Having attended several GHQ briefings since April 71, the air C-in-C had acquired a fairly clear picture of how the air force would be expected to support the army one the battles at the frontiers commenced. Pakistan’s holding corps, divisions and independent brigades were well balanced, except 18 Division which had too large an area of responsibility – a 560 mile front from Rahimyar Khan to Badin in the south. The chief of air force operations had been specially tasked to explain, both verbally and in writing, to his GHQ counterpart the capabilities and limitations of the PAF in support of the holding formations. For this purpose, a top secret letter was delivered to GHQ in May, stating the precise scale of air support which could be expected by the holding units in each sector; thereafter this document became a part of the army’s operations instruction. In mid-November 71, another classified paper from Air Headquarters was delivered to GHQ describing to the nature and quantum of air support to be expected by General Tikka Khan when he launched his offensive.

All though the late-70 and till mid-71, Air Headquarters had studied with GHQ the operational tasks of all the holding formations, including 18 Division which had been assigned essentially defensive operations. Appreciating the lack of air cover in the Sukkur area, the Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Operations) once again visited GHQ in August to emphasize the point that when ever any offensive operations were intended by 18 Division, the PAF should be given a specified notice so as to enable it to activate the nearby Jacobabad air base and to deploy aircraft there in accordance with a contingency plan which had been drawn up for the purpose. While reassuring the ACAS (Ops) with regard to the notice for Jacobabad, the GHQ planning staff seemed quite certain that 18 Division could not be tasked for an offensive into India because it was short of ammunition, water and sand tyres, and its old Sherman tanks were incapable of moving on sand. And yet, just before the war started, unknown on the PAF, 18 Division was given an unscheduled task to prepare for a two-brigade offensive to capture Ramgarh.

In the event, none of the holding formations, except 18 Division in the south and 8 Armoured Brigade Group in the Shakargarh salient, got into the kind of tight corner which required massive emergency air support to avoid a catastrophe. The table given below summarizes the air support given to the main army formations during the war.

S No	Formation	Interdiction	Armed Recce	Photo Recce	Close Air Support	CAP Cover over Movement	Total Sorties
1	GHQ/JOC	89	37	4	10	6	146
2	1 Corps	6	7	-	2	-	15
3	2 Corps	-	-	-	-	79	79
4	23 Division	85	11	2	19	-	117
5	15 Division	6	-	-	-	-	6
6	8 Division	147	-	6	51	2	206
7	10 Division	2	-	-	5	-	7
8	11 Division	28	16	16	3	-	63
9	105 Bridgade Gp	-	4	-	47	-	51
10	18 Division	38	17	-	69	18	142
11	33 Division	-	-	-	51	34	85
12	6 Armoured Division	-	-	-	-	2	2
	Total Sorties	401	92	28	257	141	919

In the Chamb-Jaurian Sector, Major General Iftikhar’s 23 Division captured Chamb by 8 December after several bravely fought actions. PAF Sabres from Peshawar were called in to support this division early on 4 December and assisted in softening enemy defences on both banks of the Tawi river. From the following day Murid and Sargodha F-86s and F-6s also joined in a destroyed 18 medium guns and an ammunition dump. PAF fighters providing cover to own troops in this area met with fierce opposition. On 10 December Wing Commander Moin Rub and Flight Lieutenant Taloot patrolling in F-86Es intercepted 2 Su-7s and shot them down over Jaurian but on the same day another F-86E flown by Squadron Leader Aslam Chaudhry was shot down by an enemy fighter. The area was particularly suited for interdiction operations, and despite strong IAF opposition, the Sabres bombed and strafed a large ammunition dump at Akhnur, and in direct support shot up many tanks, trucks and troop concentrations on the battlefield.

In the early hours of 5 December, during a convoy interdiction mission in the same area, Squadron Leader Israr Qureshi’s T-6G was hit by enemy ground fire and a shell fractured the pilot’s right arm. Profusely bleeding, the pilot flew the aircraft back with his left hand and landed safely. On 10 December, after the untimely death of General Iftikhar in a helicopter crash, his gallant force successfully crossed the Tawi during the night, although at a cost of many lives. The force was withdrawn to the west bank after the new GOC took over command and its defences were secured. The PAF’s air support to this division totalled 117 sorties.

