Pakistani Special Forces

[SSAAD]

Moderator: If possible please leave this subject as a different topic (and not part of the Army or other threads). There is quite a bit of info on SSG and other special outfits in Pakistan that should be collected and have a specific thread. Maybe there is one, but I am unaware of it.

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Special Service Group (SSG) in the eyes of observers:

- "The operational doctrine of the SSG is a mixture of US, Chinese and British SAS tactics and philosophy with a great deal of experience from the Afghan War, Siachen, Kashmir and Kargil thrown in. They are formidable opponents and easily rank as one of the finest special forces in the world."

- The training curriculum is, according to a U.S. Army Special Forces officer, "highly competitive, labor intensive, and incredibly difficult."

- "The incredible diversity of the terrain and geography of Pakistan has made the SSG into one of the world's most diverse and adaptable military special forces formations - it is one of the few "third world" units that can move from desert operations in temperatures above 135 degrees (F) to -25 degrees (F) in the northern and western portions of the country."

- "Unlike most commando elements around the world, made up of cocky twenty-year-olds, the SSG is a more seasoned group of operators. With many of the men in their late thirties and even early forties. Nevertheless, physical fitness is considered a religion in the ranks of SSG, and all unit operators are required to compete arduous obstacle courses in rigid time frames."

- On the SSG raids against Indian airfields during the 1965 war:

- "The SSG is the most sophisticated, and specialised, unit in any modern army. The success of their mission is in "The approach to Battle," even more than it is for a common-or-garden infantry unit. The courage, devotion, hardihood and individual training of SSG men is not intended to make amends for failures on planning and projection. These are rather the assets which require extra precision for their employment."

- "No one in SSG, who participated in the abortive raids, could have believed that there was some chance of success of their mission; or even a remote chance of ground exfiltration, after their strikes. They were operating in a totally hostile environment and out of context with ground operations. Their mission would be more comparable to raiding London by German commandos in 1944, or raiding Hanoi by American commandos in 1973. It would have been more realistic to call it a "Kamikaze" assignment. But the SSG had not been brought up for such commitment. It is an everlasting tribute to their courage and devotion that not a single man opted out."

.........man jaanbazam!




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SOF: Special Forces of Pakistan (Part 2 - Training & Missions)

By Keith G Emuang


Like many other elite forces around the world, the Pakistani SSG is an all-terrain, all weapons and many skills unit. But what stands out mostly is the fact that members of the SSG are some of the fittest known soldiers around, testament to the constant emphasis on physical conditioning.


Training
SSG personnel are trained to be airborne and probably air-assault-qualified. It is likely that besides being HALO-trained they are also HAHO-qualified as well. Before one can become an officer in the SSG, he must have at least two years of military experience from other formations within the Pakistan army. Only then can he volunteer for a three-year assignment with the SSG.

NCOs and enlisted men can volunteer from other formations to serve permanently in the SSG. In any case, all trainees must undergo an eight-month course at Cherat. The SSG course emphasises tough physical conditioning which includes a gruelling 36-mile march in 12 hours. They are also required to run five miles in 40 minutes in full gear.

Immediately after, the trainees must volunteer for airborne school which lasts four weeks, with wings awarded after a series of seven jumps - five in the day and two at night.

Specialised Instruction
After the basic training is completed, trainees will receive further and specialised training at any one of several specialised schools depending on their ability and prowess. A HALO course, which is part of the airborne programme, is given at Peshawar with a 'skydiver' tab awarded after 5 free-fall jumps.

A 'Mountain Warfare' qualification badge is given after completing a course at the Mountain Warfare School in Abbottad. A 'Combat Diver' badge is awarded for the course held by the Naval Special Services Group at Karachi. There is also specialised training for desert, snow and high altitude warfare.

Once the trainees pass out as fully-fledged SSG operatives, they will be allowed to don the prestigious maroon beret of the SSG and wear the SSG para wing on their left chest. A distinctive SSG badge featuring a dagger framed by lightening bolts, used since 1964 by members of 19 Baluch goes on the left shoulder; qualification tabs and badges such as SCUBA, Skydiver or Mountain Warfare go on the right shoulder.

To keep in touch with latest developments in counter insurgency and terrorists warfare, the SSG trains and exercises with other Special Forces units from Great Britain, the United States, Turkey, and Jordan.

Missions
The first reported operation carried out by the Pakistan SSG was in 1965 during the Indo-Pakistani war. Then, the SSG conducted airborne raids on three Indian air bases. The mission did not achieve its objective of crippling the installations but it did manage to cause confusion for the Indians.

In the late 1960s, the SSG was involved in East Pakistan to help control civil disturbances. By 1970, with political elections and Bengali nationalism feeding growing unrest, the SSG took on a greater responsibility of policing and enforcing control. Culprit to the civil unrest was Mukti Bahini, the military arm of the Awami League led by Sheikh Mulibar Rahman.

On 25 March 1970, elements of the SSG launched Operation Searchlight to bring civil order back to East Pakistan and destroy the Awami League. Sheikh Rahman was captured but the action sparked off a civil war. It would take the next eight months before the SSG and Pakistani Army could regain control of the cities in East Pakistan but Mukti Bahini was still in control of the countryside. What made matters worst was that India continued to supply and train the fighters of the Mukti Bahini.

Incensed, Pakistan launched a cross border raid into India in October 1971 to cut off supplies to the insurgents and destroy their training facilities. In December, India invaded East Pakistan and began the third Indo-Pakistani war. Overpowered by the strong Indian army, the SSG managed to perform a few successful harassment raids before suffering heavy casualties and capture.

Ongoing Tension
The history of conflict between India and Pakistan dates back to 1947. The first war between the two countries began only two months after they attained independence from Great Britain. They fought two more wars, in 1965 and 1971 and numerous skirmishes over the past 52 years. In 1998, a new plateau was reached when both countries conducted a series of nuclear weapons tests.

Tensions in the region rose again during 1999, when Islamic militants fighting to force India to relinquish its claim to the Kashmir region crossed the line of control and threatened the town of Kargil by shelling the only supply route from Srinagar. The SSG has been accused by India of supporting and participating in incursions into India's portion of Kashmir. Such activities will continue until the political issues surrounding Kashmir are resolved.

Another role for the SSG would be long-range reconnaissance and possibly direct-action missions against India's ballistic missile forces and weapons-of-mass-destruction facilities. The most likely scenario would involve sets of small teams locating such missiles and facilities and reporting their precise co-ordinates to be used for a pre-emptive strike. As history is the judge, it is all but too certain that Pakistan and India will cross swords in the foreseeable future. It is likely that these kinds of hostilities will continue to occur, possibly leading to a fourth war.

[SSAAD]

SOF - Special Forces of Pakistan (Part 1 - History & Organisation)

By Keith G Emuang


Like India, Pakistan did not take too long after its independence to set up its very own elite unit to counter what it saw as an imminent threat from its neighbour. As a result, in 1953, the Pakistan army raised an elite commando formation known as the Special Services Group which was ready to come into action at short notice.


Early Beginnings
Pakistan had a few years' head start over India in the formation of its first Special Forces unit. The setting up of the Pakistani Special Services Group or SSG in 1953 was done under a cloak of secrecy. US assistance was sought and to disguise its true mission status as a special military unit, the SSG was initially designated 19th Battalion of the Baluch Regiment and was stationed at its headquarters at Cherat, near Attock City.

