: army 'fixes' soldiers' careers

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Operation Vijay To Operation Whitewash: army 'fixes' soldiers' careers

V K Shashikumar reports on secret court martial planned by the army on almost 30 soldiers - erstwhile heroes of the Kargil war - in a sinister bid to cover up glitches by its top brass

Kargil, August 9

"Young officers led from the front…Scaling up bare rock under unrelenting enemy fire from vantage points above, with no place to hide; ascending cliff-faces with pitons and rope, laden with punishing loads of arms, ammunition and essential supplies, under cover of darkness in a bid to avoid enemy observation and to effect surprise; to engage in close combat at more than alpine heights to capture a critical feature or "sanghar", or silence a pitiless gun…the Indian Armed Forces displayed both values and chivalry beyond the call
of duty."

The Kargil Review Committee Report,

December 15, 1999

Contrary to what the (Subrahmanyam) Kargil Review Committee Report states, the Indian army is victimising its own heroes of the bloody Kargil war.

About 30 infantrymen (junior officers and other ranks) are facing courts of inquiry. According to information available with tehelka.com, among the officers in the dock, some commended, are Major Dwivedi of 25 Rajput, Major Madan of 2 Rajputana Rifles, Major Bhatnagar of 1/11 Gorkhas, Major Ajit of 16 Grenadiers, Subedar Lal Singh of 16 Grenadiers, Naik Subedar Maqsood Ali of 16 Grenadiers, Colonel Neeraj Mehra
of 22 Grenadiers, and Colonel M S Kukshal of 4 Jat.

Several of them will soon be facing Summary General Court Martial (SGCM) while others will be tried under General Court Martial (GCM). The courts of inquiry charges range from failure of command and control to running away from the battlefield.

This is a brazen cover-up, aptly called "Operation Whitewash" in army circles, and has triggered intense bitterness and disgust among the demoralised junior officers. These men believe that they are being made scapegoats so that the culpability of their senior officers for sub-par professionalism in Operation Vijay can remain hidden and, with the army's fabled amnesia where the depredations of its senior officers are concerned, get erased over time.

In fact, the slogan "Saviours of Dras", written above the gate of the bivouacs of 56 Mountain Brigade in Bimbet, Kargil sector, is actually a contemptuous reference to the first casualties of the ongoing "Operation Whitewash", not a reverential testimonial to the soldiers who died defending Indian territory.

After stonewalling queries from tehelka.com about the number of soldiers in the dock, the army grudgingly admitted that there are eight cases of courts of inquiry which are directly related to the Kargil operations. This is, by any consideration, a truncated estimate: the army has categorised the courts of inquiry under a slew of heads, some of them unavailable to tehelka.com, indicating many more prosecutions than are known.

The army also met questions about the reasons these men are being docked with stony silence.

What is rattling the army top brass is the fear that "Operation Whitewash" could be made public - which it was (see One Year After: The Kargil Cover-Up, August 1). The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) says that it has already received petitions on behalf of some officers seeking its intervention in this unfortunate turn of events.

In response to tehelka.com's queries, Major General-General Staff (MGGS), Northern Command, Udhampur, P P S Bindra, said, "Why do you want to dig the Kargil graves?" He later agreed to come up with a definitive figure the following day, July 28, 2000.

But it was not until 5.30 pm on July 29 that tehelka.com was able to re-establish contact with Maj-Gen Bindra. He said, "There are eight cases where courts of inquiry are being held or have already been held. They are all of varied intensity and range from proven cases of cowardice in battle to the odd case of desertion. The figure that you have suggested (30) is too high."

"These eight (sic) cases are directly operationally related to Kargil, the others are not,"
he said. "You see, in any case there are many other means available to punish the officers if the aberrations in which they were involved are established. They could be given adverse battle performance reports and so on."

But communications within the army's top echelons is obviously not as swift or smooth as they should be. When Brigadier A K Ghosh of Army HQ's Media Liaison Cell was contacted by tehelka.com to reconfirm the figure given by Major General Bindra, he blurted out a contradiction. "I have no information on the figures and there is no information available with us on whether there are any courts of inquiry in progress - not that I know of," he said.

