Kargil Conflict

[SSAAD]

Lets have a discussion on Kargil over here gentlemen. Strictly Pakistani point of view though.

Some rules of discussion. Please keep it civil and no personal attacks (regardless of you having someone close who faught, got injured or was martyred) since we are all on the same side. This issue tends to get hot but I think we should discuss it to learn more about it.

[omerkerim]

I read about Kargil briefing to PM Nawaz Sharif. When the commander asked him if he has any question, Mr. Sharif asked to raise hands for a prayers to the success of the mission!

This notion that PM Sharif did not know about the mission, or Musharraf did not know about the mission or DG NLI acted on his own behalf is purely concocted.

I personally think that Air war factor was kept in mind. That is why we were able to bring down two Migs.

What I can not understand is why the mission was planned in the first place. I do not think Kargil is as high as Siachen. Was it planned to get hold of more bargain chips at the table?

[Noman Habib]

just to involve America into the conflict of Kashmir.
2.it was calculated rightly that unlike 1965 India will not be able to attack international border
3.Move forward was extremely secretive and that is why no assembly of troops were reported by Indian intelligence.
4.to relieve off the pressure of Indian forces in the valley on mujahideen kargill resulted in temporary thinning out of the Indian troops
5.The area did not have any approach towards the valley and it was not possible for for attacker to construct roads/tracks and fight so that is why it was not backed by induction of more forces at the maximum it was about 2000 strong force consisting of mujahideen and few regulars
6.AIM was to internationalise the Kashmir issue by crossing over LOC and force the Indians to retaliate and fight at the ground of our chosing.Causing maximum attrition to enemy in the process
7.Hold/exit according to international situation.

The only weakness in the operation was Exit strategy at highest level which did not cater for psychological impact of Pull out.Army was not willing to commit more forces in kargill rather was waiting an all out attack by India along LOC in that case Kargil would have been last priority.

[msalman]

I think the plan itself was gutsy, brilliant and perhaps very well executed. The wisdom of doing it I am not so sure of.

My understanding is that the idea was to cut off the Indian supply route to Siachin. I don't buy the Internationalization thing. For that they should have discussed the plan with the Foreign Office. It sounds more like an after thought. And it did not internationalize the issue.

But here are the problems with it.

1. It was a very significant plan with major repurcussions which I think were not properly thought through. Every action has a reaction but we failed to fully understand what India might do. Why the AF and Navy were not informed is just mind boggling.

2. Pakistan lost all credibility when it started saying that this was not an army action but the freedom fighters were responsible for it..

3. I think it would remain a mystery what would have happened if we had stayed there. I wonder if that would have made India leave Siachin or in a full scale war.

I really like the plan and how it was executed. And I just wish it had worked.

[JunaidNasir]

First my apology as Saad sahab as rightly poined out that at the time NLI did fall under FCNA, so the person in question was commandand FCNA.
For those who say that it was planned and executed by DGMO, than please tell me

1. Why was the logistics head of FCNA a Col. (who i wouldent want to name) was being court martialed, on charges off non supply of materials to the front line soldier. He in subsiquent brirfings explicitly said "that he was not informed of any operation and all the resources at his disposal were for normal opp and not enough for any operation. (The only reason why he was not courtmartialed was his father knew PM personaly). Now it is that the planners forgot to make provisions available for the opperation and on top of it forgot to inform the man whose job is o make provisions available. The result being that the situation had become so desperate that the soldier in the front line was surviving by puting "energile on snow and eating that

2. Two full brigades of the PA reached the area of operation after the hostilities was over ie over a month.

3. The ia has been vecating these heights since simla accord(when hey were given to bindia) ie they vecate them in winters and return in summers. Why did the army top brass feel the need to take this advneture at this point in time.

4. You plan to conduct an opperation on this scale n forget to involve the AF n navy. Some planning!. Result being that bindia deploys a corp. + srength of artiliary right in front of ur positions. And shelling the sh*t out of you, wih airburst shells, with impunity. Just imagine IA selecting a grid and than plotting a grid reference and than shelling it till not even a rock is left standing..
This fire was so accurate n effectinve that more often than not our soldiers would loose their ammo or if the ammo servived than they would loose their weaponary. This was not all, the artillary salvos were followed very very closly by bindian foot soldiers. In quite a few cases as our soldiers had lost their ammo or weapons or both, so they resorted to throwing or tumbling stones down the slopes to quell the bindian advance.
All this as PAF was not involved. Not only this but our forces did not have heavy guns to support our soldiers. Wt was avilable did not have the range. When they eventually did reach the area of opp, the hostilities had ceased. (some planning)

Kargil was an episode full of decite n deception, i can give you instances where PM in paricular was decived to the hilt and kept in the dark. I can go on and on. but than again this is not the place to air our dirty laundry.

