The chief utilisation of the Sabre from 8 to 23 September was in trying to meet the army's increasing demands for close air support. During this period ad hoc attempts were also made to try and streamline the overall army/air force liaison essential for more effective close support. The practical weaknesses in this system had glaringly exposed themselves at the very outset: army ground control of close support aircraft through their air contact teams (ACTs) was extremely poor and serviceability of their radio sets highly unreliable. Other major weaknesses were the absence of experienced PAF liaison officers with army formations in the combat zones and an unsatisfactory system of marking specific targets. PAF fighters were often required to spend excessively long periods cruising around below 1,000 ft trying to locate and identify their targets.

This meant unnecessary exposure to Indian light flak, although it is a remarkable fact that in the course of nearly 500 close support missions by its Sabres during the 1965 war, the PAF did not lose a single F-86 to enemy ground fire. This indicates its wild inaccuracy although its intensity is reflected by the total of no fewer than 58 Sabres-over 50% of its F-86 forcewhich were hit and damaged (none of them seriously) by enemy ground fire while attacking tanks, troops and vehicles.

Despite the shortcomings of the forward air control (FAC) organization, the PAF had the advantage that, once its F-86s had found their target, they were sufficiently contemptuous of enemy air interference to set up a textbook attack pattern. If necessary, a couple of Sabres acted as top cover while waiting their turn to strafe, and the remainder flew systematic circuits each covering the other's tail and ensuring its predecessor was clear before beginning its firing pass. It was not uncommon for the PAF Sabres to spend as long as 30 minutes working over a target, whereas the Indian strike fighters seldom made more than a single hurried pass against Pak Army targets.