In the case of the PAF there was another reason: the unrealistically powerful image of the air force that had been created after the 65 war. It is very true that the PAF had been well prepared and well trained and well led in the preceding years, and during that war the leadership had exploited this background to the best advantage. But in all sober analyses, it was also manifestly clear that the spectacular success of the PAF was in considerable measure attributable to its adversary’s multi-faceted shortcomings. While it may have been undesirable from the public relations angle to explicitly acknowledge this fact, there was no justification for going to other extreme, to project a greatly inflated image of the PAF’s capabilities. The inevitable result of this exaggeration was a notion which took root among the sister services that the PAF would always be on call ‘anytime, anywhere’ to relieve imminent misadventures on land and at sea.

Although the majority of the PAF’s hierarchy tried to dispel this dangerous notion both within the air force and without, the David and Goliath allusion gained favour even in government circles, and did so in both its implications: that the grossly outnumbered PAF would emerge ever victorious over its enemy, and that it would continue to do so without needing to increase in size; this latter notion being of course, an economically convenient self delusion.

It goes to the credit of the large majority of professional PAF officers and men that they were able to keep their heads in that euphoric aftermath of the 65 war, and to view the PAF’s success in its true perspective. Only thus were they able to continue seriously to train for what might lie ahead.