India is Rattled

As a result of Indian offensive in Kashmir, the President of Pakistan in consultation with C-in-C, Pakistan Army, decided to undertake offensive operations and to attack the enemy in Chhamb and Jurian. The Indians had prepared concrete bunkers, interlinked by covered communication trenches and planned to meet all possible eventualities. They had a top story for observation, the ground story with MMG, LMG and RR emplacements for fighting and the basement for living. It was a proper defensive line and it succeeded in creating the defensive mentality. All defenses are double edged weapons. The stronger they are the greater is the intensity of defensive attitude produced by them. The close atmosphere acts on the minds of defenders very adversely thereby creating fear and queer type demoralization which engenders the quest for freedom of movement and is only removed by coming out in the open. When such defenses are subjected to heavy shelling, the explosion and their reverberating echoes produce a near concussion effect and the men inside either wish to run away or lie down listlessly. The Indian could not know the after effects of Maginot Line type of defenses. They had never experienced them. They thought it was good for prestige to have modern defenses and they adopted them1.

The Indians had started advancing in Haji Pir Pass area and due to the few troops in that sector it was more than likely that the link up between Indians advancing from Uri and those advancing North from Punch would soon take place. The Indians had thought that they would then be in a position to push westward in a view of the area being very thinly held by AK troops.

The only way to force India to release pressure in that area was to force her to pull out substantial portion for her forces assigned for the conquest of AK areas. An attack on Chhamb-Jurian which would threaten Akhnoor nerve center of Indian Line of Communication to Punch, was the correct answer. The Indian High Command when making grandiose plans for the invasion of Pakistan did think of this weak link in their chain of defenses and that was the precise reason why they had paid extra attention to this sector and constructed seemingly impregnable concrete defenses.

The troops available to Pakistan for an attack on Chhamb were:

102 Infantry brigade
4 Azad Kashmir
Two Companies of 12 FF (R and S)
11 Cavalry
13 Lancers

In view of shortage of troops 7 Infantry Division minus 25 Infantry Brigade, 14 Para Brigade, 22 Cavalry and some other elements was moved to Gujrat area on August 30, 1965. Apart from elements of divisional troops the only formation left with 7 Infantry Division now was 10 Infantry Brigade. This was placed under command 12 Infantry Division for the initial phase. This meant that 12 Infantry Division now had three infantry brigade to attack with. It thus had the following

10 Infantry Brigade (2 Battalion Brigade): commanded by Brig. Hayat
102 Infantry Brigade (2 Battalion Brigade): Commanded by brig. Zafar Ali Khan
4 Azad Kashmir : Commanded by brig Abdul Hameed Khan
Two companies 12 FF
11 Cavalry
13 Lancers

Divisional artillery and other services.

The Indians had then in the areas 10 Indian Mountain Division, 191 Indian Independent Infantry Brigade and parts of 93 Infantry Brigade.

The task allotted to 12 Infantry Division was to destroy enemy in area Lalial, Dewa, Sakrana and Chhamb and then to threaten Akhnoor. The Divisional Commander Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik decided to undertake the task in two phases. In phase one, he decided to destroy the enemy West of Tawi in area in area Lalial, Dewa and Chhamb. The second phase was to cross Tawi and pose a threat to Akhnoor by destroying enemy in the enemy of Jurian.

One September 1, the attack went in at first light. The Corps artillery supported the attack led by 9 Punjab, 13 Punjab and 11 Cavalry less one squadron. By 1030 hours the enemy position at Phur, Dalla, Barsala, Jhanda, Malgotian, Chak Pundit and Munawwar had been rolled up. The strong fortification were of no avail to the Indian troops not used to live under artillery shells directed at them.

The enemy at Moel and Burejal felt insecure soon after the enveloping movement very nearly cut off their threat. They were, however, quick enough to realize it and managed to retreat before they were completely cut off. In the process they gave a good deal of casualties.

The enemy AMX tanks were trying desperately to stop the advance of Pakistani tanks. Which had by now swung North East of Phagla and were heading for Chhamb. Dewa was in the hands of Pakistanis by 1400 hours.