In the mid-1950s, the 19th Battalion trained Naga rebels in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), to fight the Indian government. In March 1964 a Mobile Training Team from the US Army Special Forces Group (Airborne) went to Pakistan to set up a new airborne school at Peshawar for 19th Baluch. With the new school, the 19th was now able to undergo basic and jumpmaster courses which would make them airborne qualified and hence more effective as a Special Forces unit.

Increased Potency
In time, all members of the 19th Baluch, as they were then known were airborne qualified. The training team also included four riggers, who helped train Pakistani counterparts. By this time, the 19th Baluch began to refer to themselves as the 'Special Service Group' of the Baluch Regiment. The 19th Baluch consisted of 700 men, divided into 24 specialised companies, and was commanded by a colonel.

Each company had specialisation units, specialised in desert, mountain, ranger, and underwater warfare. The desert companies participated in training exercises with US Army Special Forces Mobile Training Team in 1964. The scuba company in Karachi was renowned for its tough physical training.

Added Roles
Due to a growing insurgence by Islamic terrorist groups operating in the region, in 1970 an anti-terrorist role was added to the SSG. It was given to an independent formation within the SSG known as the Musa Company, named after Prophet Musa or Moses, as he was more commonly known.

The company was originally formed in 1970 as a combat diver unit. In 1980 however each company was given a diver unit. After the Musa Company was converted to an anti-terrorist unit, it received training by British SAS advisors in Cherat in 1981.

In 1986 SSG began a large-scale basic training program for Sri Lankan Paramilitary militia forces. Commando and airborne training was given to members of the Sri Lankan Commando Regiment. SSG units have also been seconded in covert operations in Afghanistan during the Afghan war, as air marshals on passenger airlines and as VIP security.

Organisation
At any one time, there are two SSG battalions that normally rotate through Cherat with a third battalion divided between the border and other strategic locations such as the Terbella Dam, vital nuclear research facilities and other critical installations.

Each SSG battalion of 700 men is split into four companies. Each company is further split into platoons and further sub-divided into 10 men teams. All battalions are commanded by Lieutenant Colonels who in turn are answerable to a Colonel. The SSG is capable of undertaking missions of their speciality which include counter-terrorism, unconventional warfare, counter-insurgency, security for VIPs and strategic infrastructure, reconnaissance, raids, snow and riverine operations.

Coming up next - The training, and missions of the Pakistan SSG

[SSAAD]

Pakistan Special Service Group

Mandeep Singh Bajwa

V.1 November 18, 2000

Editor's note: Additional information regarding historical background, training, qualification, and uniforms is available at called specialoperations.com. This site can be accessed through www.specialoperations.com/foreign/Pakistan . It also has graphics of the Pakistan Naval SSG including uniform and badges. As we have not yet obtained permission from the website to duplicate some of their material, we request readers to proceed directly to the site. Because there are some differences between information provided on the specialoperations.com website and this article, we have listed the main differences. With all respect to the authors of the specialoperations.com article, who appear to be Pakistani, the information provided by Mr. Bajwa is more accurate when there is a conflict.

Mr. Bajwa writes:

Background and History

The Pakistani Army’s special forces were raised as the Special Service Group in 1956 using the cadre of 19 (Para) Baloch. [Editor's note: Pakistan now calls the Baluch Regiment the Baloch Regiment. The former spelling is the British version, and reflects a slight difference in pronunciation.] Their first CO was Lt. Col. (later Maj. Gen.) Abu Bakr Osman Mitha.

[specialoperations.com says that the SSG consisted of 24 companies at the time it was designated as such. This is an extraordinarily high figure. Mr. Bajwa reports that the SSG had six companies and this is more likely.]

Their initial training and orientation as regards tactics was based on the US Special Forces pattern with whom they co-operated closely in the Cold War years. Later Chinese training, tactics, weapons, and equipment were also introduced.

After a few preliminary operations on the Afghan border, the nascent SSG’s first test came during the 1965 war. Around 100 officers and men were dropped on the night of 6/7 September near the Indian airbases of Adampur, Pathankot and Halwara in an ill-conceived operation to destroy Indian combat aircraft and put the bases out of action. Badly planned, lacking any solid intelligence, and even more badly executed the operation ended in a disaster. The SSG commandos fell easy prey to hastily gathered Indian troops and adventurous civilians. Only a handful made it back to their own country after numerous travails. No Indian planes were damaged or casualties inflicted on Indian troops.

By 1971, the SSG boasted of 3 battalions with one permanently stationed in East Pakistan. Their performance in the 1971 war was much better with 1 Commando Battalion making a spectacular raid on an Indian artillery regiment and disabling several of their guns besides inflicting casualties. 3 Commando Battalion in Bangladesh performed creditably in a normal infantry role. The SSG’s role in the Afghan War was highly commendable and much of the credit for the spectacular successes of the Mujahideen goes to them.

Likewise, they have fought well in Siachen though in one or two instances taking heavy casualties. In the preliminary stages of the 1999 Kargil Operations the SSG performed well, infiltrating relatively deep into Indian territory undetected. Subsequently being used as stock infantry troops to hold posts/defensive positions, they took heavy casualties and suffered the mortification of being ‘denied’ by their own country.

In 1980, an anti-terrorist role was given to Musa Company, which was originally formed in 1970 as a combat diver unit. This company was subsequently trained by British SAS advisers in mid-1981. In 1980 however each battalion was given a diver unit. The battalion in East Pakistan earlier had a frogman platoon with which it was planned by Gen. A.A.K. Niazi (GOC Pakistan Eastern Command) to attack the Indian Farakka Barrage. This emphasis on frogmen, however, means that the Indian Army can expect underwater attacks on its combat bridges in case of a conventional war.

Deployment

At present, there are three Commando battalions, a frogmen company, and an anti-terrorist company. The whole is controlled by a Group HQ commanded by a Brigadier. The battalions normally rotate around one in training and one on operations in

Kashmir/Afghanistan with a third on stand-by. 2 companies are normally deployed on the Siachen Glacier.

[specialoperations.com says two battalions rotate through Cherat and one is divided between "the border" and protection of vital installations like the Tarabela Dam and Pakistan nuclear weapons establishments. Mr. Bajwa's information is far more accurate. Given the situation between India and Pakistan, we can understand why Pakistan sources would prefer to pass lightly over the SSG's combat deployments.]

The SSG also provide Close Protection Teams for the security of the President, Prime Minister, COAS, and nowadays the Chief Executive.

Recruitment and Training

Personnel for the SSG are volunteers from all arms and services and normally serve a tenure of 3-5 years before going back to their parent units. Their training centers are at Attock and Cherat. The SSG’s badge is a commando dagger flanked on either side by a bolt of lightning

The SSG does not have any class composition and all classes are eligible to join. The training is rigorous and the accent is on training soldiers as individual commandos capable of taking independent initiative. The ‘buddy’ system beloved of the US Special Forces and the SAS is encouraged.

The SSG regularly sends students to the US for special warfare and airborne training. The training programs in China are not so well documented however given the closed nature of it’s society and obsession with security. For specialized training specific to Siachen a Snow and High Altitude Warfare School has been established at Khappalu.

