The DODO (DRDO) Stories thread

[M.Ghaznavi]

Arms and our money:



The defence ministry could be bolder


http://www.financialexpress.com/fe_f...tent_id=139047


Given the scale of India’s armament purchases—we began a Rs 40,000 Crore (US $ 8.59 Billion)* -plus round of military modernisation last year, on top of the Rs 27,000 Crore (US $ 5.8 Billion)* outlay the year before—any fresh thinking on transparency in field trials and avoiding delay in decision-making is welcome. Whether the updated Defence Procurement Procedure announced by minister Pranab Mukherjee will bear out such hopes adequately remains to be seen. The DPP he announced a year before promised “the highest degree of probity and public accountability, transparency in operations..” With Bofors, Tehelka and like episodes, these phrases have been staples in officialese on the subject for years. Given the scathing remarks addressed by the office of the Union comptroller and auditor-general (CAG) on almost every aspect of procurement (and on storage) by the military, there’s substantial room for scepticism still. It was just at the beginning of this week that the Central Vigilance Commission found the need to issue new directives to the defence ministry on the need to avoid single-vendor situations and not to dilute qualitative requirements during the course of a decision.

The minister made some remarks about the new DPP leading to more participation by Indian industry, in both production and R&D. A closer reading doesn’t reveal much change; Mr Mukherjee has been speaking of the need to enhance private sector participation in military defence since he took office and officials about the “paradigm shift” that is supposed to have already taken place from the earlier near-full reliance on the state sector. Policy, however, has been cautious; some chambers of commerce had made an official suggestion last year to identify 10 major products or technologies which serve our military requirements and also generate demand in the global market and to select a consortium for each of these from both state and private sector firms. We haven’t seen much official response on worthwhile suggestions like these.

There are provisions in the new DPP to encourage indigenous content and to encourage industrial involvement in high-technology systems under the Defence Research & Development Organisation. The CAG has expressed much critical comment on the DRDO’s functioning in recent years and these need to be addressed, if the hopes on sharing of developmental costs with identified vendors are to bear fruit. Bolder steps in involving private industry seem warranted.
(* US $ 1.00 = IN Rs 46.5481)

[M.Ghaznavi]

Ajai Shukla: Weapons? Equipment? Main hoon na!

BROADSWORD

Ajai Shukla / New Delhi September 12, 2006

http://www.business-standard.com/com...Left=0&chkFlg=

Hallelujah! A new bible is here to govern the expenditure of some Rs 50,000 crore a year on weaponry for India’s defence forces. On September 1, the Defence Procurement Procedure and Manual, 2006 (DPP-2006 and DPM-2006) superseded its equally inconsequential predecessor, the DPP-2005, unveiled just a year earlier. Despite the fanfare that attended its release, the latest manual is little more than a compilation of existing regulations, now set out in consolidated form. The DPP-2006 makes some attempt to create bulwarks against corruption, but it fails to address a fundamental issue in arms procurement: the systemic bias against the private sector that has prevented it from carrying the values of cost-efficiency and accountability into a Palaeolithic landscape dominated by public sector dinosaurs.

In 2001, defence manufacturing was opened to the private sector, with conditions that still apply: compulsory licensing and a ceiling of 26% on foreign shareholding. Despite many private companies being keen to enter the defence business, they were allowed no more than a peripheral role by entrenched patronage networks between defence production officials in the MoD and the government research and production agencies [the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), the nine defence PSUs and 39 ordnance factories]. Using the rhetoric of self-reliance as a smokescreen, these monoliths anointed themselves keepers of the faith, with creative accounting and cross-subsidies hiding a sorry tale of inefficiency. Last year, the far-sighted Kelkar Committee recommended that private industry be tapped to create an integrated defence industry. DPP-2006 does nothing to unshackle the private sector.

The dominance of government agencies like the DRDO rests on the veto power that they wield in the procurement process. When the military requests for any new equipment, the DRDO gets to decide whether that demand should be categorised as “buy” (purchase outright from the international arms market), or “buy and make” (buy technology from a foreign vendor and manufacture in India) or “make” (develop the technology in DRDO laboratories and then manufacture it in defence PSUs or ordnance factories).

A frustrated military does not dispute the need for foreign purchases to be weighed against the possibility of indigenous development. But there is bitterness at the DRDO’s unchallenged power to hold up desperately-needed equipment by opting to make it, dragging on research for years, and finally delivering a shoddy product. There is growing realisation that the DRDO has a vested interest in opting for development; the vast establishment of scientists, laboratories and a generous budget has to be justified somehow. This conflict of interest goes unquestioned. Rarely, if ever, is research passed on to the more sophisticated private sector. With characteristic gallows humour, army officers suggest the DRDO motto should be: Main hoon na!

While the government dinosaurs grapple unsuccessfully for decades with sophisticated systems like tanks, air defence missiles, night vision devices and radio sets, there is nobody to provide the simple, low-tech kit that the army needs most desperately—boots, helmets and bullet-proof jackets. Soldiers in J&K wear cheap, off-the-pavement motorcycle helmets instead of the Kevlar helmets, which are standard protection for reputable armies. Frontline combat units still do without bullet-proof jackets for all their soldiers. It is easy to see why ordnance factories or defence PSUs have failed to provide such basic necessities: the budgetary allocations would not be as lucrative as they are for high-tech projects.

DPP-2006 fails to address the DRDO’s discretionary powers to cherry-pick projects. Also unaddressed is the unfair clout of the defence PSUs, establishments like Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), whose institutionalised role in MoD decision-making effectively elbows out the private sector. The Deputy Chief of Air Staff received a communication from BEL earlier this year (letter 4860/2/DCMS/HQ dated 15th March 2006), demanding business favours in contracts for 12 critical projects, including electronic warfare equipment, radars and navigation systems, many of which were already being procured from other companies. BEL did not explain why it should be given preferential treatment. It was enough to say, “Main hoon na!”
Compare this marginalisation of India’s private industry with mature powers like the US and the UK, where defence research and production are entirely privatised. The US is developing a high-tech Future Combat System (FCS), comprising a light, air-portable force of 150,000 soldiers, who see a far-away enemy through a network of satellites, make decisions through secured communications links and then use high-tech weaponry to hit the unsuspecting enemy. The lead contractor for this $500 billion project is Boeing, which is harnessing the efficiencies of several other private corporations. The Pentagon will provide Boeing $21 billion for research till 2014; Boeing will answer for any delays.

Similarly, in the UK, privatised corporations like BAE Systems do major R&D and also operate many of the systems required to keep the British military functioning, such as aircraft maintenance and pilot training. South Block scoffs that India’s private sector lacks the capability to execute major defence projects. If private companies are kept on the margins forever, that will always be the case.

Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee, while releasing DPP-2006, declared, “We have effectively opened the doors for the (private) Indian industry to participate in defence research, development and production.”

Not really. The chorus in South Block is undiminished: “Main hoon na!”

[M.Ghaznavi]

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/a...ow/1988827.cms

GOOD NEWS!!

DRDO working on new missile
Rajat Pandit
[ 14 Sep, 2006 0112hrs ISTTIMES NEWS NETWORK ]


RSS Feeds| SMS NEWS to 8888 for latest updates

NEW DELHI: The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) cannot be faulted for at least one thing: thinking big. Despite frequent technical glitches and time and cost-overruns in its missile programme, it's going ahead with development work on the beyond visual range (BVR) air-to-air missile 'Astra'.

BVR missiles are fired by fighter jets to destroy enemy aircraft at ranges beyond 40 km. They are urgently needed these days since BVR combat, as compared to dogfights or WVR (within visual range) combat, has become the norm in modern-day aerial warfare.

Being a complex system, only a few countries like US, Russia, France and Israel have managed to develop BVR missiles. IAF's frontline fighters like Sukhoi-30 MKIs and Mirage-2000s, for instance, are armed with expensive BVR missiles of French and Russian origin like the "Matra Super 530D" and "AA-12 Adder".

DRDO is not deterred by all this. Holding that the "systems design, aerodynamic configuration design etc of various sub-systems" of Astra have now been completed, DRDO plans to soon conduct "controlled flights" of the missile "from under-slung ground launchers".

The DRDO, incidentally, had conducted test-firing of three primitive Astra prototypes from the Chandipur-on-Sea interim test range in May 2003. But nothing much was heard after it. On March 31, 2004, the government approved the Rs 1,000-crore project to develop Astra, with a 80-km "head-on range".

"I don't think DRDO will be able to deliver Astra to IAF by 2009 as promised," said an expert.

[Saeed Khan]

Indian Air Force grounds MiG 29 fighters:

Chandigarh, Oct 2, 2006: Following the crash of a MiG-29 — the IAF frontline counter-air fighter — near Ambala last week, the Air Force has “grounded” part of the fleet for extensive checks, it is learnt.

Sources at the Adampur airbase in Punjab, where two of the IAF’s three MiG-29 squadrons are based, told The Tribune that flying operations had been suspended till further orders.

An MiG-29 from Adampur had crashed while on a routine sortie after both its engines had seized or flamed-out. Failure of both engines of an otherwise reliable design is stated to be “one in a million” chance.

“The situation is what we refer to as aircraft-on-ground (AOG), where the entire fleet may not be affected by a particular snag, but flying operations are put on hold simply as a precautionary measure till the exact cause of an accident is established,” a senior officer at Air Headquarters said.