It was at 1630 hours that the Indian Air Force came to the rescue of the Indian Army2. Four of them all, Vampires, were taken on by Pakistan Air Force , and were bagged within minutes. One of the JCOs of 13 Punjab whose Platoon had been earlier strafed by the Vampires said afterwards, "I wasted time over trying to remember what a Vampire looked like. They never visited us again in this front." A few Hunters came near last night and strafed our leading troops but did not stay long enough to give battle to Pakistan Air Force. The example of vampires was still fresh in Indians minds to venture over Pakistani troops for long.

On the left of 102 Infantry Brigade, 4 Azad Kashmir had advanced at an equally rapid speed. The brigade objective had been Dewa and Lalial. 5 AK contained Pir Jamal and a few other localities, on the right, and 19 AK put in an attack on Patrara. The position was well dug in and supported by a number of MMGs in addition to artillery. All the likely approaches had been mined intensively by the Indians. In a well conducted attack the leading company of 19 AK assaulted the position from the left flank and by 0730 hours had pushed the enemy out of Patrara. The brigade Commander, Brigadier Abdul Hameed Khan, desirous of maintaining the momentum of attack ordered the C.O. to continue the advance and roll up the rearward defenses of the enemy. Chakla and Dewa had fallen into our hands by the evening.

5 Azad Kashmir which had, earlier in the morning, contained enemy positions at Dalla, Paur, Pir Jamal and Maira, put I attack on Maira at 1100 hours. The Indians put in very little resistance and place was in Pakistan Army's hands very soon. The incident of capture of 53 Indian other ranks of 6 Sikh Light Infantry, by Lt. Col. Babr of A.O.P deserves mention. He had seen a collection of Indians, lurking in a nullah (creek) from the air. He landed his helicopter nearby and between himself and his companion Capt. Akbar rounded up 53 Indians. They had no officer or J.C.O. with them. They had all deserted them and ran away in their command vehicles.

Moel was attacked by 5 Azad Kashmir in the after noon and was occupied by them by 1700. Mopping up operations were undertaken by the battalion in the rest of the area including Dalla and small pockets of the enemy were cleared in places where they had been bypassed by 102 Infantry Brigade and 19 AK except Pir Jamal.

Headquarters 7 Infantry Division had arrived in the area and it was felt that the command of this sector would be exercised more expeditiously if 7 Division commanded by Major General Mohammad Yahya Khan, controlled the operations. 12 Division Headquarters was too far from the area of operations and the C-in-C, General Mohammad Musa, felt that the command of operations should be exercised from the headquarters which was located closer at hand rather than the headquarters from a distance. It was inconvenient to continue controlling the battle from Tactical Headquarters for too long which had to be done until then. As a result of this decision 7 Infantry Division assumed of operations from 1100 hours on September 2.

Major General Mohammad Yahya Khan gave orders for the completion of Phase I. 102 Infantry brigade and 10 Infantry Brigade consolidated positions along river Munawwar Tawi. 102 brigade was at this stage in the North and 10 Brigade to its immediate South. 4 AK brigade further North consolidated the position captured by it on the previous day.

The position having been consolidated the GOC ordered 10 Infantry Brigade to cross Munawwar Tawi at 1730 hours on 2 September and established a brigade head across it.

The brigade head was complete by 1930 hours and both the battalions of 10 Infantry Brigade, 6 FF and 14 Punjab with 13 Lancers under command 10 Brigade crossed this formidable obstacle. It is surprising at the complete paralyzing of the enemy ground forces. The water in the river was no where less than 4 feet deep and it was a very wide stream. The going was not easy and the banks were fairly steep. The crossing was expected to be opposed by the enemy very stubbornly but it seemed Indian troops had lost all relish of opposing, the day before. Inspite of the whole day at their disposal to dig in and establish themselves across the river they had not been able to make up their mind that they would resist the crossing.

5 AK to the West, cleared Pir Jamal by 1630 hours after a very stiff and hand to hand fight. The Indians had fought stubbornly and accepted a large number of casualties before being forced to withdraw.