The Second Round In Kashmir

The debacle in Kutch disappointed the Indian Warlords. They had great hopes on this seemingly innocent border incident. It did not escalate as expected. The visits of reverted pundits like Shastri, the Prime Minister, and Chavan, the Defence Minister did not succeed in infusing life into the demoralized Indian soldier. Commanders like Major Karnail Singh believed that they were doomed to be taken prisoners whenever and wherever they went to war. A high powered conference was called. All the brass and all the excellencies attended. The adversaries were in the lobbies but near enough to influence decisions. After a little mud slinging between the politicians and the soldiers the conference settled down to sober deliberations. The blame for that defeat was thrown on the Pakistanis. They had not played the game expected of them as a small weak neighbor. They should have agreed to loose but instead they had stood up and had managed to attack with superior forces at the desired time and place whenever they decided to adopt offensive defense.

The decision arrived at by this high powered conference was to try again. The mighty Indian white elephant, its army, was to be geared into motion once again but this time it was considered best to roll it down the hills of Kashmir. As soon as it had gained momentum it was to be supplemented by an energetic push from all directions and across all fronts. It must be noted here that the principle of diversifying the points of attack had not yet been given up. In the plan to initiate the move from Kashmir the beginning was to be made once again from disputed territory. A certain amount of ingenuity and the dovetailing of political and military strategy was to be in greater prominence than in the case of Rann of Kutch. The Indians realized that Pakistan had relied too long on the promises of UNO. The question of Kashmir and Pak-Bharat problems had become in the meantime a matter of the so called global strategy of big powers. As a result Kashmiris had become so frustrated that since 1964 any aggressive move by India in Kashmir had brought about retaliation by AK Forces. Chaknot and other places had shown the changed attitude of the government of Azad Kashmir. The Indian shrewd mind was quick to come to conclusion. If Indian heightened her aggressive attitude in Kashmir through increased breaches of Cease Fire Agreement and raids into territory controlled by Azad Kashmir were stepped up, it was more than likely, in fact certain, as the Indian Prime Minister put it to the meeting-that Pakistan and the government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir would reply in the same coin-1. It was even possible, said the pupil of Chanakya smilingly, that Pakistan may join hands with the revolutionaries in the valley and other parts of held Kashmir who would certainly rise if in addition to the use of agents provocateurs, the control was relaxed a little. If this happened, as he was mistakenly certain it would happen, then the next step for India was to march into Pakistan from all directions. "After all, all roads lead to Islamabad. What fun could you not have, General". The reply was very military like, "Yes Sir. You know the brave jawans of the Sena2 are itching to march westwards at your command". With a "Well done" and "I have faith in you and your brave jawans. Give them all my Ashir Bad3", and the meeting ended.

As a last reminded the Prime Minister turning to Mr. Nanda the Home Minister, had said, "Are the plans regarding dispatch of Jan Sangh volunteers complete". When the Home Minister nodded with "Yes" in an undertone, the Prime Minister smiled and left the room. The plan, they all thought was so simple that it could not fail to achieve the desired result. The Army of Occupation in Indian held Kashmir was ordered to set up raids across the Cease Fire Line and the puppet Government of Srinagar was instructed to provide agents provocateurs who could light the fuse and blow up the smoldering heap of explosives, that Kashmir had become. The security troops had to be moved nearer to the FDLs in any case. The relaxing of control, the presence of agents provocateurs and increased persecutions were expected to create conditions which, the Indians thought, would force Pakistan to listen to Kashmiri leaders' requests of marching into Indian held Kashmir.

The record of Indians in Kashmir was fairly black even before this eventful decision but immediately after this meeting the activities across the Cease Fire Line were stepped up out of all proprtions. The cease fire violations are reported to the U.N. observers by Pakistan during the past had been as follows:

They now produced a different picture in 1965.

With the figures of raids across CFL mounting up week after week it was only natural for India to expect Pakistan to retaliate. It can be said that the dovetailing of political with military strategy by India had succeeded to the extent that it drew out the Kashmiris exactly as the Indian Pandits had anticipated. They, however, had miscalculated the results in more than one manner, and particularly the action which they thought Pakistan would take. The error of judgement referred to by Lieut. General Kaul, in his book, cost the Indians heavily4.

The first mistake which the Indians made was that they had not weighed up the Kashmir situation inside the Indian held Kashmir itself. The repression which had been planned to be simultaneous with increased activities across CFL and to precede the final push had reached a crescendo by the time the level of junior executives was reached. These officials had been supported by thousands of armed Jan Sanghis imported from India after intensive training and careful screening. The plan boomeranged as a result. Persecutions and cruelty have a limit in every case. Even the most willing sufferer will not be able to bear patiently beyond a certain point. The same happened in Kashmir as it had happened in 1930. A countrywide tumult arose, a lot more than the Indians had expected. That part of the Indian Army which had been hitherto utilized for local protection and to frighten the Kashmiris was not there to stifle the voices. The troops had been moved forward to carry out raids through the FDLs into Azad Kashmir (AK) territory. The absence of these troops helped the revolutionaries to organize better that the Indian authorities felt they would be able to do.

The second miscalculation was regarding the exact reaction of Pakistan. Indian commanders had visualized that with the threat of AK, Pakistan High Command would move at least two divisions into AK to thicken up the defenses in addition to retaliation. This would have weakened the defenses in Lahore and Sialkot. Nothing of the sort happened. No units, much less formations were moved into AK. The Azad Kashmir leaders had been pressing Pakistan Government that if Pakistan was not in a position to act, the kashmiris should be left free, but so far Pakistan had been able to hold them back.