EXCERPTS: The final countdown

Cross-posting from 'Military Books and Magazines' thread.

EXCERPTS: The final countdown

By Brigadier (r) A.R. Siddiqi

Brigadier (r) A.R. Siddiqi describes the confusion which gripped army headquarters in December 1971 when the war in East Pakistan was lost.

On December 15, Indian paratroopers landed at Jamalpur, some thirty miles north of Dhaka. The GOC of the leading Indian division, Major-General Nagra, was physically in Narayanganj and his staff was in touch with Niazi discussing the modalities of surrender.

For the past few days the Indian Army chief, General Sam Maneckshaw, had been addressing our frontline troops through loudspeakers, telling them to surrender unconditionally and be treated "honourably as PoWs under the Geneva Convention or face massacre". Leaflets, in hundreds of thousands, were also being dropped from the air, ordering surrender. There was no question of a conditional ceasefire - the choice was between unconditional surrender and death. One leaflet bluntly warned: "If you do not surrender, we will hand over all your prisoners to Mukti Fauj for butchery".

* * * * *

At about the same time, the necessity and wisdom of psychological operations was still being discussed at the GHQ to raise the morale of the frontline soldiers in East Pakistan on the one hand, and to tell India off on the other. The question was how to reach the frontline soldiers fighting desperately for their survival; even more importantly, how to get the message heard in the midst of the thunder of the battlefield...

While the details of the psychological operations were still being worked out at the GHQ, news came of General Niazi's acceptance of an unconditional surrender. Until just about a couple of days earlier, he had boasted in front of the foreign correspondents at the Inter Continental that the Indians would have to drive a tank over his body to enter Dhaka.

December 16 dawned on a doleful, funereal note for Pakistan. Foreign networks, mainly the BBC, the villain of the piece, had even announced the details of the surrender parade scheduled for that afternoon. Communication between the GHQ and the Eastern Command, extremely erratic since December 11, had been totally cut off. No one knew as to when, how and who, might have accepted unconditional surrender.

Until about 4 pm on December 16, we were still at sixes and sevens about the accuracy of the news and how to break it officially. Gul Hassan was not available, so I contacted Major-General Shaukat Riza, deputy chief of the general staff. "We must catch the 5 pm news bulletin," I urged. Shaukat agreed, suggesting that we should go to the information secretary and seek his views.

We drove to his Chaklala office to find him and his senior officers in a huddle, looking utterly confused. He had been in constant touch with the foreign secretary, Sultan Mohammad Khan, who, in turn, had little to add to what we had all heard over the BBC. We phoned the military secretary to the president, Major-General Ishaque, hoping to have a word with the president. Ishaque brusquely told us that the 'old man' had just retired to catch a wink of sleep and could not be disturbed. That left nothing for us to do, except to put our heads together, and produce a 26-word draft as follows:

Under an arrangement between the commanders of India and Pakistan in the eastern theatre, Indian troops have entered Dhaka and fighting has ceased in East Pakistan.

So that was the end of the burlesque, which began at midnight on March 25-26, 1971, ending on the afternoon of December 16, 1971. A reprieve of full nine months - long enough to correct the course - had been cold-bloodedly and cussedly wasted away. The news of the unconditional surrender was still echoing thunderously - each repetition gaining in volume and resonance - when Yahya came on air, to tell the nation that the war would continue. He called the fall of Dhaka "a temporary setback in one theatre of war, which by any means did not signify the end of the struggle. We may lose a battle, but final victory in this war of survival shall Inshallah be ours".

That was on the 16th. On the morning of the 17th, copies of the draft constitution of a united Pakistan were distributed by the press department of the information ministry. The text of the draft was to be broadcast by TV and radio networks at 7 pm. I went to Gul Hassan for his advice and orders. My own view was that this should be 'killed' there and then. Riza also joined and we all agreed to stop the broadcast at all events. Gul Hassan directed us to see Roedad Khan and so the two of us, Riza and I, drove out to Chaklala again. The information secretary was in the midst of a meeting with his media chiefs, finalizing measures to ensure airing the summary of the draft constitution as programmed. "Well, what's up now?" he asked as he stood up to receive us.

"The summary is not going on air!" Riza replied promptly.

"But how can that be? That's a presidential command!" Roedad said. He contended that as 'a civil servant' he was duty-bound to carry out the orders given to him by the president himself.

"Nothing doing!" was our joint answer. East Pakistan was no longer there. Our forces had already surrendered to the Indians and were under their protective custody. India and the USSR had already recognized Bangladesh. Where then was the rationale for the constitution of one Pakistan that had ceased to exist? After a heated exchange, we left Roedad's office. Riza said that he would take it up with Gul Hassan. The broadcast had to be stopped at all costs.

After dropping Riza at the GHQ, I drove back home. PTV and Radio Pakistan repeatedly interrupted their regular programme to tell the listeners that a major announcement would be made at 7 pm. The programme opened on time, primed by the usual recitation from the Holy Quran. With the recitation over, the anchor announced that the scheduled major announcement had been held up due to 'technical reasons'. That was that - our successful 'coup d'radio'.