“The IAF has not issued a central order restricting flying by MiG-29 and the AOG orders may have been issued at the command level,” he added. Nonetheless it means that the majority of MiG 29s are not flying.

This is for the second time in two years that a major combat type in the IAF has been placed on AOG. In 2004, the Jaguar fleet was grounded for extensive technical checks after four of them crashed in succession.

IAF sources said that the possibility of adulterated fuel, which may have led to engine seizure, is also being seriously explored. “There is reason to explore this angle,” an IAF officer said, indicating that instances of fuel adulteration may have come to light earlier.
It is now known that the first engine of the ill-fated flamed-out was due to a fuel problem. Sources revealed that engine flame-outs in the MiG-29 is becoming a cause of concern, with three such incidents occurring this year.

Also to note is the latest Comptroller and Auditor General’s report, which revealed serious shortcomings in the MiG-29’s maintenance and overhaul process, particularly the work on engines.

The meantime between failure (MTBF) of HAL overhauled engines was also very low, with 74 per cent of engines that underwent full overhaul during the past eight years being withdrawn prematurely. “This necessitated carrying out more interim overhauls at a cost of Rs 56.56 crore,” the report said.

The MTBF of HAL-overhauled engines was just 60 hours whereas it was 213 hours for engines overhauled by the original equipment manufacture OEM. The Air Force also pointed out that engines overhauled by HAL had been found to be with serious defects which had grave flight safety and maintenance implications.

The CAG also pointed out deficiencies in maintenance at the squadron level. In one instance it found out that available specialised tools were not being used resulting in misalignment of components, leading to excessive vibrations in the engines.

Inducted into the IAF about two decades ago, the MiG-29 has one of the best flight safety records in the IAF. It is now in for a major upgrade programme entailing increase in its range by incorporating larger internal fuel tanks as well as in-flight refueling facilities, more powerful radar, advanced avionics and a newer variant of its RD-33 engine. The IAF has three squadrons of this type.

TTI

[john]

Saeed Khan, actually this report is not true. I just saw a TV interview of the IAF spokesperson, who said that the MiG-29s are not grounded, and will take part in the IAF anniversary celebrations as planned soon.

[Mujahid Achakzai]

If what you say is to the contrary of the news article, then might be so kind to bring proof. Some news link or something to counter it. If not, speculations are nothing more than whistling in the wind!

[M.Ghaznavi]

India shelves Trishul project

By Iftikhar Gilani

link

NEW DELHI: Following repeated failures, India has put the Trishul missile system project on hold. Sources here said that the government-run Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO) has been told to stop work on Trishul and the project will be wound up by the end of the year.

The government has asked the DRDO to concentrate now on co-development of the next generation Barak II missile system project that was signed last January as a joint venture with Israel. Barak II is to have a firing range of 60 km. Barak I’s firing range is 9 km. Ironically, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) filed a case against former defence minister George Fernandes and some businessmen only a few days ago for taking bribes in the purchase of Barak missile systems.

Fernandes had ordered five Barak systems while the present government has ordered seven more after they were certified as the best by the Indian Navy.

Trishul has been a pet project of President APJ Abdul Kalam, who used to be the chief of the DRDO. The end of Trishul is seen here as a major blow to the DRDO, which had already been under attack in the Defence Ministry for the failing guidance and propulsion mechanisms of the long-gestation project.

Fernandes went for the Barak purchase in 2000 on the Indian Navy’s insistence but he did not kill the Trishul project. After some 50 trials and estimated expenditure of over Rs 3 billion on Trishul over the past 22 years, the Indian Navy told the government to junk it two years ago.

Trishul was developed as a short range missile with three variants as part of the Integrated Missile Development Programme (IGMDP). It was meant for a range of 12 km fitted with a 15 kg warhead. Designed to be used against low-level (sea skimming) targets at short range, the system aimed to defend naval vessels against missiles and also as a short range surface to air missile on land.

In 2004, the DRDO was told to remove Trishul from the list of active programmes for the user, meaning it need not be developed to meet the requirements of the Indian Navy. It was, however, allowed to continue the project as an exercise in “technology demonstration”. The navy has since told the government that even demonstrations are unnecessary after India struck a deal with the Barak manufacturers for joint development of future systems.

Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Arun Prakash has stated that there should be no doubts about the Barak’s capabilities. “Our experience with the Barak missile has been good. We are happy with it,” he said. “Trishul” means trident in Sanskrit, while “Barak” stands for lightning in Hebrew.

[Murad]

[B] ...............Following repeated failures, India has put the Trishul missile system project on hold...............The government has asked the DRDO to concentrate now on co-development of the next generation Barak II missile system project............

List of DRDO successes keeps piling up!

I am assuming by "co-development" they mean putting an Indian coat of paint (with imported raw material) on it - like Brahmos - and calling it a joint venture. I bet the Israelis are thrilled about it, they have been itching for DRDO geniuses to participate in their projects..........

[Munir]

Keymag is filled to the top with Indians (western nicknames like Harry, Nick and now we have here a john) being extremely happy with the fact that they come up with the idea that JF17 is not joint venture. I don;t think that Pakistan wants zero TOT. And they are openly telling that some TOT can not be realistic cause we need more trained people (Gripen). Indian are so busy to mark PAkistani items are being imported and painted from countries like Chine and North Korea. Still the result is that with less money, less time, less engineers and less barking, Pakistan has achieved results in various fields. We do see fixed fuel rockets, cruisemisiles, Mushaq, K8, JF17, Zarrar, Khaled and more and more. We see at the same time failed LCA, Arjun and many more "state-of-the-art" imported weapons that end in the corner... We must be happy with a failed neighbour cause it would be a nightmare if it was as good as us.

[M.Ghaznavi]

Gotta thank Saeed Khan on PDF for keeping us up-to-date with our friendly neighbourhood DODO. A few articles we missed.


What CBI doesn’t say: Trishul is a DRDO dud:

LINK


New Delhi, Oct 11, 2006: The CBI, while naming former Defence Minister George Fernandes in its FIR on the Barak deal case, claimed that he opted for the Israeli missile system despite the objection of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) which was pitching for the indigenous Trishul. What the CBI and DRDO don’t say is that the Trishul was not ready then, not now. Two hundred scientists, Rs 250 Crore and 21 years later, Trishul remains a technology demonstrator.

In a written response to queries sent by The Indian Express, the DRDO today admitted to the major problems that crippled the Trishul programme:

“Consistency of the missile guidance and control system — mainly the technical problems in perfecting the three-beam missile guidance system. Non-availability of critical components, devices and subsystems due to embargoes imposed upon the country and also depletion of experienced specialist manpower during a critical phase of the development has led to delay in the project.”

The “technology demonstrator” designation, officially stated two months ago by Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee in Parliament, is no compliment to the country`s Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP). For the Trishul, the “TD” suffix principally labels it a technology pool from which other, newer systems may borrow technology. But this speaks little of the Ministry’s own frustration with the Trishul, even if the missile’s imported replacement, the Israeli Barak, is now in the eye of a political storm.

In April this year, with inputs from IAF deputy chief Air Marshal AK Nagalia, the Defence Ministry provided unusually forthright testimony to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence. “The Trishul weapon system which was to replace OSA-AK weapon system has not met with success. These delays have derailed modernisation/replacement programme resulting in critical voids,” it told the Panel for the latter’s 11th report.

In March, DRDO chief M Natarajan, whose area of specialisation is armoured vehicles, told the Defence Ministry that the Trishul was ready for user trials. At any rate, three of the seven Chief Controllers (CCs), Dr Prahlad, Dr A Sivathanu Pillai and Dr VK Saraswat, among the more decorated scientists in the country, have been involved with the Trishul and the IGMDP at large.

When the Navy projected a “very threatening scenario for warships” after Kargil, things came to a head in mid-2002. Faced with mounting pressure from the IAF, headed then by Air chief S Krishnaswamy whose force was facing critical obsolescence in air defence systems, the Trishul was de-linked from user service requirements, and pushed back onto the drawing board under then DRDO chief V K Aatre.

The Navy was less patient — with a capability projection nearing its tenth year with no movement, it had begun to look abroad for stop-gap measures in the 1990s under Admirals V S Shekhawat and Vishnu Bhagwat, finally succeeding in 2000 with the Israeli Barak. The DRDO and even sections of the Navy were not happy, saying the missile was not suitable for Indian warships.

The DRDO, however, said today that “All development work on Trishul has been completed and the project closure is underway.” But even if user trials take place and succeed, it’s still too little, too late for all three armed forces. The Army and IAF have committed to buying Israeli quick-reaction missiles, deals together worth nearly Rs 4,000 Crore, and the Navy has set its eyes on the next generation Barak missile for its warships.

The cost of these deals makes a one-time purchase uneconomical. The biggest possible sign of despondence about Trishul however came in January this year. The Hyderabad-based Defence R&D Laboratory (DRDL), the very establishment that has brought the Trishul this far, entered into an agreement to develop the Barak-II with Israel, with the understanding that co-development will have technological spin-offs, ironically enough, for the Indian guided missile programme.



