The Battle of Sehjra Salient
A detailed account of an epic battle during 1971
[M A GILANI ]

Introduction
Success has too many claimants whereas failure often remains orphan. Performed acts of valour and during actions are usually eclipsed by the shadow of failure. But a failure is attributed to many factors and without knowing the details an outright criticism and condemnation of the plan, performance of troops and leadership is unjustifiable.

During December 1971 War, on the western front the Sehjra Salient was lost, to the enemy by a heterogeneous force, after bitter fighting.

Aim
The aim of this article is to highlight salient features contributing to the loss of Sehjra Salient. For this purpose the following sequence has been adopted.



Location and Strategic Importance
Sehjra Salient belongs to Pakistan which has gone 12 km into the Indian territory and surrounded on three sides. About 10 villages are located in it. In the north west Kasur town is located about 10 km from Sehjra Salient and in the West Ganda Singh Wala is about 2 km away from where a Kacha road joined the salient. The town of Khem Karan (India) is located 2 km in the north and in the south east the river Sutlej passes through the Sehjra Salient whereas a few villages belonging to Pakistan are located across the river only 10 km from the strategic town of Feroze Pore.

At the opening the width of the Salient, from the bridge over the Rohi nullah, is only 1000 yards and the entire movement and traffic can be seen from the Indian OP towers. In the centre the Salient is 8 km wide whereas in the east it shrinks to about 4 km. Sehjra Salient is aggressively facing Indian territory like a trident. Its strategic importance can be judged from the fact that Harike bridge (over the Sutlej and the Beas) and Makhu railway station are only 25 km away. Amritsar via Tran Taran, the main railway and the Indian GT Road are about 48 km away. Strategically, politically and economically the area between the Ravi and Sutlej is considered the centre of gravity and Sehjra Salient also provides a direct route to it.

The escarpment created by erosion of the old river bank is about 15 to 30 feet high and runs through the Salient like the trail of snake. The flat area is cultivated and a few jeep tracks connected the Seven Ranger Posts. The enemy watch towers on higher ground watched all the movements except in the dead ground and behind the villages. During September-October 1971 the Indians had provided all out support to the Mukti Bahini for guerilla war in East Pakistan. Simultaneously, Indian forces were concentrating against East Pakistan borders. War was, thus, imminent and in self- defence holding formations were moved to the borders of West Pakistan during October 71.



Relative Strength
11 Division was responsible for the defence of Kasur sector. It had a front of about 100 km, but was not possible to defend it aggressively, nor it could afford more than one battalion group force for immediate counter attack. About 8 companies of local Mujahids were placed under command for 2nd line defence. The division had its own affiliated artillery and armour regiments.

The Indian Commander Western Command was well aware about the danger Sehjra Salient was posing. Therefore, opposing 11 Division, a formidable force was deployed for defence as well as for counter offensive action. The enemy force consisted of 5 brigades, 2 armour regiments, an artillery brigade and 2 BSF battalions. The reserve force (1st Armoured Division and 14 Division) of the enemy was concentrated behind Feroze Pore in area Farid Kot and Kot Kapura and its task was to capture Kasur, Mustafabad and Raiwind, and also to destroy the strike force (2 Corps) of Pakistan.

Opposite Sehjra Salient the enemy had built bunds and dug anti-tank ditches.

Sehjra Force
To ward off pressure on the main defences, allow sufficient time for own 106 Brigade to capture Hussaine Wala Salient and also to lock at least two enemy brigades and one tank regiment opposite Sehjra Salient, GOC 11 Division deployed a heterogeneous force. This force consisted of one regular infantry company, 2 Mujahid companies (strength 180) and one company (strength 110) of the Rangers.

To enhance the fire power the force was provided with 4x3” Mortars (old type-range 1600 yards), 4 x 6 Pounder anti-tank guns and 2 Vickers MGs. These obsolescent weapons were handled by semi-trained crew from the Rangers. The LMGs issued to the Rangers and Mujahids (one per platoon) were also obsolescent, carrying 2 to 3 stars indicating frequent repairs, and most of these fired single shots.

To reinforce the defences a 6 feet high and 3 to 8 feet thick bund was constructed in front of the most dangerous approach. AP and anti-tank mines were laid for blocking another long stretch of open approach. Defences were prepared, on higher ground and the escarpment, covering all the approaches which provided clear field of fire. The Rangers were ordered not to leave their posts, located far apart, until attacked and if the position became untenable they would join the main position.

The local Mujahids were from the working classes. Obviously, they lacked training of regular soldiers, thus were not fit to fight in the front line. Their section, platoon and company commanders were mostly shopkeepers, teachers and clerks etc. In order to create confidence and infuse fighting spirit in Mujahids and Rangers some NCOs and sepoys from the regular infantry company were appointed their section and platoon commanders.