I walked over to Gul Hassan's house soon after that to have a word with him about the next move. As I entered his drawing room, I saw Air Marshal Rahim and Shakirullah Durrani, managing director, PIA, one or two ADCs, and some others. I hesitated, somewhat unsure whether or not to excuse myself and leave when Gul Hassan asked me to come in.

They were in the middle of an animated discussion about who should be the next boss. Rahim was for his former chief, Air Marshal (retired) Asghar Khan. Gul Hassan was all for Bhutto. He went on to rebut Rahim on his preferred choice of Asghar Khan. "How can you even think of a person defeated by a bloody corporal in the elections, sir?"

As it so happened the PPP candidate, Khurshid Hassan Meer, had defeated Asghar Khan by a wide margin of 40,000 votes in a Rawalpindi constituency. Meer had served as a corporal in the Royal Indian Air Force during the Second World War. Pressing his argument in Bhutto's favour, Gul Hassan said, "I am afraid that we are left with no choice but to try this joker, Bhutto. After all, he is now the leader of the majority party..."

At this point, Shakirullah Durrani intervened, "You don't seem to realize, Gul, what you'd be in for once you have Bhutto as the boss. The sort of person that he is he would 'Fix you up' at the first available opportunity."

"I would rather go along with Durrani Sahib as far as Bhutto is concerned!" I dared put in.

Just then, the ADC to the air chief came running in to tell him that the president wished to see him immediately at the President's House. Rahim stood up promptly to leave and we all stood up with him. I asked Gul's permission to depart as well.

On the afternoon of the 18th, the unilateral ceasefire offered by the Indian prime minister, Indira Gandhi, in the western theatre, was accepted by Yahya under President Nixon's personal advice. The GHQ was working out the modalities of the ceasefire, in consultation with GHQ, India. There was an uproar in the country against the army, focussing on Yahya Khan and his drunken sex orgies. It had hardly been as violent as might well have been expected, considering the apocalyptical nature of the national disaster. The loss of East Pakistan might, indeed, have been a good riddance. What appeared to be uppermost in people's mind was the safety of the Pakistani PoWs and their speedy repatriation.

I went to see Gul Hassan first thing the next morning, December 19, to find him a broken man. "There is serious trouble in Kharian. Officers of the 6 Armoured Division are up in arms against their divisional commander. They phoned me to ask me to come and see things for myself. I told them to come here instead... let's wait and see. This could be my last day in the office. I am right now in the middle of cleaning up this mess..." he said, pointing to the drawers of his desk which he was busy cleaning out. "Wait for my next call. The boys are on their way and should be here soon."

I left his office and returned to my own. There was not much to do except work on one or two press releases regarding the state of the ceasefire which was still fluid, as could be expected.

There was no call from Gul Hassan for the rest of the day. The next morning, December 20, I called the CGS, wondering as to what might have happened in the meantime. Major Javed Nasir answered, "Sir, I am worried myself about the old man. You know Mr Bhutto has arrived and it seems there is a war of succession going on right now at the President House."

Things had definitely taken an ugly turn, as indeed could be expected after all that had happened. Just then a circular arrived, saying that COS General Abdul Hamid Khan would be addressing officers of the rank of lieutenant colonel and above at noon at Ayub Hall. About half an hour or so later, another circular was delivered replacing the words 'lieutenant colonel and above', with 'all available garrison officers' to attend the COS's address.

I reached the auditorium at around 11.45 am, to find it packed to capacity. Three PSOs, Major-General Khuda Dad (Adjutant-General), Major-General Osman Mitha (Quartermaster-General) and Lieutenant-General Khawaja Wasiuddin (Master-General of Ordinance), were all there in the front row.

Only Gul Hassan was missing, which exacerbated my fears about his personal safety. A minute before the stroke of 12 noon, however, Gul entered looking somewhat 'deliciously tired', I thought, like one at the end of a day's hard but rewarding work. At about the same time, General Hamid entered from the speaker's entrance followed by an aide. He stood behind the lectern, surveyed the audience, cleared his throat and began to address the gathering. A shakier speech could not have been expected from a man of such a high rank. It was a long and rambling apology for the top planners in the army and in the administration. The country, he said, was passing through "a grave and most serious crisis, but let us be men enough to face it".

From the benches and the public galleries in the rear were heard muffled angry murmurs from the young officers, i.e. lieutenant colonels and below. It was impossible for any one sitting in the front seats to make out what they were saying but the mood itself was eloquent enough to obviate the need for words. The atmosphere was explosive like a live volcano ready to erupt. The top brass looked isolated and totally cut off from the rank-and-file. It looked as if the force was already divided into two uneven factions - the bigger one representing the rest whereas the top brass was isolated as a small minority. The junior officers were up in arms against the generals. Hamid began:

"The country is passing through a serious and disturbing crisis, never before faced in the country. As a result of the happenings in the country, particularly those in East Pakistan, the people are grief-stricken, depressed and confused. It has also resulted in a lot of recrimination amongst the people.

"The facts of the situation are very disheartening. But we should be men enough to face the stark realities. We must match up to the challenge of the time, otherwise we are doomed. What is required is to have a realistic reappraisal of the problems coolly and calmly. We need determination and resolution to overcome them."