[Noman Habib]

To cut of supply rout to Siachin was not aimed PA had kept Road Srinagar-Leh blocked and is still in position to block it by fire. Indian had other road available i.e Manali-leh so cutting off of supply rout was not possible anyway.
The second thing about able to replenish the troops or did not do the forward dumping is bit vivid we had to weigh between surprise and logistical support both were not achievable at same time.priority went to surprise initially but there was a time gap between occupation and loss of surprise that is when Indian patrol was ambushed by own troops/mujahideens.This time gap was fully utilized to do forward dumping plus if not wrong IA would do the ration dumping in summers to cater for eventuality of manning the heights in emergency situation in winters so the lack of supplies was not a problem.
About Commander FCNA no body in PA ever liked him even in case of hostility
people would prefer to be exposed IA snipers then to be seen by their own commander who was blunt rude but a very thorough professional who would make sure every detail is worked out so tactically there was no error in the plan.He simply will not let the mistake to happen not even by his juniors .He did it with in the resources of FCNA and it was a job well done at his level.
Probably the Indians cried too loud all over the world but strategically it benefited Pakistan but it is questionable that why America was involved in it with out keeping american track record in mind.

[SSAAD]

Quote: Originally Posted by msalman I think the plan itself was gutsy, brilliant and perhaps very well executed. The wisdom of doing it I am not so sure of. My understanding is that the idea was to cut off the Indian supply route to Siachin. I don't buy the Internationalization thing. For that they should have discussed the plan with the Foreign Office. It sounds more like an after thought. And it did not internationalize the issue. But here are the problems with it. 3. I think it would remain a mystery what would have happened if we had stayed there. I wonder if that would have made India leave Siachin or in a full scale war. I really like the plan and how it was executed. And I just wish it had worked.

Yes there would have been escalation across the IB if Siachen had been choked off (however I think it would not have been a full scale war).

My own understanding is that the CoAS, PM, DGMO, FCNA, as well as Gen Aziz and Mahmuds were aware of all that went on. The assumption on the Pakistani side was that the ingress into Kargil would be perceive by the Indians as a continuation of the ongoing Siachen conflict (where both sides have mutually agreed to keep the affair an all-army one without the respective AFs playing any part). This is the gamble that did not work out from the Pakistani planning standpoint.

The availablility of MANPADs in the unit was not an indication that the planners had taken into account the possibility of the IAF getting involved as even units in Siachen are equipped with MANPADs and prior to the recent peace talks, downing of each other' s helis in the Siachen region was a routine issue (BTW, the IAF was not a major player in this whole affair as has been repeatedly made out by the Indian media and the Pakistani detractors of the Kargil planning). In my own research (backed up Indian sources), the much touted LGBs, which supposedly turn the tide of war according to Indians, were used in such a limited number (7) that they may have helped with taking of one or two positions, but along the width of the Kargil front, Pakistanis had taken over 120 positions, 95% of which were vacated voluntarily by us.

The Indian Artillery was more effective (as was Pakistani) but the air support from a tactical standpoint was ineffective and with the downing of their aircraft and helis, the aircraft were under a greater threat than the defenders. From a PR standpoint it gave Indians a plus (since the induction of air support gave the world this impression that things had heated up beyond the normal).

Although now we have the benefit of hindsight, however I too think that had we maintained those positions till the winters, aside from losing a few of the 120 or so positions/piquets, it would have been impossible for the Indians to do anything about it. However, they would have definetly stirred up trouble in other areas.

Coming back to the issue of who was responsible for what, let me just make one point about all of this finger-pointing. The key planners involved are tasked with looking at areas of vulnerability for the Indians and taking advantage of those. MO directorate is constantly churning out proposals and plans and it is upto the senior commanders and then the civilian (or military if the country is being ruled by an officer of the armed forces) leadership to approve or veto the plans. Some people seem to be putting blame on some of the officers for planning this as if they did something wrong. I do not think so. They did what any commander would do in an area which is disputed. Even the Indians agreed initially that the ingress was in a disputed region, as such their planning is no different than what the Indians planned and executed at Siachen. The BS benevolent excuses made by Indians are full of $hit now simply because they themselves have taken advantage of all similar situations whenever a chance has risen.

