The PAF’s Command Operations Centre (COC) at Rawalpindi and all air base command posts had been fully activated on 21 November. While the commanders, pilots, engineers and support personnel remained ready to launch operations at a few minutes notice, the air chief strove each day to persuade General Yahya to honour his political and moral obligation to counter the Indian invasion of East Pakistan with retaliatory action on the western front.

GHQ had much earlier agreed to Air Headquarters request that the army’s opening actions would be coordinated with the PAF’s first strikes and that is how it was planned. At a meeting on 30 November between the President, the air C-in-C, the army chief of staff General Abdul Hammed Khan and the chief of general staff General Gul Hassan, D-day was finally set for 3 December. President Yahya made the air chief responsible to brief the navy C-in-C regarding the plan of action and Rahim Khan did so on 1 December. On D-day, the President formally announced the decision at 1630 hours and spent the early evening in the PAF’s Command Operations Centre watching the launch and recovery of the first air strikes (See table below).

So poised for action was the air force that its first strike formations were hurtling down the PAF runways just twenty-one minutes later. And the formal messages declaring a state of war were still being decoded at the bases when the strike aircraft were returning to land.

Mission Serial	Target	Strike & Escort Aircraft	Munitions	Mission Leaders
1.	Srinagar Airfield	8 F-86F	Bombs – Some with delay fusing	Wing Commander S A Changezi
2.	Awantipura Airfield	8 F-86F	Bombs as above	Wing Commander Abdul Aziz
3.	Pathankot Airfield	8 F-86F	Bombs as above	Wing Commander S A Jilani
4.	Amritsar Airfield	4 Mirage	Bombs as above	Wing Commander Hakimullah
5.	Pathankot Airfield	4 Mirage	Bombs as above	Squadron Leader Aftab A Khan
6.	Amritsar Airfield	2 F-104	Gun attack with Special aiming	Wing Commander Amjad H Khan
7.	Faridkot Radar	2 F-104	Gun attack with special aiming	Wing Commander Arif Iqbal

In accordance with a pre-planned assault against IAF airfields and radar stations, the first dusk strikes crossed the border at the same time and struck their targets between 1709 and 1723 hours in two waves with varying intervals.

The F-104s returned after successfully attacking the two radars. At Faridkot one of the pilots could not resist the sight of a light aircraft parked near the runway and made an extra attack to set it on fire. For their part, the fighter-bombers reported 25 craters on 4 target runways despite 3 aircraft experiencing bomb malfunctions and 2 pilots missing their targets due to poor light conditions. None of the strike aircraft were intercepted by IAF fighters; the more alert ack ack gunners did open up against the Mirages and F-86s but without scoring any hits. All aircraft returned safely.

Pak Army formations launched their cross border attacks the same evening as previously arranged, and as they manoeuvred to improve their tactical positions along the border, the PAF’s night bombing campaign was launched with 15 B-57, 4 T-33s and 1 C-130 (See table bellow).

Despite the late hour of the PAF’s night attacks, and the lapse of much time since the Indian Prime Minister’s radio address informing her nation of the PAF’s assault, the Indian airfields were once again taken by surprise. The PAF pilots found this rather intriguing, particularly when they saw Srinagar and Jamnagar airfields fully lit up even during their first dives. Only at two airfields did the ack ack and SAM units open fire while the attackers were still overhead.

Mission Serial	Target	Strike Aircraft	Munitions	Mission Pilots/Navigators (*)
8 – 9	Ambala Airfield	2 B-57s	Bombs – Some with delay fusing	Wg Cdr Rais Rafi Flt Lt Wasif Bokhari* Wg Cdr Feroze Khan Sqn Ldr Iftikhar Malik*
10	Agra Airfield	2 B-57s	Bombs as above	Wg Cdr M Yunus Sqn Ldr W D Harney* Wg Cdr Mazhar Amin Flt Lt Nasim Khan*
11 – 12	Halwara Airfield	2 B-57s	Bombs as above	Sqn Ldr Abdul Basit Sqn Ldr G A Khan* Flt Lt Iqbal Javed Flt Lt G Malik*
13	Amritsar Airfield	1 B-57	Bombs as above	Flt Lt Majid Javed/ Flt Lt M Sarwar*
14	Pathankot Airfield	1 B-57	Bombs as above	Flt Lt Sultan Arshad Sqn Ldr Qayamuddin*
15	Srinagar Airfield	1 C-130	Bombs as above	Gp Capt M A Qayyum Wg Cdr Nisar Yunus Sqn Ldr Chaudhry Rizwan*
16	Sirsa Airfield	1 B-57	Bombs as above	Sqn Ldr Y H Alvi Flt Lt S M Ali Shah*
17	Jaisalmer Airfield	1 B-57	Bombs as above	Sqn Ldr Ishfaq Qureshi Sqn Ldr S A Khan*
18	Bikaner Airfield	1 B-57	Bombs as above	Sqn Ldr Baharul Haq Sqn Ldr Ansar Ahmed*
19 – 20	Jodhpur Airfield	2 B-57s	Bombs as above	Sqn Ldr Sohail Mansur Sqn Ldr Aurangzeb Khan* Sqn Ldr Aftab Zia Flt Lt Zulfiqar Ahmed*
21	Jamnagar Airfield	1 B-57	Bombs as above	Flt Lt Ejaz Azam Wg Cdr Murtaza Malik*
22	Uttarlai Airfield	1 B-57	Bombs as above	Wg Cdr M Akhtar Flt Lt A B Subhani*
23-26	Uttarlai Airfield	4 T-33s	Guns	Sqn Ldr Qureshi Sqn Ldr A Choudhry Sqn Ldr Akhtar Flt Lt Bashir