When he said, "The president did his best for a political solution..." the angry backbenchers burst into deafening chants of 'shame, shame' mixed liberally with certain expletives.

At one point, Hamid broke down and withdrew from the auditorium. The general impression was that much of Hamid's show of shame and grief was a put on. His actual mission was to gauge the tempers of the young officers (hence the change in invitation from lieutenant colonel and above to all available officers), and, if favourable, to delay the transfer of power, or arrange it on more favourable terms like the return of Yahya back to the GHQ or his replacement by Hamid as the army chief. Bhutto would consider neither; the rough house, during and after Hamid's address, proved to be the last straw to break the Yahya-Hamid back.

Surprisingly, however, the fury and anguish of the raucous backbenchers, besides the personal misconduct and corrupt practices of senior officers, focussed more on the safety of the PoWs and their speedy repatriation than on the loss of East Pakistan per se. The loss of the eastern half was accepted, more or less, as a fait accompli.

As we dispersed, Radio Pakistan announced the news that Yahya had resigned and Mr Bhutto had taken over as the CMLA, president, and the supreme commander. Curiouser and curiouser - a civilian and a democrat donning the hat of the CMLA! Later, in the evening, Bhutto appeared on TV to address the nation. He announced the immediate retirement from the army of some twenty senior armed forces officers including Yahya and Hamid. Lieutenant-General Gul Hassan Khan was appointed the army chief in the same rank. Air Marshal Rahim Khan retained his job as the air chief and was placed a notch above the army chief in the order of precedence.

Brigadier (r) A.R. Siddiqi was the head of the ISPR at the time of the East Pakistan crisis in 1971. After his retirement from the army he has written about the problems of peace and war in South Asia. He writes regularly.

This book narrates the chain of tragic events that finally led to the break-up of Pakistan in 1971.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Excerpted with permission from: East Pakistan the Endgame: An Onlooker's Journal 1969-1971

By Brigadier (r) A. R. Siddiqi

Oxford University Press, Plot # 38, Sector 15, Korangi Industrial Area, Karachi

Tel: 111-693-673

Email: ouppak@theoffice.net

Website: www.oup.com.pk

ISBN 0 19 579993-3

260pp. Rs395

http://www.dawn.com/weekly/books/books1.htm

I knew I had seen Hamid Khan somewhere else!

COS General Abdul Hamid Khan (crossbelt) behind FM Ayub Khan and GC Hasan Iftikhar (my father ;-) at the Khalid Coy messhall at Pakistan Military Academy circa 1958.

I also got the skinny on the stuff that was dished out to Gen Abdul Hamid Khan by very junior officers during the above mentioned meeting...suffice it to say that I would not have wanted to be there in his place... :D

Lastly, this is the one and the only picture to be posted here...I know I am not suppose to do this here...but the above excerpt needed a face to go with it.. ;)

Saad,

Just one mistake in the description of the picture that you have posted. And that is you father is not a G/C rather a corporal.

Cheers,

Quote:

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Originally Posted by ROMMEL

Saad,

Just one mistake in the description of the picture that you have posted. And that is you father is not a G/C rather a corporal.

Cheers,

---

I know...the "teen feeti" deal, thanks for pointing it out ;-)...then again when Ayub Khan came for the Passing out in 1959, my father was BSUO.. :p

Isn't the corporal 2 stripes?

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by ROMMEL

Saad,

Just one mistake in the description of the picture that you have posted. And that is you father is not a G/C rather a corporal.

Cheers,

---

Rommel,

Here is a tidbit about the above picture from my father's memoirs:

"When I was in the fourth term, Ayub Khan, the President of Pakistan, paid a visit to the PMA. It was an unscheduled visit. As he made his round of the academy grounds, he came to the Drill Square where we were practicing for the passing out parade and observed us for a few minutes before moving on. After the drill, we went to the mess hall for breakfast. The senior term was out of the academy on a field exercise at the time. As I was eating breakfast, the butler came to me and told me that the President Sahib was coming to the mess hall and as I was the senior most present in the mess at that moment, I had to receive him. I left my breakfast unfinished and went to the entrance of the mess hall. When he came in, he shook hands with me for quite awhile as I welcomed him. He asked me whether I called myself a havaldar or a sergeant! I told him that I called myself a "Gentleman Cadet Sergeant!" He asked me a few more questions about PMA life and training in general. He then went to the dining area where some of the cadets were eating breakfast. He chatted with them for a few minutes and then left. I still have a photograph of this occasion." thus the picture attached above. :p

Saad, I agree with what you said. We had corporal and sargents among the cadets during our training at PAF College and now Academy at Risalpur. I believe nothing has changed. They still have the two and three stripes. In fact these stripes identify the outstanding cadets and have certain powers and perks associated with them. Be proud of your father.

SSaad,
wow! what an amazing photograph! thanks a lot for sharing. why do you say you shouldnt be doing this here, i hope you do more of this very often :)
btw, whats the discussion about the stripes and the havaldar/ sargeant instead of GC? is it for appointment holders? and whats the diff between BSUO and CSUO and BJUO...?
thanks!

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by ROMMEL

Saad,

Just one mistake in the description of the picture that you have posted. And that is you father is not a G/C rather a corporal.

