The flash message which went out to all PAF bases at 1735 hrs on 3 December must have occasioned wry smiles in the ops room of 14 Squadron at Tejgaon airfield: “As of this evening Pakistan is at full scale war with India. Phase Three is declared with immediate effect.’’

Due to a temporary communications breakdown the message arrived an hour late but this made little difference to the recipients. No 14 Squadron and all of Eastern Command had in fact been in a state of full scale war since 25 March 71. The mounting disaffection among the East Pakistanis had rapidly escalated into a full blown armed rebellion, with Indian aid and encouragement. Sabotage and murder had become commonplace and of the 1,222 air force men based in that wing, the 645 East Pakistani had to be laid off duty by early April 71. The PAF’s mobile observer units (MOUs) deployed in the countryside to give early warning of IAF attacks, had to be withdrawn in the first week of April after 40 airmen and one officer were murdered by terrorists at different locations. Against a multi-directional air threat, including one from Bay of Bengal where the Indian aircraft carrier Vikrant was expected to make an appearance, there was now no reliable source of advance warning except from a few Pak Army units scattered here and there along the border.

After March, the transfer of jet fuel from the Narayanganj depot to Dhaka airfield in bowsers also became impractical and the PAF was forced to use the C-130 in the tanker role; it brought fuel from as far away as Rangoon and Sri Lanka to keep the tanks at Dhaka airfield topped up. The Sri Lankan government, however, would understandably not permit warlike materials to be transported from West to East Pakistan via their territory, such as 2 replacements F-86Es, 2 T-33s and 2 Alouette helicopters.

The adverse air situation in the east was not unanticipated. After the 65 war a minimum of 2 fighter squadrons were proposed to be based in East Pakistan and these were to have a choice of widely dispersed wartime airfields from which to operate. For their permanent peace time location, the PAF had succeeded in persuading the government to invest in a new air base at nearby Kurmitola, whose runway was ready for use by mid-71, but without any facilities. Another air base, 50 miles north of the Tejgaon-Kurmitola complex was proposed by the air force but had yet to be approved. Owing to the acute scarcity of high ground which would stay dry during the torrential monsoon rains, the PAF appreciated the government’s inability to acquire any more land for new airfields; as an alternative, the air force succeeded in having a ‘road runway’ plan approved in 1967 whereby 3 jet landing strips would be provided along the existing roads near Bogra, Sylhet and Joydevpur. The project was to be funded by the ministry of communications but became a victim of lethargy and shortage of funds; none of the 3 road runways was available for use in November 71.

The men of the 14 Squadron operated with resolute courage under these grim conditions. During March and April the squadron flew some 170 sorties for air support to the army which had become heavily engaged in operations against the Mukti Bahini and by mid-year, had managed significantly to reduce he scale of rebel activity. Then followed a lull during the monsoons when the intensity of the insurgency was even further inhibited. The Indian high command had become increasingly perturbed by this diminished activity and, in the words of the Indian Deputy Director of Military Operations of the time:

“Hope of a solution through Mukti Bahini action had receded, for it was apparant that that it would take such a movement years to unloosen the military stranglehold on Bangladesh … Under the circumstances, restive public opinion forced the Government to contemplate the extreme step of military intervention … The service chiefs were given the go ahead to plan and carry out preparations to meet the contingency … New Delhi, alienated by the US, turned to the Soviet Union in its difficulties … and … an Indo-Soviet treaty … was announced on 9 August 71.”

In the third week of November the Indian prime minister announced in the Lok Sabha that “Indian forces had been instructed to enter East Bengal in self defence”.

The demand for air support sharply increased in November and 14 Squadron flew nearly 100 sorties to assist Pak Army units. It provided several fighter escorts to PIA Fokkers ferrying troops to Jessore near the western border for reinforcement against an Indian infantry and armour penetration some 15 miles inside the border. The PAF went into action on 19 November to impede this thrust and flew several missions against Indian guns and troops. Tanks were well camouflaged and could be spotted for the first time only on 22 November. A photo recce RT-33 flew in the area to confirm enemy dispositions, while F-86s helped to enforce the army’s ‘river curfew’ to eliminate rebel strongholds. The squadron had been kept busy in attacking Indian tanks and troops near Chaugacha since the early hours of 22 November, and had not met any opposition.

At 1518 hrs another flight of 3 F-86Es was called out with guns and rockets to the Chaugacha area. Although after 3 attacks the Sabres were running low on fuel, the formation leader, Wing Commander Afzal Chaudhry carried out a fourth attack. During this dive he heard his No 2 calling out that 2 Gnats were behind him. Chaudhry broke into the Gnats and shot one of them down. Soon thereafter his wingman again called to say that 2 more Gnats were now in pursuit. Chaudhry then ordered a disengagement but when he looked back he could not spot his wingman and saw his No 3, Flight Lieutenant Pervez Mehdi, ejecting after being hit by the enemy fighters. As Chaudhry headed back alone towards Dhaka he acutely felt the absence of any radar cover for his own formation whereas the IAF aircraft had the advantage of this facility. Both his No 3 and his wingman Flying Officer Khalil, had been shot down over Pakistani territory but were transported to India after being taken prisoner by the Mukti Bahini. The lack of radar cover also hampered the timely rescue of the downed pilots despite a rescue helicopter being rushed to the scene.

Operating under these extremely difficult conditions the AOC, Air Commodore Inamul Haq Khan now prepared 14 Squadron for its ultimate test. He reorganized Tejgaon’s ack ack defences, dispersed all his aircraft, and mobilized special runway repair teams of army jawans and airmen. Dummy aircraft and equipment were placed in eye catching spots at Kurmitola and Tejgaon, while the real hardware was carefully camouflaged. He asked for, and made maximum use of, any defence warnings that could be provided by the outlying Pak Army border forces. The AOC considered Chittagong airfield to the south to be too far for protection by his single squadron and ordered its runway to be blocked. Jessore airfield on the western border had to be evacuated when it began to come under constant Indian artillery fire in the last week on November. Each of the 600 odd men under the AOC’s command had more than enough to do, and every single one responded with inspired dedication. Above all, everyone’s eyes were focused on the pilots of 14 Squadron who symbolised their defiance and resolution.