In 1965 the Indian armed forces were at a qualitative disadvantage in some respects but by 1971 they learned their lessons and had created for themselves ascendancy both strategically and militarily, as well as superiority in defence planning and the higher direction of war. During that year, while Pakistan’s political leadership was locked in an internal battle for power, the Indians had planned, and prepared with deliberation, for an invasion of East Pakistan – with clearly set political and military goals.

Ever since the 1965 war India had been engaged in an accelerated acquisition of weaponry from various quarters to build an effective military machine, efficiently trained, and geared for another encounter with Pakistan. In terms of military hardware the IAF stood fifth largest in the world after the USA, USSR, France and China. It possessed over 1,200 aircraft, some of them belonging to the very advanced category and the remainder of substantial capabilities.

The inventory of advanced aircraft, which were capable of performing multiple roles, comprised 232 Mig-21, 128 Su-7 and 165 Gnat fighters. These were backed by some 300 relatively old but still operational Hunters (199) Mysteres (61) and indigenously produced HF-24 Maruts (54). Nearly 85 Canberra night bombers were also available. Even the obsolete Vampire (224) and Ouragon (50) fighters could be used in areas uncontested by the PAF, to add to the IAF’s overwhelming numerical superiority.

These weapon systems gave the IAF the capability to carry out all types of offensive operations against Pakistan up to a range of 800 miles depending on the type of aircraft being utilized. In addition the IAF possessed 192 transport aircraft and 210 helicopters giving it a massive airlift and heliborne capability in support of the Indian army.

On Pakistan’s side, the PAF too had combat aircraft which could performance-wise match the IAF to a reasonable degree, but when it came to numbers, the PAF was at a tremendous disadvantage; and even relative superiority of performance can ultimately be offset by the ‘quality of numbers’. Compared with 1965, the PAF also lacked, due to unavoidable circumstances, the desired balance between offensive and defensive aircraft. The US embargo had degraded the spare support for the F-86, F-104 and B-57 force and the inescapable dependences on the Chinese F-6, a sort range air defence fighter, had meant that only the single squadron of Mirage-IIIs constituted the main offensive element of the PAF. Even the Mirage weapon system could not be equipped with special munitions for attacking target systems such as runways, armour or ships simply because such munitions did not till then exist in the French marketplace, nor could they be cleared for sale to Pakistan from other sources in Europe or USA. Moreover, the air staff had still not had the opportunity to build up sufficient numbers of certain critical items such as bomb pylons, launchers, gun packs etc for the Mirage squadron. This meant that of the 20-odd bomb, rocket, gun and missile configurations possible on the Mirage, the air staff were constrained to restrict operations to only such munition loads as would permit rapid turnaround of aircraft with minimum configuration changes.

Between the wars, the IAF had also developed and elaborate airfield infrastructure which, given Pakistan’s geographic disadvantage of lack of depth, gave the IAF an enhanced capability to reach targets deep inside Pakistan. Moreover, the Indian air defence system had been greatly improved with the soviet assistance, and now consisted of a vast network of early warning and low looking radars. The terminal defence at most of the airfields had also been upgraded with very effective rapid fire radar-controlled ack ack guns as well as surface to air missiles (SAMs). Most of the IAF’s combat aircraft could be dispersed over a number of airfields and housed in concrete shelters (pens). Finally, India had developed an indigenous manufacture and assembly capability which ensured that it had a very strong logistic base and reserve capacity in terms of aircraft, weapons and spares.

The improvements brought about were not restricted to the material sphere only. Having learnt its lessons from its 1965 encounter with the PAF, the IAF had effected changes at the conceptual and doctrinal levels as well, and operational training of pilots had received full attention. Some organizational improvements were also brought about with the creation of the IAF’s Western and Eastern Air Commands, which had their advance headquarters alongside their respective Army Commands. With each Indian corps headquarters a Tactical Air Centre (TAC) was co-located. Each of these TACs had communication links with the forward airfields where the squadron assigned for the support of a particular sector was based.

Drawing further from its lessons from 1965, the IAF also reviewed its target systems and assigned priority to attacking Pakistan’s vulnerable energy resources (fuel storage tanks, Sui gas-fields, oil refineries) and its rail and road transportation system, most of which lay within easy reach of IAF’s forward bases. In the absence of PAF radar cover, this strategy was to prove very fruitful for the enemy, specially in terms of economic losses to Pakistan, as well as by inhibiting some vital north-south rail and road traffic close to Punjab and Sind border areas.

If the situation in the West was difficult, in East Pakistan it was quite hopeless, in view of the ongoing civil war and the PAF’s small size. No 14 Squadron – the ‘Tail Choppers’ of the 65 war – had since June 67 given up their tired F-86Fs for the faster F-86Es but had continued to operate from their solitary base at Dhaka’s Tejgaon airfield, while the nearby runway at the underconstruction Kurmitola airfield was available to them only for recovery and relaunching in an emergency. Surrounding 14 Squadron were 10 squadrons with 203 aircraft of IAF comprising Hunters, Su-7s, Mig-21s and Gnats. This overwhelming force was menacingly poised at airfields all around East Pakistan, giving it a multidirectional offensive flexibility. Given the very minimal air potential of the PAF, it was thought probable that the Indian aircraft carrier Vikrant would also be deployed in the Bay of Bengal. The lone squadron at Dhaka would thus be faced with an omni-directional threat in the true sense of the word.

In terms of air defence the situation was no better. There was no early warning for Dhaka because the PAF’s mobile observer units had to be withdrawn from their border as well as inland locations after suffering casualties at the hands of the Mukti Bahini and armed insurgents. Consequently it was not possible for the Dhaka based F-86Es to scramble in time against low level raids, which would be the preferred Indian approach. Given these circumstances 14 Squadron would have to maintain round the clock Combat Air Patrols (CAPs), and to depend on the single low looking radar that was deployed 12 miles from Dhaka. It was felt that continuous CAPs around the sensitive areas demanded an unsustainable sortie rate and 14 Squadron would be forced to cut back. In view of these manifold adverse factors, the air staff did not expect the squadron at Dhaka to be able to continue its operations for more than 24 hours if the IAF employed its resources with full effectiveness.

Thus on the eve of 1971 war the odds were set heavily against the PAF; it was pitted against an air force which had an overall 4:1 numerical superiority (10:1 against East Pakistan), an elaborate infrastructure and an effective air defence system. The IAF had brought about far reaching changes in its affairs arising from the lessons of the 65 war; it was now efficiently trained and led and perhaps most importantly, its leadership had given clear political and military aims to be achieved.