Uniforms

Combat uniforms were previously the standard Khaki of the Pakistan Army. From 1972, a new disruptive pattern combat tunic was introduced for the entire Army. This was phased out beginning 1979. The SSG uses the US woodland pattern camouflage combat dress. The ubiquitous symbol of parachute forces, the maroon beret, is worn with a cap badge in a light blue square.

[Other uniform details can be found on the specialoperations.com website]



Doctrine

The operational doctrine of the SSG is a mixture of US, Chinese and British SAS tactics and philosophy with a great deal of experience from the Afghan War, Siachen, Kashmir and Kargil thrown in. They are formidable opponents and easily rank as one of the finest special forces in the world. The SSG cut quite a dash at the recent the ceremonial Pakistan Day parade in Islamabad marching past the saluting dais in the double time; a very tiring procedure.

Overseas Operations

The Pakistan Government has also used the SSG as an instrument of influence. The SSG has a presence in a large number of Arab/Muslim countries through its training/advisory teams. Basic training in CI Ops and VIP security is imparted to the armed forces of these countries. In 1986, alarmingly for India, the SSG began large-scale training of the Sri Lankan Commando Regiment. The SSG is also involved in covert operations in Afghanistan and India. Air Marshals have been provided for Pakistan International Airlines.

Organization

Group HQ

Commander: Brigadier

Staff: 5 officers

Three GSO 2s - Operations, Intelligence and Training DAA & QMG – Logistics and Personnel assisted by a Staff Captain (A/Q). An Establishment Officer and an Adminstarion Officer (Finance) (presumably to finance covert operations in other

countries)


A HQ company services the Group HQ.

Paratroopers Training School (Peshawar)

3 Officers

23 JCOs (Junior Commissioned Officers are the same as Non Commissioned Officers.)

54 ORs

Akbar Company (Frogman Unit)

4 Officers

4 JCOs

60 ORs

Musa Company (Anti-Terrorist Unit, always on operational stand-by.

3 Officers

4 JCOs

90 ORs

Iqbal Company (Signals Unit)

3 Officers

3 JCOs

100 ORs.

Commando Battalion

Battalion HQ

CO

2IC

Adjutant

Intelligence Officer

HQ and clerical staff

HQ Company (1 Officer, 1 JCO, 59 Ors)

Signal Platoon

MT Platoon

Administrative Platoon


Each battalion has 4 - 5 Commando Companies

Company HQ

1 Officer

1 JCO

21 ORs

3 Platoons, each:

1 Officer

1 JCO

43 Ors

Platoons are large because they conduct independent operations

Company supporting weapons

18 x MGs

3 x RPG-7s

3 x 60mm Mors

1 x 106mm RCL

[SSAAD]

Pakistan's Naval Special Service Group
In the eyes of some observers, the past few years have seen Pakistan switch from being a very close friend of the West to being a potential danger to the international community. While the country was at the forefront of resistance to Soviet regional expansion during the Cold War - a role enhanced when Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan in 1979 - once the Red Army had withdrawn, India became the greatest threat to Pakistan's security. The subsequent search for a nuclear arsenal raised Western fears and curtailed arms sales.

This has, in turn, led to a shift by Pakistan away from a Western-style democracy towards closer links with its Islamic neighbours, especially Iran. The mutual relationship between Pakistan, a relatively poor but well-armed country with a very advanced nuclear programme, and Iran, an ambitious and unpredictable state, could signify a major change in the balance of power. The recent election of Benazir Bhutto could shift the balance yet again. In this fast changing political scenario, it is important to consider the role played by a small but elite branch of the Pakistani Armed Forces - the Naval Special Service Group (SSGN).

The Formation of the SSGN

In 1966, Pakistan raised a group of special forces under a centralised command which was similar to the US Special Forces Command (SOCOM) concept. In this Special Service Group (SSG), which fought bravely during the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971, the navy had a small but important part to play.

At the outbreak of hostilities, there were some 100 naval servicemen in the SSGN. They were trained especially in counterinsurgency and anti-terrorist operations in coastal and riverine environments. The unit was tasked with long-range operations in western Pakistan (then Bangladesh) to counter infiltration by Indian agents and special forces. It was also required to keep pressure on local rebels of the pro-Indian Bengali Party. This latter task was relatively successful even if conducted with scant regard for human rights. Eventually, when the Indian Army invaded western Pakistan, the sub units of the SSGN which were deployed there suffered heavy casualties; most of the operators were killed, captured or escaped to neutral bordering states.

Organisation

The headquarters of the SSGN is the naval station of Iqbal in Karachi. Here, amphibious and underwater training for the SSGN and otherservices is carried out. Furthermore, Iqbal has the necessary facilities for accommodating the mini-submarines which represent a valuable asset.

The training of the SSGN involves weapons, tactics, martial arts, camouflage and concealment, escape and survival, explosive ordnance disposal, communications, as well as swimming, diving, air and heliborne operations. Free-fall parachuting, path finding, mountain and rock climbing also form part of the syllabus. These training activities are conducted within the SSG bases of Cherat and Peshawar. Close-circuit oxygen breathing equipment is commonly issued for underwater activities to a maximum depth of about 12 m. In the case of deeper missions, for mines clearance or explosive disposal for example, common air breathing equipment is used.

The SSGN used to train alongside US Navy SEALs and undertook 'wet' training with Saudi special forces. During more recent times, however, the SSGN has conducted joint training with Iranian Islamic revolutionary guards (Pasdaran) which has significantly enhanced the latter's operational skills.

Mini-Submarines

Pakistan has more experience in submarine warfare than many other Third World countries. During the 1971 war, a Pakistani submarine torpedoed an Indian frigate (INS Khukri), the very first prey of a submarine after the Second World War and the only one other than the sinking of the Argentine cruiser Belgrano during the Falklands war in 1982.

Beside having the largest and best trained Third World submarine fleet, the Pakistani Navy employs a number of mini-submarines. These are small units very well suited for underwater special operations. Five boats of 75 t displacement entered service in the mid-1970s. Built by the Italian firm Cosmos, the submarines played an important role in the aggressive development of underwater warfare in Pakistani special operations.

The mini-submarines were tasked with the transportation of four to six combat divers each. The divers were then required to swim to the target directly or to use swimmer delivery vehicles (SDVs). During several years of continuous operations, one of the original five boats was lost with all crew in an accident, and another reached the end of her operational life; the latter vessel has become a well-known monument in a Karachi square. Although the other three boats should also have been laid up, it is believed that at least two have been handed over to Iran for evaluation and training.

The mini-submarines have now been replaced in the Pakistani Navy with three new 110 t boats, also built by Cosmos. They are much more capable in terms of endurance and payload. The submarines, armed with two torpedo tubes and capable of minelaying, could be used to establish choke points or create barriers, especially in shallow waters. Combat swimmers also can operate from the boats. The submarines' small signature and dimensions make them a perfect instrument for this kind of activity. A very small crew (usually up to six men), coupled with the relatively low unit price, gives a further advantage, especially for small navies. In the Iqbal base, the mini-submarines are usually kept in dry hangars for maintenance. They are lifted into the water by cranes only for when operational required.

