Although the problem was strictly speaking an air force one, the air chief had to view it in the context of its farreaching consequences on the outcome of the land battle, on which must hinge the ultimate fate of Pakistan. Simple air victory by itself was not sufficient, though certainly a good enough start. If, however, in achieving it the PAF so depleted its strength that it -could not render support to the army when it was most needed, was it then a worthwhile exercise to pursue, and should the PAF not therefore hold back for the final round?

The targets for individual squadrons had been specified many weeks before, and a lot of flying hours had been invested in practising simulated profiles of these meticulously planned strikes. The parameters for a strategic decision to order the strike had been clearly defined, leaving open only the minor modifications which may be necessitated by the prevailing tactical situation. The final decision to mount the strike was at last taken at about 1100 hours, leaving two hours less than the minimum time required for efficient preparations.

Details of the strike plan were now hurriedly amended to fit the tactical needs of the moment, without altering the strategic concept on which it was based, and by midday mission signals to units had been despatched. All the missions were preplanned but the targets were reduced to those that presently menaced the survival of the PAF. The rest could wait -the biggest and most immediate threat needed countering first.

Indian Targets

8 F-86	Adampur
8 F-86	Halwara
4T-33	Ferozepur Radar
6 F-86, 1 Elint B-57	Amristar Radar
8 F-86	Pathankot
2 B-57	Adampur
2 B-57	Halwara
2 B-57	Pathankot
8 F-86	Jamnagar
4T-33	Porbunder Radar
6 B-57	Jamnagar

All available resources were flung into the action in a spirit of do or die. Even the basic trainers -the Harvards - were summoned to make their small contribution, in the role of road interdiction, as soon as night fell. Since the PAF had accepted more commitments in support of the ground forces than had been envisaged, there was a need to augment the number of aircraft at Sargodha, which had borne the brunt of the work so far. The aircraft could only be spared from Mauripur, and accordingly 12 F-86s and 6 T-33s were ordered to move from there to Sargodha. The TOT for the strike was 1705 hours for the fighter-bombers, followed after dark by the B-57s. Paradrops of the Pakistani commandoes (of the Special Services Group, SSG) over a number of important enemy airfields were also planned, with the TOT at midnight.

Just before the strikes were to go in, 2 F-104s were sent to do a low level visual recce of the forward airfields of Adampur and Halwara to confirm that the IAF was still there and that the bulk of their aircraft had not been withdrawn to safer locations in the rear. If that had been the case the strikes would obviously have been called off. As it turned out, the Indian bases were packed with aircraft and the F-104 pilots had to exercise great restraint in not disregarding their instructions which were that they were in no circumstances to fire at any aircraft on the ground, so as not to give the game away. The recces were a very chancy business indeed, for they could well have compromised the surprise factor and led a wary enemy to deduce that something was up, thus allowing him to prepare a reception that could prove highly perilous for the attackers.