We should be proud of the guys who planned these ops and tried to execute them becuase tactically and militarily it made sense to put pressure on Indians at Siachen. The fact that the country had been screwed beyond belief economically and politically is the fault of the then civilian leadership. The military saw a chance where they could gain advantage and ran it by the leadership, this was their job! They got the approval and went for it. It was the govts responsibility to ensure that either Pakistan was economically and politically capable of going through such thing or the PM should have called it a no-go. Maybe the civilian leadership did not appreciate the scope of the operation and as such was caught totally illprepared? Don't know, but overall I think it was the right move militariliy against the Indians, geo-strategically, the govt should have done a better job of gauging its implications (in which it failed) and maybe somethings were kept from the government, but after a while, I think both the Army and the Govt went on auto-pilot to see how things turn out.

I agree with Junaid about the logistics issue. I think the planning did not take into account the impact of interdiction of the supply lines. As such units upfront ran short of supplies and ammo.

[H Khan]

We have started a objective review of the Kargil Operation and its ramifications. Please continue and lets bring some tactical, logistic and specific objective reports and view.

There is a book written by Sharin Mazhar, I think, is it the only analysis from Pakistan side?

[H Khan]

Publish Date: Sunday,23 April, 2006, at 09:51 AM Doha Time

NEW DELHI: The army ignored specific information on Pakistani movements in the Kargil area of Jammu and Kashmir, leading to a bloody border clash in 1999, says the former head of India’s domestic intelligence.

A K Doval, who headed the Intelligence Bureau (IB) in 2004-05, also termed as “national intelligence failure” the hijacking of an Indian Airlines aircraft to Kandahar in December 1999 and said exchanging dreaded terrorist Maulana Masood Azhar for the passengers was a “mistake”.

Doval’s remarks came during an interview with weekly newsmagazine Tehelka.

He brushed aside suggestions that an intelligence failure led to the Kargil operations in which over 500 Indian soldiers died and faulted the army for not acting on information it had been provided.

“There was definite intelligence about it (Kargil). There was a definite communication sent to the people concerned. The only defence given by certain agencies was that it was marked to a person and perhaps it didn’t reach the person sitting on the other side of the table,” Doval said.

He said Pakistan’s intentions had become known on June 2 1998.

“The government agencies were alerted a good nine months (earlier). After the information was passed on, the physical intelligence had to be collected by the people who patrol that area. They (the army) patrolled that area on paper,” Doval said.

“The patrols were going for years, but not actually to the places they were showing in the logbooks. The movement was being shown but the actual patrolling was not being conducted,” he said.

“Presuming that they had gone on patrolling, they would have found something, some cigarette butts, blade or anything.”

The communication on Kargil, he said, was signed personally by then IB director Shyamal Dutta. This in itself was unusual as IB directors normally don’t sign such documents “unless it is something extremely important”, Doval said.

“It was sent personally by him to the defence minister, to Director General Military Intelligence (DGMI) and various officers,” he added.

The communication was very “specific”, Doval said.

“It talks about Kargil, it talks about Tiger Hill and other features. Every word is well chosen,” he added, noting that even a government panel that probed the Kargil episode hadn’t “dismissed” it.

“All it said was, it was not marked to the DGMO (Director General of Military Operations), it was marked to the DGMI,” Doval said.

Lamenting that there was “no response” to Dutta’s note, Doval said “if the agency provides the information, the user agency must invariably provide the feedback.

“The point is that after this information had gone into the system, it should have been verified. Somebody should have gone to the heights and said we have seen this movement,” Doval said.

On the Indian Airlines hijack, he said the intelligence agencies should have been more alert.

“(It) was a national intelligence failure. We should have known that the planning was being done in Nepal. They came from Bangladesh, we should have known,” said Doval, who went to Kandahar to negotiate the release of the passengers.

He added: “Our giving (away) Maulana Masood Azhar was a mistake. Purely on security and intelligence considerations, any swapping was wrong. It should not have been done.

“Nobody should have been swapped, least of all Maulana Masood Azhar.” – Indo-Asian News Service

[SSAAD]

Quote: Originally Posted by H Khan We have started a objective review of the Kargil Operation and its ramifications. Please continue and lets bring some tactical, logistic and specific objective reports and view. There is a book written by Sharin Mazhar, I think, is it the only analysis from Pakistan side?

Well that is the only book, however there have been many articles written by various armed forces officers that deal with this subject matter. The book is alright from the standpoint of a reference about how the govt was appraised about the ops. Some pictures and dates of briefings given to PM at HQ X Corps (to which the FCNA reported to) about the ops as well, which shed some light on the fact that possibly "every one was on board".