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Military imbalance with Pakistan:


LINK

There is a sudden spate of “hard luck” stories (including a letter written by Chief of Air Staff to the Defence Minister) highlighting how there is a slump in ratio of India’s conventional military capability vis-a-vis Pakistan. This is a far cry from the nuclear lobby’s assertion that once India achieves nuclear weapons capability the cost of defence would be reduced because deterrence would prevail. The lone voices that warned that nuclear parity would shift the equation back to conventional weaponry were ignored in the aftermath of Pokharan II.

The current outcry over “slackness in modernisation” is a symptom of that miscalculation for which the nation could pay very heavily if the demands of the armed forces become translated into Kargil-style off-the-shelf purchases.

Indian Air Force has had to make one such purchase of a surface-to-air missile from Israel recently to fill the gaps in its air defence ground environment system (ADGES). This is because the Defence Research and Development Organisation, (DRDO), has failed to ‘deliver’ Akash as promised even three years after the deadline. Several prestigious DRDO projects have got stuck in the pipeline for years. This has largely contributed to “slackness” in the modernisation of our armed forces and made the turn to imports.

Despite loud talk, acquisition of military equipment remains a victim of middlemen. It in fact has become a political football as the FIR against George Fernandes, the NDA defence minister shows. That Fernandes himself was not a bit player in the infamous Bofors row is beside the point.

The Israeli connection too is threatening to become controversial. It is a fall-out of Indian move to consider withdrawing its military contingent posted in Lebanon under a UN mandate. New Delhi’s action is justified as the terms of engagement have been altered. Intriguingly, a hesitation on the part of Israel to deliver the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and night vision equipment has coincided with this rethink. The contracts were signed before the Lebanon war erupted. Another interesting coincidence is the remark by Deputy Prime Minister Shimon Peres that he hoped that Israeli military equipment sold to India would not be used against Pakistan. Is this new concern a reflection of growing contacts between Israel and Pakistan or a clever attempt at arm-twisting India to fall in line with Tel Aviv plans for Lebanon?

Another factor accentuating India’s concerns vis-à-vis Pakistan is the US decision to resume supplies of F-16 fighter aircraft to Islamabad. Frankly, much of the strategic imbalance has not occurred overnight. There has been a steady fall in the squadron strength of the IAF. Because, we have failed to heed the La Fontaine Committee recommendation to buy an Advanced Jet Trainer (AJT) and allowed the issue linger on for decades. What is more we also ignored problems in ‘maintenance’.

It was only after the AJT contract was given to the British Hawk that the maintenance problem came into focus. Immediately thereafter came claims that the rate of accidents had fallen by 50 per cent. If this indeed is true, what prevented our defence mandarins to act much earlier and thus saving the lives of the scores of young flying officers who had been killed because of machine failure?

The erosion of the ratio of conventional fighting units is directly connected with our miscalculation that our nuclear weapons capability would contribute to a reduction in the budget for conventional forces. Pakistan changed the scenario by resorting to war by proxy using jehadi terrorists closely supported by its regular infantry.

Counter-insurgency is manpower intensive. The fable of the invincibility of the “Kashmiri freedom fighters” grew till India did a better job of raising counter-insurgency forces in Jammu and Kashmir. In fact, the crushing of the Khalistani movement in Punjab occurred when force levels and synergy between the Army, the paramilitary and the police reached an optimum level. The same needs to be done in Jammu and Kashmir.

Empirical studies show that there should be more security forces in terrorist infested areas. The theory is that for every one terrorist there should be at least upto fifty armed force personnel on duty. That there is some validity in this postulate is highlighted by Pakistan’s demand that the Indian Army be withdrawn from Jammu and Kashmir.

Accepting the demand which Pakistan gratuitously calls ‘de-militarisation’ will leave the field open to the jehadi terrorists 5000 of whom have received training in camps in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir and Pakistan itself and are waiting for an opportunity to infiltrate across the Line of Control (LOC). This lot is bolstered by the more than 150,000 retired personnel of the Northern Light Infantry of the Pakistan Army (the same lot who disguised as “mujahids” infiltrated and captured the heights in Kargil in 1999).

It is not for nothing that the ULFA in Assam and the Manipuri insurgents should choose this moment to intensify their militancy. The intention is to stretch the Indian security forces and make it difficult for them to concentrate their efforts.

Thus ratio and force levels have deteriorated over decades. That the issue should suddenly surface at this point of time beginning with the leaked letter from the Chief of Air Staff to the Defence Minister points to an orchestration. Military force levels and concomitant military equipment cannot be enhanced in short time frames. Manpower improvement would take the better part of one year and acquisition of equipment would range across a decade (in the case of aircraft).

Any attempt to stampede the government into making off-the-shelf acquisitions will, in the first instance, undercut the intent and purpose of recently declared acquisitions policy. There should be no a single vender situation not merely to strike the best bargain but also to ensure that the arms procurement will not become political football.




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Trishul cancelled, DRDO to focus on Barak II development:




New Delhi Oct 14, 2006: Research and development work on the indigenous ship defence missile Trishul will be stopped in December, official sources confirmed in New Delhi on Saturday.

Instead, the Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) will focus on developing an advanced version of the Israeli Barak missile, now in the middle of a controversy following allegations of bribery in its imports.

The sources said Trishul was intended only as a technology demonstrator, meaning work on it would have formed the basis for developing missiles of the same category. They implied that the missile was not intended for induction in the Indian Navy although statements at various points of time by DRDO scientists suggested otherwise.

At least 50 trials have been conducted and nearly Rs. 300 Crore has been spent on developing the Trishul, which is meant to shoot down missiles homing in on a ship.

The decision could cast a shadow on two other missiles — Akash and Nag — being developed by the DRDO as part of the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme. While the DRDO has managed to develop Nag, meant to destroy tanks, it has had little success with the advanced versions, available off the shelf in the global armaments market for a decade. Akash's case is also the same and the Indian Air Force is understood to be hunting for alternatives abroad.

Officials do not think that the current controversy would inhibit the joint development of the next generation of Barak, which would be effective in a range of 60 km instead of the present 9 km. According to the CBI investigation, the Navy imported the Barak anti-missile systems and missiles despite DRDO objections and a middleman allegedly paid Rs. 2 Crore to the then president of a political party.

Barak, the only choice:

Barak remained the only choice out of 14 companies tried out by the Navy on its three ships INS Brahmputra, Beas and Betwa that were readied for Trishul fitment after the then programme chief A.P.J. Abdul Kalam assured the Government that the indigenous missile would be ready by 1994.




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Buy or make: Can the forces bank on DRDO?

LINK


New Delhi Oct 16, 2006: Buy or make? This existential question has dogged defence acquisitions in the tussle between the armed forces and DRDO over the years. The Barak case has once again brought their conflict to the fore.

Strangely enough, for an organisation not known for its competence, DRDO has time and again managed to veto plans of armed forces to 'buy' military hardware and software from abroad by promising to 'make' them indigenously.

"After promising the moon, DRDO either does not deliver or delivers too little, too late, affecting our overall defence preparedness," says a senior officer.

Take the CBI case in the Rs 1,160 Crore deal, which was signed in October 2000, for Israeli Barak-I anti-missile defence systems. One of the main CBI contentions is that the then defence minister George Fernandes gave the go-ahead for the Barak deal by overruling DRDO, which had then held that its own Trishul AMD system was in an advanced stage of development.

While kickbacks may have been paid, the decision to overrule DRDO was certainly valid, considering that the 9 km-range Trishul system is still nowhere near becoming operational, despite being tested over 80 times.
As reported by ToI earlier, from missiles, radars and electronic warfare programmes to juices, mosquito repellents and titanium dental implants, DRDO has a whopping 439 projects and studies worth around Rs 16,925 Crore (US $ 3.725 Billion)* on its plate at present.

*(US $ 1.00 = IND Rs 45.4349)




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'Akash' Project delay has upset IAF plans:

LINK


New Delhi Oct 16, 2006: Defence Research and Development Organisation on several ocassions has vetoed plans to "buy" military hardware and software by promising to "make" them.

But while self-reliance in defence is a worthy objective, it cannot be at the cost of military preparedness.

Here's a sample of some key Defence Research and Development Organisation projects:

1) Akash:

This indigenous 25 km-range missile system was meant to bolster air defence cover, which still has many gaping holes. But just like its sister Trishul, Akash is still far away from induction into the armed forces.

IAF chief Air Chief Marshal S P Tyagi, in fact, says the delay in Akash has "upset" his force's air defence plans. Consequently, IAF is now going to acquire 18 Israeli quick-reaction SpyDer anti-aircraft missile systems, worth around Rs 1,800 crore, to replace its aging OSA-AK and Pechora systems.

2) Arjun:

Despite this project being sanctioned way back in 1974, the Arjun main-battle tanks are yet to be fully combat-worthy. If left to the Army, they would use the bulky Arjun tanks for target practice only.

It was, incidentally, Pakistan's acquisition of 320 T-80UD tanks from Ukraine, coupled with a general upgradation of its armoured capabilities, that led Army to press for procurement of 310 Russian T-90S tanks at a cost of Rs 3,625 crore.

Under the February 2001 contract, another 1,000 T-90S tanks will now be produced indigenously over the next decade, under transfer of technology from Russia, to ensure India retains the armoured combat edge over Pakistan.