That courts of inquiry were and are being held has been admitted by the top echelons of the Northern Command. That Army HQ is denying it is the biggest mystery - irony, communications botch-up, whatever - of the season.

Maj Gen Bindra, on being questioned whether the court of inquiry on the goof-up and consequent vacating of Pt 5353 (Bajrang), the highest feature in Dras, (see One Year After: The Kargil Cover-Up, August 1) in Kaksar
fell into "the eight cases where courts of inquiry are being held or have already been held," he replied in
the negative.

According to information with tehelka.com, the first series of court martial proceedings were to have commenced in the first week of August. Army Headquarters (HQ), however, panicked when it realised that there was not enough evidence to prosecute the officers and other ranks and therefore, postponed
its plans.

Perhaps the worst aspect of this skulduggery - there is no other name for it - is that it damages beyond repair the battle performance reports of the officers and soldiers in the dock, the consequences of which will reverberate through their lives.

This was, sources say, precisely what the army top brass had done to some officers of 16 Grenadiers and 1 Naga sometime in August-September 1999. In fact, all officers of 1 Naga, except the Commanding Officer, Colonel Patil, were "fixed" in their battle performance report. The officers of these two battalions told tehelka.com that it would take at least 15 years for their battalions to regain their stature.

A 1962 Supreme Court ruling had set the precedent that SGCMs and GCMs should be held wherever there happen to be the maximum number of witnesses. This ruling is being openly flouted and SGCMs and GCMs are being convened in remote and isolated places. Although the parent units of the victimised officers and other men had moved on to peace locations after Operation Vijay came to a close, the victims were, strangely enough, attached to other units, and every attempt was made to isolate them.

On July 27, 2000, Major General-General Staff (MGGS), Northern Command, Udhampur, P P S Bindra, told tehelka.com in an interview, "Failure is not taken amiss unless wilful negligence is established. It has to be seen in the correct perspective if an objective is not attained. A Company Commander's sense of responsibility cannot
be equated with the sense of responsibility of a Battalion Commander, and so on as it goes up higher in the chain of command."



This statement flies in the face of ground reality, something that Maj-Gen Bindra is undoubtedly aware of. Except for Brigadier Surinder Singh, former Commander of 121 Brigade in Kargil, there is no other officer of commander rank against whom there is a
court of inquiry, a fact of obvious selectivity that raised many eyebrows.


The disturbing question that lingers is why senior commanders have been decorated with war medals when they should have been held accountable for operational failures (see other Kargil Cover-up stories).Maj-Gen Bindra said, "There are few inquiries
of wilful negligence. The courts of inquiry will determine what led to the aberrations (operational failures). Wherever culpability is established, action is being taken or will be taken."

If at all a fifth India-Pakistan war were to be fought, said a senior officer, Army Training Command, Shimla, "The next operation will be a disaster unless a decision is taken at the senior-most levels of the Indian army to stop the cover-up operation and restore the morale of young officers."

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*Army lied through its teeth to Kargil Review Committee

*Strategic Kaksar winter cut-off post was vacated to enable participation in divisional firing competition

'Operation Whitewash', army code for coordinated manoeuvres and machinations by senior army commanders to hide their rank idiocies during the Kargil conflict, has been on for the past one year, reports V K Shashikumar, following extensive investigations in Dras and Shimla and meetings with frustrated military personnel

Dras and Shimla, July 30

The operational details of the Kargil war last year, which could have thrown light on how the Pakistani forces intruded into areas that were ostensibly "held" by the Indian army, were withheld from the Subrahmanyam Committee that was set up to review the Kargil conflict, an investigation by tehelka.com reveals.

What that essentially means is that the army top brass in the then "Kargil Formations" lied through their teeth to the Committee about why the most crucial post in the Kaksar sector, the winter cut-off post named Bajrang, was vacated. The Committee, formally christened the Kargil Review Committee, submitted its report on December 15, 1999.

