As the bombed up B-57s were being given their final checks on the evening of 3 December, for their deep strikes against Indian airfields, the air defence system in West Pakistan – night interceptors, high and low looking radars, MOUs and ack ack guns – waited in readiness for the expected night assault that would herald the Indian counter attack. The defenders’ means were significantly better than those in East Pakistan, but the PAK was still far from well equipped for night interception of low flying targets. There were no doppler radars (later to become commonplace) to provide reliable detection of such targets and the few available low looking radars did not give sufficiently long or dependable early warning; the Mirage and F-104 air interception radars too were of late-50s design and virtually ineffective against low targets; none of the ack ack guns defending the airfields were radar-directed and there were no SAMs possessed at that time by any service in Pakistan. The carefully kept secret of existing gaps in the country’s radar coverage had also been divulged to the Indians by the defecting East Pakistani officers.

The operational limitations imposed by these deficiencies in the PAF’s air defence system were fully understood by the men involved. In the post-65 period they had trained with full consciousness of their reduced capabilities. This was an advantage in some respects: commanders and staff officers at all level were able to set and achieve realistic goals, without being misled by wishful notions or exaggerated expectations.

The first of 15 Canberra raids on the night of ¾ December struck Rafiqui air base at 2236; also included in that night’s targeting were Sargodha, Mianwali, Risalewala, Murid, Chander and Masroor. The four bombers against Masroor were led, on that night and the following two nights, by the CO of No 35 Squadron, Wing Commander K K Budhwar, operating from Pune. Budhwar believed that except for “one lucky strike on a culvert at Masroor on the very first night . . . no major damage was inflicted on the PAF or its installations.” Although he wanted to attack Karachi harbour’s oil storage tanks . . .his request was ‘turned down’ . . . by his superiors who wanted him to . . . ‘‘Keep to the targets designated, which were the airfields around the Karachi, and not to be diverted to anything else.’’

In fact there were two lucky strikes by the IAF’s bombs at Masroor during the war. The culvert (which was hit on the second night, not the first) did prevent some aircraft from taxying out to the runway for about 3-4 hours, and a hangar received a direct hit on the night of 5/6 December, destroying an Elint RB-57 perked there temporarily for maintenance. Although the Karachi tanks farms were fairly lucrative targets, the IAF squadron commander’s experience provides confirmation that the subject of bomber targeting was receiving equal scrutiny on both sides of the border. The PAF’s B-57 commanders and its leadership remained convinced that, given the bombing systems’ unsuitability for precision attack, runways offered the best returns.

Damage done by the Canberras on that first night was light, due to the most of the bombs missing the runways. At Sargodha the 4 craters the grassy sides of the main runway caused no damage, but threw up a lot of the loose earth which was soon swept off while operations continued unhindered from other runways. One bomb at Mianwali caused an identical inconvenience while Masroor remained completely undamaged. The only runway to be cratered was at Chander, where repair parties soon got to work.

The Canberras followed a similar bombing routine throughout the war, given almost uninterrupted nightly attention to Masroor and Faisal (Drigh Road) while the intensity of raids on other airbases varied according to the IAF’s own perception of how best to inhibit of the PAF’s operations in these sectors. Occasionally Su-7s were also used for night bombing, some of these obviously in the hands of skilful pilots.

On the night of 4/5 December, 6 air bases were attacked, Masroor again receiving the maximum number of bombs, on of which cratered the main runway and the other destroyed a taxiway culvert. Chander airfield was also cratered in two places but both air bases were soon recovered. One of the Canberras (piloted by Flight Lieutenant M Sasoon) was shot down by Flight Lieutenant Naeem Ata with a missile from his Mirage.

The IAF mustered its maximum bombing effort on the night of 5/6 December and lost its second Canberra (piloted by Flight Lieutenant S K Goswamy) to the Sargodha ack ack gunners. One crater on Sargodha’s main runway again forced the base to switch operations to alternate runways. Another bomb impacted on a night engineering facility where Squadron Leader Dar and Flight Lieutenant Wasim were working; both were killed. At Masroor that night the PAF lost the valuable Elint RB-57 and the secondary runway received a hit, hampering operations for sometime.

During the next four nights, the IAF’s night bombing campaign began to decline sharply - a fact not fully explained by the waning moon - and totally ceased during the remaining eight nights of the war except once, on 14/15 December, when only Masroor was attacked with 3 Canberras, without causing any significant damage. The PAF B-57s were, on the other hand, able to continue their nightly assaults against Indian targets without a break until the ceasefire.

In summary, the Canberra/Su-7 night bombing campaign did little to frustrate the PAF’s night or day operations. A certain amount of disruption was caused which could have seriously hampered certain specific operations but for the unruffled manner in which the repair crews went about the recovery of damaged runways. The effect of sustained night bombing on the morale of personnel was also to be reckoned with and in the PAF’s case, spirits seemed to remain high at air bases and elsewhere.