3) Tejas LCA:

The Light Combat Aircraft, sanctioned in 1983 to replace the aging MiG fighters in IAF's combat fleet, will take another six-seven years — if not more — to become fully-operational.

Though Defence Research and Development Organisation proclaims LCA will be a state-of-the-art fighter when ready, Indian Air Force is already grappling with a rapidly-depleting number of fighter squadrons.

By 2012, the overall LCA project cost could touch Rs 10,000 Crore (US $ 2.2 Billion), with the government having already sanctioned Rs 5,489.78 crore for Tejas till now.

It's no wonder IAF is desperate for the $6.5-billion deal to acquire 126 multi-role combat aircraft from abroad to take off as soon as possible. These three cases are just the tip of the iceberg.

With around 29,000 personnel in 50 laboratories and establishments, Defence Research and Development Organisation continues to be way behind schedule in several crucial projects ranging from the

4) Nag anti-tank guided missile to the

5) Kaveri engine meant for fighter jets.

The solution probably is to go in for more and more "Buy and Make" deals, which involve direct acquisitions followed by indigenous licensed production, or joint R&D projects to develop frontline weapons. A good example of this is the joint development of the 300-km range BrahMos supersonic cruise missile with Russia.

As for advanced AMD systems, Navy has pinned its hopes on the January 2006 DRDO-Israel Aircraft Industries agreement to develop Barak-II or Barak-NG (next generation), with a 60-km range, by early 2010 in the $350-million project.




However, none of the 13 missile systems except Barak could fit in the space made on the ships.

[M.Ghaznavi]

DRDO must get its act together: Services brass
Rajat Pandit
[ 19 Oct, 2006 0133hrs ISTTIMES NEWS NETWORK ]


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NEW DELHI: The armed forces' brass had two specific messages for PM Manmohan Singh on Wednesday. One, corruption scandals in defence deals should not be allowed to derail modernisation plans. And two, DRDO must get its act together, instead of delivering too-little, too-late.

Sources said the PM was told during the combined commanders' conference that long delays in procurement of desperately-needed military hardware and software, coupled with tardy progress in DRDO projects with unrealistic timeframes, was causing a steady depletion in the war-waging potential of the armed forces.

Navy chief Admiral Arun Prakash, for instance, stressed that episodes like the recent CBI kickbacks case in the Rs 1,160-crore Barak deal would send the wrong message that it's better to avoid taking decisions rather then they coming back to haunt you later, said sources.

Any paralysis in decision-making would not augur well for the future of India's defence preparedness, he said. The Navy, of course, is quite upset that one of its former chiefs, Admiral Sushil Kumar, has been named as an accused by CBI for legitimately favouring the top-notch Israeli Barak-I anti-missile defence system in 1999-2000 over the still-unsuccessful indigenous Trishul system.

IAF chief Air Chief Marshal S P Tyagi, in turn, pointed to the long delays in the indigenous 'Tejas' Light Combat Aircraft, as well as the acquisition process for 126 multi-role combat aircraft from abroad, to buttress this point, said sources.

Grappling as it is with a rapidly-depleting fighter strength, the IAF will lose its long-standing combat edge over Pakistan in a few years from now, warned ACM Tyagi.

Pakistan, as it is, is on course to get 36 or more advanced F-16s, apart from upgradation of its existing 32 F-16s, from the US.

This will be supplemented by a large number of JF-17 'Thunder' fighters jointly developed with China. The PM, on his part, said the government would ensure a "balanced development"of the country's defence capabilities.

In pursuing the modernisation of the armed forces, "we seek the optimal blend of developing and producing indigenously and sourcing from elsewhere".

"Transparency in procurement is a desirable objective, both for good governance and national security. Reports critical of such processes can demoralise the Services, where they are untrue, and must be directly addressed, where they are true,"he said.

The forces certainly need reassurance that the frequent eruption of defence scandals will not hit their modernisation plans.

[M.Ghaznavi]

Crown of thorns awaits new defence minister:

http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_1828394,0008.htm

New Delhi Oct 24, 2006: Room # 103, South Block. A smorgasbord of challenges awaits the new defence minister who will have his work cut out for him as he prepares to get into the hot seat in South Block.

Whichever way he trains his vision, he will realise the urgency of thinking through a clutch of knotty problems afflicting the armed forces, which have a bearing on the nation’s war-waging capabilities.

At the very outset, Pranab Mukherjee’s successor will have to ensure that the modernisation of the armed forces figures prominently on his list of priorities.

At a time when almost every defence deal reeks of kickbacks and fixes, and high-flying but corrupt wheelers and dealers virtually control the armament industry, the new defence minister’s litmus test would be guaranteeing transparency in defence procurements without letting critical acquisitions suffer.

"It’s paramount to provide the necessary momentum to the modernisation of the armed forces, despite the Bofors, the Denel and the Barak.

Every time an arms scam is exposed, the services fear derailment of acquisition plans since the entire establishment becomes cagey and tends to play safe,” says a retired lieutenant general who was closely involved in the procurement process.

The IAF chief, Air Chief Marshal SP Tyagi, has articulated concerns about "a shift in the balance of power in the subcontinent" against the backdrop of new F-16s being acquired by Pakistan, even as the IAF desperately waits to induct fighters to counter its depleting force levels.

The government has been sitting on the request for proposals (RFP) for the acquisition of 126 multi-role combat aircraft for almost two years now.

The navy too is struggling to fill voids its maritime surveillance capability, which has been severely restricted due to shortage of aircraft. The army is conducting an unprecedented fifth round of evaluation trials for acquiring the upgraded 155 mm artillery guns.

Army chief General JJ Singh’s explanation, “We are not taking any shortcuts. The army wants the perfect weapon system." Some say the Bofors ghost still haunts the army Swedish Weapons Systems, formerly Bofors AB, is among the short-listed bidders including Israel’s Soltam for the artillery guns.

The defence minister will also have to discipline the DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organisation), which has let the armed forces down time and again. Despite Crores being funnelled into indigenisation programmes, the services still have to upgrade obsolescent equipment or turn to foreign vendors.

"The DRDO always resists import of technology to counter delayed induction of new equipment. The political masters should not shield its incompetence," says a serving officer, not wishing to be named.

Inter-services synergy is another area that will require the new minister’s immediate attention. He will have to strive to evolve consensus among political parties for the appointment of the CDS (chief of defence staff) so that the three services work together to ensure maximum impact in action.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said at the combined commanders' conference last week, "This assumes even greater relevance as we invest more in our naval and air capabilities and develop a modern and well-equipped navy and air force. The three services must work together to pack a punch."

Against the backdrop of fratricidal killings and suicides in the army, the defence minister will also have to spare a thought for stressed-out soldiers involved in counter-terrorist operations in J&K and the northeast. The dangerous presence of ISI moles within the army ranks too will warrant immediate action.

[M.Ghaznavi]

Defence Scams Stink Spreads:

http://pd.cpim.org/2006/1029/10292006_snd.htm


Oct 29, 2006: The stench of sizeable scams in military purchases, arising from the Tehelka expose during the NDA regime and the inquiry into spurious dealings during the Kargil conflict, has come back with a bang. The CBI has registered FIRs against NDA convenor and the then defence minister George Fernandes, his friend and Samta Party general secretary Jaya Jaitly, the then party treasurer R K Jain and others for allegedly having accepted kickbacks while pushing through various defence purchases, notably of Israeli Barak missile systems, for the navy (whose then chief, Sushil Kumar, has also been named in the FIR) and in other deals for armoured recovery vehicles (ARVs) and anti-tank terminally guided munitions.

The usual cans of worms have also been opened up once again. Up for debate are the role of middlemen in defence deals, the performance of the DRDO and other indigenous defence production agencies, defence procurement processes, corruption in the Indian bureaucracy and even in the military, and whether the CBI is just a tool used by the ruling party for political vendetta. The same questions have been raging in public discourse for over two decades since the Bofors scandal dramatically surfaced and, unfortunately, except for episodic responses, the people of India are none the wiser, nor has anything been done to clean these Aegean stables.

Barak deal:

The Barak deal struck in the year 2000 brings all these issues to the fore. The deal figures prominently in the Tehelka tapes in which R K Jain boasts of having swung the deal with “the boss,” meaning “Raksha Mantri Fernandes,” with the help of his confidante Jaya Jaitly and slush funds provided by well-known arms dealer Suresh Nanda, son of retired Admiral S M Nanda. The CBI alleges that it has good evidence on kickbacks of at least Rs 2 crore although around Rs 170 crore may have actually been involved. The Barak deal and its implications were analysed in considerable detail in a CPI(M) publication titled Indefensible Dealings, brought out in April 2001 in the wake of the Tehelka expose, and that analysis remains valid.

The Barak is a missile defence system, the need for which was felt urgently by the Indian Navy at the time of Kargil when the Pakistan Navy acquired US-made Harpoon and the deadly French sea-skimming Exocet ship-to-ship missiles for which India did not have an effective counter. This deal worth US 270 million dollars (about Rs 1,300 crore) is for 7 ship-mounted systems or missile batteries worth Rs 1,160 crore and 200 of the actual missiles worth Rs 350 crore. The Baraks are made by Rafael Systems and the Israeli Aircraft Industries, which are also in line for the US 1.1 billion dollars (Rs 5,200 crore) Phalcon AWACS or airborne early warning systems for the India Air Force and agreements for upgrading its Mig-21 and Mig-27 fighter aircraft.