Cheers,

---

WOW SSaad,
Great Picture. :cool: A real thing on which you can be proud of !!

Anyways, he was a Seargent not a Corporel, Sgt wears 3 and Cpl 2 stripes. ;)

Just for information. Following are the appointments amongst Final Termers. Third termer can only be a Corporel.
ASUO, BSUOs, CSUOs (Senior Under Officers)
A/B/C JUOs (Junior Under officers)
A/B/C SMs (Seargent Majors) most horrible ones.. :)
A/B/C QMS (Quarter Master Seargents)
Prelium/Boxing,Platoon and Sports Seargents.
A/B/C stands for Academy, Batallion and Company levels respectively.

Reagrds,
Umair

Thanks guys. I am definetly very proud of my father (too bad I did not follow in his footsteps, but he is still my role model;-).

Umair, I was just pointing out to Rommel that my dad was a GC sgt in the picture as he had said that my father was not a GC, but corporal :-) (I had initially simply stated the name of my father as GC Hasan Iftikhar...) He was CSM Khalid Company in the 4th term and then in the last term, he was made BSUO.

Academy SUO must be the big man in Kakul but back in the days of my father, there was only one bn (First Pakistan Batallion, Quaid-e-Azam's own) in the entire PMA so there was only one BSUO and alhamdolillah my father was given this appointment. He to this day says that the respect you get as a BSUO is awesome....some great stories from those days.

Umair, BTW, is the LC still composed of 5 terms? or is the 4th term the last now? Which LC will you pass out with?

Quote:

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Originally Posted by syed saad

Thanks guys. I am definetly very proud of my father (too bad I did not follow in his footsteps, but he is still my role model;-).

Umair, I was just pointing out to Rommel that my dad was a GC sgt in the picture as he had said that my father was not a GC, but corporal :-) (I had initially simply stated the name of my father as GC Hasan Iftikhar...) He was CSM Khalid Company in the 4th term and then in the last term, he was made BSUO.

Academy SUO must be the big man in Kakul but back in the days of my father, there was only one bn (First Pakistan Batallion, Quaid-e-Azam's own) in the entire PMA so there was only one BSUO and alhamdolillah my father was given this appointment. He to this day says that the respect you get as a BSUO is awesome....some great stories from those days.

Umair, BTW, is the LC still composed of 5 terms? or is the 4th term the last now? Which LC will you pass out with?

---

Salaams,
BTW how u come to know that I am a GC. Strange, i never tried to expose it. Anyways, might had said something which depicts my status. Saad, LC is of now only 4 terms comprising of 2 yrs period. There is now no more 5 terms like thing. TGC is of 1 yr, IC is of 6 yrs. TGC Comprises of Engrs while IC comprises of Instrs and Drs.
I will (Insha-Allah) Pass out with 112 L/C in Oct 2005. I am a third termer.
I also got one picture of my father with Prime Mister Muhammed Khan Junejo. COAS is also in view alongwith several other officers. So here it goes.

Regards,
Umair

Umair,

There are two types of people who know anything about PMA, either they have gone there (like you & my father), or nuts like me who have spent a considerable part of their lives reading, researching and asking questions of people specifically about PMA and the SSG ;) . My father has been a super source of information as he has told me so many things about his stay at both the PMA and then the SSG...

If given a chance, in my later years inshallah, I plan to do a kick ass documentary on the Pakistan Military Academy....(I know nothing about filming etc..) but I intend on doing an awesome job of it (I must say I am very ambitious about this project :D. There is a simple motivation in my mind about this....I think that PMA is the finest military institution in South Asia...the fact that not a lot of people know about it is the reason something needs to done about it.

There is so much tradition and heritage there for all to see..and I would like to highlight that....so none of the cheesy, patriotic songs or clumsy music with the documentary...just very factual, to the point sort of a thing about traditions and life at PMA....

BTW, good picture with Junejo.

Can some one please post more long articles on the 1971 war as I want to hear Paistan's side of the story.

Ashiq,

check http://www.pakdef.info/pakmilitary/army/index.html

and then go to the 1971 war tab on bottom left.

Hth

Cool thanks. Here's a story from our side about Shaheed Captain Mohiuddin Jahangir.

_______________

Our Heroes

Oh Captain, My Captain

In the summer of 1971, four young boys from the Pakistan Corps of Engineers in Sialkot deserted their post on the Karakoram Highway and crossed the treacherous Azad Kashmir border into India. Their destination was the newly declared state of Bangladesh, their dream: its liberation. There was young Capt. Shahriar Rashid Khan, Capt.Khairul Anam, Capt. Salahuddin Ahmed and a smaller, reclusive boy whose only possessions were a Maoist Red Book and an iron will to liberate his country. Five months later - two days before Bangladesh won its independence - when he fell, in a valiant operation to capture Chapainawabganj, he was already a legend among his soldiers. This is his story. This is the story of Bir Sreshtha Captain Mohiuddin Jahangir.


By Mahtab Haider (Republished by the BMF Group)

“It was on this very night — the night of 13th December — thirty-two years ago that we crossed the Mahananda for the capture of Nawabganj Sadar,” says Qayyum Khan.