Interestingly, Pakistan's most likely opponent, the Indian Navy, recently obtained three mini-submarines of almost identical design. The procurement of these new three boats included the technology to establish an autonomous building programme. To date, however, this capability has not been developed as it would require local industrial resources which are in scarce supply as well as expertise which is currently lacking.

To be truly effective, the mini-submarines must be considered not as smaller brothers of a fleet of larger boats but just as dedicated special operations crafts, manned by special forces personnel and under the direct control of a special operations command. The Pakistani Navy has done just this and, as far as it is possible to ascertain, it possesses a very good operational capability with skilled personnel. It should be assumed that, even during normal peacetime, covert operations are routinely conducted in, or very close to, foreign waters.

Conclusions

The capabilities of the Pakistani SSGN represent an important factor in the military balance of the Indian sub-continent. Two countries, both with a nuclear capability, face one other directly. Strong tensions are present, generated both by religious intolerance and border claims; these could all too easily lead to military engagements. In this scenario, the covert intelligence and raiding capabilities offered by a naval special warfare unit are considered invaluable.

[SSAAD]

Brief mention of SSG troops. A good read nevertheless.

The Forbidden Climb
By Brady Robinson
Reprinted from The Leader, Fall 2000, Vol. 16, No. 1

Jimmy and I crept up onto the roof of the Indus Hotel after dark. There were no stars out and the few Pakistanis who loitered on the roof paid us no attention. It was becoming a routine--haul up the thick plastic case, take out the satellite phone, set up the computer and antenna, hook up all the cables. We waited in the glow of the screen as the computer logged onto our server in the U.S. and sent our images and stories from one side of the globe to the other. We felt like secret agents, since we hadn't yet received official permission to use our satellite phone in Pakistan. That night after a successful transmission, we came back down the stairs and learned that two Pakistani Intelligence officers had been at the front desk looking for us. Gulp.

Traveling in developing countries is usually an adventure. Toting illicit computer equipment while exploring climbing areas long closed to foreigners makes it all the more exciting. Last summer, Jimmy Chin, Dave Anderson (both NOLS instructors), Steph Davis (well-known U.S. free climber), and I did just that. Jimmy put the legwork into researching and getting a permit for the Kondus Valley of Pakistan. Mountainzone.com gave us financial and technical support in exchange for bi-weekly updates to their web site in the states. NOLS generously offered financial support too. We had heard that there were great rock towers to be climbed in the Kondus, so we were excited at being the first westerners in 18 years to get a chance to climb there.

We finally got our satellite permit faxed in from Islamabad and headed off towards the mountains. First we stopped and visited with Brigadier Tahir, a friendly bear of a man who spoke perfect English and seemed to have had a hand in getting us our most important permit. He commands all the units engaged in the high altitude war with India in Northern Kashmir. He showed us a map marked "secret" and casually chatted about mountains he'd seen, where he suspected the best towers were. One tower was his favorite, right at the entrance of the Kondus valley. "You must climb it, I think," he said. We exchanged unbelieving glances at each other while the Brigadier spoke. What great luck! He showed us photographs of other unclimbed towers and later told us stories from the time he had worked as a Liaison Officer for Rienhold Messner, the famous mountaineer. He also said he'd be sending a soldier with us to escort us through the police check posts on our way to the Kondus. We thanked him and went back to our hotel, unable to believe our good fortune.

Three Jeeps carried us and our gear into the Kondus Valley. As the first westerners to pass several police check posts in more than 18 years, we were thoroughly scrutinized. Several officials tried to turn us back, but strong words from our guide Zahid along with our escort and a letter from the Brigadier assured us a safe passage. We rounded a bend and saw the tower that the Brigadier had spoken of, a looming spike reminiscent of El Capitan just several hundred feet off the jeep road. We hastily set up a base camp. After two days of exploration, we dubbed the spire "Tahir Tower" and decided it was indeed the best objective in the valley. The tower's south face rose to a huge vertical expanse of beautiful gray granite. A single, nearly continuous crack split the entire face and was the only obvious line.

Our base camp wasn't what first comes to mind when you think of high mountain ranges. It was dusty and hot, devoid of snow, water, or anything green. In fact, the whole area had a desert feel to it. During the day, we hid from the sun under tarps and drank from water barrels hauled in by the jeep. Early on, Dave got very sick with a high fever, so we rested and organized our gear, waiting for him to recover.

Since we were located right off the only road to the village of Karmading, we attracted a crowd of local people every day. While the women worked hard in the fields and carried grass all day, the men--who never seemed to have much of anything to do--would sit around for hours, shamelessly staring at us. It was a little unnerving. Sometimes our interactions were more meaningful. One day a man came to us with severe abdominal pain and we sent him off to the nearest army hospital in the jeep we'd rented, since he didn't have the money to pay the fare himself. We later heard that he'd just made it. The specifics of his condition were lost in translation, but it was nice to feel we'd helped a bit.

One afternoon an army jeep pulled up to our camp. We were pretty nervous at first, but Captain Abdulla of the Pakistani Special Forces Group, or SSG (not sure where the second S comes from!) came out and warmly introduced himself. We were to develop a good relationship with the SSG. Captain Abdulla came back later with a group of men and sodas and snacks for us. He spoke perfect English, as do all officers in the Pakistani military. He requested a lesson for his men. We taught the same classes to the soldiers that we would have taught on a rock section of a NOLS course. After showing them all our gear, we taught knots, fixed line ascension, anchor building, knot passes, and rappelling techniques. They were superb students. Obviously much of what we taught was review for them, but they really seemed to like certain little tricks, like the double loop figure-8 or the auto-block rappel back-up. They weren't interested in skills for recreation, though. They often employ technical climbing systems while fighting.

The Kondus has long been a base of operations for Pakistan's ongoing war with India. The standoff is entirely political. The soldiers on the ground know that the war is a costly and hopeless stalemate. Soldiers on both sides huddle in freezing temperatures at 20,000 feet and above, taking occasional and perfunctory mortar shots at each other. We were told that variations in pressure and wind velocity at high altitude make accurate fire impossible. The shells would miss by miles. Since small arms battle is nearly impossible in such extreme conditions, the only way to gain an enemy position is to wait until the enemy gets tired of holding it. So the soldiers sit in snow caves and wait stoically. More than 8 out of 10 casualties are the result of the environmental factors such as avalanches, exposure, and altitude sickness.

We worked on a strategy for the climb. It was clear the route would require "big wall" tactics. We would climb, fix ropes, haul our gear, establish a camp, and repeat the process until we reached the summit. We didn't know how big the tower was, but were guessing around 2,500 feet. We had no idea how long it would take either, but 12 days on the route seemed like a good number.

Eventually, because Dave was still sick and Jimmy was beginning to feel crudy too, Steph and I got to start off the climbing. As we left our base camp, a small crowd of locals gathered around us and mostly just stared, but sometimes made requests. Zahid translated for us.

"If you find any dry wood up there, could you throw some down? Nobody has ever collected wood up there before."

"If you find any 'mountain oil' (a black ooze that leaks from cracks) could you give us some?"