Essentially the Kargil planning architects have become victim to the famous adage "victory has many fathers, while defeat has none!" The day we say at least on a private/individual level (in contrast to the Govt level just because it would place GoP in a difficult spot) that what Pakistani army did was the right thing to bring to an end the bs in Siachen, the closer to the truth we get. I see this tendency that when the Indians were getting their asses handed to them at Kargil, people were full of wah wah, yet when the troops were withdrawn (as against pushed back which they were not), people are looking to pin blame on the commanders. Had this operation been a complete success, the generals including Musharraf would have been touted as God's gift to PA and Pakistan.

If people are interested in further discussion, I can post which units were involved etc. to further this discussion. Let me know.

[M.Ghaznavi]

IAF's 'political' show in Kargil
By Ali Abbas Rizvi
IMAGINE, a sophisticated Indian Air Force Mirage 2000H firing a laser-guided missile at a train of mules carrying supplies to the Mujahideen fighting at Kargil.

Imagine, the first 'precision-guided' missile fired by the aircraft going astray; the second only succeeding in blowing to smithereens the last train, carrying food for the fighters perched atop the heights.

For most air force commanders of today, operating in a world of precision-guided munitions, stand-off weapons, advanced avionics and stealth, this is simply unimaginable, preposterous - even foolish. For the Indian Air Force, however, this was not the case, as amply shown by its pilots and commanders during the Kargil fiasco.

The IAF was pressed into action in a haste, with its leadership displaying loss of strategic imagination in the employment of Air-Land battle concept. The senior commanders of the service ignored the air campaign plan, which describes air centres of gravity, phasing of operations, resources required and level of support given to the army and the fact that the plan must be followed throughout the duration of the supporting operation. These elements were seen missing in the IAF's Kargil campaign.

The result was that in early June, the Indian Army was forced to ask the air force to terminate all its operations in the sector concerned. The situation compelled Air Chief Marshal Anil Yashwant Tipnis to rush to the 15 Corps Headquarters in Srinagar on June 16 and confer with army commanders, in particular the general-officer-commanding of the 8th Mountain Division operating in Drass and Mushkoh.

They discussed 'new strategies' to flush out the Mujahideen. Soon after, the Mirage 2000Hs were pressed into service, firing locally-produced laser-guided bombs. Again, the IAF failed to achieve the desired results, with one of the operational videos released for television viewers showing the cross-hair of the firing device in one corner and the missile exploding in the other corner of the screen. Also, viewers with some knowledge of military aviation were taken aback when the word 'mast', which blinks when the weapon misses its target, appeared on the screen!

The IAF air campaign in Kargil, beginning on May 26, can be characterized in the following sequence.

LACK OF PLANNING: At first, the IAF did not want to go into the battle, citing unfamiliar terrain, inadequate weapons and inexperience of pilots in mountain warfare. But when Prime Minister Vajpayee ordered it into battle, the service went into action, losing three aircraft in three days. For the first three weeks of the conflict, the IAF was involved in high-altitude unguided bombing which would not be recommended by planners where the wind flow is unpredictable and friendly troops are present. The quality of planning for the air campaign, on the whole, remained poor.

INADEQUATE WEAPONRY: The IAF, with its array of weapons configured for use at sea level, discovered during the Kargil operation that it did not have suitable stand-off weapons to engage high-altitude targets. In one case, nevertheless, one of its stand-off weapons succeeded in blowing away the last mule in a Mujahideen supply column. The accuracy of the laser-guided bombs was so poor that an IAF air marshal, at a post-Kargil briefing, denied ever using them.

TARGET MISFIRES: The Indian Army's C3I (Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence) system was digitalized, the IAF's Air Defence Ground Environment System (ADGES) was not. Therefore, when the army pinpointed the targets, there were slight errors in calculation. At such heights, where precision is vital, a miss by two or three yards can result in the missile harmlessly smashing a boulder miles away in another mountain range.

EXORBITANT COST: After the initial losses, the IAF pilots, flying some five kilometres high, threw away an excessive number of rockets and bombs in uninhabited areas of Kargil, Drass, Kaksar, Turkuk and Chorbatla. There was little consideration whether the weapons released at safe heights hit the Mujahideen bunkers or not. What perhaps mattered was that the aircraft were not hit by the surface-to-air missiles in possession of the Mujahideen, while the weapons smashed harmlessly into mountainsides. Also, escort aircraft were sent to protect the strike aircraft when there was no aerial threat from Pakistan.

LACK OF COORDINATION: There was little coordination between the Army Air Defence and the IAF with the result that army anti-aircraft guns frequently fired at the IAF aircraft though without causing any damage. There was also a serious 'friend or foe' identification problem. At times, the IAF launched fighters to intercept its own aircraft sent to attack Mujahideen posts from another base.

