Nuclear Black Market and IAEA

Pakistan will not allow nuclear assets inspection: Akram


ISLAMABAD (February 08 2004): Pakistan's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Munir Akram, has said that Pakistan is a sovereign country and not a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT).

There is no question of allowing anyone to inspect or hand over documents regarding investigations on nuclear proliferation, he told BBC.

"We have to safeguard our nuclear and strategic assets which are not open to inspection. We will not be open to inspection," he added.

He said Pakistan started courageously and voluntarily to ascertain facts regarding allegation of nuclear weapon proliferation. As soon as information was provided to Pakistan that there was something going on, Pakistan acted quickly and the network to nuclear proliferation from Pakistan end has been broken, he said.

Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons for strategic deterrence against India. It was not logical to say that Pakistan proliferated, he added.

US Secretary of State Colin Powell, Munir said, has expressed his satisfaction at the co-operation and the assurances provided by Pakistan and now it was ensured that the network was not broken. "As far as Pakistan was concerned, we were co-operating and we shall co-operate voluntarily to ensure and assure everyone about the facts and Pakistan has no reason to hide the facts," Munir said.

Pakistan was partner in the fight against nuclear proliferation. There was no evidence of transfer of nuclear weapons proliferation to non-state actors.

He said it was a difficult technology. Even states have difficulties in mastering nuclear weapons technology. It was hard to believe that non-state actors would have the capability to acquire such weapons.


Copyright Associated Press of Pakistan, 2004

RECORDER REPORT
LAHORE (February 08 2004): Although, at present, there is no threat to Pakistan nukes, it should not, however, be assumed that the US and the West have accepted Pakistan as a nuclear state.

These views were expressed by General Hamid Gul, a former ISI chief, while addressing a seminar on Kashmir here on Saturday. He said that "our nuke poses a threat" only to Israel. Hence it does not want to see Pakistan with nuclear arsenals. "Although Pakistan is not engaged in a physical war, it is engaged in a 'cold war' with the West on of nuclear issue and Kashmir," he added.

According to him, the present scenario advocates establishing national forum of intellectuals, which should debate and come up with solutions to the problems faced by the country, leaving their prejudices aside. Moreover, the government should resist the US interference in Pakistan's national matters, he added.

Gul averred that there were two paths to the resolution of the Kashmir issue: one, through democratic means, and the other non-democratic; and the present government has adopted the latter option under which Pakistan would be on losing side. "Thus, we should change our path and adopt democratic means to resolve the outstanding issue," he suggested.

He observed that Nato had failed to normalise the situation in Afghanistan and controlling the resurgence of Taleban. Hence, the US was seeking Pakistan's assistance to counter the Taliban. Moreover, the US also wants access to Afghanistan through Kashmir, so that it has alternative option to Afghanistan, he added.

Senator Ghafoor Ahmed of JI said that it was "the darkest period of our history" when Dr A.Q. Khan pleaded guilty and appeared on TV.

He said that President Musharraf has no constitutional authority to give clemency to Dr Khan before a trial in a court of law. "However, the matter of scientists has not ended with the apology from Dr Khan, as depicted by the President. In fact, the issue would be exploited in the international forum by our antagonistic," he warned.

Muhammad Farooq Rahman, convener of All Parties Hurriyat Conference, said that a peaceful solution should be formulated for the Kashmir issue and it should be acceptable to all parties.

Naveed Anwar of Islami Jamiat-ul-Tulba, Fareed Ahmad Piracha of JI, Haroon Rasheed, Irfan Siddiqui and Abdur Rasheed Tarabi of JI also spoke on the occasion.


Copyright Business Recorder, 2004

This guy is really out of control

Tough talk about nuclear weapons program all over the world by the U.S. has left one country out of the nuclear radar scope. In fact, the world does well to remember that most Middle East weapons programs began as a response to Israel’s development of nuclear weapons. That program started in the early 1950s — and had secretly yielded a bomb by 1968.

Israel is now believed to have between 100 and 200 nuclear weapons, a stockpile of chemical weapons and an active biological weapons program that has developed several weapons agents. If you do not know much about Israel’s programs, it is not surprising. Israel is never mentioned in semi-annual reports the U.S. Congress requires the intelligence agencies to prepare on “the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6 months of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of weapons of mass destruction.”