“We broke through the enemy lines an hour before dawn, in what was to be our fiercest and most ambitious operation. Two hours later, Captain Jahangir was dead. Two days later, on the 16th, his dream had come true. Bangladesh was an independent nation.”

We stand on the Mahananda bridge, bathed in the soft glow of the long line of sodium lamps, buffeted by a northerly draft that whistles through the cold December night.

For those that I accompany, the sight of the river has suddenly overrun floodgates of memory. Dr Naila Zaman Khan’s characteristic effervescence gives way to a quiet melancholy. She grips the railing — cold and gun-metal grey, as she looks out into the darkness of the river.

Her father, Colonel Zaman — Sector Commander of the region in 1971 — had remained preoccupied throughout the drive from Dhaka. Even now, he says nothing and is visibly pensive about his first return to Sona Masjid since 1971. He is back to attend the first reunion of Sector 7 since the war ended.

As for Qayyum, he shuttles between nostalgia and overwhelming rushes of adrenaline, as he explains how, on that fateful night, they had broken through the defences of the Pakistan army, armed with little more than SMGs and rifles. How the enemy had left from their positions, retreating deeper and deeper into the sadar. “I was 19 — only 19 and a second lieutenant in charge of 200 soldiers.”

And then as we are filing back into the mini-van, Qayyum takes one last look.

“It was there,” he says, pointing in the darkness at the northern side of the bridge. “It was there that Captain Jahangir fell. He was only 24.”

“My most abiding memory of Captain Jahangir is that he was very simple in his ways,” Dr Naila Zaman Khan remembers.

A first-year university student at the time, she had been posted at the Sona Masjid field hospital in Modipur where Jahangir was the sub-sector commander. “A half-sleeve shirt, a lungi, a gamchha tied at the waist, a sten gun on the shoulder and a pair of canvas shoes. That was the way Jahangir bhai was dressed at all times,” she recalls.

But as Naila points out, Jahangir’s Spartan ways belied a personality who commandeered respect through his actions and abilities as a leader.

“He was our Che Guevara,” she says with a smile of recollection. “Even though he was a sub-sector commander, he always ate what his soldiers ate, slept on the hard ground, owned nothing but the bare essentials, and always, always, led his soldiers from the front.

“Of his 400 rupee monthly allowance, he would keep 30 rupees and give the remainder to families living in misery in the refugee camps nearby.”

It was into the house of Abdul Motaleb Howlader of Babuganj, Barisal that Mohiuddin Jahangir was born. The family had had an affluent past with their village Rahimganj named after Jahangir’s grandfather. But by Jahangir’s time, the family wealth had been diminished significantly. Even as a child, Jahangir was intense and reticent.

He was well known in his neighbourhood for his social conscience and he was a fierce competitor in the sporting arena. It was during his college years that the young Jahangir came in contact with the writings of Lenin, Chairman Mao and Ernesto Che Guevara.

In 1966 after he passed his Intermediate exams, Jahangir joined the Pakistan Military Academy as a cadet. He was commissioned as an officer in the engineering corps in 1968 and gained repute as an explosives expert.

In 1971 when the liberation war started he was posted at a barracks along the under-construction Karakoram Highway. Knowing that the penalty of desertion would most likely be death, Jahangir and three others escaped into India through the Azad Kashmir border. They wanted to return to Bangladesh and fight for its liberation.

By December 16, 1971, two of the four had been killed in combat. Captain Salahuddin Ahmed Bir Uttom in a valiant operation with the First Bengal Regiment, in which he knew that his death was certain; and Captain Jahangir in Chapainawabganj trying to force his way through enemy lines, most probably also secure in the knowledge that he would be killed.

“Jahangir’s tragedy was that he was a soft-hearted man plunged into a situation in which there was no choice but to harden his heart,” says freedom fighter Moinuddin Ahmed of Kansart, popularly known in Sector 7 as ‘Montu Daktar.’

As we sat in Ahmed’s ground floor verandah, he spoke in his typical laconic fashion, as he rubbed mustard oil on his torso in the early morning sunlight.

“Once, we captured two Pakistani soldiers, and realising the inevitable, I asked him to spare their lives. Though it tormented him to give the order, he told me that it would be a crime against the thousands of Bengali boys who had sacrificed their lives in the war, if we let them live,” Ahmed remembers.

Shahjahan, who is presently the MP for Shibganj-1 constituency, describes Captain Jahangir as “courageous as a lion.” He remembers an attack on enemy lines in nearby Dhobra on Eid day in which the company had lost some of their best boys.

“We were all devastated but Jahangir was unforgiving. He refused to be deflagrated by the losses. Now I understand that he was being strong for all of us. It was on that day, I remember that for the first time in our many months at the front-line that I saw Captain Mohiuddin Jahangir cry.”

On the night of 13th December, Captain Jahangir and his men had already secured a consolidated position on the western bank of the Mahananda. Some days ago, he had already told Shahjahan that he knew now that the entire nation was on the brink of liberation. “If we don’t capture Chapai sadar now,” Jahangir had said, “how will we show our faces in independent Bangladesh?”