It took about five minutes to hike from camp to the base of the route. I got the first pitch, which was less than stellar. I had to rub my shoes off on my pant legs every move to keep the ball-bearing-like granite granules from lubricating my foot placements. I carefully made my way up a wide crack and ran out of rope much sooner than I had anticipated. We looked up and realized that Tahir Tower was bigger than we had originally guessed, which was great news. Our original estimate of 2,500 feet looked to be about 1000 feet short--making the tower possibly bigger than El Capitan! The climbing continued to be interesting, if a bit loose. We followed a huge slanting crack system for several days, fixing ropes and coming back down to base camp at night. While we climbed, Dave and Jimmy were suffering in the sweltering heat. There was no place to escape the sun. Jimmy spent one day lying under a tarp, barely able to move, running a fever of 103 degrees.

Luckily, Jimmy and Dave soon recovered. The climbing improved, with clean rock showing up now and again. Dave led a particularly dangerous pitch, with only one piece of protection in approximately 80 feet of 5.10 climbing. That pitch brought us to a huge ledge system we had chosen to be our first wall camp, which meant it was time to haul the gear and supplies up the lines. We loaded our haul bags with water (there was no water on the route, so we estimated that we would need 180 liters for 12 days of climbing), tinned fruit, fuel, dehydrated meals, cameras, clothes, two portaledges with flies, a computer, the satellite phone, and other stuff. We spent the next seven days hauling the gear up 1,200 feet and resting. It took four trips up and down to get all the gear up. The system we used to haul it all up was simple: a rope ran from the bags, up to a pulley, and back down. We pulled like mad to get the bags up.

Days spent hauling have been some of the worst in my life, or at least some of the most frustrating. Looking at an additional 1,000 feet of hauling distance, pulling for all you're worth and getting the little train of two bags and one barrel to move just another few feet makes everything seem pretty hopeless. The absurdity of wall climbing strikes you at such moments. What am I doing here? I spent much of the first day upside down, pulling myself down the rope with my hands, bracing my feet on the wall above my head. "One, two, three, PULL!" The bags moved one foot. "One, two, three, PULL!" The bags moved a little more. On the next pull I lost my grip, so Steph and Dave pulled to no avail. And so on. As I squirmed around in my harness, searching for a position that didn't squeeze my rubbed-raw hips, I questioned our tactics. Maybe we should try to climb something light and fast. Maybe my old hand injury will flare up, and the others will have to haul for me. Why is it I never liked golf? Big wall climbing isn't as much about skill as it is about endurance, perseverance, and good logistics.

But soon the bags were all up and we were able to move onto the wall permanently and enjoy the benefits our work afforded. A massive dihedral (or corner) swept up from our camp, a single corner system running for more than 1,000 feet. Though the rock was less than perfect, the feature was stunning and the climbing enjoyable. We fixed lines for several days, climbing pitch after pitch of the incredible corner. We surpassed a roof and soon arrived at our second wall camp, which was also conveniently located on a ledge system. We hauled for two days and installed our final wall camp.

The pace of life was very pleasant at our second camp. While two people climbed above the ledge, the other two had nothing to do but lounge--eating, resting, and sending emails to friends via our satellite link. The climbing was steep and the cracks were thin, so we had to resort to aid on several pitches. Jimmy spent a whole day leading through a horrifying band of nearly featureless rock. We had correctly guessed it to be the crux of the route when we scoped it from the ground, so after Jimmy's success it seemed that the summit was within our grasp.

We nearly lost our chance two days later. Jimmy was aiding a particularly loose section of rock when a seemingly well-placed cam pulled and he took a 25 foot fall. He hit his face on a ledge before the rope caught him. Dave and I were horrified to see him rappel back into camp, blood all over his face. We washed him off and patched him up, and though we suspected a cracked rib in addition to the obvious cuts on his face, it could have been much worse. Jimmy kept climbing in spite of his injuries, inspiring us with his tenacity.

Zahid radioed up and told us we were very near the summit, so on June 20, all four of us ascended our lines with the hope of summitting as a team. An easy crack pitch brought us to an open, grassy plateau. The summit spire stood up off the ridge like a miniature version of Tahir Tower. It was Steph's turn to lead, so she worked her way up a tricky crack to the top, fixed the rope, and the four of us were soon celebrating on the summit.

We descended over the next two days, rappelling with heavy loads, pulling our ropes and leaving a minimum of fixed protection behind for rappel anchors. Standing back down on the ground, we were proud of our achievement: 23 days of toil for one summit, including 12 days spent on the wall. A lot of work, but it was worth it. The Baltis crowded around us, still unbelieving that four Americans would want to come all the way to Pakistan to climb an obscure tower unknown to anyone.

If I were to look at the expedition only as a climb, I would see that we spent thousands of dollars and days and days hauling loads for only eight or nine pitches of climbing each. The climbing was exciting, but the memories go far beyond the wall: bonding with the SSG men, walking into a village that hadn't seen a foreign visitor for 18 years, exploring a valley nearly unknown to the climbing community, meeting so many wonderfully different people. You can't put a price on experiences like that.

On the ride to the airport, I was lost in this reflection: if you go forth and adventure, spread good will and clean up after yourself when you're through, you won't be sorry. The risks, expenses, effort, and sacrifice are almost always worth it in the end.

[SSAAD]

Special Forces of the Indian and Pakistani Armies

Introduction
The history of conflict between India and Pakistan dates back to 1947. The first war between the two countries began only 2 months after they attained independence from Great Britain. They fought two more wars, in 1965 and 1971, and numerous skirmishes over the past 52 years. In 1998, a new plateau was reached when both countries conducted a series of nuclear weapons tests. Tensions in the region rose again during the summer of 1999, when Islamic militants fighting to force India to relinquish its claim to the Kashmir region crossed the line of control and threatened the town of Kargil by shelling the only supply route from Srinagar. India alleged that the militants had the backing of the Pakistani Army and the Inter Services Intelligence Directorate and also that Pakistani Army Special Forces (SF) were participating directly in the cross-border operations. It is likely that these kinds of hostilities will continue to occur, possibly leading to a fourth war. Therefore, it is important to know about the SF units that will be out in front and even behind enemy lines during such crises. This article discusses the background, organization, training, missions, and equipment of the SF units of both countries.

Background and Organization
India
The roots of the Indian Army's SF (see figure 1) can be found in the establishment of Indian parachute units during World War II. The personnel of these units gained valuable war-time experience, which proved valuable in the recreation of a post-independence Parachute Regiment. It was not until the second Indo-Pakistani war in 1965 that India formed "an ad hoc commando (Cdo) detachment composed of volunteers from various infantry units." They performed their wartime duties so well that the government decided the following year to establish a permanent Cdo (Cdo) unit, the 9th Battalion (Bn) of the Parachute Regiment. The 10th Bn was established in June 1967 from elements of the 9th, and a month later both units were renamed the 9th and 10th Para Cdo Bns. One aspect of their specialization was that each Bn focused on and recruited from a specific geographic region. The 9th Bn operated in the northern mountains, while the 10th Bn operated in the western desert.




Figure 1. Indian SF Organization

These SF units first saw combat in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war—the 9th in Jammu and Kashmir, the 10th in the Sindh region. Both units received commendations for their actions during the war. In 1979, a third unit was formed and named the 1st Para Cdo Bn. This unit was not given a geographic specialty, but instead was considered a strategic reserve.