The agencies provide their assessment of programs in Iran, North Korea, India, Pakistan and others, but Israel (and Egypt) are omitted. This pattern is repeated across the board.
For example, the new report on the ballistic and cruise missile threat from the National Air and Space Intelligence Center lists 18 nations with missiles, including U.S. allies Bulgaria, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Yemen, and Egypt — but not Israel. Yet, Israel is the only nation in the Middle East with nuclear weapons and an array of medium-range missiles that could deliver them.

Of course, the United States does not see Israel as a threat — but other nations in the region do. That is the whole point. By ignoring Israel’s programs in order to protect the people of Israel, we may actually be increasing their danger.


It should be obvious that Israelis are better off in a region where no one has nuclear weapons than in one where many nations have them. That is why repeated UN resolutions have called for a Middle East free of nuclear weapons. The United States, Israel and the Arab states have all supported this goal. In fact, for a few years in the 1990s regional talks on these issues appeared to make significant progress — but sputtered out as the Palestinian-Israeli peace process collapsed.

That was then. Now, U.S. policy is based on a different assumption. It seeks to knock off evil regimes seeking these deadly arsenals while tolerating — even encouraging — their possession by states deemed responsible. This policy can work piecemeal, as in Iraq, but cannot work systematically because the proliferation impetus transcends particular regimes.

Proliferation issues arise in democracies as well as dictatorships. Even if democratic transformations sweep the Middle East, a new Iraq and a new Iran would still want nuclear weapons as long as Israel has them — and as long as they are seen as the currency of great powers. The Iranian nuclear program began under the Shah when the United States sold him his first reactor. And it will likely continue under future governments unless fundamental regional dynamics are altered.

While recognizing the genuine security concerns that gave rise to the Israeli programs, now may be the perfect moment to use the victories from a preventive war in Iraq to ensure that we do not have to wage one again. Now is the time to put U.S. muscle behind long-standing U.S. policy, recently reaffirmed by Secretary of State Colin Powell. He spoke of the need to create conditions “in this part of the world where no nation would have a need for any weapon of mass destruction.”

No one would deny the serious internal security issues confronting Israel. What is not appreciated, however, is that nuclear weapons are completely irrelevant to that struggle. Lost in the cycle of Palestinian-Israeli violence is the fact that Israel has never been more secure from external threats.

Its conventional forces can easily defeat any conceivable combination of Arab armies. One of its key regional opponents — Iraq — has just been eliminated. Syria is demonstrating a new, more compliant diplomacy. There is now a substantial U.S. military force in the region. Thus, Israel has less need of nuclear weapons now than at any time in its history and it has a clear interest in preventing any other regional power from getting the one weapon that could offset its conventional superiority.

Arab and Muslim nations now believe that their suspicions of U.S. regional goals have been verified by the failure to turn up any chemical, biological or nuclear weapons in Iraq and by President Bush’s lukewarm support for the Roadmap for Peace in the Middle East.
Instead of confirming these suspicions, the United States could now prove them wrong by adopting an even-handed policy that views all non-conventional weapons in the Middle East as threats to regional peace and stability.

Everyone already knows about Israel’s bombs in the closet. Bringing them out into the open and putting them on the table as part of a regional deal may be the only way to prevent others from building their own bombs in their basements. It will not be easy and will likely take years to fashion such an agreement. That is why there is no time to lose. And, who knows, it could all be a stroke of genius on the part of the Bush Administration to bring up the Iran issue — in order to be able to tackle the related Israeli program and forge a lasting solution to this horrific regional competition.

by George S. Hishmeh

According to the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Israel is the fifth largest nuclear power in the world. The CIA estimates Israel’s nuclear weapons to number between 200 and 400. According to published research on Israel’s nuclear program, Israel’s arsenal enables it to “obliterate all imaginable targets in most Arab countries.” Furthermore, a 1993 official report to the U.S. Congress states that Israel has “undeclared offensive chemical warfare capabilities” and is “generally reported as having an undeclared offensive biological warfare program.” Yet despite Israel’s nuclear might, polls have shown that only 18.3 percent of Israelis have a sense of national security. Moreover, one in four Israelis believe that the country should give up its nuclear arsenal.

