Indian strategy in the air up to now had reflected some flaws in the IAF's judgement. The hornet's nest had, however, been disturbed, and the IAF must now surely divert all its attention to delivering an ever increasing weight of attack against the PAF. The Indians had surrendered their initiative in the air and a settlement was now due. India's procrastination had allowed Pakistan's air defence elements to learn a number of minor but important lessons, which they were able to assimilate before the challenge of the 7th morning, so that it was with confidence that the PAF awaited the trial of strength that must now earnestly begin.

With most of the PAF's fighter force concentrated on this one frontline airfield, Sargodha had given ample evidence over the last week to suggest the degree to which the PAF was dependent on it for its operations, and everything possible had therefore been done to make Sargodha as impregnable as resources Permitted.

Everyone in the air defence chain had been alerted, and anxious eyes watched the Scopes and the skies for the first hint of an enemy raid. This was why the half light before dawn on the morning of 7 September found Squadron Leader Alam and 5 other of their Sabres and F-104s, ready to hit the start switches at the end of the runway, waiting for the signal to scramble as soon as warning of approaching IAIF aircraft was received through the Pakistani radar and observe network.

Although Sargodha already had its initial pre-dawn F-104 fighter patrol airborne, the first intimation of the arrival of the IA F was the sight of 6 Mystere fighter-bombers pulling up out of the sunrise from their tree-top approach to deliver their attack at about 0530 hours. Their navigation was good, and the great air base -packed with aircraft, fuel bowsers and other rewarding targets - lay sprawled beneath them. While most of the PAF fighters were spread around in camouflaged dispersals, 4 F-86s and 2 F-104s were lined up, through operational necessity, on the operational readiness platform (ORP) at the end of the runway. Sargodha was well defended with light ack ack, but it had only 3 fighters airborne and the Mysteres, enjoying virtually complete surprise, had the Pakistani base at their mercy. This practice of parking some interceptor aircraft on the ORP, for a quick get away when a raid was reported, was based on the premise that these exposed fighters would all be off the ground by the time the raid reached the base. This was one of the two glaring defects in operational posture which the Sargodha and other base commanders had totally overlooked during several exercises and post mortems in preparation for war. What would be the fate of these aircraft and pilots if a raid arrived undetected? Perhaps this question was just 'around the corner' in various discussions but somehow never got asked. Had it done so, the answer would have been to do exactly what Sargodha, and indeed all other bases, did from that point onward: abandon use of the ORP altogether and operate only from protected pens; the extra taxying time from the pens nearest the runway was an affordable penalty.

Strapped helplessly in their aircraft on the ground, the PAF Sabre and Starfighter pilots watched the Mysteres pull up to about 1,000-1,500 ft, still maintaining tight and unwieldy echelon formation, and spray the empty tarmac area at random with their weapons. First they fired their underwing rockets, although several simply jettisoned the pods with the rockets still in them. Some of these battered but full pods are still on display at the PAF Museum at Peshawar. Then they opened up with their twin 30mm cannon, but virtually without taking aim during their single high speed pass. That they were unable to make out any of the 65 or so aircraft scattered about the airfield was excusable, given the excellence of the base's camouflage and concealment techniques. That they missed the 6 gleaming fighters on the ORP was a case of sheer panic as soon as the ack ack let loose a vicious barrage. They exited towards the southwest leaving Sargodha unscathed. They them selves, however, were less fortunate: one was shot down as it flashed past the anti-aircraft defences, while another fell to the 20mm cannon of the patrolling Starfighter.

Immediately after this first IAF daylight attack, Alam and his No 2 Flying Officer Masood Akhtar, were scrambled with 2 other F-86s and an F-104 for an airfield patrol at about 15,000 ft. Within about five minutes they were directed by ground control towards an incoming Indian raid, but after flying eastwards for 10-15 miles, they were told to turn back because IAF fighters were overhead Sargodha. It was then about 0610 hours. Flying top cover for the F-86s in the F-104 , Squadron Leader Arif lqbal did not get a chance to join the combat, although he watched it from beginning to end. He recalls:

"I was orbiting base at about 15,000 ft when I saw 4 Hunters right over the runway, heading southwest. I don't know whether they had already delivered their attack but I called 'contact'. Flight Lieutenant Bhatti was orbiting about 10 miles or so southwest of base, and Alam was about 5 miles further south."