The IAI is in fact among several Israeli armaments manufacturers who are striking it rich in India. India has become the largest and fastest growing market for Israeli weapons export, already worth over US 3 billion dollars (Rs 16,000 crore). Israeli armaments firms have, over the past decade and more, established firm roots within the Indian defence establishment and have obviously become very familiar with its byzantine workings, including how to grease its machinery!

In this case, as the story unfolds in the Tehelka tapes and now in the CBI’s FIR, the then defence minister George Fernandes went out of his way to push for the Barak deal, overriding the objections of the Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) and the then scientific advisor to the PM, A P J Abdul Kalam on the grounds that the indigenously developed Trishul system would “soon” be available. Fingers have also been pointed at objections by the then defence secretary and at the single-vendor nature of the deal. While Fernandes allegedly pushed for installation of Baraks on India’s only aircraft carrier, INS Viraat, the then navy chief was allegedly “persuaded” to urge such installation on six other battleships as well, giving the necessary “push from below” as recounted by Jain.

The CBI claims to have found some hard evidence during simultaneous raids on the offices and residences of over 40 persons involved in one way or another. Going by past experience of cases involving corruption especially in defence deals, hopefully the CBI has better evidence than merely the statements recorded in the Tehelka sting operation and can bring the offenders to book. Hopefully also, the defence ministry’s new defence procurement procedure will bring about both transparency and efficiency in defence procurement. But the general problem of corruption and rent seeking by officialdom will require structural changes of a different kind.

Questions about Barak:

None of this necessarily means, however, that the Barak is a bad system or that inferior equipment were acquired for the Indian defence forces, although this has indeed been suggested by some former navy commanders. The charge of corruption does not automatically imply or require that the deal itself, or the weapons system in question, compromises national security. The case of the Bofors gun, which more than proved its mettle during the Kargil conflict, is a case in point.

The way the system works in India, and not only in defence matters, kickbacks and bribes are sought by both administrative and political officials even in the most straightforward cases, for simply putting the final signature on the file, for moving the file from one processing stage to another, and so on. Any opportunity is good enough for rent seeking. And if something out of the ordinary has to be done, like leaking information about rival bids or “redefining” specifications to fit one supplier, then clearly much higher amounts are called for. Especially after the Bofors case, when military officers saw the huge sums of money involved in securing defence contracts, many serving officers “in the right place at the right time” also seem to have become caught up in seeking remuneration for “smoothening” the process.

In any case, retired senior navy commanders have pointed out that the Barak is relatively untested, that it was surprisingly the only system selected from out of 11 considered, and that there were indeed other options such as the Trishul itself or rival Russian systems. Yet there are good counter arguments too. Despite the fact that the Barak is in service with only a limited number of navies, in Israel itself and in Singapore, even serving Indian navy officers attest to the Barak’s effectiveness. Critics argue that the Barak failed even in its first field trials and should therefore have been ruled out. On the other hand, not only has this initial failure been recorded and discussed on the IAI website, the Barak system has succeeded in 12 out of 14 field trials.

There were also other considerations too which went in favour of the Barak. The anti-missile systems were to be mounted on existing ships which required that the physical size, weight, orientation etc of the system should be such as would facilitate installation on serving battleships without much modification. This apparently worked against many rival systems which simply did not fit with the navy’s specifications.

Without access to all the facts and inside story, the one true surprise, which has received scant attention in the press even from defence commentators, is the exclusion from consideration of the Russian Klab missiles. These longer-range missiles, originally designed for submarine based operations, also have supersonic capability enabling them to engage sea-skimming missiles such as the Exocet. The Klab missiles are in fact coming to India along with several Kilo-class Russian submarines bought by India. Modified versions have also been fitted on to the reconditioned Russian aircraft carrier Gorshkov and on several stealth technology frigates being built in Russia for the Indian Navy. The modified frigate-mounted versions of the Klab are also vertically mounted systems like the Barak (and unlike the Trishul), making it easier to mount and operate on existing vessels. The booklet Indefensible Dealings had therefore asked: Whether there had been a comparative evaluation of the two systems or had subjective pro-Israeli biases or undue pressures been brought to bear in favour of the Israeli systems? And the question is relevant even today.

DRDO and self-reliance:

The Barak story and the CBI case has also brought with it a storm of criticism against the Trishul system and against its designer and manufacturer, the DRDO, which also runs the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme and is charged with developing many other systems vital for self-reliance in defence.

First the Trishul itself:

In rebuttal of the CBI charges, George Fernandes has claimed that as defence minister he only endorsed the requests of the navy chief and the scientific advisor Abdul Kalam for immediate acquisition of the Barak. A P J Abdul Kalam had headed not only the DRDO but also the missile programme specifically and is widely credited with having given it a business-like “mission orientation,” something he is now fond of recommending in numerous circumstances. The CBI’s FIR makes clear that Abdul Kalam had in fact objected to the Barak deal in 2000 and other information suggests that he had been consistently and understandably objecting to the missile system imports since the mid-90s. Mr Abdul Kalam needs to clear the air on this aspect.

However, the DRDO’s faith in Trishul is clearly not shared by the navy. Despite the numerous promises and calls to expect the delivery of the Trishul “soon,” the hard reality is that the Trishul is far from ready for induction into active service. Besides the delay and performance failures, the Trishul system is extremely heavy, weighing over 15 tonnes compared to the Barak’s one tonne, is not vertically mounted and also needs to be “pointed” in the rough direction of the target missile, further reducing its reaction time and accuracy. The defence minister, after days of statements from various sources that the Trishul project had been scrapped, has only saved Trishul some face by giving it a one-year extension and describing it as a “technology demonstrator.”

Trishul has been under development since 1985, that is for over 20 years, at a cost of around Rs 250 crore (US 53 million dollars), admittedly a relatively low investment compared to similar projects elsewhere. Nevertheless, Trishul has undergone as many as 80 field tests and still has an unacceptable failure rate of over 25 percent. The DRDO itself has acknowledged that Trishul has problems in its guidance and control systems, the very heart of a guided missile. In unusually frank terms, the defence ministry has even informed the parliament’s standing committee on defence that “the Trishul system… has not met with success… resulting in critical voids” in defence preparedness.

The controversy hungry media has now begun a dissection of the DRDO’s record and it does make sorry reading indeed. In case after case, huge time delays and poor performance, not matching the user service’s requirements, have resulted in defence forces being pushed into importing defence equipment at a huge cost to the nation and loss of self-reliance. The Arjun main battle tank (MBT) is proving so unwieldy and bulky, providing a sizeable target profile to opposing forces, that the army is having to keep even the small numbers ordered of 125 tanks away from potential frontline action, and has ordered over 800 Russian T-90s. The much vaunted light combat aircraft (LCA) is so far off-schedule, now not expected to join service before 2010, from the original 1995 date, that its very usefulness is in serious doubt, and the air force is having to repeatedly import expensive fighters to overcome the rapid obsolescence of its mainstay Mig-21 fleet. Due to inordinate delays in the indigenous missile programme, the services have ordered huge quantities of Israeli missile systems costing over Rs 4,000 crore. After the Barak acquisition, it has been decided to go in for joint development and production of the longer-range (90 km) Barak New Generation (NG) or Barak-II missiles, with India and Israel each contributing US 350 million dollars. The same story repeats itself ad nauseam.

The entire defence research and production set-up in India, comprising numerous institutions and agencies, operates in highly secretive and protected environments with little or no accountability, all in the name of self-reliance in the crucial area of defence. India cannot indefinitely claim to be a scientific and technological power without delivering on this claim, at least to its own satisfaction. The biggest blow to corruption in defence imports would be an effective and efficient indigenous defence production system which the nation sorely needs.

[M.Ghaznavi]

India to buy 330 main battle tanks from Russia:

http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topic...0&parent_id=22


New Delhi Sun Nov 05, 2006: India has signed a fresh contract with Russia to buy 330 T-90S main battle tanks (MBTs) in complete sets of components for local assembly, a leading British defence journal has reported.

Citing military-diplomatic sources, the authoritative Jane’s Defence Weekly said that the order for the additional T-90S kits would in no way impinge on the agreed scope of the licence programme to construct the MBTs at the Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF) at Avadi, near Chennai.

India bought 310 T-90S in 2001 for around $ 800 Million – 124 in completed form and the remaining 186 to be assembled at Avadi in response to Pakistan inducting the Ukrainian-built T-80 UD MBT into service 1997 onwards.

The Indian army was the first export customer for the T-90S which had been in Russian army service since the mid-1990s.

Deliveries of the initial 124 T-90S tanks began in December 2002 and were completed within 12-14 months while another 180 MBTs have since been assembled at Avadi and the first part of the order is nearing completion.

The T-90S tanks have been inducted into six armoured regiments in northern and central India.

The associated licence agreement provides for the assembly of up to 1,000 T-90S tanks in India with production scheduled to begin sometime in 2007.

This was supposedly also to lead to a gradual increase in the share of components made locally in an effort at enhancing the T-90S indigenisation.