The bombes had dropped a total of 183 bombs on their targets and the pilots reported over 120 hits on the 12 target runways, but there was no conclusive means of damage assessment at night. For day photo recce; only 3 Mirages were available which had to be used sparingly as they were embarked for the Army’s priority tasks. The photo recce capability was further reduced when 2 of the 3 Mirages sustained bird strikes and were temporarily grounded for repairs. A few recce missions that could be launched to photograph Pathankot, Awantipura, Srinagar and Amritsar airfields, together with some Mirage cine films which had recorded hits by preceding formation members, showed not only bomb impacts on the runways but also the fresh repairs of craters made in earlier attacks.

What was it like at the receiving end? For the major part the Indian press statements claimed that no damage had been done at all on the IAF airfields and even tried to ridicule the PAF’s ‘bungled preemptive strike’ (which incidentally, was a misnomer as the term ‘preemptive’ applies specifically to a strike ‘initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent’). Over the years, however, factual accounts of the damage inflicted continued to be received from different sources. The most authentic comments emanate from the 1971 Indian Air Force chief himself, who would hardly be inclined to exaggerate the PAF’s performance.

Halwara

Amritsar

Pathankot

Sirsa

Jaisalmer

Uttarlai

Bhuj

All the preceding passages are from a narrative of events by Air Chief Marshal P C Lal, who commanded the IAF during the 1971 war, from his book “My Days with the IAF”. It bears stressing that all the above quoted bomb damage reports except the last one (Bhuj) have been positively identified from the book as relating to the first day of the PAF’s counter air campaign ie 3 December. It would be reasonable to assume that similar levels of damage continued to occur during the next thirteen days as well.

One other IAF source deserves mention here by way of a tribute to the PAF’s B-57 crews who valiantly faced the highest loss rate of the war, and persisted doggedly each night, despite their rudimentary bombs and aiming devices, in carrying the war deep into the enemy’s heartland. The narration comes from an Indian Mig-21 pilot taken prisoner after being shot down over Pakistan. Flight Lieutenant Harish Sinhji, who belonged to a Sirsa-based squadron, stated:

“After one of PAF’s night bombing strikes on our airfield, we were all grounded for six hours. The runway had been cratered in many places. The following morning our CO, Wing Commander V B Sawardekar, took us all to the runway to show us the Pakistani pilot’s bombing accuracy. Pointing to the craters on our runway he said ‘this is the kind of bombing accuracy the IAF pilots should achieve against Pakistani targets.’’

During the next two weeks the PAF’s F-86s, Mirages, T-33s, B-57s and C-130s (first used as bombers in the 65 war) continued the bombing campaign against Indian airfields and radars. The limited objective remained that of creating disruption in the IAF’s day to day operations until the time came to concentrate all available effort on the 4 or 5 airfields that would pose the greatest threat to General Tikka Khan’s forces. While waiting for that phase of the land battle, the PAF’s counter air campaign involved some 130 sorties to deliver 1,000,000 lbs of bombs on their targets. The IAF was kept under constant pressure, its overall effort generation was effectively curtailed and its night operations over Pakistan proportionately inhibited.

Minutes after the Mirages and F-86s struck the IAF airfields at sunset on 3 December, No 8 Division’s artillery thundered over the Indian Dharam enclave on the Pakistani side of the Ravi, and the territory fell to General Abdul Ali Malik’s soldiers without resistance. Far to the north, General Akbar Khan was boldly launching his 12 Division towards Poonch, and in Chamb General Iftikhar prepared to lead 23 Division across Tawi river. As dusk fell in Lahore and Kasur, General Naqvi’s 10 Division and General Majid’s 11 Division attacked across the border to gain tactical ground. Fierce battles were fought in Husainiwala and Sulemanki by 106 Brigade and 105 Brigade Group, while far to the south, General Mustafa postponed for 24 hours the desert assault of his ill-prepared 18 Division to capture Ramgarh.

By 9:00 pm the IAF Canberras too were being bombed up for their night forays deep into Pakistan, their objectives hundreds of miles apart, from Kashmir to the Karachi coast, their first targets being the PAF bases which had launched the war on the western front.

But first to the incredible saga of some 18 F-86 pilots about to write an unforgettable chapter of indomitable courage over Dhaka, as they prepared to fight 200 aircraft with their 16.