There was no ambivalence in Jahangir’s mind. He knew what had to be done. And so the operation of the fateful dawn of December 14 was planned. The Pakistan army’s position on the western bank of the river had been cut off further south by then Major Gyas, ruling out the possibility of a retreat, and Second Lieutenant Bazlur Rashid was to come with a platoon from the north to take the enemy from the rear as they countered Captain Jahangir and Second Lieutenant Qayyum’s attack from across the river.

“What an operation that was,” Qayyum Khan remembers. “We were 200 men but we crossed the river silently. My last memory of Captain Jahangir is from a few hours before that operation. We were lying up inside a house, on a charpoy, eating Chalbhaja and talking strategy. As we approached the first bunkers of the Pakistan Army it was a boy called Enamul who realised that he was on a blind spot for the machine gun positions. In a rush of adrenaline, Enamul ran in and held the gun barrels of the enemy with his bare hands, while Entaj Ali threw in a couple of grenades.”

“With the first line of defence down, we had stirred confusion in the enemy ranks and they retreated,” says MP Shahjahan. “We diverged, with Captain Jahangir headed along the left flank while I took the right with my men.”

“In the end,” says Second Lieutenant Qayyum, “it was a sniper that killed Jahangir — a lone sniper that was lying up on an elevated position.”

“When we heard the news that morning,” remembers Ahmed Ali Tufan, “the whole platoon was on the verge of a breakdown. It was like we had lost our father.”

By the time Second Lieutenant Rashid’s company had joined the fray, the enemy was on the retreat. A day later, Chapainawabganj had been liberated of enemy positions. Another day passed, and Bangladesh was liberated.

On December 14, 1971, it was Moinuddin Ahmed — along with Ahmed Ali Tufan — who recovered Captain Jahangir’s body from a trench on the bank of the Mahananda. “He had been killed with a single shot through the left eye,” remembers Ahmed, as he suddenly looks away, teardrops collecting at the corners of his baggy, wrinkled eyes. “He used to call me Dula-bhai. He used to say ‘Dula bhai, if I ever die in combat, please bury me at Sona Masjid.”

Naila Zaman also remembers that Jahangir loved the Sona Masjid area. “He would spend a lot of his free time in the grounds surrounding the mosque,” she recalls. On the morning of our Victory Day, 16th December, Captain Jahangir was, as per his instructions, buried in the grounds of the 14th century Sona Masjid.

“Not a word was spoken,” remembers Shahjahan. “There was nothing to say.”

© Bangladesh Military Forces. All rights reserved

[IMAGES: A rare drawing of Captain Jahangir and also his tomb next to Sona Masjid where he wanted to be buried.]

__________________________________________________ __________________

I posted this idea so that both sides can get an idea of each others situation during the 1971 Liberation War. This post was not posted to incite anything -- Also a special thanks to New Age BD and the Bangladesh Military Forces for the article and images.

© Bangladesh Military Forces. All rights reserved

Umair thanks for the list of appointments. if you could, please also post a bit about what all these appoitments bring for a cadet? the responsibilties, the priveliges and the function and duties? i'd be most thnakful!

and SSaad,
youre absolutely right about 2 kinds of ppl being out there who tend to have a lot of info abot the military, whove been there and the others are the kind of you and me, i'd call myself absolutely falling into the second category like you, as i keep hunting for info on the forces all the time i can too, as you can see i never leave you or umair alone wiht my questions :D
and for that i'm most thankful to you guys.

and surprisingly, like you i was also able to guess about Umair's being a GC few days ago during ramazan :) the passion talks and is readable by passion sharing folk!

and your mention about a documentary makes you and me fellows of the same boat! it was great to know ure into that, i've been thnking about stuff like that for ages! i'm damn sure i'll do it someday InshAllah! and good to know there are more ppl like me wiht whom forces could be joined to accomplish the goal! i'll pm you soon a bit on that and what i've ben thnking about on these lines. so we'll discuss on that.
and another question for umair,
what are the TGC of 1 yr and IC of 6 yrs?
and, great pic you posted of ur dad with Junejo, in the background in Aslam Beg right? but when Aslam Beg became COAS, junejo wasnt PM as ZiaulHaq had removed him before his demise i think, am i right?

well thanks guys!
and SSad, iguess Umair maybe at the academy now so if its ok could you answer the questionss for him too :D thanks!

TGC stands for Technical Graduate Course, and those from MCE, EME etc after doing there engr degree comes in it. They get training of 1 yr (needs to do every exericse those are done by L/C GCs, and they undergo complete Physical training, the difference being that they dont study Academics other then Mil Subj and English). After there passing out, they join supporting arms, like EME, Engr, or Signals. IC stands for Intergrated course. GCs come under this course who had done MSC/MBBS and after there training, they become Instr, or Doctors. They had a limited tenure/training but still it is good that now they come to PMA for a short while. Previously they were not trained at PMA.

Umair

umair, the IC is 6 mths or years?

Guys this might feel odd to you guys, after reading very different articles about 1971, i am very confused about it. Can someone explain why was that 1971 War's results did not come out good. Was it more of army's leadership mistakes or Pakistan didn't have enough military resources to get out of this?

It was both....the senior leadership basically collapsed (after what they say were orders sent by the western command to surrender)...the junior officers (Brig. downwards) wanted to keep on fighting but were ordered to surrender to the Indian forces.