CONCLUSION: During the two months of operations, the IAF lost a MiG-21, a MiG-27 and an MI-17 helicopter to the Pakistan Army. In addition, it lost four MiG-21s, one Mig-27, one Jaguar and two helicopters in the Kargil theatre. The loss of a Mirage 2000 at the Srinagar airbase, besides several other aircraft which were hit by the Mujahideen, could not be confirmed.

On the whole, the IAF operations in Kargil were 'more show than go'. The main purpose behind launching the media war in the high-altitude theatre was to get more funds for the services and a bigger share in nuclear delivery systems. The employment of extensive air power in a zone where there was no real threat in the air and insignificant targets on the ground, the IAF's action can be best described as more of a political stunt than a tactical operation.

[JunaidNasir]

Quote: Originally Posted by syed saad Yes there would have been escalation across the IB if Siachen had been choked off (however I think it would not have been a full scale war). My own understanding is that the CoAS, PM, DGMO, FCNA, as well as Gen Aziz and Mahmuds were aware of all that went on. The assumption on the Pakistani side was that the ingress into Kargil would be perceive by the Indians as a continuation of the ongoing Siachen conflict (where both sides have mutually agreed to keep the affair an all-army one without the respective AFs playing any part). This is the gamble that did not work out from the Pakistani planning standpoint. The availablility of MANPADs in the unit was not an indication that the planners had taken into account the possibility of the IAF getting involved as even units in Siachen are equipped with MANPADs and prior to the recent peace talks, downing of each other' s helis in the Siachen region was a routine issue (BTW, the IAF was not a major player in this whole affair as has been repeatedly made out by the Indian media and the Pakistani detractors of the Kargil planning). In my own research (backed up Indian sources), the much touted LGBs, which supposedly turn the tide of war according to Indians, were used in such a limited number (7) that they may have helped with taking of one or two positions, but along the width of the Kargil front, Pakistanis had taken over 120 positions, 95% of which were vacated voluntarily by us. The Indian Artillery was more effective (as was Pakistani) but the air support from a tactical standpoint was ineffective and with the downing of their aircraft and helis, the aircraft were under a greater threat than the defenders. From a PR standpoint it gave Indians a plus (since the induction of air support gave the world this impression that things had heated up beyond the normal). Although now we have the benefit of hindsight, however I too think that had we maintained those positions till the winters, aside from losing a few of the 120 or so positions/piquets, it would have been impossible for the Indians to do anything about it. However, they would have definetly stirred up trouble in other areas. Coming back to the issue of who was responsible for what, let me just make one point about all of this finger-pointing. The key planners involved are tasked with looking at areas of vulnerability for the Indians and taking advantage of those. MO directorate is constantly churning out proposals and plans and it is upto the senior commanders and then the civilian (or military if the country is being ruled by an officer of the armed forces) leadership to approve or veto the plans. Some people seem to be putting blame on some of the officers for planning this as if they did something wrong. I do not think so. They did what any commander would do in an area which is disputed. Even the Indians agreed initially that the ingress was in a disputed region, as such their planning is no different than what the Indians planned and executed at Siachen. The BS benevolent excuses made by Indians are full of $hit now simply because they themselves have taken advantage of all similar situations whenever a chance has risen. We should be proud of the guys who planned these ops and tried to execute them becuase tactically and militarily it made sense to put pressure on Indians at Siachen. The fact that the country had been screwed beyond belief economically and politically is the fault of the then civilian leadership. The military saw a chance where they could gain advantage and ran it by the leadership, this was their job! They got the approval and went for it. It was the govts responsibility to ensure that either Pakistan was economically and politically capable of going through such thing or the PM should have called it a no-go. Maybe the civilian leadership did not appreciate the scope of the operation and as such was caught totally illprepared? Don't know, but overall I think it was the right move militariliy against the Indians, geo-strategically, the govt should have done a better job of gauging its implications (in which it failed) and maybe somethings were kept from the government, but after a while, I think both the Army and the Govt went on auto-pilot to see how things turn out. I agree with Junaid about the logistics issue. I think the planning did not take into account the impact of interdiction of the supply lines. As such units upfront ran short of supplies and ammo.

I agree with Saad sahab 100% when he says that who ever planned kargil, always calculed it on the premis that it will remain a localised affair visa vie siachin and the planners did no anticipate the strong reacion from india.