On the international level, there has been continuous apprehension over Israel’s “alleged” nuclear program. Israel has purposely remained ambiguous about its nuclear program, maintaining that it would not be the first to “introduce” nuclear weapons in the region. Successive U.S. governments have refused to raise the issue with Israel and have remained silent as international demands on Israel to tell the truth increase.

But with the growing tensions in the Middle East and the Bush administration’s “crusade” to rid the Middle East of weapons of mass destruction, can the United States justify its insistence that Iran, Libya and Syria allow inspections while allowing Israel to disregard international inspections?

Revealing the Secret - Mordechai Vanunu:

Details of Israel’s secret nuclear program were brought to light 18 years ago by Mordechai Vanunu, the Israeli scientist at Israel’s top-secret Dimona reactor. Vanunu, who has served 17 years in an Israeli prison—11 of which were in harsh solitary confinement—took photographs of the sensitive areas of the reactor complex and smuggled them to the United Kingdom were they were published in the London Sunday Times. The revelations were the first confirmation that Israel had an extensive nuclear program. Vanunu’s scheduled release in less than three months is sure to spark speculation over whether the whistle-blower still holds secrets that would add to international apprehension over Israel’s nuclear program.

The Israeli nuclear program is rarely discussed in the United States, and less so in Israel. The United Nations General Assembly and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference have adopted 13 resolutions since 1987 appealing to Israel to join the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. With the resolutions being non-binding, Israel has ignored them.

The United States, United Nations, and Israel’s Weapons:

In May 1963, U.S. President John F. Kennedy told then-Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion that the Dimona reactor “seriously jeopardized U.S.-Israeli relations.” According to published materials, it was clear to the United States that Israel was building an atomic bomb to the “vexation of Kennedy, for whom nuclear non-proliferation was a touchstone.” However, the Israelis were “splendidly” evasive on the subject, setting off a flurry of diplomatic activity with Washington demanding to inspect the site. Today, the United States carefully avoids addressing Israel’s nuclear program and whether it is in favor of international inspections of Israel’s nuclear stockpile. When asked specifically about Israel, U.S. officials simply reiterate that the United States “has a long-standing position of universal adherence to the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.”

Most disconcerting however, is the Bush administration’s relentless approach on nuclear and chemical weapons in Iran and Libya, even Syria, while it refuses to raise the issue with Israel. Israel’s nuclear program has advanced rapidly since its initiation in the 1950s. Today, Israel is capable of launching a nuclear attack by air, land and sea with its Dolphin Class submarines from Germany specifically equipped with modified cruise missiles. The German submarines are said to be the most advanced diesel submarines in the world with only the United States capable of destroying them.

Representatives of the United Nations have also expressed concern over Israel’s nuclear program. In late 2003, Mohammed Al Baradei told Israel’s Haaretz newspaper that he believed Israel had nuclear weapons and that the stockpile should be eliminated in order to promote peace in the Middle East. He stressed that Israel has never tried to deny or disprove the assumption that it has nuclear capability.

Nuclear Weapons or Peace:

The most puzzling decision has been the Bush administration’s lukewarm reaction, to put it mildly, to Syria’s recent proposal at the United Nations Security Council to make the Middle East an area free of weapons of mass destruction. The Syrian proposal also included a call for all countries in the Middle East to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty. To this day, Israel remains the only country in the region that has yet to subscribe to this international accord.

Israel’s continued disregard of international inspections will continue to drive countries in the region to acquire chemical and biological weapons, if not nuclear arms. Efforts to reach a stable and lasting peace between countries that rely on having superior arms for leverage on the negotiating table will fail. The best way to avoid calamity may be in linking nuclear non-proliferation with an all-encompassing Middle East settlement.

By

Warner D. Farr, LTC, U.S. Army


THE THIRD TEMPLE'S HOLY OF HOLIES:
ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Warner D. Farr, LTC, U.S. Army

The Counterproliferation Papers

Future Warfare Series No. 2

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air War College

Air University

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama


The Third Temple's Holy Of Holies:
Israel's Nuclear Weapons

Warner D. Farr, LTC, U.S. Army

September 1999

The Counterproliferation Papers Series was established by the USAF Counterproliferation Center to provide information and analysis to U.S. national security policy-makers and USAF officers to assist them in countering the threat posed by adversaries equipped with weapons of mass destruction. Copies of papers in this series are available from the USAF Counterproliferation Center, 325 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427. The fax number is (334) 953-7538; phone (334) 953-7538.