But, Jane’s reports that the order for the 330 sets of T-90S components is driven by the fact that the Indian army desperately needs modern MBTs due to chronic delays in the production schedule of the domestic Arjun MBT.

In addition, official sources said the upgrade of the army’s Soviet and locally built T 72 MBTs, that form the backbone of the armoured regiments, was delayed by several years due to bureaucratic vacillation.

Delivery of T-90S kits from Russia, Jane’s adds, would "speed up" the fielding of new MBTs as assembly using Indian-made components is more time consuming.

But army officers complained that the existing T-90S tanks faced "recurring" technical problems which were adversely impinging on the force’s operational preparedness.

Senior armoured corps officers said the Catherine thermal imaging (TI) camera supplied by Thales of France that is the "heart" of the T-90S’ fire control system (FCS) had "repeatedly malfunctioned" in the excessive summer heat of the western Rajasthan desert where the MBTs frequently exercise and will eventually be deployed.

Officers operating the tanks said temperatures in excess of 60 degrees Celsius inside the tank had rendered between 80-90 FCS "unserviceable" over the past four years. Attempts to rectify them had so far largely proven unsuccessful.

In one armoured regiment in Punjab, an alarming 30 out of 40 tanks were "off-road", lamented an officer, declining to be named.


Army chief Gen J J Singh recently declared that the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) was considering proposals to "partially" air-condition the T-90S to overcome the overheating problem.

[syed_yusuf]

When I was growing up in Pakistan; people used to say that India made every thing in house. While Pakistan buys. Now in just 20 years alhamdullilah Pakistan is developing and manufacturing and India is still assembling. What a shame. They stay where they were 20 years ago. In 80's they used to assemble mig-27 and mig-21 and jaguars. Now they assemble su-30's. In 80's they used to assemble t-72 now they assemble t-90s. What a difference. Alhmadullilah we have come along way and insha Allah we will continue to prosper. Ameen.

[Boota]

Work Halted on India’s AWACS
Air Force Claims DRDO Design Fails To Meet Requirements

By VIVEK RAGHUVANSHI, NEW DELHI

Yet another of India’s high-profile defense projects is facing delays due to criticism from the military service for which it was intended.
The Air Force has said the Defence Research and Development Organisation’s (DRDO’s) $500 million effort to design and develop an airborne early warning and control system (AWACS) fails to meet the military’s requirements.
A senior DRDO scientist said that the Air Force’s objections have halted work on the AWACS program at the Bangalore-based Centre for Air Borne Systems (CABS), a premier DRDO aeronautics laboratory.
A senior Defence Ministry official said the DRDO has been directed to re-evaluate the project. It also will be scrutinized by the ministry and defense forces, he said.
India will not be without an AWACS capability, however. In 2004, a $1.1 billion contract was signed with Israel for the Phalcon radar, which would be mounted on three Russian-built Il-76 aircraft. The delivery of the Phalcon-mounted AWACS planes will begin in mid-2007.
A senior Air Force official said the problems with the indigenous effort include the Embraer EMB-145 aircraft proposed as the AWACS platform, which cannot fly 10-plus hours or at an altitude above 40,000 feet, which are the minimum requirements of the defense forces.
In addition, the service official said, the surveillance radar has a range of only 300 kilometers and coverage area of 240 degrees, less than required.
Call for Closer Cooperation
The Air Force official said that the DRDO, awarded the work in September 2004, did not work closely with the end-users to set the technical parameters.
The DRDO must work hand-in-hand with the users, the Defence Ministry official said, and cannot ignore the objections raised by the Air Force.
The agency, in consultation with the Air Force, will set new technical parameters for the AWACS program, which is likely to be completed and cleared by the Air Force by mid-2007, the DRDO scientist said. The likely in-service date, therefore, will slip from 2012 to 2016.
The government approved a DRDO proposal in 2004 to develop an AWACS capability. The approval followed Pakistan’s deal with Sweden to mount Ericsson’s Erieye radar on Saab 2000 aircraft.
India’s program calls for three AWACS aircraft that can be deployed with all three military services as needed. The Air Force is the lead service on this project.
The primary systems and subsystems for the program include:
• A phased-array radar.
• Identification Friend or Foe system.
• Microwave data link.
• Electronic support measures.
• Operator display consoles with tactical software.
• Air-to-air voice and data links.
• Satellite communication links.
• Search-and-rescue capabilities.
An earlier effort by the DRDO to develop an indigenous AWACS capability was suspended in 1999 following the crash of the Airborne Surveillance Platform during trials. •

[Gul Khan]

What projects is bannia talking about, Almost every thing even a damn tie-wrap is imported... Unless it is paint job DODO is refering to.

http://www.samachar.com/showurl.htm?...rther~delays~~

Key missile projects run into further delays

New Delhi, PTI:

The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DODO) has yet again put off fresh trials of the country's most potent missile- the nuclear-capable Agni-III with a range of over 3,000 km.



The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DODO) has yet again put off fresh trials of the country's most potent missile -- the nuclear-capable Agni-III with a range of over 3,000 km.

Highly placed sources said the missile's second trial had tentatively been scheduled for the year-end or early next year but this has been delayed as scientists are yet to fully analyse the causes of the failure of its maiden test in July.

The Agni-III had crashed into the sea during its first teat when its second stage failed to separate.



Though the government has announced another year-long extension for (DODO's) prestigious Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP), some key components for the Akash surface-to-air missile and Nag anti-tank missile are reportedly running behind schedule along with heavy cost overruns.

The short-range Prithvi I and II surface-to-surface missiles and the medium-range version of Agni-I (with a reach of 700 km) and Agni-II (1,500 km) are now being inducted into the armed forces, but clouds still loom over the induction of the Akash and Nag missiles.

The long delays in the missile programme have begun to have telling effects on the modernisation drive of the armed forces and this has been expressed by IAF chief, Air Chief Marshal S P Tyagi.

Tyagi said the country's preparedness to counter low- level air attacks had received a setback as the Akash missile's induction had again been delayed.

The Akash programme was launched in the early 1980s and the missile was expected to enter service in the early 1990s. But the missile did not pass acceptance trials by the armed forces in 2004 and 2005.

[M.Ghaznavi]

6,000 Crore (US $ 1.35 Billion)* wasted; 10 Year Delay and now DODO wants 150,000 Crore (US $ 33.66 Billion)* more!

http://www.indianexpress.com/sunday/story/16477.html

DRDO has just asked the Govt for an assured Rs 10,000 crore per year for 15 years. In the first of a series, The Sunday Express finds out why this is a joke on the nation’s security and the taxpayer



New Delhi, Nov 11, 2006: Make India prosperous by establishing a world-class science and technology base ... provide our Defence Services the decisive edge by equipping them with internationally competitive systems and solutions ... design, develop and lead to production state-of-the-art weapons systems ...

That’s the “vision” and the “mission” the Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) has proudly spelt out for itself.

An investigation by The Sunday Express into official records that include detailed testimonies by the Ministry of Defence to a Parliamentary Standing Committee — its report is yet to be tabled in Parliament — shows that if there’s one thing this behemoth of 50 laboratories with a staff of about 33,000 has developed to almost perfection, it’s this: wrapping itself around the flag to hide a record of delay and non-delivery in virtually all major weapons programmes.

At a time when China is rapidly modernising its armed forces through international collaboration and acquiring advanced technology from abroad, the DRDO has become a prisoner of its own misleading slogan on self-reliance. In preventing the armed forces from buying urgently needed weapons with brave talk, “we can make it here”, and failing to deliver, the DRDO has introduced uncertainty into the government’s defence planning.

According to latest official records, obtained by this newspaper, in 12 of its showpiece projects, none of which is anywhere near completion, the DRDO has overshot sanctioned estimates by Rs 6,013.43 Crore in just the last 10 years. The projects include the crucial guided missile programme, the Arjun tank, the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA Tejas), the Samyukta communication system and Kaveri jet engine.

To put this in perspective, this cost overrun is larger than DRDO’s budget of Rs 5,356 crore for the current year. And this is reflective of just 12 projects. It speaks nothing of 427 others, all in varying states of drift. And yet DRDO claims, “Global level R&D and any world-class defence product can be brought out in competitive time and cost.”

These were the words used in a September 22 presentation to the Standing Committee especially in the year of the organisation’s biggest symbolic failure, the Agni-III strategic missile.

But if cost overruns were not enough, consider this: Records show that for all major projects, DRDO’s average time overrun is 10.11 years (see chart). For example, a 16-year delay for the Arjun tank and 12 years for just Phase I of the LCA Tejas.

Responding to a written questionnaire from The Sunday Express, DRDO chief M Natarajan, who has also been involved with one of DRDO’s biggest failures, the Arjun tank, says: “This is a complaint which I hear very often. But one should understand these are all R&D projects. All advanced countries face similar situations. If you say that we are always late, then it would not be fair to us. We generally deliver the goods on time.”

If that were true, Natarajan must have had a trying time explaining that on October 29 at the very first DRDO presentation to new Defence Minister A K Antony. Drawing comparisons with the China-Russia relationship, Defence Secretary Shekhar Dutt reportedly wanted to know why there were such “massive delays” in DRDO projects and persistent technological gaps.