Pakistan had 45000 regular troops in EP, if the senior leadership had wanted to, they could have fought on for a while and kept Indians at bay (although they would have suffered casualties, in my mind they would have been exhonerated of the disgraceat least that they faced post surrender). Keep in mind, once inside the cities, it would have been extremely hard for the Indians to take over since they were neither trained for urban warfare and nor would the Muktis have been much help.....was truly tragic that they did not fight on..

Overall, the army performed well under the junior leadership (however we can consider that at a tactical level), strategically, the western command failed to plot out a way for the Eastern command to survive an Indian invasion of East Pakistan..

In speaking to some Army officers, I was told the issue was simple....the Eastern command did receive orders to surrender (post the war, the western command denied this)..and they complied...so not sure where the blame lay..but one thing for sure, if they had been told to fight on, believe me they would have put up one hell of a fight...even Indians agree that Pakistanis put up a stout defence (this was seen in all of the Indo-Pak war) when the thrust was against West Pakistan...with their backs against the wall in East Pakistan, most of the junior leadership would have liked to fight on..

This is my opinon from various readings and in talking with ex-personnel in the army..

There are a few war veterans in my village who were made prisoner in 1971 war in the east. These men were all belows officer rank. When i spoke to them on this topic, they said that the soldiers really wanted to continue hte fight.
I dont knwo where the failure lies either, but it does not belong to the foot soldiers. That much i know.

Aside from that, its a shame that the overall failure of 1971 hides the gallantry and professionalism of our soldiers. If people read the 71 war in detail, there is a lot to be proud of as well !!

“Once, we captured two Pakistani soldiers, and realising the inevitable, I asked him to spare their lives. Though it tormented him to give the order, he told me that it would be a crime against the thousands of Bengali boys who had sacrificed their lives in the war, if we let them live,” Ahmed remembers.

These fallen warriors are our heroes that we must not forget and we must pray for.

I dont know really about what all happened in Eastern Wing, but in some of the sectors from Western Side, I am sure about the brave acts of Pakistan Army. My own father was at that time Adjt in 76 Fd Arty, and he won the battle near Sulemanki Sector. I posted some of the pictures regarding Indian PAKKA Village, (in PA Pictures thread) it was the same village which was occupied by Pakistan Army.
Moreover, great crossing of Sabuna Drain by Sec Comd 2/Lt Farooq (TJ) were also one of the proves of brave Pakistan's Army warfares in 1971. So it was not really "failure". Dont know what all happened behind scenes.

Umair

One thing we should all remember is that the history is written by the victors. The results of '71 war might make it look as if the Pak Army Ran or acted cowardly, they didn't. They fought with great courage under adverse conditions, the loss was political, not military.
Nowhere in the battles did PA surrender, and actually quite a few gallantry awards came from recommendations of the highly impressed Indian officers. The Inidan army started the war becasue Mukti Bhahni had failed.

The point I am making is that we shoudl not be ashamed of Pakistan army in '71, even though we were defeated in the East, they fought gallantly and bravely.

I know there are many charges against the army about how they behaved in east pakistan, and about how west hated the bengalis. I don't know what happened in the east but from my perspective in the west, I usually remind my bangladsehi friends that there were millions of bangldeshis in the West and you never hear of anyone being injured or killed in the west. I would think that all the relatives we lost in the East, people would have taken revenge on the ones in the west, but they were treated graciously and most bid farewell sadly, not to mention bengalis who chose to live in the west instead.
There are millions of bangladeshis in pakistan even now, most came to pakistan in the 80's and 90's. anyone from karachi can vouch for the fact that every house servant and cook in karachi is from bangladesh and a hig percentage of workers in textile industry and other places in punjab is from bangladesh.

It was a very sad time in our history, mainly made by politicians from both sides. Just as a lesson, remember what happened to all the protagonists in the episode, Bhutto, Mujib and Indira. they all died like the vermin they were and got exactly what they deserved. We should all learn from it, when we are too intoxicated by the power we wield temporarily, what ever we do will come back to haunt us, learn!, benazir, sharif and all the rest!

