The PAF’s day and night strikes against Indian airfields and radars which began on 3 December were in accordance with the high command’s operational concepts. Recognizing the limited size and means of the PAF, it had been decided that all air operations would be governed by five basic goals.

The overriding priority of the PAF was to give maximum support to General Tikka Khan’s proposed offensive into India; every other air force objective was to be subordinated to this requirement. The air chief considered this commitment to be pivotal because the success or failure of the PAF’s support would in all likelihood determine the fate of Pakistan’s crucial offensive. When the estimated ‘cost’ of fulfilling this commitment was calculated at his behest by the planning staff in July 1971, it worked out at a loss of 100-120 combat aircraft and pilots over the projected 7-10 day period. Rahim Khan was aware that this would amount to losing one third of his force but he had the full support of his senior commanders when he directed them in August to prepare their units to pay this price for ensuring the success of the army’s offensive.

It followed from the pervasive primary mission that a condition of air superiority would have to be achieved, in he form of a moving umbrella over the Army’s deep thrust, just before it got underway. Beneath that umbrella would be the additional need for some direct offensive support by the PAF, to soften specially hard resistance by opposing Indian army units. The deeper Tikka Khan’s penetration the greater would be the IAF’s intensity of attacks – and staying power – against his forces, as they drew closer to the enemy airfields in the process. This also meant that the control of air space over the battle area would be more and more fiercely contested as operations progressed. The implication of this assessment was that the Pak Army offensive must advance very rapidly and, having reached its objectives, must consolidate its position as swiftly as possible. The PAF’s protective cover would continue to be provided in full measure until Pak forces could dig in and secure their own protection.

Control of the air, even in the limited area of Pakistan’s counter attack, involved not just the prevention of IAF interference by direct confrontation overhead. The PAF also felt compelled to plan attacks against those 4-5 enemy airfields from where the maximum weight of attack against General Tikka Khan’s force could be launched. How could this counter air effort be conducted? Since all the combat aircraft on these airfields would be invulnerable to air attack in their concrete pens, and since other camouflaged targets such as fuel tankage, ammunition dumps and command centres could not be readily identified or accurately attacked, particularly at night, the targeting choice once again fell, as in the 65 war, on Indian runways and air defence radars.

Another key task to enhance Tikka Khan’s chances of success would be for the PAF to interdict enemy supplies directly serving the Indian forces opposing him. To preserve the element of surprise, these interdiction and airfield strikes in support of the offensive would be commenced only after it had been launched.

Next came those other tasks the importance of which the PAF high command fully appreciated within the context of the overriding mission i.e. promoting the success of Tikka Khan’s offensive. These tasks are outlined below.

Until the army’s offensive was launched, the PAF was to maintain offensive pressure on the IAF with sustained strikes against some of its forward and rear bases, in order to inhibit – both physically and psychologically – the enemy’s ability to act against either the Pak Army in the field or other targets on Pakistani territory, including the PAF’s own air bases and other installations. During this same period, the PAF was also to provide whatever air support was needed for the Pak Army’s holding actions along the entire 3,700-kilometer border from Kashmir to Kutch. These relatively shallow penetration actions were meant to tie down as many of the enemy’s resources as possible and to try to achieve a favourable tactical posture in the process.

As war progressed, the PAF was also to provide whatever air support it could to Pak navy within the limits of its air-to-sea capability, which in real terms, was near zero. The PAF did not have a maritime recce capability of any consequence, and totally lacked any special anti-ship weapons such as torpedoes or mines. These PAF limitations had remained unchanged since before the 65 war and naval headquarters (NHQ) staff had been aware of them all along. Consequently they had not placed any unrealistic demands on the PAF during the war.