The central principle on which Pakistan’s strategy was based was perceived by its leadership to have been validated by the 65 war. Controversial as it was, the idea persisted that East Pakistan would not be seriously threatened so long as India remained convinced that major reverses could occur on its western borders if the Indian armed might was split up to attack both wings of Pakistan simultaneously. What did come under question was the credibility of just 1 infantry division with some tanks, 1 destroyer with 4 gunboats, and 1 fighter squadron in East Pakistan in the new circumstances. To provide the eastern wing with a greater measure of confidence some additional defence assets were thought to be necessary, and had been included in the services deployment plans soon after the 1965 war. To redress, to some extent, the great disparity between the opposing air forces in the east, the PAF had decided in 1969-70 that an additional F-6 squadron should be raised to join the single F-86 squadron in Dhaka. The plan had to be shelved when the support and operation of even existing PAF squadrons became problematical due to inadequate budget allocations.

The Pakistan Army had similar plans of enhancing the land force elements in the east but these assumed urgency only when India’s preparations for invading East Pakistan became obvious in early 1971. Although still adhering to the concept that the crucial battle for the defence of Pakistan’s eastern wing would be fought on India’s western front, GHQ were by March 71 convinced that in the face of the East Pakistani rebellion, the Eastern Command had to be bolstered to a total of at least 3 infantry divisions to withstand India’s imminent multi-directional thrusts. A remarkably successful strategic airlift via Sri Lanka was then organized by the PAF, utilizing Boeing 707s of Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) during March and April 71. The airline, placed under PAF control during national emergencies, responded magnificently to this unusual task, and its crews repeatedly undertook these exhausting 6,500 mile return flights without any rest. The Eastern Command was thus provided with two additional infantry divisions (9 and 16) six months before the Indian launched their full-scale invasion at four points across East Pakistan’s border, on Eid day 21 November 71. The additional divisions were very lightly equipped and did not have their normal complement of armour, artillery and signal support. However inadequately equipped, these men at least constituted a substantial enhancement of the army’s manpower resources. The air and naval elements remained at their grossly inadequate levels.

The widely understood concept of Pakistan’s military strategy was that, if India chose to attack East Pakistan first, there would be an immediate response from Pakistani forces in the west. This doctrine had been so deeply ingrained in the minds of Pakistan’s general staff that it would have been inconceivable to imagine anything less than instant retaliation to such an Indian move.

The events which followed the Indian attack on East Pakistan, showed that the commander of Pak forces, General A A K Niazi persisted in a faulty concept of border defence, against advice from many quarters, and thus not only failed to use his zealous soldiers properly but also nullified the military advantage that the 2 additional infantry divisions had given him for effective holding action against the advancing enemy. In west, the President and army Chief of Staff fall into a paralytic state of indecision concerning the counter offensive for which they had prepared the Army and the PAF for over a year. Thus the military as well as the moral foundation of Pakistan’s defence strategy was demolished in the two wings by its own architects. As November gave way to December, the bewilderment of the soldier, sailor and airman in the field turned into raging frustration. Even when the much delayed decision was taken to open the western front on 3 December 1971, it was at the insistence of the air chief, Air Marshal Rahim Khan who, in doing so, was also voicing the feelings of GHQ’s second echelon generals and the army’s field commanders.