For most of its existence, the Pakistan Navy has failed to receive the degree of attention and budgetary support that its mission and role have demanded. Prior to 1971, one of its most important tasks – to keep the sea lanes between East and West Pakistan open – was totally beyond its capabilities. After the 71 war, the PN rightly felt that it had not been equipped to meet even its diminished obligations in national defence. Perhaps long exposure to budgetary neglect had compelled the Service to seek more air support for its operations than could be reasonably expected.

In a spirit of inter-service cooperation the PAF had always striven to support naval air operations to the maximum extent within its limited means. Unfortunately, despite Air Headquarters’ attempts to establish a viable antishipping in the air force, paucity of funds had always defeated such moves. It was only after the loss of two naval vessels in quick succession to enemy missile boats in the 71 war, that both the PN and the PAF were enabled to acquire some minimal air to sea capability.

In 1971 all that the PAF could do in support of the navy was to provide only daytime strikes against ships at sea. In the maritime reconnaissance field, the PAF could place PIA aircraft or its own C-130s at the navy’s disposal but for visual surveillance only – effective round-the-clock reconnaissance demanded much more sophisticated hardware: specially equipped aircraft with modern radars and other sensors to detect surface and sub-surface vessels and to distinguish between hostile and friendly ships. As clouds of war gathered again in Mid-71, neither the PN nor the PAF had any such capability.

Senior Air Headquarters staff officers were anxious that their naval counterparts should be equally mindful of these and other deficiencies; one of the limitations was dramatically illustrated in a navel-air exercise in which the PAF’s inability to attack ships at night was clearly brought out. Anticipating that, as a last resort in a tight situation, the PN may still be tempted to look to the PAF for unrealistic assistance, a special meeting was called at Air Headquarters in February 71 to reach a very clear understanding about the scope of air support that the navy could expect. It was explained to the Director of Naval Warfare and Operations, who represented the PN, that while shore installations of importance such as the Indian naval base at Okha would be targeted by the PAF, both by day and by night, enemy ships at sea just could not be attacked at night as that capability did not exist. Targets at sea could only be attacked by day, and only with conventional bombs, rockets and guns, provided they were within range and their position was accurately pinpointed by the Maritime Headquarters (MHQ). Regrettably, all those well documented and painstakingly defined limitations seemed to have been forgotten at the very outset of the war: the first mission the navy demanded of the PAF was a night strike against enemy ships 270 miles out at sea!

Recognizing the psychological pressure of their predicament to be the main cause of MHQ’s persistence with unrealistic demands, the COC staff did their best to help out to the limits of the air force’s means. Every night PAF B-57s and F-86s were tasked, at PN’s request, to search and destroy Osa missile boats. They flew at different heights and in different patterns; they improvised imaginative techniques to utilize their onboard equipment and all the knowledge that they possessed, to try and locate the elusive boats, but to no avail; they just did not have the right equipment. The PAF had all the sympathy for the PN in its loss of two ships on the second night of the war.

The second Osa boat attack that set the oil tanks in the Karachi harbour on fire (which burned fiercely for many days) was thought to be well synchronised with the IAF’s bomber attack at Masroor which occurred at the same time. Subsequent revelations show that it was only a coincidence and that the Canberra leader was completely unaware of the missile boats presence in the same area which contained his target. Each service claimed to have started this “biggest fire in Asia”.

There were some moments of acute emotion, frustration and embarrassment between MHQ and COC, as evident from some of the entries made in the log book at COC:

6 December: 0547

6 December: 0640

9 December: 0045

Realistic or not, the PAF went along with the MHQ’s demands in a spirit of comradeship and to the best of its ability. It flew 35 missions on B-57, F-86, F-104 and T-33 in PN’s support, besides making 127 sorties available to the navy for visual reconnaissance.

Not all the missions were futile though; On the night of 5/6 December, a B-57 piloted by Flight Lieutenant Shabbir struck Okha harbour and set its fuel tanks on fire. The fire could be seen from 60 miles and burned for several days, as confirmed by 2 F-104 pilots who went four days later to attack Okha harbour again. They set some more tanks on fire, but did not spot any Osa boats on the way in or out from the target. On 10 December, the F-104s again went to Okha and the leader Wing Commander Arif Iqbal shot down an Indian naval Alize aircraft on the way.

It is virtually certain that the PN officers at the MHQ were aware that they were asking the PAF to do things which were beyond its capabilities. But in later recollections of their desperate predicaments, perhaps some of them tended to forget the patience and readiness with which the air force gave them all it had.