In contrast to its adversary, the PAF had struggled with a number of serious problems immediately after the 1965 war and had only partly resolved some of them by 1971. When the United States, Pakistan’s predominant source for defence equipment, embargoed the supply of arms and spares to both Pakistan and India, this ‘even handed’ policy was in fact highly discriminatory against Pakistan because India, in any case, received almost all of its equipment from the Soviet Union. The latter, far from exhibiting neutrality towards the two states, had in effect become a party to its ally’s aggressive designs.

In this hour of Pakistan’s predicament, China came forward to set perhaps the modern world’s best example of how to forge sincere, enduring and mutually beneficial relations between sovereign states. With her help the unsupportable American F-86 was replaced by the F-6. A Chinese-built version of the Soviet MiG-19 (India was already flying its successor, the Mig-21, in large numbers) the F-6 was, in both ground attack and interception roles, less capable than the F-86. The endurance of the F-6 was shorter, its weapon delivery system reflected technologies of the late 1940s, and it could carry only about half the munition load of the F-86. On the plus side, the F-6 was considerably faster and, with modifications applied to it by the PAF, it could be made to perform quite well, specially in the air defence role for which it was primarily designed. In its financially stringent circumstances, the PAF eagerly and gratefully inducted about 100 F-6s, modified them and trained on them with the greatest urgency as India’s determination to avenge the 1965 stalemate became unambiguously manifest.

A revival of the dwindling force of US-supplied F-86Fs was also sought by the PAF with the acquisition of a Canadian-built variant, the F-86E. Some 90 used Es were being phased out of the German Air Force in 1966 and their induction provided the PAF with a critically needed cushion. Despite being in the last years of their useful life word-wide, both models of the F-86 were kept operational by tapping international sources for badly needed spare parts, as well as by locally manufacturing a number of components.

The underground arms bazaars that would become commonplace in the 80s were very dubious sources in those closing years of the 60s. The PAF’s other two types of combat aircraft, the F-104s and B-57s, became even more difficult to support than the F-86s. Lack of options compelled the air force to obtain spares from any willing source, while the US Government continued to apply its discriminatory embargo against Pakistan.

The only significant new addition to the PAF’s obsolescent force was a squadron of 23 French Mirage fighter-bombers delivered in 1967. The Mirage-III was quite effective as a day interceptor and somewhat better in the strike role, capable of delivering bombs and rockets on targets as far away as 250 miles. However, its AI radar was susceptible to ground clutter at low altitude and, coupled with the marginal performance of the handful of the low level air defence radars, this left a persisting void in the PAF’s capability against low level night attacks. Besides, the severe budgetary constraints precluded the acquisition of this expensive aircraft in large numbers, and it seemed very probable that in war the single Mirage squadron would need to split up to perform a wide variety of offensive and defensive tasks.

All in all, when the Indian forces were poised to cross East Pakistan’s borders in the undeclared war they would start on 21 November 71, the PAF could muster only 280 combat aircraft against the IAF’s 1,025 – not counting the 275 fighters held in reserve by the latter.

The deficiencies in the PAF’s infrastructure, highlighted by the 65 war, did receive a great deal of attention and by the time war clouds began to gather in the early 1971, the PAF had twice the number of operational bases. Nearly all had underground fuel storage, command and communication centres and other essential facilities. Concrete pens were available for fighter aircraft and munitions were stocked in dispersed locations. In East Pakistan too, a fully-fledged operational alternative to Dhaka’s Tejgaon airfield was being built at nearby Kurmitola, but the progress of construction had been severely affected by the disturbed conditions in that wing.

The air defence environment of the country had only marginally improved since 1965. Despite the US embargo the 2 American high powered radars were being kept in a serviceable state, albeit with great difficulty, and greater reliance was being placed on the 3 medium powered and 5 low looking radars inducted since the 65 war. Altogether these radars provided barely 25% of the high level cover required over sensitive areas, and a mere 7% of the desired surveillance at low level. The network left some dangerous gaps in the Kashmir region and in the area south of Multan between Sukkur and Hyderabad. Of the 2 radars deployed in the East Pakistan, one had to be withdrawn due to increasing threats of sabotage by the East Pakistani insurgents and Indian abettors.