Former IAF chief Air Chief Marshal S Krishnaswamy was more direct. Called in a year after he retired to give testimony, he told the Parliamentary panel: “For improvement in DRDO’s working, it is essential to make fundamental changes in organization and structure with accountability to the user and to do work in time.”

Krishnaswamy couldn’t have been more spot on. For, although DRDO defended its performance by blaming the three services — they change their requirements while development is in progress, they spend too much time on trials — here’s just how bad the current situation is: In the 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th Plans, with DRDO’s failures a compelling factor, according to the Defence Ministry, the country has spent an average of 24.25% of the Defence budget on imported systems to fill in holes caused by DRDO’s non-delivery. That translates into roughly Rs 42,376 Crore (US $ 9.51 Billion)* since 1991-92.

Even the “self-reliance” index, the one plank the entire DRDO justifies itself on, has remained static for the last 15 years. Ironically, in 1991, it was President A P J Abdul Kalam, then DRDO chief, who charted out a plan to push self-reliance up to 70% by 2005. Today’s self-reliance index, according to the Ministry’s own estimate: 30 per cent.

Kalam, in fact, started the Self-Reliance Implementation Council (SRIC) in 1992 and monitored it to check for slippages and gaps. But that was more an academic exercise than anything else. For five years now, the council hasn’t met once.

Papers are only “activated” when Parliamentary questions are asked. In what has the armed forces on tenterhooks now, on October 29, the DRDO recommended to Antony that a “certain percentage of defence acquisitions be earmarked exclusively for DRDO and indigenously developed products.”

The total cost of 439 projects currently in progress with DRDO adds up to Rs 16,925 crore, with just 17 of those adding up to Rs 13,560 crore, most of them on time and cost extensions. In September, DRDO asked, in its testimony to the Parliamentary committee, for an assured allocation of Rs 1,50,000 crore at the rate of Rs 10,000 crore per year for the next 15 years starting 2010.

It’s time Antony asked the DRDO a few questions, beginning with the Integrated Guided Missile Development programme. There is no indigenous weapons project as prestigious as this, neither is there one that matches its record of repeated and expensive failures.

...

(to be continued)


Every project has to fructify within a given timeframe, otherwise it will just begin to drift and lose focus.

Air Chief Marshal S Krishnaswamy


DRDO needs greater accountability. We have not been able to get the maximum out of DRDO, even though self-reliance should be our core.

Gen V P Malik


In our effort for self-reliance, we had placed much faith on DRDO, but this trust was only answered by delay after delay.

Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat


We have had a mixed bag of success with DRDO. But there have also been failures. When time frames are not met, we have to look outside.

Gen J J Singh


* (USD 1.00 = INR 44.56)

[M.Ghaznavi]

PART II:




Armed Forces wait as showpiece missiles are unguided, way off mark:


New Delhi Mon Nov 13, 2006: It is the Defence Research and Development Organisation’s most prestigious undertaking. Yet the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) remains a venture matchless for its repeated and expensive failures.

Of the five missile families that the DRDO announced at the IGMDP launch in July 1983, two ballistic missiles, the tactical Prithvi and long-range Agni, have been inducted into the Services. But investigation by The Indian Express reveals that even these are far from operational readiness. Among the other three missiles, the situation is worse.

DRDO claims its first success, Prithvi-I, is fully operational. However, the missiles were forced upon the Army even before crucial terminal accuracy trials were complete, according to a 2003 report by one of DRDO’s own top scientists. Even now, despite DRDO’s claims, the Army does not rely on the Prithvi as an effective deterrent and cannot do so unless serious technological issues affecting launch preparedness are resolved.

Former deputy director of the Prithvi project and now DRDO’s chief controller of missiles and strategic systems Dr V K Saraswat’s report RCI/PGT/PGM/1 admits: “Accuracy of missiles like Prithvi is acceptable in surface-to-surface theatre role, but precision strike without collateral damage is not possible with this system.”

Agni-I and Agni-II, the only strategic delivery systems in the Army’s arsenal, are considered risky. DRDO has told the Parliamentary panel, in testimonies available to The Indian Express, that the missiles have been successfully tested five times. What it conveniently leaves unsaid is the fact that this is out of at least 10 tests. Either way, the Army feels a handful of tests is not enough to prove a missile’s worth.

The Agni-III, which plunged into the sea after just five minutes of flight in July, will be tested again only towards mid-2007 as the teams at DRDL and the Integrated Test Range in Chandipur try to unravel the disaster.

As for the remaining three, anti-missile system Trishul is a closed chapter proving to be only a technology demonstrator, by former Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee’s own recent admission, after it was decided that persistent beam guidance glitches could not be put behind the project.

Even though the system’s radar is ready and functional, the Trishul team has never been able to correct the missile’s flawed trajectory — in all tests it has escaped out of its envelope. The project’s manpower has already been distributed among PSU Bharat Dynamics Ltd in Hyderabad, the Indo-Israeli Barak-II next generation missile project, the Project Nag and the submarine-launched missile, designated K-15.

A notional one-year extension granted to the project till December 2007, after hectic lobbying, is being seen as an outrage by the Army and Navy.

The Akash medium range surface-to-air missile, which DRDO publicly claims “is in the process of induction” will, according to the Ministry in testimony to a Parliamentary Standing Committee, only begin Phase-II user trials in December on a T-72 platform, a change that could pile up the massive time overrun further.

An exasperated IAF, which calls Phase-I user trials unsatisfactory, has decided to buy Israeli Spyder missile systems instead.

Realisation of the ramjet propulsion system has crippled the Akash programme, which continues to flounder when the missile is fired at its ceiling range of 25 to 27 km. The IAF, in fact, has certified the missile to a range of just 16-18-km, virtually declaring it a dud at maximum capacity. Officers in the IAF fear the Akash may go the Trishul way, but Natarajan claims: “The Akash missile defence system has been successful.”

The third missile, the anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) Nag, which DRDO brags as an “imminent success,” has not been accepted by the Army. After 57 flight trials, it has encountered unforeseen problems with its Imaging Infrared (IIR) seeker, rendering it inaccurate until the seeker is properly miniaturized for use. User trials are slated for June-December 2007. Saraswat’s report calls for integrating Nag’s seeker with Prithvi to make the latter a precision-guided munition (PGM) but that hasn’t worked either, since the Nag’s seeker is far from ready.

The result: After over two decades of research in seeker technology and expenditure of upto an estimated Rs 800 Core, all Indian missiles, even the Indo-Russian BrahMos, fly with foreign seekers. This is especially troubling since the North Korean and Chinese missiles are known to fly with far superior terminal guidance technologies.

The IGMDP should have wrapped up each of the projects by December 1995 using Rs 388.83 Crore, but it got a 10-year extension from the then Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao after the then DRDO chief APJ Abdul Kalam managed to convince him that only a two-three year extension was not acceptable. Its revised funding: Rs 1,771.43 Crore, a budgetary overrun of Rs 1,382.6 Crore. The time line has been further extended to December 2007 under the current chief M Natarajan.



“The Akash was to come at a certain time, and it didn’t. I had to change everything to make up for the delay.”

Air Chief Marshal SP Tyagi


“It was a troubling scenario. On the one hand, DRDO assured us of Trishul’s success, and on the other our Western fleet was sitting completely vulnerable to a Pak missile attack.”

Admiral Sushil Kumar (retd)



(to be Continued)

[pshamim]

Thanks Ghaznavi Saheb for an excellent posting from Indian Press/

Pakistan should feel safe and secure so long as DRDO is at work. The report about Indian Missiles reminds me of a famous verse from an Amitabh Song:

Jis Ki Biwi Bhaingi Us Ka Bhi Bara Nam hay

[xinhui]

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India's DRDO Rethinking the Way it Does Business
Posted 17-Nov-2006 08:36


In " India's Defense Market: Obstacles to Modernization" DID looked at the various organizational pathologies that were creating repeated failures for Indian defense procurement efforts, to the point that billions of dollars were being appropriated and not spent. We have also followed projects like India's Kaveri jet engine, its missile programs, the Arjun tank, et. al., which have consumed a great deal of time (over 20 years in many cases) and many crores of rupees without fielding operational weapons systems.

The changes required are wide-ranging and complex - but in a democracy, these things eventually come home to roost and reform efforts begin. There have been a few signals lately that these changes may begin at last. Where are they going? Will they succeed?

PJ-10 BrahMos
(click to view full)

With China taking significant steps to improve its defense industry, while funding that industry at levels far higher than a democracy like India can, something clearly has to be done. Opening India up to foreign defense manufacturers, which has been the de facto result of many of DRDO's project failures, can be an effective solution - vid. the PJ-10 BrahMos missile - but it is not a panacea.

Scientific Adviser to Defence Minister Shri M. Natarajan's concerns re: the "triple trap" of relying on foreign defense procurement are well stated:
What is developed abroad may not suit local requirements
What is suitable may be denied
What is not denied could be unaffordable

Which means India's defense industry must retain some local capabilities, and work to increase them. To that end, he is correct to note that business as usual won't suffice.

India Defence now reports that The Government is looking at "substantial changes" in the existing model of developing advanced defence products. Defence & Research Development Organisation (DRDO) chief M. Natarajan said recently that they have:

"...proposed greater involvement of stakeholders by sharing project expenditure and management. DRDO is not a manufacturer. Its primary job is to create capacity. The industry is also realising that this would be possible if there is some mechanism of assured minimum quantity and there is some partnership with foreign entities."