The Subrahmanyam Committee report stated that Bajrang had been "vacated in the face of extreme snow conditions", a reason that is as good as any - if any reason is good enough for having vacated, in the first place. But, in that case, why is the army itself now conducting a court of inquiry on why the post was vacated?

This is another of those botch-ups that are busy being swept under the post-Kargil red carpet laid down for those gold-braids-and-epaulettes senior officers who "dutifully and selflessly" conducted the war from the Indian side.

The seniormost officers of 56 Brigade, Dras; 79 Mountain Brigade, Mashkoh;HQ 8 Mountain Division(which took operational controlof the Dras-Mashkoh sector);121 Kargil Brigade; andHQ 3 Mountain Division (which was moved to Kargil
for operational control of Kargil and Batalik sectors) initiated "Operation Whitewash", which misled not the enemy forces but an inquiry set up to review a war that, in retrospect, had more than its fair share of command skulduggery.

Within army circles, "Operation Whitewash" is military code for a series of manoeuvres and machinations orchestrated by senior army commanders to cover up their follies during the Kargil conflict. "Operation Whitewash has been underway ever since the government announced the end of Kargil operations on July 26, 1999," says an army officer at the Army Training Command (ART-RAC), Shimla.

The Kargil Review Committee was limited by its terms of reference. Starting, with literal exactitude, on the ground, this is how it described Pakistan's topographically-linked strategy: "So grudging and virtually impassable is the terrain here that both sides have traditionally maintained just temporary summer posts, from which they launched patrols, only to withdraw from them variously between November and May when General Winter resumes command…Obviously they (Pakistani Northern Light Infantry soldiers) took care to move only into areas in the unheld gaps using routes that were not under observation of Indian winter posts."

Information gleaned by tehelka.com after speaking to army officers (who spoke out of frustration but on the necessary condition of anonymity) involved in the Kargil conflict reveals a story vastly different.

Pakistani intruders, apart from moving into unheld gaps, also occupied winter posts that were vacated with the full knowledge of the top brass of 15 Corps in Srinagar and 3 Mountain Division in Leh. These were posts that should not have been vacated under any circumstances - even the most extreme.

The most crucial post in the Kaksar sector is the winter cut-off post called Bajrang. It was vacated - as it never should have been, being a winter cut-off post - almost a month before the Pakistani intrusion in this sector took place. Bajrang was vacated with the full knowledge of Lt General Krishan Pal, the then 15 Corp Commander,
and Major-General V S Budhwar, Commander of 3 Mountain Division.

Winter posts were thus defined by the Kargil Review Committee: "Permanent posts within the various defended areas/localities which it is operationally necessary to keep under occupation throughout the year, but whose routine maintenance support is not possible during winter months due to snow conditions, are called 'Winter Cut-Off Posts'. These posts are stocked up (level of stocking maintained is for 210 days) during the summer months so that they can sustain themselves without re-supply for the period they are cut-off."

Why have the top brass of 121 Infantry Brigade, who were directly responsible for defensive postures, and the senior commanders in Leh and Srinagar not been held accountable?

In the chapter titled Kargil Intrusion Reconstructed, the Kargil Review Committee Report states: "The enemy intrusion was detected on May 14, 1999 by a patrol of 4 Jat in the areas of Pt 5299 South West Spur, commonly known as Bajrang Post (the only post vacated by Indian troops on March 2, 1999 in the face of extreme
snow conditions)."

And here lies the catch. If 4 Jat vacated Bajrang because of "extreme snow conditions", as reported by the Kargil Review Committee, then why is the army conducting a court of inquiry on why the post was vacated?

Why was Bajrang vacated? All for the sake of a piddling divisional firing competition.

On April 22, 1999 a divisional firing competition was scheduled in the Kargil firing range. All the battalions under the 3 Mountain Division were compelled to send their crack firing teams to take part in the competition.

