The Second Round In Kashmir Continued

It must be borne in mind that as far as Kashmiris are concerned the CFL is an arbitrary arrangement between the UNO, Pakistan and India separating the two armies, as they stood on Jan. 1, 1949. The civilian population is not affected by it. The Kashmiris consider themselves both morally and legally justified to cross and recross it in either directions at will. This is their birth right which not even the UNO can take away from them.

To say that even seven thousand Kashmiris infiltrated back into Indian held Kashmir through a thickly held CFL, maintained themselves for weeks after weeks in Indian held territory, moved bout, disrupted the Indian L of C, ran a government in certain areas without the active and planned cooperation of the local population , would seem highly improbable if not completely impossible. If however, they did all that and traversed the valley of Kashmir day in and day out under the very nose of the Indian Army then it would mean that they had been invited by the local revolutionaries and that the Indian Army was as inefficient as the revolutionaries were brave and resourceful. There can be no doubt that these revolutionaries were all Kashmiris. It appears that Indians were certain of a number of Pakistani formations having been brought into AK by Pakistan. At least this is what appears from the faked interrogation reports of the supposed Pakistani troops that India alleged to have taken prisoner. Banking on this they moved forward to liquidate Azad Kashmir. The Indian XV Corps Commander, who is responsible for the Indian held Kashmir, was given the task of capturing the whole of AK as his objective. All that he managed to accomplish was the capture of a few posts.

If Indian High Command was not prepared for the complete break down of its L of C in Kashmir, it was much less prepared for an offensive in Chhamb and Jurian. They may have felt that Pakistan could take to offensive in this sector and that may be the reason for the unusually strong defenses in this sector. But when it happened, it came like a bolt from the blue and completely put the Indians off balance. Their concrete defenses seem to have crumbled under the impact of this attack. They saw its implications rather belatedly, not until Akhnoor was really threatened. To stop it they had to do two things, both unpalatable to them, but most important. First they had to rush at least two divisions to halt this whirlwind advance of determined Pakistani and AK troops under seasoned commanders. Two of the most brilliant Pakistani Generals had so far shared the laurels. Major General Akhtar Hussain malik had set the ball in motion in a masterly manner and the move had been brilliantly competed by Major General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan. Both were awarded well earned Hilal-I-Jurat in these operations. India was loath to send reinforcements to this sector but the Pakistani commanders by uprooting three storied well-planned concrete bunkers had left no choice to Indian High Command. By sending two of the best Indian Divisions to halt this avalanche the Indian High Command was upsetting the Chaudhuri plan for the main invasion. Having been left with no alternative the Indians cut down the number of divisions from the most important sector of Sialkot.

The second alternative to the plan forced on India by this bold and swift action ordered by C-in-C Pakistan Army was the putting forward of the date of the invasion of Pakistan by the Indian High Command. Originally the date had been fixed for the fourth week of September.

The offensive at Chhamb, across the cease fore line was undertaken by Pakistan Army on September 1, 1965. The result of this offensive was not clear until the evening that day. The Indian invasion of Pakistan could be attributed to the result of this offensive only if the concentrations of the Indian Army opposite Khokhrapar, Lahore and Sialkot were planned, ordered and brought about after this date. We have ample evidence emanating from various sources and conformed by the statement of Indian POWs that the concentration of the Indian Army had started before Chhamb had been attacked by Pakistan.

For example 1 Indian Armoured Division and 2 (Independent) Indian Armoured Brigade received orders to move forward on the morning of September 1, 1965. It is obvious that the decisionhad been taken earlier in the day if not, a day or two earlier. 6 Infantry Mountain Division commenced leaving its locations somewhere in Central India during the last week of August 1965. 4 Sikh reached Frerozpur on 28 August and 9 horse left Saugar on 2 September. 67 Indian Infantry Brigade left Jodhpur on 1 September. 3 madras left Dhar Chilla on 30 August and 5/5 G.R. was out of babina by September 1. NO army can concentrate in a day. Neither is the present Indian Army reputed for excellent movement control and an efficient railway support. At the time of the invasion of Goa, when a little over one infantry division had to be deployed to march across the border, the Indian railway schedules were so upset as to crate a confusion lasting over for a week, The Indian concentration against Pakistan involved a much larger number of formations, inspite of the already sizeable concentrations close to West Pakistan border, and the shorter distance that the 1 Indian Armoured Division had to move.

The Indian Army, due to its huge size, had perforce to take a few weeks to concentrate on a number of points from a much larger number of cantonments. The movement had, therefore, to be spread out over a considerable period. This is the reason why the forward concentrations of the Indian Army started in mid August and according to the existing scheduling had to be completed by mid September. The reason for the move must have been guessed by some elements in the Indian Army. The diary of Lieut. Col. Nitranjan Singh, C.O. of 2 Grenaders , who left Bombay for Pathankot, with his battalion on 14 August, wrote regarding the impending war, on the following day, in his diary, "In the morning I felt the whole thing to be purposeless, illogical and without meaning. All that is happening is ridiculous by any standard". Another battalion of the same brigade left its peace station on 18 August. There are a score of other moves which provide ample proof that the invasion of Pakistan was already planned but for a later date. Pakistan's offensive in Chhamb merely rattled the Indian High Command and losing their sense of proportion they out forward the date of the invasion by two weeks and not only upset their plans but also unbalanced their whole army.

The utter dislocation caused inside held Kashmir, the danger posed to Akhnoor and the possibility of a threat developing against Jammu was too big a risk, or so thought the Indian General Staff, to wait for the scheduled date, in late September to arrive. It rattled General Choudhuri as much as Mr. Shastri and the whole of the Indian nation. It merely explains the frame of mind into which the ill conceived propaganda of Indian Government had placed the whole nation, but it shows the fear that had been generated by reverses in Kutch and later in Jurian Sector and the activities of a handful of Kashmiri Revolutionaries behind the Indian lines, that when Mr. Chavan, the Indian Defence Minister, informed the Indian parliament that Indian Army had invaded Pakistan, the whole house stood up to give him an unprecedented ovation. To neutral observers it appeared as if the much promised event had at last taken place. The digression was necessary to bring out the Indian plan and the way in which the Indian rulers wished to escalate fighting in Kashmir into a full scale war. We must now proceed with the events in Kashmir.

It was India which informed the world that she had failed in throttling the voices of the chained and handcuffed Kashmiris by announcing the presence of so called raisers in Kashmir.