Even though we kicked their butt royally(in terms of losses), still we suffered loses and if we take a look at them the thing that strikes me the most is the percentage of officers martyered in comaparsion to O.R/JCO's. (i am not sure if its apprpriate to give numbers here but ull have to take my word for it). Which shows the courage of our men in uniform and their willingness to laydown their lives for the country.

The fighting spirit was so high that the PMA course that was passing out in those days, had signed a patition in which all had valuntered to serve in Kargil.
The AC gilgil at was an ex-PAF(GDP) he too had made him self available for service with the PAF and had written to this effect.
We as a nation were united and behind our men in uniform.
But were let down again by our leader both civil n military.

[Hafeez]

Quote: Originally Posted by syed saad If people are interested in further discussion, I can post which units were involved etc. to further this discussion. Let me know.

Like they say "Naeki aur pooch pooch". Go ahead Syed Sahib.

One thing i want to ask is, while we say again and again "we were let down by our leadership". What was the other course of action for us. Were we prepared to go to war on Kargil??

[Mujahid Achakzai]

Quote: Originally Posted by M.Ghaznavi CONCLUSION: During the two months of operations, the IAF lost a MiG-21, a MiG-27 and an MI-17 helicopter to the Pakistan Army. In addition, it lost four MiG-21s, one Mig-27, one Jaguar and two helicopters in the Kargil theatre.

Is there any link to verify the loss of 'four MiG-21s, one MiG-27, one Jaguar and two helicopters'? I ask this for my own knowledge and would be grateful if Ghaznavi can give those links. Also, i don't mean to offend anyone, nor am i discrediting Ghaznavi. But i would recommend to everyone the same thing i do. I try to verify the claims made by the author by searching for valid and credible links that would confirm such an claim. Reason why i do this, is because it helps when i come across a yapping indian whose so sure of himself.

[msalman]

I need help some facts too. It seems that our logistics got hit. I need to know:

1 How bad were they hit?
2. Was the IAF responsible for that? Or was it IA artillary?

Thanks.

And yes, I am puzzled why when India started the Siachen problem no one from the rest of teh World said anything. And when we went into Kargil every oen was up in arms. Also, I have never understood why we did not use the AF when India started Siachin. But this may make us deviate from our topic.

[Mujahid Achakzai]

Quote: The fact that the country had been screwed beyond belief economically and politically is the fault of the then civilian leadership. The military saw a chance where they could gain advantage and ran it by the leadership, this was their job! They got the approval and went for it. It was the govts responsibility to ensure that either Pakistan was economically and politically capable of going through such thing or the PM should have called it a no-go.

I agree with this policy, whereby there is a concensus b/w the military and the government on such actions. Further, looking at this advantageous position that Pakistan Army did have, one should've considered the country's economic predicament in wake of sanctions imposed because of the Nuclear Tests that Pakistan held.

More so, i say that it would've been prudent that we had held back on the temptation and waited for the situation to improve, as they did after 9/11. If we had retained the element of surprise by showing no indication of any intent to the Kargil area. Then we could've in the future, say for example, after the induction of F-16s, J-10s, JF-17s and Erieyes.

It is the same as the situation in 1960s, where Pakistan had recieved F-86 Sabres, F-104 Starfighters, B-57 Intrepids and C-130 Hercules, among other stuff. The military was in a position to consolidate its hardware procurements by further enhancements in building up logistics supplies.

One could've imagined what it would've been like if Pakistan had initiated operation gibralta with a years logistical supplies incase of a full blown war. Where the PAF would've had 300 Sabres instead of just a hundred, 50 Starfighters instead of just 12, 50 Intrepids instead of just 26 and 30 Hercules instead of just 6!!!! The devastation PAF would've inflicted on india, would've been more than what they had suffered at the hands of the Chinese.

I have nothing but praise for PA, PAF & PN, for their valiant & daring fighting abilities. But i would say to the pride of our nation, that they should plan with 2 years of realistic and calculative possible outcomes. Both in terms to war against india and the geo-political environment in the world today.

[JunaidNasir]

A very pertinant quote for our armed forces personal visa vie our military n poliical leadership:

We the willing, led by the unknowing,

are doing the impossible for the ungrateful.

We have done so much for so long with so little,

that now we are qualified to do any thing

wih nothing.

