The PAF had successfully accomplished the first difficult phase of its task: repelling a four times larger force’s assault against itself while providing substantial air support to Pak Army’s defensive formations. In their turn, these formations had succeeded in stopping the Indian army’s advances everywhere. The IAF had lost the will to continue its expensive daylight attacks against PAF bases which stood unharmed; the PAF’s pilot and aircraft attrition had been moderate and its logistic base was intact. The culmination of the air force mission now remained to be enacted. Plans were set for a fresh concentrated assault on preselected IAF airfields as a prelude to establishing control of the air over the area of General Tikka Khan’s offensive; this would lead to the final and most crucial phase of the PAF’s contribution: massive direct support and battlefield interdiction to sustain the momentum of that offensive, while retaining control of the air overhead.

But the offensive did not materialize, despite a last attempt by air Marshal Rahim Khan on the evening before the cease-fire, to persuade the President to “let Tikka go”. Thus it came to pass that the Pakistan army, chafing on the battlefield, and the PAF, poised at its bases, were both denied their most powerful act of reprisal – for want of a timely decision.

In the atmosphere of national rage and humiliation that prevailed after the defeat and surrender in East Pakistan, it was difficult for the PAF to derive any real comfort from an acknowledgement that it had acquitted itself honourably during those last fateful days. This recognition came, fittingly enough from the army C-in-C, in a letter to the air chief dated 1 January 72

“. . . I wish the Army was in a position to exploit the excellent favourable air situation that was made possible by your small yet hard hitting Air Force. . .”