Events leading up to the separation of East Pakistan from its western half in 1971 will be interpreted differently for many decades, not the least due to the fact that throughout most of that year both Pakistan and its enemies reacted to events with such mutual intransigence as could lead to only one end – the dismemberment of Pakistan. But by now some established facts of that separation also stand out clearly: that there was an unforgivable failure on the part of Pakistan’s leadership in both wings to act purposefully to dispel the East Pakistan’s notion that their wing was being economically exploited by the West, and that East Pakistan had been left defenceless against India because of inadequate forces in that wing; that after the 1970 election, a totally irreconcilable conflict arose between the leadership of the Awami League and the PPP, after the latter refused to abide by the verdict of that election; that the military President of that time did not move forcefully, as he should have, to resolve the conflict; and finally that the decision by the Pakistani government in March 71 to try and avert secession by the use of force, while legitimate by prevailing international norms, betrayed a superficial reading of the true dimensions of the political problem of East Pakistan.

But these were not the only, and in the event not even the decisive, factors which brought about the actual dismemberment of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh. Many countries, including some highly developed ones, are tackling similar problems of social inequality and the consequent secessionary pressures – but they all need time to solve them. In 1971, India’s collusion with the Soviet Union, formally embodied in the treaty signed that year between the two states, foreclosed the possibility of Pakistan getting the time needed for resolving its crisis.

India’s hue and cry about the 10 million refugees that had allegedly poured into her territory – but were never allowed to be visited by any international agency – fooled not even her staunchest supporters. Of the many countries that condemned Pakistan’s harsh suppression of the Bengalis, none failed to see the Indian forces’ crossing of East Pakistan’s borders on 22 November of what it was: a brazen aggression, on the strength of a superpower’s backing, against a sovereign neighbouring state which had been militarily debilitated by a highly inflamed civil war.

Following the defeat of Pakistan’s forces in the East, the irrepressible urge to exult soon led India to drop all pretence about what it had earlier projected as moral support of the oppressed, and to claim now a ‘second liberation’ of a part of the original undivided India. But wars, whether evilly premeditated or fought in righteous defence have, in the end, being judged by the modern world more for their aftermath than against the logic of morality. As the pilots of Pakistan’s only squadron in the eastern wing took to the air repeatedly from Dhaka against 10 IAF squadrons attacking it from all sides, these young men were under no illusion about the end. Their spirited assaults upon the Indian bombers over Tejgaon airport were clearly visible to foreign correspondents from the roof of the nearby Dhaka Intercontinental hotel. Several of the newsmen took pictures and movies shots of India fighters being chased and shot down by the handful of outnumbered 14 Squadron pilots who continued, even as their ability to operate from Dhaka diminished with the increasingly-cratered runway, to write another glorious chapter of courage and perseverance of the history of their Service.