[Noman Habib]

I don,t understand this defeat theory the nature of operation dictates withdrawal after certain time i.e Raiding the enemy would we term the retreat/withdrawal as failure where as raiding troops had caught the enemy with pants down and mauled him badly and then disengaged at will.
To link it with Siachin is absolutely wrong this could have an indirect influence on Siachin but nothing direct except some kind of bargain chip in negociations.Let us assume for analysis purpose the absolute success of the operation the way most of us see it.....scenario(sorry)
Pakistan army holds the initial gains and convert it into a strong foothold/firm base beyond Road kargil-leh by that time forward troops are under contact with enemy we induct two brigades of infantryone heads north to words Leh the other south to words Srinagar astride the only road present now if we grant absolute success to these brigades still no more than one mile of area on each side is gained two divisions might get few more miles but from road N1H1 as Indian call it to Pakistan we have no track available to replenish the troops so area is occupied but untenable after few days end result we have to abandon the gains and go back.
With no offence to anybody the people who consider this operation in traditional area gains /causality based yardstick for victory or defeat are ignoring the conceptual innovation to the conduct of war.The topography and nature of the terrain ,the enemy deployment and the nature of the conflict vs own capabilities will decide the nature of operation which could give the desired political/tactical results.
The aim of Kargill was not capture of certain areas no more than few heights were tenable from logistic point of view which might have some significance at local level but that little area is not that significant to risk a full fledged war when foreign exchange reserves are no more than 120millions according to some estimates.
In tactical terms it is close to a ''turning move" when an area is held deep inside enemy territory in order to make him fight on the ground of own choosing
and inflicting a crushing blow to his moral.It has to be followed by other operation and timely disengagement and withdrawal is one option.In case of kargill this was the only option was with drawl as the gains were logistically unattainable but Indians were mauled badly their moral was down the drain,kashmir was hot topic in international circles and all was done by ingenuity of mind of an able field commander so PA has nothing to be ashamed off .The factor ignored was psychological warfare how to make common man understand the importance of events.

[JameelY]

Noman sahib

What you describe seems to be a convenient "post war" explanation. I am not convinced that anyone in PA had these ideas or goals for the Kargil operation.

You say Kashmir was the "hot topic" in international circles but the world was talking as though India was the victim and we were the bad guys. Every country, including China was giving "sanctity" to the LoC. As to "morale factor" - we were sky high when the news came out that few mujahideen caught India "pants down" but once we had to withdraw under pressure, everyone I know had the lowest of low morale. Even Mexican army can catch the US with "pants down" but without an idea of the proper end game there is no point. Kargil was done and claimed in such a way that we cannot even officially recognise the bravery of our men and officers. If the plan was to harass and withdraw then we should have withdrawn on our own terms, not under American pressure. I don't know of anything that hurts the morale more than being disowned by your own superiors under foreign pressure. All your points seem to be convenient rewriting of history. Zia had the foresight to reject the Kargil plan because he saw no endgame. Musharraf went ahead and paid the price.

[SSAAD]

Quote: Originally Posted by JunaidNasir I agree with Saad sahab 100% when he says that who ever planned kargil, always calculed it on the premis that it will remain a localised affair visa vie siachin and the planners did no anticipate the strong reacion from india. Even though we kicked their butt royally(in terms of losses), still we suffered loses and if we take a look at them the thing that strikes me the most is the percentage of officers martyered in comaparsion to O.R/JCO's. (i am not sure if its apprpriate to give numbers here but ull have to take my word for it). Which shows the courage of our men in uniform and their willingness to laydown their lives for the country. The fighting spirit was so high that the PMA course that was passing out in those days, had signed a patition in which all had valuntered to serve in Kargil. The AC gilgil at was an ex-PAF(GDP) he too had made him self available for service with the PAF and had written to this effect. We as a nation were united and behind our men in uniform. But were let down again by our leader both civil n military.

Junaid sahib,

This is a sign of all good armies when such a large number of offrs make the ultimate sacrifice (not to take anything away from the Indians, but they also lost a lot of junior officers for the same reason). I have a list of offrs and ORs as well, but please pm me your numbers if possible. I rather not have it published openly (as it will inevitably be used for propaganda purposes by the other side).

[SSAAD]

Quote: Originally Posted by msalman I need help some facts too. It seems that our logistics got hit. I need to know: 1 How bad were they hit? 2. Was the IAF responsible for that? Or was it IA artillary? Thanks. And yes, I am puzzled why when India started the Siachen problem no one from the rest of teh World said anything. And when we went into Kargil every oen was up in arms. Also, I have never understood why we did not use the AF when India started Siachin. But this may make us deviate from our topic.

IAF did not do diddly squat and that is the reality of the matter. IA's artillery did hit us and same goes for our artillery against them. But my understanding is that the casualties suffered on the Pakistani end were due to the artillery fire. How bad is a difficult one to address simply because the supplies were mostly undertaken by Mule trains and them not reaching the front lines ended up impacting the men upfront (losses were due to men running out of ammo and supplies, and then positions getting hit by artillery.). More on this later.