The Indian MoD release is more specific. Natarajan suggested a pattern of funding with DRDO contributing 70%, Industry 20%, and the user Services (Army, Navy, Air Force etc.) 10% for better stakeholding in long term projects.

That may not be the right ratio, or even the most important step, but note the direction of his thinking.

Which brings us to other recent statements from various officials at the International Seminar On Defence Finance & Economics.

On the one hand, External Affairs Minister Shri Pranab Mukherjee has called for greater synergies between public spending and private enterprises with regard to defence production. What he appears to mean by this is the traditional pursuit of industrial offsets as part of defense contracts, plus expanded auditing.

At the same conference, Sir Kevin Tebbit of U.K. presented Britain's work in the area of 'Smart Acquisition' to manage time, cost and performance, while Dr. Elisabeth Wright of the U.S.A. made an presentation on Life Cycle Management of defence acquisition costs.

All are well and good. None of them appear to address the root issues.

Techniques like life-cycle management, outcome budgeting and accrual accounting may offer limited help in specific areas, and could become part of a drive to greater accountability for results if used properly. On the other hand, the kind of "oversight" much beloved of politicians can contribute to waste and delays as easily as it prevents them. The core question is, "what is the real problem?"

Unless that question is answered correctly, such measures as are proposed above can easily become a substitute for real diagnosis, and the opposite of help. Further damage is especially likely if one's biggest problem is a cultivated environment in which people won't take risks and paperwork is seen as more important than production, all in a heavily state-owned and run sector. In that environment, even Natarajan's proposal to shift some project funding away from the state can be seen as a simple offloading of risk and expense onto other entites, while maintaining a controlling share.

On the other hand, there are currents afoot that could leverage the ideas of synergies with the private sector and a move away from the state as a manufacturer, using industrial offsets to help expand India's private defense industry, all done in conjunction with expanded use of modern management tools. For instance:

"Addressing the seminar the Union Finance Minister, Shri P. Chidambaram said that Defence PSUs needs to improve their comptitiveness by reducing costs and enhancing productivity. He said, "The argument that the Government in all circumstances must support loss making undertakings or inefficient ordnance factories because of their strategic importance or surge capacities is difficult to sustain in an increasingly globalised world with many more efficient alternatives. Efficiency, productivity and true competitiveness have to be the underpinning of a strong and vibrant Defence Industrial Base."

Shri Chidambaram said that optimal allocation and utilisation of resources is the challenge before Defence Finance & Economics. Referring to the many positive aspects of India's economic growth in the last few years, he stated that policy changes are already in place to allow private sector participation in the Defence sector with up to 100% equity ownership. Shri Chidambaram said the partnership has to be further strengthened and taken to higher levels with greater outsourcing by Defence PSUs, Ordnance Factories, R&D Labs etc. The Minister said Defence Accounts Department must constantly review their systems and procedures for faster service delivery. Shri Chidambaram was of the opinion that Cash Management Systems, Management Information Systems, Migration to International Accounting Standards are some of the important aspects in this context."

SEI CMMI 5 Levels
(click to view full)

India's software development community, which boasts more Level 5 CMMI firms than anywhere else in the world, shows that Indian firms are well acquainted with the demands of quality, development of new technologies, and performance to specifications.

As DID has noted in our coverage of India's annual Ministry of Defense report, however, large segments of India's arms industry are government-owned. Given the number of jobs (read: votes) dependent on these enterprises, the political reality is that closing these firms or even substantially reducing their workload is extremely difficult. The result is an environment of non-accountability.

One that won't be fixed by changing the accounting methods.

There are many other reforms that will be necessary in order to create a defense industry and capability level that matches India's ambitions - but if the core issues revolve around culture and performance, greater involvement by the growing private sector in India's state-run defence industry and projects is a fine place to start. Most of the other items discussed, from greater use of modern management tools, to increased focus on performance, to a growing private sector capable of partnering effectively with foreign firms, can then begin to improve of their own accord.

Will India succeed? it is impossible to know. One may begin to say, however, that they are headed in the right direction at last.

Additional Readings & Sources
India - Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO)
India DRDO - Scientific Adviser to Raksha Mantri: Shri M. Natrajan. Note that Mr. Natrajan has been in charge of the Arjun tank project since 1987.
India Ministry of Defence (Nov 14/06) - Defence Experts Debate R&D And Acquisition Issues
India Ministry of Defence (Nov 13/06) - International Seminar On Defence Finance & Economics Opens
India Defence (Aug 7/06) - Indian Navy to be balanced in ten years: Admiral Prakash. "...with the indigenous ship building efforts in the country gaining strides and other ongoing acquisition programmes like aircraft carrier and other force multipliers coming to fruition, the Navy would be an all purpose maritime force to be reckoned with in the next 10 years. "Though our maritime interests are now all over, anything that happens from the eastern coast of Africa and the straits of Malacca", he said the immediate footprints for the navy was the Indian Ocean area."
DID (March 14/06) - China's Official Military Budget Jumps Another 14.7%
DID (March 1/06) - India's Defense Budget Rises 7%, to $20.11 Bn
DID (Jan 11/06) - RAND: Chinese Arms Industry Improving
DID (Nov 30/05) - India's Defence Minister: Improve Quality, Or Else
DID (Aug 3/05) New Foreign Procurement Rules in India
DID (May 24/05) - India's Defense Market: Obstacles to Modernization
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[Asif Afridi]

India can now bring down enemy missiles Will US ask india's help?
PTI | November 27, 2006 | 11:53 IST

In a major breakthrough, country's defence scientists on Monday successfully carried out a surface to surface missile interception over the Bay of Bengal, brightening the prospects of development of an indigenous anti-missile shield.

A target Prithvi missile was launched from the Interim Missile Test Range at Chandipur at 1015 hours, its trajectory continuously monitored and then successfully intercepted by another missile fired from the Wheeler Islands.

Though, the Navy has successfully conducted missile interceptions over sea using Israeli Barak missiles, this was for the first time that defence scientists successfully carried out interception of surface-to-surface missile, which could bring some relief as India actively faces a threat from the presence of nuclear capable missile in the neighbourhood.

The interceptor missile, which was in anti-missile mode, was not identified by the Defence Research and Development Organisation officials . "The interceptor missile had inertial guidance mid-course and active-seeker guidance in its terminal phase," they said.

The DRDO had for years been working on making Trishul missile into an indigenous anti-missile system, trying to incorporate into it the capability of taking on multi-targets at the same time. But the missile had failed many of its critical tests.

"The country has achieved a significant milestone in missile defence system," a Defence Ministry official said in New Delhi after the reports of successful interception came in.

"We have acquired air defence capability against incoming missile," the official said, adding: "The success of the mission assumes significance as DRDO scientists were able to 'continuously track the missile and feed its trajectory into computers to launch its interception."

Officials said the target missile interception time was programmed at 170/175 seconds while the missile from Wheeler Islands blasted off roughly 60 seconds later with interception time of 110/117 seconds. The distance between Chandipur, which is on the shoreline, and Wheeler Islands off the Dhamra coast in the Bay of Bengal, is about 72 km.

Faced with the failure of its Trishul project, India had been in negotiations with the US, Israel and Russia for procurement of an alternative anti-missile defence system.

"Notwithstanding the success of Monday's interception," Defence Ministry officials said, adding: "We will continue to observe the development of the US Patriot anti-missile shield as well as other competing systems."

Though the range of Prithvi missile system in its various marks ranges between 150 to 350 kms, DRDO officials said: "What is important was to validate the capability of interception. Once we develop this we can incorporate it in country's surface to surface missiles of various ranges."

Defence Minister A K Antony immediately patted DRDO scientists on the achievement, which comes in the midst of widespread criticism of the organisation over time and costs over-runs in its major projects, including the integrated guided missile development programme.

"Heartiest congratulations," Antony said in a message to the country's top missile scientists, including V K Saraswat, working on the key project.

Success with the missile interception could prove a shot in arm for the DRDO scientists who are now feeling confident to go ahead with re-testing of the country's most prestigious surface to surface missile, 3000-km range Agni-III. The maiden test of the missile ended as a dismal failure couple of months back.

Saraswat has been quoted as saying that DRDO might go ahead with the second trial of the missile early next year.

[SSAAD]

I hope Pakistan is putting a serious effort in terms of countering this ABM shield issue with a MIRV type capability. Although I have my serious doubts about the efficacy of these ABM shields, I think it would be prudent for Pakistan to not wait for this capability to downgrade the Pakistani nuclear deterrance.

[Gul Khan]

http://www.ptinews.com/pti%5Cptisite.nsf/$All/AEF2C747FB23C70B652572330053CC65?OpenDocument

Later, top DODO scientists, on the condition of anonymity, said in New Delhi that the missile had the capability of intercepting an incoming missiles thousands of kilometres away and had a response time of just 30 seconds.

[zeeshan]

Assalamaoalukum,

this got to be the biggest BS I have ever heard. What the heck ? one Prithvi intercepted another one?
Even Americans with their ultra modern sensors could not achive capability of shooting a missile in outer atmosphere. But yet our genious baboons have done what no one could do. I wonder if there were two missiles that just failed and crashed.