But Colonel M S Kuksal, commanding the 4 Jat Battalion, refused to send a firing team because he did not have enough manpower. Brigadier Surinder Singh, the then Brigade Commander of 121 Infantry Brigade in Kargil, ordered Col Kuksal to vacate Bajrang after consulting the Divisional Commander, Major General, V S Budhwar.

This stupendously important order was given to make it possible for Col Kuksal to send a 4 Jat firing team for the competition. It was like pulling out a frontline tank battalion to escort a filmstar to a shoot.

The irony is that after 4 Jat pulled out from Bajrang, the senior commanders decided to postpone the firing competition to May 24, 1999.

It goes without saying that Brigade Command could not have given the orders to vacate the post without the concurrence of 3 Mountain Division commander, Major-General Budhwar and 15 Corps commander, Lt Gen Krishan Pal.

According to the Kargil Review Committee Report, Bajrang was vacated on March 2, 1999; the area remained unpatrolled till April 11, 1999. The first patrol went to the Bajrang area after 38 days (on April 12-13).

The Kargil Review Committee Report states: "It is evident from Captain Hussain Ahmad's (12 Northern Light Infantry) diary that small groups, primarily consisting of officers, moved across the LoC in the Maskoh sector in February-March 1999 and established themselves in 'igloo' tents…The main body of troops commenced occupation of the heights across the LoC in the latter half of April 1999."

It further states: "Own patrol of 4 Jat found Indian post at South West spur at Pt 5299 (Bajrang) intact on April 12-13, 1999 from where troops had earlier been withdrawn on March 2, 1999 and this was subsequently occupied by Pakistani intruders."

If Bajrang was actually vacated on March 2, as reported by the Subrahamanyam Committee, why was the first patrol sent up after 38 days? This question is crucial because it is evident that the actual reason for vacating was not the stated "extreme snow conditions"

The next patrol was led by Captain Amol Kalia. He and his men were brutally tortured and killed by the Pakistani intruders. Shouldn't responsibility be fixed for their deaths? If the commanders in Kargil-Leh had not ordered the vacation of Bajrang, the intrusion in Kaksar could not and would not have taken place. Captain Amol Kalia and his men would not have been brutalised.

The intrusion was finally detected on May 14 by another patrol of 4 Jat.

Bajrang is a monument to a standing humiliation. It remains one of the few posts that the Indian army could not win back - the Pakistani forces withdrew from it of their own volition.

When the commanders realised their massive strategic failure, they mounted pressure on the infantry units to recapture Bajrang. In fact, till the withdrawal of Pakistani intruders was announced on July 17, 1999, the fight for the post had claimed 37 lives.

After the intrusion was detected, a single company of 28 Rashtriya Rifles was released to contain the intrusion. Subsequently, on May 21, 14 JAKRIF was deployed in the Kaksar sector.

Right through Operation Vijay, Bajrang's recapture remained a festering prestige issue. Said a Commanding Officer who had commanded a battalion
in Operation Vijay, "The pressure was so much that Colonel D K Nanda, commanding officer of 14 JAKRIF, suffered a heart attack soon after Operation Vijay
was over."

The question of who will be nailed for the massive dereliction is, of course, the crux of the matter, now that the event is over and done with - courtesy the Pakistani self-withdrawal. The entire 4 Jat Battalion, commanded by Colonel M S Kuksal, is in the dock and punishment will undoubtedly go no higher than this level.

Major-General P P S Bindra, major-general-general-staff (MGGS), Northern Command says, "It (the vacating of Bajrang) is more serious than a error of judgement. We have carried out internal inquiries and a court of inquiry is in progress and those responsible will be fixed."

On being asked who exactly would be "fixed", the MGGS replied, "All this is confidential and I cannot reveal the details, but that the vacation of Bajrang should not have taken place is beyond doubt. Action is being taken and action will be taken."

But any "action" now will be so retroactive that it will make little difference to what is another screw-up of the kind that is turning the Kargil imbroglio into a monument for the rank unprofessionalism of some of the Indian military's top brass


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