The 1980s were a busy time for the para Cdo units. In 1984, Sikh extremists took several moderate Sikh leaders hostage and holed up at a fortified religious complex called the Golden Temple. The army tried to soften the Sikh positions with light shelling in order to assist an assault by the local Special Frontier Forces. This attempt failed, and the para Cdos were assigned to the mission. Elements of the 1st Para Cdo Bn led the assault to rescue the hostages; four hostages were rescued, and two were killed. The Cdos then led Indian infantry back into the temple in order to take out the rest of the extremists. The 1st Para Cdo Bn suffered 17 fatalities and approximately 60 wounded.

In 1987, Indian SF participated in a peace-keeping mission to Sri Lanka, which evolved into a counter-insurgency operation against the Tamil rebels that were operating in the northern part of the island. The opportunity for a peaceful settlement evaporated when the Tamil rebels kidnapped and murdered five peacekeepers from the 10th Para Cdo Bn. The Indian Army decided to break the rebel organization by capturing its headquarters in the city of Jaffna. A heliborne assault was led by the 10th Bn, acting as pathfinders for the rest of the force. However, the Tamils were monitoring the Indians' communications and were able to ambush the Cdos at the soccer field, which was to be their landing zone. The survivors of the ambush were rescued the next day by a column of T-72 tanks. The 10th Bn continued to be used in counter-insurgency operations until it was relieved by the 9th Bn in 1988. This gave the 9th Para Cdos an opportunity to gain battle experience. India withdrew from Sri Lanka in March 1990.

In 1992, an SF Headquarters and an SF Training Wing were established at Nahan and Belgaum, respectively. In 1995 or 1996, a fourth SF Bn was created and named the 21st Para Cdo Bn. The location and geographic specialty of this unit are not known.

Pakistan
Pakistan had a few years' head start in the formation of its first SF unit (see figure 2). In 1953-54, the Pakistani Army created, with assistance from the U.S. Army, the 19th Bn of the Baluch Regiment. In the mid-1950s, the 19th Bn trained Naga rebels in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), to fight the Indian government. In 1964, the U.S. Army's 10th SF Group (Airborne) sent a Mobile Training Team to assist the Pakistanis in building a new airborne school at Peshawar. This school allowed the 19th Bn to become airborne-qualified. Also at that time, personnel of the 19th Bn began to refer to themselves as the "Special Service Group" of the Baluch Regiment. The Bn consisted of 700 men, divided into 24 specialized companies, and was commanded by a colonel. The companies were trained to carry out missions involving desert, mountain, and underwater warfare.




Figure 2. Pakistani SF Organization

Pakistani SF performed their first combat missions during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war. One of their first missions was to conduct airborne raids against three Indian air bases. Although the raids failed, the unit suffered relatively few casualties and did manage to confuse the Indians. In 1966 the unit was expanded to three Bns and officially became the independent Special Service Group (SSG). The headquarters for the SSG was established at Cherat; it oversees the 1st, 2d, and 3d Cdo Bns of the SSG. Each Bn consists of 700 men and is led by a lieutenant colonel. In 1970, a combat diver company was formed and named Musa, after the prophet Moses. Musa was responsible for Pakistan's inland waterways, since the Pakistani Navy had its own Cdo unit. In 1980, each Cdo Bn established its own combat diver detachment. As a result, Musa company was converted into a counter-terrorism unit.

During the late 1960s, each of the SSG's Bns rotated through East Pakistan to help control civil disturbances. In 1970, political elections and Bengali nationalism led to growing unrest, which caused the entire 2d Cdo Bn to be deployed to the east. In January 1971, the 2d Cdo Bn was replaced by the 3d Cdo Bn. The unrest was led by the Awami League through its military arm, the Mukti Bahini. The leader of the Awami League was Sheikh Mulibar Rahman. During the night of March 25-26, the Pakistani military launched Operation Searchlight, with the goal of bringing order back to East Pakistan and stifling the Awami League. The operation began in the early morning, when a platoon from the 3d Cdo Bn raided Sheikh Rahman's house and captured the Awami leader alive. By the end of the day civil war had broken out. Over the next 8 months, the army was able to regain control of the cities of East Pakistan. During that time, the 2d and 3d Bns of the SSG gained a lot of experience at urban warfare. However, the Mukti Bahini controlled the countryside where India supplied and trained the Bengali fighters. In October 1971, the SSG started to perform cross-border raids into India in order to cut off supplies to the insurgents and destroy their training facilities. In December, India invaded East Pakistan and began the third Indo-Pakistani war. By that time, most of the 3d Bn had withdrawn, and only the 2d Bn remained in the east. Although the Bn was able to perform a few successful harassment raids during the month-long war, many of its personnel were killed or captured trying to exfiltrate.

Training
India
The personnel of each Para Cdo Bn are airborne-qualified and probably air-assault-qualified as well. Certain detachments of these Bns are also trained in high-altitude high-opening and low-opening (HAHO/HALO) operations. Members of the U.S. Army SF participated in joint HAHO training with the Indians in 1992. Other joint training between the U.S. and Indian SF consisted of underwater training in 1995 and anti-terrorism training in 1997. Para Cdo Bns are trained in desert warfare (10th Bn) and mountain warfare (9th Bn). It is likely that certain elements of India's SF, the 9th Bn in particular, are trained to operate at extremely high altitudes, such as the Siachen Glacier. Little is known about language training within the Indian SF, but it is likely that all SF personnel are capable of at least rudimentary English, one of India's official languages, and that some personnel are trained in Chinese and certain Tibetan and Pakistani dialects.

Pakistan
As with their Indian counterparts, personnel of Pakistan's SSG are airborne-qualified and probably air-assault-qualified. Elements of the SSG are known to be HALO-qualified, and it is likely that they are HAHO-qualified as well. Personnel of the SSG receive training at the following schools: airborne (Peshawar), mountain warfare (Abbottad), combat diver (Karachi), and desert warfare. The SSG trains and exercises with other SF from Great Britain, the United States, Turkey, and Jordan. As for languages, English is widely used in Pakistan, although it is not an official language. It is likely that the SSG possesses linguists fluent in certain western Indian dialects.

Missions
India
The Para Cdo Bns are capable of carrying out the following missions: counter-terrorism, hostage rescue, counter-insurgency, security for very important people and places, reconnaissance, raids, peacekeeping, and sabotage. One likely current and future mission would be cross-border reconnaissance and raids into the Pakistani held areas of Kashmir. These missions would be focused against Islamic militants that operate in India but are supplied from and trained in Pakistan.

Pakistan
The SSG is capable of carrying out the following missions: counter-terrorism, unconventional warfare, counter-insurgency, security for very important people and places, reconnaissance, raids, and riverine operations. The SSG has been accused by India of supporting and participating in incursions into India's portion of Kashmir. Such activities will continue until the political issues surrounding Kashmir are resolved.

Another role for the SF of both countries would be long-range reconnaissance and possibly direct-action missions against the other country's ballistic missile forces and weapons-of-mass-destruction facilities. The most likely scenario would involve sets of small teams locating such missiles and facilities and reporting their precise coordinates to be used for a preemptive strike. If Pakistan or India develop or purchase smart munitions, another possible role for their SF will be to act as target designators.

Equipment
Very little information is available concerning the weaponry, transportation assets, communication gear, and general equipment being used by the SF of the Indian and Pakistani armies. It is likely that both countries try to import or indigenously produce the best weapons and equipment they can purchase with their meager resources.