In the Shakargarh area, the largest number of air support sorties (206) were flown when a grave situation developed against Major General Malik’s 8 Division after its first night’s success in capturing the Dharam enclave on the Ravi. A strong multi-directional attack had been launched by the Indian Army across the Ravi and from Samba in the north, to capture Shakargarh and deeper objectives, but the PAF’s timely intervention effectively frustrated this Indian move. Most of the close support missions were escorted by accompanying top cover to enable attack pilots to give undivided attention to target identification and accurate weapon delivery.

Meanwhile 8 Division continued to fight local actions successfully, inflicting casualties on enemy troops who managed to advance through some gaps in Pakistani minefields. In this area, the PAF’s F-6s and F-86s from Sargodha, Murid, Peshawar and Risalewala provided extensive battlefield support and interdiction with guns, rockets and bombs every day from 7 to 17 December and Mirage photo recce missions were flown whenever requested. It was during this period that the PAF attacked three bridging attempts across the river, effectively disrupting the bridging operations and in the process, destroying or disabling 56 tanks, 114 vehicles and several troop concentrations in the bulge as well as in the surrounding areas of Samba, Jassar and Dera Baba Nanak.

Overhead, air engagements were a frequent occurrence. On 7 December Flight Lieutenants Atiq and Mushaf in their F-6s met 4 Su-7s and downed one each. Enemy ack ack claimed Flight Lieutenant Fazal Elahi’s F-86F the next day and he was killed. On 11 December Wing Commander Imam Bokhari and Squadron Leader Cecil Chaudhry in 2 F-86Es intercepted and shot down 1 Su-7 each, Bokhari damaging a third. Only five days earlier Cecil himself had been shot down in error by Pak Army ack ack, but was safely recovered to fly another day. Enemy ack ack continued to take its toll and on 11 December Flight Lieutenant Shahid Raza’s F-6 was shot down and he was lost. In the last air encounter over this area Squadron Leader Salim Gauhar in an F-86 spotted a light observation aircraft and shot it down.

To try and halt the continuing Indian advance into the Shakargarh bulge, 8 Armoured Brigade launched a counter attack on the night of 15/16 December. This was the biggest and bloodiest tank battle of the war. 13 Lancers and 31 Cavalry began their advance their objective Bara Pind in the early hours of 16 December, and ran straight into a well prepared killing ground of recoilless rifles and Indian tanks. Both units fought with outstanding courage, some indomitable crews changing in mid-battle from their stricken tanks into others that were combat-worthy, and in this manner finally succeeded in halting the enemy. The battle was over in a matter of minutes but the brigade paid heavily for inadequate reconnaissance before commencing its attack. There was no time to call for air support.

In the Sialkot area, while Major General Abid Zahid’s 15 Division was keeping the opposing Indian units busy in minor skirmishes, it lost Pukhlian salient on the night of ¾ December because the salient was held too lightly, mostly by rangers. No further action of consequence took place in this sector. The PAK was asked for only 6 sorties of interdiction in support of this formation but lost an F-6 to enemy flak on 7 December; the pilot, Flight Lieutenant Wajid Ali was taken POW.

In the Lahore sector, 10 Division commanded by Major General Naqvi fought several successful tactical actions, occupying Indian territory, improving defences in its area of responsibility, and keeping the front secured until the end of the war. The Division used only 7 sorties of close support and battlefield interdiction.

In the Kasur sector Major General Majid’s 11 Division began its limited operations on 3 December to improve its respective brigade defences. The small Pakistani enclave of Sehjra was attacked in strength by the Indians who occupied the village. The Division’s 106 Brigade captured the important Hussainiwala enclave by midnight of 3 December in a well executed and heroically fought battle. The Indian’ Army’s subsequent attempts to retake Hussainiwala failed despite IAF assistance. The PAF’s F-86s and Mirages flew 37 sorties in support of this brigade and accounted for several vehicles and an ammunition dump, apart from a number of enemy troops.

