the time and place of attack on Pakistan. In the time old Chanakian style the rulers of India had launched a full scale attack on Pakistan without either declaring war or giving an ultimatum. The secrecy with which preparations for the invasion of Pakistan were made was so great that the object of the forward movements was kept hidden even from the invading army until the last moment. The men had been told that they were going on a route march. Indian High Command was afraid of leakage of information and possibility of a few last minute desertions. The men were however, ordered to put on their best uniforms as there would be a ceremonial march at the end of the route march. The author of the Police Action in Hyderabad, general Chaudhuri C-in-C Indian Army, was hopeful of another lucky break. He had his first during the invasion of Hyderabad in September 1948, which India declared as it was just a Police Action. Lieut. General Kaul speaking of the command qualities of Indian C-in-C says,

"The largest tank formation he commanded was a division with which he never fought in any battle but only against ill armed and irregular razakars (volunteers) in a Police Action in Hyderabad." (Kaul op. Cit., P 447)

He, therefore, had decided to march through the streets of Lahore in new uniforms. His advisers were confident that the mighty white elephant at his disposal would, through its sheer momentum, carry him towards Lahore Gymkhana by the same evening. The next few days were to be used in mopping up operations. He was impetuous enough to advice his senior commanders to keep their mess kits and medals handy and to issue invitations to senior civil officials to join him at a cocktail party at the famous Lahore Gymkhana the same evening.

The military Governor of Lahore had been nominated and administrative services earmarked. The police force, to enforce law and order of the type that India had practiced during the days of partition, aided by Jan Sangh mobs, was to follow the army. After all, the world at large was to be told, after a fair accompli, that it was no more than a Police Action.

The Indian High Command was confident of the unawareness of Pakistan to such an extent that they chose the assembly areas of their forward troops a few hundred yards from Pakistan border. Move to the assembly areas started at 10 p.m. on September 5, 1965 and by a little after midnight the mighty Indian Army was poised for the march into the dreamland which would, not only allay the land hunger of their rulers, but would also remove the hunger and starvation brought on to the land of Bharat by her warlords. The acquisition of Pakistan was also to be the first step towards the fulfillment of the dream of Greater India which the Indian demigods had hoped would stretch from Indonesia to the Dardanelles. The steel steeds of India started fuming and puffing from soon after midnight.

The checking and cross checking of formation and unit positions on the start lines was complete by 3 a.m. on September 6. The Zero hour was drawing near and with it was increasing the anxiety of the Indian commanders. They felt, as all commanders in their position should e able to feel, that their troops, who by now had been told the purpose of their presence on the border of Pakistan were a little jumpy and not as elated as the occasion demanded. This eventuality must have been foreseen. A good doze of Rum was administered to the men a few minutes before the order for advance was given.

At 3:30 a.m., 4 a.m. Indian standard time, the green light went up all along the front and the Indian Army rolled into Pakistan. The capture of Lahore being on the cards for the first day's events, the press was told to publish its fall without any mental reservations. The Operation Order of 25 Indian Infantry Division for the attack on Pakistan had said, "The defenses of Lahore have not been prepared and are not manned."

It is to the credit of the West Pakistan Rangers that they forced the enemy to deploy at the very outset and fight for every inch of Pakistan territory. They were neither trained nor equipped to fight a first rate enemy but they did. Unknown to the Indians the Rangers were expecting them. General headquarters Pakistan Army had issued a signal to the Army and HQ West Pakistan rangers on the evening of September 4, that an Indian attack appeared imminent and although efforts were to be made to avoid an escalation of fighting yet the defensive positions were to be occupied. The D. G. Rangers, Brigadier Khuda Dad Khan had issued an order on September 5th to be prepared to meet an Indian invasion. The Rangers, however, could not be everywhere and the Indian Army was able to roll on towards Lahore until they suddenly hit the forward positions of Pakistan Army in the early hours of the morning. Instead of surprising Pakistan Army there, Indians were themselves surprised. They had been allowed to march into Pakistan without much hindrance.

They were sure that fighting against Ranger Posts, which were nowhere in larger strength than a section and armed with rifles only had been localized and even if they had sent back information of Indian invasion it would not be possible for the garrison in Lahore and elsewhere to get ready, collect arms and ammunition and come out of their cantonments before the Indians were inside the town of Lahore itself.