[SSAAD]

Quote: Originally Posted by Mujahid Achakzai More so, i say that it would've been prudent that we had held back on the temptation and waited for the situation to improve, as they did after 9/11. If we had retained the element of surprise by showing no indication of any intent to the Kargil area. Then we could've in the future, say for example, after the induction of F-16s, J-10s, JF-17s and Erieyes. It is the same as the situation in 1960s, where Pakistan had recieved F-86 Sabres, F-104 Starfighters, B-57 Intrepids and C-130 Hercules, among other stuff. The military was in a position to consolidate its hardware procurements by further enhancements in building up logistics supplies. One could've imagined what it would've been like if Pakistan had initiated operation gibralta with a years logistical supplies incase of a full blown war. Where the PAF would've had 300 Sabres instead of just a hundred, 50 Starfighters instead of just 12, 50 Intrepids instead of just 26 and 30 Hercules instead of just 6!!!! The devastation PAF would've inflicted on india, would've been more than what they had suffered at the hands of the Chinese.

Mujahid saheb, although I get what you are saying but militarily, initiative cannot be left to "better times". You take advantage of the situation as it comes to you and not thinking about how in the future you would have JF-17s, F-16s...with the same token the Indians would have more of everything in the future. The units on the ground that were involved were sufficient for the operation undertaken. The problems with logistics etc. was an all army affair. That terrain is so difficult that had their supplies lasted, the Indians would not have been able to get them back even with heavy use of LGBs (the pods in use were LDPs which are also limited by weather, clouds etc., the IAF M2Ks were not equipped with FLIR etc. as such their accuracy and delivery was always a suspect). There were just too many positions for Indians to get to them all. Had we stayed, all along the route to Siachen via Kargil/Drass could have been interdicted somewhat better than what PA can do now even after losing some of the dominating heights to the Indians.

[SSAAD]

Quote: Originally Posted by JameelY Noman sahib What you describe seems to be a convenient "post war" explanation. I am not convinced that anyone in PA had these ideas or goals for the Kargil operation. You say Kashmir was the "hot topic" in international circles but the world was talking as though India was the victim and we were the bad guys. Every country, including China was giving "sanctity" to the LoC. As to "morale factor" - we were sky high when the news came out that few mujahideen caught India "pants down" but once we had to withdraw under pressure, everyone I know had the lowest of low morale. Even Mexican army can catch the US with "pants down" but without an idea of the proper end game there is no point. Kargil was done and claimed in such a way that we cannot even officially recognise the bravery of our men and officers. If the plan was to harass and withdraw then we should have withdrawn on our own terms, not under American pressure. I don't know of anything that hurts the morale more than being disowned by your own superiors under foreign pressure. All your points seem to be convenient rewriting of history. Zia had the foresight to reject the Kargil plan because he saw no endgame. Musharraf went ahead and paid the price.

I agree. The biggest problem was the inability of the Govt. to turn this into a favorable deal on the geo-strategic front (and I agree it was a difficult job simply because Indians did a much better job of PR than us).

[JameelY]

Saad sahib,

You are right about the PR war. IAF's "role" in Kargil is a joke - givne that India lost 2 aircrafts on one of the first days of combat flying. But as usual India was able to propagandize its way out. I had a book by an IA officer (retired?) in my local library who said that IAF only dropped 9 LGBs in the 3 months period during the Kargil battles. Yet, IAF was ble to show some fake video game type videos and claim "victory." We could have sustained Kargil ops through mule trains but it would have not been deniable. Ultimately, PA superiors felt that deniability was more important to them than strategic victory or the lives of their men.

To me the right way for Pakistan would have been to pull back to a few key positions once India started bleating to the world. A few key posts would be easier to defend politically and diplomatically. We could have pointed it out as an extension of Siachen and said that PA took action to defend Siachen from further Indian aggression. Instead we stuck to this mujahideen line which basically cut us out of any legal position.

[S Haider]

I was in USA when dumb Nawaz was taking family pics with Billy and bag.....Somtime i hate demoractic process cuz this process somtime elect dumb donkey like nawaz. We won the war we lost the war, cuz we couldn t justify our action, because of extremely week leadership of Nawaz . Benazir was worse too, but atleast when General Aziz presented the kargil plan in her time, she set up meeting with foreign minister and finance minister, and ask them can we afford this action, they said no, reserves are very low . She describe the situation to General, and he postpone the action for future...and am totally agree...that was biggest PR failure...