The force was commanded by a recalled Lt Col and only two infantry officers, one artillery OP officer and five JCOs from the regular units were present.

The communication system was unsatisfactory. The telephone cable was hanging over trees and passed through bushes. Due to frequent breakdown messages were passed by runners.

The nearest main defensive position of the Division was about 7 km behind the Sehjra defences and from the same direction the connecting track was used for supplies etc. Most of the route remained under the observation of the enemy OP. The local people provided tools for digging, bullock carts and donkeys for carrying supplies and stores. They even helped in repairing tracks for use by the force. They brought water pitchers from far and near.



The Battle
On 21 November 1971 India attacked, with an overwhelming force, East Pakistan and the same day movement of troops, vehicles, civilians opposite Sehjra Salient stopped. However, day and night patrolling of the border continued by both sides. In Sehjra Salient movements were being carried out during dark hours.

Sehjra force was told to hold Sehjra Salient as long as possible. There was no plan by the Division HQs for helping the force by sending out troops or tanks, nor there was any arrangement to guard the only L of C available. No counter attack plan had been issued by the Formation HQs.

At night about 1/4th of the force remained on patrolling. On 30th November a section commander of Sehjra Mujahid company was arrested by the ISI special team because some days back he was seen by our agent with the Indian intelligence staff in the Indian territory. It is correct to assume that the Mujahid NCO had provided all the information, about the Sehjra defences and the main defences of the Division, to the enemy. Certainly there would have been more Indian agents, in pay roll of the Pakistan Army, lurking in the border area of 11 Division.

At 1815 hours on 3 December we heard own artillery fire in the direction of Hussaine-Wala. The war had started in West Pakistan also. According to the plan the nearby enemy area of tactical importance was captured without opposition. The registered targets in the enemy area were shelled. The enemy also retaliated and shelled Sehjra position and local houses. The villagers, carrying in hurry whatever they could, left their houses during shelling. About 50-60 Mujahid soldiers also disappeared without permission. For the section and platoon commanders it was becoming difficult to keep the Mujahid soldiers in the trenches. Many Mujahid soldiers left the forward trenches for the rear and depth position. Some trenches had been destroyed during the shelling and a few soldiers had embraced Shahadat and some were wounded.

During 4 December shelling, RR fire and MG fire had increased. Many trenches due to direct hits were destroyed. Own 3” Mortar position was also destroyed. The forward Ranger posts were shelled heavily and the posts were vacated, whereas most of the men disappeared. Own OP officer also engaged enemy targets and from some places thick smoke appeared which continued for many hours. Own RRs also destroyed enemy bunkers in a bund about 800 yards away. Own telephone communication system had broken down with all the posts and nearly all the forward localities were also out of touch.

On 5 December enemy guns continued shelling the localities. Depth position and administrative area also received enemy mortar fire and it proved that the enemy agent (Mujahid Section Commander) had pinpointed our entire layout to the enemy intelligence team. Whenever any movement was seen in the enemy area it was engaged promptly by own guns and MGs when within range. By the evening 3 x 6 Pounder anti-tank guns, after firing a few shots in enemy bund position, had been destroyed with direct hits. Only one 6 Pounder gun remained intact which had been sited at the entrance of the village track. Most of the Mujahid soldiers and Rangers sent on patrolling had disappeared.

At 2200 hours on 5 December information from the Division HQs was received that an enemy brigade would attack the Sehjra position at 2300 hours. The attacking force would be using the long gap exhisting between the Sehjra position and the forward most locality of the Division main defensive position. The information was passed to all company and platoon commanders and a platoon was detailed to lay an ambush in the gap. Due to the disappearance of many Mujahids and Rangers majority of the platoons had 10 to 15 men in the trenches. Most of the remnants were concentrated facing the expected direction of the enemy attack.

It was moonlit might and the visibility was up to 100 yards. The Brigade and Division HQs were requested to arrange for aggressively blocking of the over 7,000 yards wide gap by sending a rifle company and platoon R&S, and which should also be assigned the mission of “Spoiling attack”. The Division HQs was also requested to keep a force, composed of 2 rifle companies, one R&S platoon, one tank squadron and some APC, ready at dawn for counter attack in case a portion of the Sehjra locality had been captured by the enemy. This force could also be used for encircling enemy pockets operating against the Sehjra locality. But both the HQs replied that the use of the gap by the enemy would be denied by continuance shelling by medium and field guns. But it was a discouraging reply because the prevailing dangerous situation, and disappearance of more than half the Mujahids and Rangers, was not appreciated. Even a novice like Mujahid was not convinced.