mater of fact is no body in GHQ ever had any plan to defend east Pakistan just one sentence was repeated so many times we will defend it from westeren sector but from westeren sector no serious plan was made as YAhya khan never realised where ;center of gravity was'' as for as indian forces were concerned.Now even if we grant 100% sucess let us assume to all the offensive planed in 1971 would the capture of Amratsar,Punch,Akhnoor,
jaisalmir etc off balance india that much that they would leave the victory in easteren sector in hand and run to save India,Pakistan simply had no troops to complete the rout march to dehli what to talk about advance. our best bet was interferance of our allies and cease fire on both sectors but to achieve this our easteren command had to hold dhaka for as long as july 1972 but commander eastren command had a compultion from our mighty
foriegne office that was ;;dont let so called Bangladesh GOvt who was established in calcata to hold any district of east pakistan and to operate from there as this will portray the fight of bangladesh vs Pakistan and our diplomates will find it hard to defend our position in the UN.''
SO the commander eastren command was bound by diplomates rules
once it came to planing. Gen Niazi was bound to scatter his forces all over east PAkIsTAN
in order to exercise the state authority every where and secondly our intelligence and our foriegne office were of the openion that if we control east Pakistan and bring law and order
back India might not attack east Pakistan owing to international pressure but the situation on ground was, there were refugee camps all along border and mukti bahni was doing hit and run tactics and they had public support in east Pakistan too.SO there were only few options availiable to genral niazi i.e
1.Do hot persuit to mukti,s and destroy the camps in india and risk all out war
2.to have net of well defended localities all along the border and carry out opration agaist mukti,s from there and get back to defend these localities in time
3.gather all his troops in dhaka and and plan a long war contrary to the wishes of westeren command.
for first option he never had enough forces and he needed aproval of high command for option three if he goes for defence of capital right from the out set he would have been labled as ghadar much earlier than 16 december so he opted option two.
as it would ensure the safety of borders as well as establishment of state authority over east Pakistan which was achieved but what went wrong ,
HERE is main playe r comes into light INdian army realising that by abbetting MUkti fighters they can not librate Bangladesh as there maximum abilty was reduced to raids and ambushes that too with support of indean regulars so they got involved with pakistan army as early as october 1971but still they were not able to attack openly till december third 1971 at that time Niazi realised that he should defend dhaka and prolong the fight but it was too late as our air fields were knocked down and Indian air force and Mukty,s were hindring the withdrawl and niazi had nothing to defend dhaka The question wether he was ordered to surrender or not is irrelevent as the attack from west pakistan never gave the desired results so he had few choices i.e
1.try to melt into civilia population and make his way out?????????????????
2.he could have easily left by choper
3.instead of falling to dhaka hold chitagong port and wait for seventh fleet
4.or surrender and save the lives of his civil as well as military personells


THERE CAN BE HUNDRED AND ONE REASONS FOR DEFEAT BUT NOT A SINGLE EXCUSE

The defeat was political.The lethargy in our political system of gevernance at caught up with our destiny.Look at Ahmad's quote:"Once, we captured two Pakistani soldiers, and realising the inevitable, I asked him to spare their lives. Though it tormented him to give the order, he told me that it would be a crime against the thousands of Bengali boys who had sacrificed their lives in the war, if we let them live,” Ahmed remembers"
And so it was with all the propoganda put up by India.The 1970 cyclone is what really produced the vital scenario and our civil admistration with its letargy gave them the chance.
I know it sounds bad, but a Tsunami effecting 12 countries produced 100,000 deaths and 2 million homeless. But a cyclone in 1070 and 55,000 troops of Pakistan produced a few million deaths and displaced 6-10 million people depending on who is speaking.Instead of exposing this lie, we turned on ourselves and let it be believed by the world.That was the real failure.Everything else is just details.The killings of non bengalis is never mentioned because our politicians are busy shifting the balame to the army just as the senior officers opf the army dont want any accountability of their failures.There should a despationate accountibilty of these failures but it is unlikely to happen.The political leadership who can do this have their own axe to grind, the government is too busy defending itself to point to the real problems and the civil service too self centered to do anythig.The need is to break this log jam.This means reorganisation of how we project ourselves.Repeating old shiboleths ad nauseum is no going to do it.To day Sind produces less crops of all our main comodities yet it claims to be making a major contribution to our economy.Then they are agreieved!!!
I wish instead of these fictions some facts were researched and put out by the Government of Pakistan, but the ministy Of Information just sits on its hands.I'm sure with time the peioplw will be better informed by site like yours where open discussion is taking place.May Allah give you more strength to keep it up.

Our policies in East Pakistan had serious flaws after the cancellation of 1956 constitution by Ayub khan as that was the last political package both wings agreed.After October coup there was nothing common. In addition to that behavior of our beaurocracy was that of the rulers, it was in both wings but Bengalis being much more educated politically active resisted against beaurocracy both military and civil. I t was very common for and is very common for establishment to label their opponents as ghadar. That is what they did to Bengalis.
IN 1970 election where held on one man one vote basis and despite reports of coercion of voters by awami league results should have been recognized and the majority party should have formed the Government but the problem was 6 points of awami league
Which were not acceptable
1.army to go back in the barracks
2.center to keep defense foreign affairs.
3.Seprate currency
4.capital to be shifted to Dhaka
I don’t remember exactly the rest, some body else might elaborate on it
But agreement was reached with mujeeb who shown flexibility as for as he could go but the national assembly session was called of and east Pakistan went into flames.thier was no civil administration left virtually country was independent .The Indian infiltrators were in small no. But they were there the one who brutally murdered west Pakistani women and children which brought massive retaliation from Pakistani soldiers but fact is that at that time commander eastern command who is probably the only states man we had yaqoob khan had to resign because of deference of opinion and later on history proved him to be right.
It can be said as Bengalis had plans to separate but in politics some times two prong strategy is adopted and politician keeps two parallel alternatives open.Awami league should not had been allowed to take part in election on basis of six points but if they had succeeded then only way left was negotiation not military force but when policy is turned into war than statesman should not put diplomatic limitation on genral.He must let the war follow her own course .This is the freedom Niazi never had and he was given assurance that west Pakistan will defend him which never materialized.