Three weeks later, a development occurred which was a typical illustration of the lack of coordination and trust which had plagued Pakistan army and air force planning from the earliest days. On 22 July 65, the day before the command of the PAF passed from Asghar Khan to Nur Khan, the ACAS(O), Air Commodore Rahim Khan, brought news from GHQ that a major operation involving the infiltration of a large number of mujahids from Azad Kashmir into the occupied area was imminent. Both the air marshals were astonished, and not a little perturbed, by the fact that the air force was informed of this 'major operation' (called 'Gibraltar') only in passing, and without any sense of real urgency which, they felt, the situation demanded. With India's army massed on Pakistan's borders; with her militarism inflamed by the Rann of Kutch ignominy; and with the increasing clamour by the Indian public for revenge against Pakistan, it seemed the height of unrealism to think in terms of a localised conflict without catering for the glaring probability of rapid escalation into all out war.

Be that as it may, Air Marshal Nur Khan called on the C-in-C Army the next day, on which he assumed command, to discuss with him the extent, nature and likely effects of the operation. General Musa merely confirmed that an operation was in the offing, but he was of the view that it would remain localised. He considered it basically a 12 Division responsibility, and did not in any case think that major air action would be called for. The air chief was, however, not too happy with the army C-in-C's description and assessment, and felt a mounting frustration at the lack of liaison between the two services. After his meeting with General Musa, the air chief was more perturbed than ever, and he flew immediately to Major General Akhtar Malik's controlling HQ in Murree, to seek further details.

The C in C felt sure that Indian reaction to the projected movement would be sharp and violent, and that it was necessary, therefore, in the short time that was available before the 5th of August, to build up a base for supplies somewhere in the north. He could not see how the Mujahid movement could progress unless it had something more than merely an erratic supply of ammunition and food. The general was inclined to agree and, since a proper supply could only be ensured by the PAF, the C-in-C had no hesitation in committing the PAF to performing what was clearly its first role in the unfolding drama. It was clear, too, that if the Indian Army penetrated across the cease fire line into Azad Kashmir, to counter the Mujahid threat, the entire Pakistani and Azad Kashmir forces defending the cease fire line could be trapped without supplies, so that the PAF would have to become even more deeply involved, and possibilities of escalation would increase tremendously. But the immediate task was organisation of the supply drops, for which all must be in readiness when the demands came; and coordination was begun between the PAF transport base at Chaklala and 12 Division. Supply drops in mountainous terrain were not new to the PAF, but this time there was a difference: some of the supplies would be required to be air-dropped by defenceless C-130s almost certainly inside held Kashmir, where there was the threat of fighter interceptions by day - the noise factor alone could give the game away - so that, as once before in the first Kashmir war, it was clear that the PAF would be forced to resort to night missions.

The problems were immense, as the slightest slip or failure could spell disaster for the entire scheme, and result in the destruction of valuable aircraft and lives. Furthermore, the country ran a clear risk of being termed the aggressor, inviting criticism from world public opinion, and retaliation from the enemy. Accordingly the mission had to be performed with the greatest of care. Nur Khan took a personal interest in the planning for the missions, thus underlining their critical nature.