At 2245 hours intense shelling of the Sehjra position commenced. More than a divisional artillery guns were pounding the area. Enemy RRs and MGs were also actively participating in firing by directly engaging targets within range. Our artillery also retaliated promptly.

Own patrol composed of 3 regular, 4 Mujahid and 4 Ranger soldiers successfully ambushed the enemy party of about 50 strong and reached the Command post safely during the enemy shelling.

At 2325 hours one enemy battalion attacked from the east and the second attack of two battalions was launched from the south. The enemy attacking troops received very little small arms fire. Only one MG kept firing and inflicted lot of casualties. Most of the trenches were empty and the enemy occupied some localities without fight.

The command post held out for few hours. It was defended with only two officers, one JCO and 30 men, including a few Mujahids. The attacking enemy was repulsed with only rifle fire. Own artillery also brought accurate shelling on the attacking enemy troops. The localities occupied by the enemy were also shelled heavily by own artillery. Shelling of the gap also continued for 15 to 20 minutes but it failed to stop the attacking enemy two battalions, obviously there was no one present to direct shelling on the concentration and movement of the enemy attacking troops.

Another wave of enemy attacking troops advanced towards the command post. A 6 Pounder gun sited at the entrance of the village was handled by a couple of Ranger soldiers. Two shots were fired at point blank range and accurate rifle fire was also inflicted. Some enemy soldiers fell on the ground and the rest ran back and disappeared in the darkness. Our artillery shelled the area promptly.

In the meantime enemy troops entered the village Sehjra from the rear and eastern flank. Now the command post was encircled from two sides by the enemy. They fired verey lights which illuminated the area and also indicated their location to the other attacking units/sub units. Enemy MGs and RRs were firing from a close range. Shelling on the Command post also continued. There were no troops available for immediate counter attack. The enemy troops were shouting slogans. The situation was becoming untenable. No help was forthcoming from the Formation. At 0550 hours on 6 December, with the permission of the Formation HQs, through the wireless communication of the Artillery OP, the Command post was vacated. Firing their arms on the enemy at close range the Command post personnel (Broadly 25) managed to penetrate through the enemy attacking troops and joined the main defensive position about 7 km away from Sehjra locality. A great number of Mujahids and Rangers had already been arriving since the afternoon of 5 December.

Thus ended the Sehjra episode in despair, the memory of which keeps on haunting, those who had participated and are still alive, like a nightmare.



Conclusion
1. In Sehjra battle about 15 Jawans had embraced Shahadat, 25 were wounded and about 30 missing. According to Maj Gen Sukhwant Singh (Defence of the Western Border-1971) and Praval (Indian Army after Independence) in Sehjra battle Pakistan Army had lost about 30 killed and 65 taken prisoners whereas the Indian attacking force suffered two officers, one JCO and 10 OR killed and 26 OR wounded. Both the writers have accepted that the fighting was stiff and Pakistanis had put up a brave fight and it was only after daybreak on 6 December that 48 Brigade (Indian) was able to secure the bulge. If the fighting was stiff then the attacking troops must have suffered at least 150-200 casualties.

2. A handful of Mujahids, Rangers and regular soldiers had fought valiant action and inflicted casualties on the attacking enemy, and had embraced Shahadat and some were wounded. A 6 Pounder gun and MG were daringly handled by a couple of Rangers. The runners, signallers, drivers and the two officers and a JCO present in the Command post had used their rifles and stenguns effectively and forced the attacking enemy to retire in the rear.

3. For the defence of a strategically and tactically important isolated area a hard hitting regular force (one infantry battalion + R and S element + a tank squadron) was required. Such a force would have locked more enemy troops and repulsed a brigade attack with heavy losses.

4. On 3 December, 106 Brigade of 11 Division, by a daring action, had achieved resounding success by capturing Hussaine Wala salient. On 6 December at dawn a daring action was required to be launched by infantry and tanks and another resounding success would have been added in cap of the Formation. On 5 December initiative had been snatched by the enemy, but for immediate counter attack own Formation commander possessed the choice of time and size of the force, and thus would have achieved surprise. Numerical superiority is only one factor relied to produce success, but success could be sought through enveloping, and fast movement would have made up for number.

5. The capture of Sehjra Salient by the enemy forestalled any offensive by Pakistan Army from that direction and denied observation and recce of the area. It also provided tactical strength to the enemy defences in the depth and an access to any offensive action likely to be launched from that direction.

6. Own artillery had provided support promptly and throughout the operation remained a great tower of strength and source of inspiration.



Source
The above narrative is mostly based on the interview of those JCOs and officers who had participated in the battle of Sehjra. Unfortunately, some of them are no more in this world. The interview was held immediately after the battle. I apologize if inadvertently the feelings of someone have been injured. I have mentioned facts known to me.