By far the most significant action occurred in the area of 105 Brigade Group led by Brigadier Amir Hamza where an imaginative and courageous assault on Sulemanki succeeded magnificently. It was in this battle that the brigade commander earned an HJ and one of his officers Major Shabbir Sharif, the highest gallantry award of Nishan-e-Hiader. The enemy defences were extremely strong and well prepared, and their neutralization involved hand-to-hand combat extending to several days, during which the enemy tried repeatedly to recover lost ground. The PAF’s contribution was in the form of some 50 f-86E sorties from Rafiqui, which attacked Indian bunkers, troop concentrations and enemy aircraft overhead, during which Flight Lieutenant Bhatti shot down a Hunter over Sulemanki Fazilka area on 7 December.

Ill fate had nothing to do with the failure of 18 Division’s attack against Ramgarh. The air chief was in CHQ on the morning of 4 December when he heard that 18 Division was to launch an attack towards Jaisalmer. He asked the CGS as to why the army was springing this sudden surprise on the PAF. Gul Hassan replied that the division commander had a good plan and that he will, “jump into Ramgarh one day and the next day he will be in Jaisalmer’’. Greatly disturbed, the air chief told the CGS that the area was out of reach of the PAF both from Sargodha and Karachi, whereas the IAF had at least 3 air bases around Jaisalmer from where it could give a severe pounding to 18 Division. But his warning went unheeded and GHQ allowed the operation to proceed. Otherwise too, the 2 brigades were neither equipped nor prepared to undertake a penetration in the desert. In the event, water, fuel and ammunition soon ran out, tanks got lost and bogged down, units failed to reach assigned objectives and pandemonium prevailed. At least one of the two brigade commanders had been courageous enough before the attack to say that his troops were not ready for the operation.

There was no PAF aircraft based within 250 miles to provide air support to the division whose commander clearly had the responsibility to have established this fact. Consequently, it look just 4 of the 6 enemy Hunters based at Jaisalmer to destroy or disable most of the Pakistani tanks on 5 and 6 December. Jacobabad had not been activated because, contrary to the agreement, GHQ had failed to notify the PAF. Only the B-57s and C-130s could reach the battle area and Jaisalmer airfield, both of which were attacked sporadically. The division withdrew its forces and a new commander (Major General Hameed) took over on 7 December. Thereafter the front became inactive.

A much more serious situation was developing further south, in the Chor-Nagar Parkar sector, requiring all of the Masroor-based air support capability. The enemy had advanced on four axes and had penetrated along the Khokrapar-Chor railway line, south of it up to Umarkot and Chachro and to Nagar Parkar itself. It goes to the credit of the PAF that it played a decisive role in preventing this advance farther inland. The Base Commander, Air Commander Nazir Latif and his OC 32 Wing Group Captain Wiqar Azim acted quickly and imaginatively. They flew composite formations of T-33, F-86s and even B-57during the day to attack the Indian forces advancing towards Hyderabad. It was important to provide top cover to these missions against interference from Indian fighters and this task was undertaken by F-86s and F-104s. Armed reconnaissance and interdiction missions achieved the destruction of many Indian trains, and this virtually choked the flow of supplies vital to the Indian advance. Nearly 150 sorties, after Shakargarh the largest air support operation, were flown in this sector. By ceasefire, the Masroor-based pilots had claimed 20 tanks. 63 vehicles, 5 trains, 3 bulk fuel stores and an ammunition dump. Additionally, the PAF had shot down 3 enemy aircraft in air engagements over the sector.

The PAF’s swift response to air support demands far in the south was made possible by the decentralised control of air operations in that theatre, allowing Masroor to coordinate directly with the army formations in the area and with the Navy. The Joint Operations Centre (JOC) located at Rawalpindi, as well as the GHQ, kept themselves in the picture, while the COC modified Masroor’s land/air support operations only on GHQ’s advice or when there was some other operational reason for doing so. For all sectors north of Sukkur, the JOC remained the main processing agency for all demands for air support. In this manner, JOC and GHQ were able to ensure that the PAF’s finite logistic base retained reserves necessary for full support of General Tikka Khan’s impending offensive, and that whatever effort was available was used to best effect.