In the western theatre the PAF fought with 9 squadrons in 1965 and with 10-1/4 squadrons in the 71 war. Although the 71 conflict was shorter by third, the air operations in the two theatres were twice as intensive even without the massive finale that never materialised. The average rate of stories per day was 201 in 1971 versus 107 in 65. The PAF flew 46% more air support for the army and navy, and launched 34% more air defence stories than in 1965. Its day strikes against enemy airfields were two and a half times those in earlier war. An overall comparison of different types of missions flown during the two wars is shown in the table below.

S. No	Type of Mission	(1965 War 22 days) Sorties Flown	(1971 War 14 days) Sorties Flown
1	Air Defence	1,304	1,748
2	Air Support to Army & Navy	647	951
3	Day Strikes Against Enemy Airfields, Radars, etc.	100	160
4	Night Strikes Against Enemy Airfields, Radars etc.	165	130
5	Other Missions (photo recce, helicopter, etc	148	38
6	Total Effort	2,364	3,027
7	Flying Intensity (Sorties per Day)	107	201

The IAF flew 7,346 sorties on all types of aircraft, including those against East Pakistan. This compares with 3,027 sorties by the PAF in both theatres. For an air force possessing only 22% of its adversary combat aircraft, the PAF’s ability to generate the vastly superior rate of air effort speaks highly of its combat and maintenance crews.

At the cease-fire the PAF had yet to employ the combat power it had held reserve for the land offensive. It had lost 24 aircraft on the western front and 11 F-86s in East Pakistan (the surviving 11 there had been self-immobilised when Dhaka runaway became unusable); a few aircraft were added to the force during the war, Pilots recalled from assignments abroad had made up all the lost aircrew; much of the logistic base had remained intact and stocks of spares, munitions and fuel were adequate. This meant that overall in the western theatre, the PAF had most of its original combat force battle-worthy for a longer conflict. The viability of the PAF at the end of hostilities was of great importance at that juncture, given India’s ominous euphoria in the aftermath of the surrender in East Pakistan.