When, on 6 September, it was decided that the PAF would go all-out in counter air operations, a para-drop simultaneously over 3 forward Indian airfields-Halwara, Pathankot and Adampur was also decided to be launched. Each strike team was to consist of 60 Commandos, and the intention was to drop them near the selected targets under cover of darkness, allowing enough night time for them to accomplish their missions. After dropping into enemy territory, each party was to assemble and proceed as a team to attack their respective target airfields. They were expected to destroy aircraft, damage communications, blow up fuel dumps and storm other vulnerable points. After their raids, the teams were to exfiltrate by land in small groups or individually.

The 3 C-130s needed for the Para-drops were positioned at Peshawar at 2000 hours ready to go. The TOTs were planned for midnight, and for three hours all B-57 strikes against the target airfields would be suspended to enable the commandos to accomplish their mission. Then, however, followed a series of developments and discoveries that are hard to believe.

Firstly, claiming that they had had inadequate notice, the SSG troops were late in coming to Peshawar airfield from their base nearby, and the time of take off had twice to be postponed. On their arrival at Peshawar, it was also discovered that their briefing for the missions, far from being perfect, which such an operation required, was sketchy at best and did not cover most of the essentials. The maps and photographs supplied to them were found to be out of date and useless-in fact, one of the groups only saw for the first time, just before take off, a picture of the airfield they were to attack. The troops were also without Indian currency, which the C-130 aircrew, appreciating their greater need, readily surrendered to them from part of their own quota, which everyone going into operations carried.

This astonishing state of affairs arose, it appears, from the fact that the army, to meet their requirements for the Mujahid action in Kashmir, had drawn both freely and indiscrirninately from amongst the members of the SSG, denuding that force of most of the personnel who had been specially trained and briefed for the specific para-commando action against the Indian airfields. This short sightedness was doubtless facilitated by the hush hush manner in which everything relating to the SSG was treated, coupled with an inexcusable failure of liasion between the DAI and the commander of the SSG. When orders were received to launch the SSG para-drop operation, hurried arrangements had to be made at the last minute to make up the numbers by drawing on personnel who were unprepared for this special assignment. Several personnel, some of whom were key figures, had not yet reported back from leave, and this had reduced further the numbers of those who were competent to undertake this task.