The Indians were banking on the acute effect of such a severe blow to Pakistan. They probably felt that with the fall of Lahore the whole of Pakistan would be at their feet. They approached the BRB canal without much concern but their concentration and the resultant disorganization was beyond description when they suddenly came under heavy small arms and machine gun fire. By now it was first light. Figures could be been seen to have halted, flattered and fall down. Others came forward but met the same fate. The Indian advance had ended. A halt had been called. Not by those who held the initiative, superior strength and unlimited resources in men and equipment but by those who were fewer in numbers and could not boast of similar resources. They were few but they had faith in Allah.

The Indian commander, opposite Lahore had 2 Infantry Divisions and one Independent Brigade under him. He was so confident of the powerful force under his command being invincible that like a school child of eight learning arithmetic, he divided the figure of 2 by 2 which was the number of axis that he wished to advance on. The answer was 1, so he allotted one Division to each axis, Wagah and Burki and sat back. The Independent Infantry brigade could be kept in hand as reserve. The simple exercise in arithmetic was to continue down to battalion and company levels. His distribution of the Corps Artillery was very just and fair, giving equal number of the batteries and guns to each Infantry Division strictly according to the arithmetical formulae. It was so simple and yet people used to tell him that it needed brains to formulate a plan for attack.

The Pakistani commander opposing him was not so fortunate. Major General Mohammad Sarfraz Khan had in all seven infantry battalions and a front of 89,000 yards to defend.

He could not do the simple arithmetic exercise and sit back. He considered the likely axis and having allotted sectors to brigades kept a little reserve in hand. 103 Infantry Brigade was given the right sector, from including Hudiara Drain to exclusive of Railway line Lahore - Wagah. The left sector stretching upto Ravi was given to 114 Infantry Brigade. 22 Infantry Brigade with only four companies of Infantry and 23 Cavalry less one Squadron was kept as the striking force. The positions had been occupied after midnight on the night 5/6 September. Although it had earlier been planned to lay a mine field in front of BRB canal, there was no time to do so.

GOC 10 Infantry Division had placed a small screen of a platoon, on the main Wagah axis from R&S battalion under Major Arif Jan. This small force cost the Indians heavily. Major Arif allowed the Indian to come close and then opened fire at short range. In view of the inadequate light this was the only course open to him. This platoon not only held up the Indian advance along the main Wagah road but inflicted very heavy casualties on them. The Indians, however, on their flanks had managed to by pass them. Rather than surrender they put up a gallant fight. Major Arif and his small band of men will for ever be remembered as a force which fought to the last man and last round. No one left his post. Not one of them was taken prisoner. They all achieved the highest distinction that man can get.

The battalion astride the Lahore-Wagah road was 3rd Battalion of the Baluch regiment. A little after first light they saw the Indians advancing astride the road. In front of the advancing Indians were a large number of refugees, men, women and children, hurrying across as if driven by a pack of blood thirsty fiends. The Baluchis could not engage the enemy until the refugees had crossed the bridge. It was risky but they could not shoot their own people. The stout resistance put up by the small R&S section under Major Arif had upset the entire schedule of 54 Indian Infantry Brigade allotted to this sector.

The Indian commander had three approaches to this position and he had allotted a battalion to each one of these. 13 battalion of Indian Punjab Regiment, on the left of Indian flank was, as a result the first to gain contact with Pakistani defenders. This happened at 0600 hours opposite Jallo railway station. Heavy toll of the Indians were taken by the company in this position supported by its own artillery. In fact the artillery fire was so accurate that the enemy fell back never to venture forward again.

The next to approach the defensive position in this sector was 15 battalion of the Dogra Regiment, following the main Wagah axis. They reached the killing ground supported by tanks at 0645 hours and having lost two of its tanks in the first few minutes called it a day. The company of 3 Baluch in this part of the sector had the moral support of many senior officers being with them. The battalion commander Lt. Col. Tajammul Hussain Malik and the brigade commander , Brig. Aftab Ahmed Khan who with the Engineer officer Lt. Col. Suleman Khan and the gunner Lt. Col. Imdad Ali Khan were all present in their midst. They were watching the Indian advance from the road bridge at Batapur. It may not have been strictly according to the customs of service, but the presence of these senior officers on the main axis made a great deal of difference. They were in a position to see the situation all the time rather than get it at intervals.