All this was either not known, or not mentioned, or considered irrelevant, at the four-hour briefing session which had been held earlier that day between Group Captain Dogar, the DAI, Group Captain Hall, the Station Commander, Chaklaia, and Colonel Mateen of the SSG. The decision to go ahead had been taken in a spirit of do or die-and to be fair, this was the spirit that animated everyone and infused every mission on that hectic and fateful 6th day of September.

At the airfield, by the time things had been sorted out, it was almost midnight, and the TOT was now fixed at 0210 hours-leaving the troops two critical hours of darkness less in which to accomplish their mission. Even now, had cool judgement prevailed, the missions could have been called off for the next day and many valuable lives saved; but "the survival of Pakistan was at stake", and so unhappily, the operations were allowed to proceed regardless. In the face of it all, the troops themselves displayed a morale and a cool courage which is deserving of the very highest praise.

The C-130s flew out at low level and dropped the troops over their respective drop zones, about 2 miles from their targets. The drops were successful, but after touchdown the commandos ran into unforeseen difficulties. Only at Adampur was the team able to regroup fully though with only half an hour left till first light. The Pathankot team found themselves unexpectedly in the middle of a multiple canal obstacle and had great difficulty in even orientating themselves. Pathankot and Halwara the teams remained splintered into small groups, as they were unable to get together. Indian security measures were efficient; Pakistani intelligence had not given any idea of how well the Indian airfieldswere defended on the ground - both by personnel as well as by tall barbed wire fencing with armoured cars patolling the perimeter.

This, added to the physical obstacles of the water channels, high crops, and the presence of a dense civil population all around, reduced drastically any chances of success. The surprise which the groups needed for both success and safety was lost because of the civil population amidst which they had landed. It was not long before the entire countryside had been alerted, and as dawn was about to break the helpless commandos dispersed into the countryside, to hide up for the day and wait for a more favourable opportunity the following night.

The entire region had however, sprung to life. Villagers armed with shot guns, lances and kirpans, civil police, troops, dogs, light aircraft, jeeps and armoured cars started the hunt for the paratroopers. Their capture was inevitable, but no one was lightly taken. They fought till they fell, or till their ammunition was exhausted. Many were bayoneted, some were taken prisoner. Those who remained undiscovered attempted the impossible the following night; but all had to abandon their mission and try, somehow to get back to Pakistan. Some managed to do this, while a few remained hidden for as long as ten days, living on sugarcane, maize and even grass, before they were caught.

Thus ended an operation which on the face of it was an unmitigated disaster. Certainly the cost in lives of the heroic para-commandos, who embarked on their perilous mission with a memorably cheerful calm, was difficult to justify. Nevertheless, ill-conceived, ill-planned, badly executed and based on faulty intelligence though these raids were, they caused a considerable diversion of Indian military efforts.