A fair assessment of the PAF’s 1971 performance should be based on a close examination of statistical data such as the operational strengths of the two adversary air forces, how they were employed in their various roles and the degree to which they were successful or otherwise in achieving their tasks. An equally relevant yardstick of assessment would be to examine the operational doctrine of the PAF to see if it was realistically evolved and applied in the prevailing military environment. This history is impeded in this task much less now than it would have been twenty years ago when very little published data was available either from international sources or from the pens of Indian and Pakistani writers. Despite some aspects still remaining obscure on both sides due to continuing constraints of security, it is now possible to piece together a reasonably accurate account of the PAF’s performance in that war.

In the grave emergency that Pakistan faced in 1971, it mattered little that PAF was in a state of operational imbalance with too few offensive aircraft, had been suddenly denuded of some 30% (East Pakistani element) of its technical manpower and faced a 1:4 ratio of strength vis a vis the IAF. It had to do its best, with whatever weapons it had, to achieve the following objectives in support of the ‘West fights for East’ land battle strategy of the Pakistan Army:

Additionally, the air force was to provide limited transport support to the sister services and to airlift warlike materials from certain foreign countries. The overriding element of the PAF’s operational plan was its crucial support of the army’s retaliation in the west; every other consideration – no matter how important it appear in itself – had to be given a lower priority. All other guidelines for operations were to flow from the PAF’s deliberate decision to carry the offensive to the enemy. Of course, the IAF was to be fought on favourable terms whenever this could be managed, but all bases threatening the Pak Army’s operation, no matter how well defended, were to be attacked by the PAF. As far as air defence was concerned, priority had to be given to war-relevant installations, in view of the severely limited number of aircraft as well as the absence of radar cover in many strategic areas. All preparations from April onwards, and all actions during the war itself, were to be guided by these cardinal considerations.

It is in the foregoing perspective that the PAF’s operational performance can now be evaluated with some established statistical data.