Conclusion
Despite the sparse funding provided to them, the SF of India and Pakistan will continue to fulfill their roles as the tips of the spears for their respective armies. It is all but certain that these armies will continue to clash for the foreseeable future.

http://www.specialoperations.com/For...stan_India.htm

[SSAAD]

This list is subject to research and hopefully change:-)

Assault rifle:
Steyr AUG, M-4 [Both 5.56mm], HK G-3A3, Type-56, Type-81 [all 7.62mm]

Grenade launcher:
UBL induction underway.

SMG:
HK MP-5 & derivatives: SMGPK, MP5A2, MP5P3, MP5SD, MP5PK1 & 2. [All 9mm].

FN P-90 [5.7mm].? Not verified.

Handguns:
Glock 17, Sig-Sauer P226 [All 9mm]. Jut confirmed HK P-7 today! (06/29/06) - saad

Sniper rifles:
Steyr- Mannlicher SSG 69 [AKA P1 in civilian usage], Finnish Tikka M55, Scoped G-3A3 [All 7.62mm]. Additional sniper rifles on order from the US.

[A Haider]

P-90 SMG is also used.

[SSAAD]

Hamza,

Do you have any links or reference to the P-90 use in SSG? I am trying to gather some sources to cross check it with. Any help would be appreciated.

Regards

[Mo Khan]

I think the SSG might be using the Barrett M82A1 .50 Sniper Rifle too since we noticed the Anti-Narcs are using it on Pak-Afghan border.

[SSAAD]

I had that in mind as well, but did not find any supporting evidence of the light fifty in SSG use. I am trying to get the most verified and authentic information on the SSG inventory.

I am not sure if all of the weapons in the Army/ANF inventory apply to SSG as well. There are weapons that are used across the board, however I can't say the same about the light fifty. If anyone has any confirmed input on this, please let me know.

I am also unsure about the handguns (one source states its P-38 but those are some really old handguns. I am pretty sure that there is a good mix of SIG/Glock and other vendors etc.) however I have no way to verify if this is indeed what the SSG has been using.

Thanks

[Sheikh]

What or who is Black Panthers?

In Eric S. Margolis's book "War on top of the world" he talks about Black Panthers being the most elite of Pakistani forces! Is this true?

[MohsinE]

I hope we imported some H&K- G-36s, Ks and Cs aswell.

[SSAAD]

"What or who is Black Panthers?

In Eric S. Margolis's book "War on top of the world" he talks about Black Panthers being the most elite of Pakistani forces! Is this true?"

There is no such unit in the PA. Eric Margolis has made a few mistakes in that book. I believe this is also one of them.

SSG typically keeps one company deployed at Siachen at all times to seize initiative, in case an opportunity arises, with special ops. tactics. The SSG also is the most elite and specialized component of the Pakistan Army. Black Panthers may have been a nick-name given to such a company deployed at Siachen. However I have not heard, read or seen any specific shoulder patches etc. to suggest that there is an outfit by this name within the PA.

I consider that particular mention as a mistake in Margolis' book. Others may know otherwise.

[Rafi]

NSSG operatives regularly conduct SEAL operations in indian territorial waters - using both midget and regular submarines.

They are also used to -put in and extract "intelligence assets" both human and sensors.

[Rafi]

The sophisticated mines we produce could effectively close an indian port.

Any photos of NSSG or more photos of SSG or marines - or the air assault brigade ???

[Sultan]

I just wanted to know what members here think of providing the Pakistani marines an offensive capability. Im talking about transforming the Pakistani marines into an elite rapid reaction force which specialises in amphibous and airborne assaults? The current numbers stand at 1500. If we double that figure and provide them equipment such as light armour, light artillery and special ops helos (the PN could possibly get into the joint PA/PAF acquisition plans-if it ever emerges- to induct helos for the Marines) they could become quite a potent force.

Im not advocating that they replace the SSGN as the SSGN has a completely different role to that of the marines but I do advocate the marines taking up more of an aggressive role that is currently employed by the Royal Marines. If the Pakistani Marines are provided with this role and provided the necessary equipment they could form the main strike element in any rapid reaction force supplemented by a dedicated PA airborne division (with their own helos of course) to form some sort of joint rapid reaction force making better use of resources during wartime.

[SSAAD]

Originally posted by Rafi
The sophisticated mines we produce could effectively close an indian port.

Any photos of NSSG or more photos of SSG or marines - or the air assault brigade ???

What air assault brigade? IMO Pakistan does not have enough heli/air support to have an air assault brigade. Pakistani infantry/Marines and SSG do train in air assault tactics, but I don't think there is a dedicated air assault component in Pakistan similar to the US air assault concept.

[Rafi]

Alot of formations and regiments have elements of "PARAS" ie units that have tactics and trained in the art of air-assault, my argument is that they should be formed into a dedicated "air assault brigade"

I was therefore only stating that this should come into effect -even if they have to borrow the choppers.

[Sultan]

What air assault brigade? IMO Pakistan does not have enough heli/air support to have an air assault brigade. Pakistani infantry/Marines and SSG do train in air assault tactics, but I don't think there is a dedicated air assault component in Pakistan similar to the US air assault concept.

As I recall there was a news piece a while ago, posted on this forum, talking of the PA forming a new elite rapid reaction unit. Rapid mobility and deployment relies heavily upon the air mobility which is why I presumed it to be an "air assault brigade".

I am well aware of the Pak armed forces lack of sufficient nos. of helos. Which is why I do believe that it is high time the Pak armed forces address this issue. Of course there are priorities to take into consideration but just because there is a lack of resources does not mean that the top brass completely rejects the notion of transforming the Marines (by providing it an offensive punch) and a dedicated PA airborne division (if it doesnt exist then we can always form one) into a joint rapid reaction force.

In terms of equipment well in order to address the helos issue the PA and PAF do have a joint acquisition plan. However to date this plan has failed to emerge. But it would be well worth it if the PN joins this joint acquisition plan to equip the marines (operated and maintained by the PN) with the necessary helos in order to address the crucial component of any rapid reaction force. The PA and PN could induct the 6 tonne Chinese Z10 general utility helo whenever it does go into prodn. We could induct large numbers of these as they will be relatively cheap and the Chinese will offer generous credit terms. Then of course we have other equipment such as light armour - Al Talha APC + Al Hamza IFV which can be inducted to equip the Marines and possibly even light artillery capable of being transported by C130s or small amphibious assault ships (Ukraine could be a potential supplier for this if the PN makes the funds available).

[Sultan]

Pakistani infantry/Marines and SSG do train in air assault tactics, but I don't think there is a dedicated air assault component in Pakistan similar to the US air assault concept.

Actually the only time the Pak marines received air assault training was when the US marines gave them a ride in their helos during recent exercises.

I was therefore only stating that this should come into effect -even if they have to borrow the choppers.

I do agree with your post Rafi although in terms of allocating helos I dont think that a PA air assault brigade should receive their own dedicated helos. Whatever helos they would use should be located with the PA air dvision who do transport troops in anycase. Although I dont think the PA air division should have to support the Pak Marines because that will just give rise to inter service rivalry. Any choppers for the marines should be owned, operated and maintained by the PN.

[Rafi]

Sultan bro- i remember the article as well - that was what i was basing my info on, having the marines and a para element is vital for Pakistan - this will help her greatly in times of crisis.

For example when deployment of forces has to be on an urgent basis. Also u have the advantage of NSSG and SSG have the Marines and Paras as readily available grounds for reqruitment.

The Chinese idea is also a vey good one - we could also comform these helis into our own requirments ie night operations, quietining technology etc.

[Rafi]

This photo from another thread shows us that the SSG and NSSG are provided with the latest and best state-of-the-art equipment.

http://www.pakdef.info/forum/attachm...=&postid=20982

These warriors are the pride of our nation.

Does anyone here remember the PTV/ISPR doco- the naval commandoes - was brilliant and reminded one of the US Navy SEALS -right down to the training of operators to swim with hands and feet tied. And swimming lond distances without breaking water -also river ops etc.

Wish i could get my hands on it.

[SSAAD]

For pictures:
http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn20...6?opendocument

U.S., Pakistan Marines train together while becoming familiar with each other
Submitted by: 26th MEU
Story Identification Number: 200231382320
Story by Sgt Thomas Michael Corcoran



PASNI, Pakistan (Feb. 28, 2002) -- The Marines of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) are restless to get home, especially after their "job-well-done," spearheading Operation Enduring Freedom. But, while these hard chargers sat recently in the North Arabian Sea, they kept busy with equipment maintenance, classroom instruction, physical training and final preparations for the journey home.

Despite their enthusiasm to head back to the U.S., they never pass on a good training opportunity. One presented itself recently as a platoon of Pakistani Marines invited their U.S. Marine counterparts to train in the desert sands near Pasni, Pakistan. This was an enticing last minute opportunity for a platoon of Marines from India Company, Battalion Landing Team 3/6.

Not only did this extra-curricular activity get the Marines off the ship for a couple of days and into the field where they belong, but it offered them a unique opportunity to train with a foreign force with the same mission as their own: to make Marines and win battles.

When members of the 1st platoon arrived in Pasni, it was a familiar sight to them they had not expected to see again. Major Wesley L. Feight, India Company commander said that he had a week's notice about sending his Marines to train with the Pakistan Marines. He said he randomly chose 1st platoon and augmented them with some Marines from Weapons Company.

The Marines' first encounter with each other was filled with curiosity. Among the first things that they noticed were how different they were from one another. The Pakistanis wore different uniforms that were brilliantly colored while the Americans wore more earth tones. The M16A2 service rifles of the U.S. Marines were comparatively lighter than the Pakistani G3 rifles, and the "foot stomping" drill of the Pakistani Marines contrasted the "snap and pop" movements of the MEU Marines.

However different they were on the outside, both loved to train and that was the bridge that brought them together.

The MEU Marines began the first day by showing and explaining their basic patrol formations, hand and arm signals, and movement to enemy contact, otherwise known as their immediate action drills.

They used the vast open area of the runway for their training, as it would allow the U.S. Marines to be able to demonstrate a movement or technique and then critique the Pakistanis' movements. The Pakistanis could see their own formations move easily without the cover of brush or vegetation and, as they transitioned from one arrangement to another, it was easier to visualize and learn.

"We taught them basic infantry tactics," said Cpl. Lucas J. Moeller, an India Company team leader. "The officers grasped what we were teaching them very well."

Moeller said the infantrymen are trained to follow their officers. They need to learn to be less dependent on them in certain situations. He said that this training should be a gateway for them to become a little more "free-thinking" in their tactics.

The next day, the Pakistanis arrived shortly after sunrise. Their day would be chock full of training, which they did not seem to mind.

They started with helicopter assault drills. The Pakistanis practiced boarding and loading in CH-46E Sea Knight helicopters from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron-365 (Reinforced).

The U.S. Marines observed as the Pakistani Marines rushed out of the helicopters and arranged themselves in a 360-degree defensive perimeter. They were highly motivated. Their legs flailed wildly as they hit the ground hard, their weapons held high and "at the ready" proving that they were learning how to channel their enthusiasm.

"This is a big morale booster for us being trained by professional people like [U.S. Marines]," said Maj. Hayat Jhan, Pakistan Marines Detachment commanding officer. "I am very happy to see the [Americans'] attitude. They are taking a personal interest in training our Marines."

After these stationary raids, they boarded the "helos" and took off into the sky for a practice raid. They were excited because for most of them this was their first time in a helicopter.

"The differences between our countries is great," explained Pvt. Nadeem Ali, a Pakistan Marine. "You have many opportunities and equipment that our military may never see. You come from a land filled with rich cities and we are from Pakistan, it is beautiful but barren."

They assaulted an objective roughly 1,000 yards away. They learned how to use assault and support by fire elements to take their objective.

After the helicopter raid portion of their training was complete, they used the mountainous terrain of Pakistan to conduct more squad formation movements.

During a resting period, the Marines took time to understand each other's culture. Using a gully for a small coliseum, they compared the two cultures' drill and rifle handling techniques, hand-to-hand combat techniques and rifle handling skills. They even took time to compare the cultural differences between song and dance. At times it appeared to be an expeditionary version of "The Gong Show."

Shortly after, the amusement once again came to an end and the seriousness of training reclaimed the mood. When the sun set, they moved on to the night raid portion of the training. They patrolled through the rugged hills to a building that was filled with aggressive role players. The assault element rushed in to take the compound and the support-by-fire element held the aggressors off with machine-gun fire from the cover of the high terrain.

After a successful raid, the Marines headed back to their gear. By this time, the energy expended during the raid left them hungry. They loaded into trucks and graciously accepted an invitation to a feast of goat and rice in their honor at the Pakistani barracks. When all the Marines had their fill of food, they mingled with each other the way one would expect warriors to do. They held arm wrestling competitions and show of strength challenges.

"There was a lot of camaraderie between us and [the Pakistani Marines]," said Sgt. Christopher M. Lazirko, India Company squad leader. "I think it showed that even though our cultures are different, they like to have fun just like us."

Everyone seemed generally pleased with the training and all the Marines said that they could foresee ongoing training between the two Marine forces in the future.

"Any time Marines train with a foreign country, they take something away," said Col. Andrew P. Frick, 26th MEU (SOC) commanding officer. "First of all, they get a better understanding of the culture...sometimes we, as Americans, are not in tune with other cultures. We take away an understanding for the terrain, which they're familiar with and we're not. And it was also an opportunity for young lance corporals to be put in a teaching role which prepares them to be better [non-commissioned officers]."

[Saladin]

The reputation that the Pak special forces have is quite high(particularly in the Gulf countries) but i am suprised at their rather small numbers, only a brigade of SSG?

Many other smaller countries have far larger forces.Israel has IIRC 5 brigades of paratroopers but several additional units of units they call Sayarets(Golani,Givati,Matkal etc)
North Korea has a staggering 34 brigade of special forces.
Even in tiny Singapore where i come from we must have at least 10 battalions of commandos.

The Indo Pakistan area of operations furthermore presents excellent opportunities for exploitation by special forces: long, porous and not easily defensible borders.In some sectors as i would imagine in Punjab or Gujarat , there must be plenty of targets worth pursuing.What's the reason for small numbers then?Lack of resources?