Counterproliferation Paper No. 2
USAF Counterproliferation Center
Air War College

Air University
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427

The internet address for the USAF Counterproliferation Center is:
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm

Contents:

Page

Disclaimer i

The Author ii

Acknowledgments iii

Abstract iv

I. Introduction 1

II. 1948-1962: With French Cooperation 3

III. 1963-1973: Seeing the Project Through to Completion 9

IV. 1974-1999: Bringing the Bomb Up the Basement Stairs 15

Appendix: Estimates of the Israeli Nuclear Arsenal 23

Notes 25

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this publication are those solely of the author and are not a statement of official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Army, or the USAF Counterproliferation Center.

The Author

Colonel Warner D. “Rocky” Farr, Medical Corps, Master Flight Surgeon, U.S. Army, graduated from the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama before becoming the Command Surgeon, U.S. Army Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He also serves as the Surgeon for the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, and the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. With thirty-three years of military service, he holds an Associate of Arts from the State University of New York, Bachelor of Science from Northeast Louisiana University, Doctor of Medicine from the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, Masters of Public Health from the University of Texas, and has completed medical residencies in aerospace medicine, and anatomic and clinical pathology. He is the only army officer to be board certified in these three specialties. Solo qualified in the TH-55A Army helicopter, he received flight training in the T-37 and T-38 aircraft as part of his USAF School of Aerospace Medicine residency.

Colonel Farr was a Master Sergeant Special Forces medic prior to receiving a direct commission to second lieutenant. He is now the senior Special Forces medical officer in the U.S. Army with prior assignments in the 5th, 7th, and 10th Special Forces Groups (Airborne), 1st Special Forces, in Vietnam, the United States, and Germany. He has advised the 12th and 20th Special Forces Groups (Airborne) in the reserves and national guard, served as Division Surgeon, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), and as the Deputy Commander of the U.S. Army Aeromedical Center, Fort Rucker, Alabama.

Acknowledgments

I would like to acknowledge the assistance, guidance and encouragement from my Air War College (AWC) faculty research advisor, Dr. Andrew Terrill, instructor of the Air War College Arab-Israeli Wars course. Thanks are also due to the great aid of the Air University librarians. The author is also indebted to Captain J. R. Saunders, USN and Colonel Robert Sutton, USAF. Who also offered helpful suggestions.

Abstract

This paper is a history of the Israeli nuclear weapons program drawn from a review of unclassified sources. Israel began its search for nuclear weapons at the inception of the state in 1948. As payment for Israeli participation in the Suez Crisis of 1956, France provided nuclear expertise and constructed a reactor complex for Israel at Dimona capable of large-scale plutonium production and reprocessing. The United States discovered the facility by 1958 and it was a subject of continual discussions between American presidents and Israeli prime ministers. Israel used delay and deception to at first keep the United States at bay, and later used the nuclear option as a bargaining chip for a consistent American conventional arms supply. After French disengagement in the early 1960s, Israel progressed on its own, including through several covert operations, to project completion. Before the 1967 Six-Day War, they felt their nuclear facility threatened and reportedly assembled several nuclear devices. By the 1973 Yom Kippur War Israel had a number of sophisticated nuclear bombs, deployed them, and considered using them. The Arabs may have limited their war aims because of their knowledge of the Israeli nuclear weapons. Israel has most probably conducted several nuclear bomb tests. They have continued to modernize and vertically proliferate and are now one of the world's larger nuclear powers. Using “bomb in the basement” nuclear opacity, Israel has been able to use its arsenal as a deterrent to the Arab world while not technically violating American nonproliferation requirements.

The Third Temple's Holy of Holies:
Israel's Nuclear Weapons

Warner D. Farr

I. Introduction

This is the end of the Third Temple.

- Attributed to Moshe Dayan

during the Yom Kippur War1

As Zionists in Palestine watched World War II from their distant sideshow, what lessons were learned? The soldiers of the Empire of Japan vowed on their emperor's sacred throne to fight to the death and not face the inevitability of an American victory. Many Jews wondered if the Arabs would try to push them into the Mediterranean Sea. After the devastating American nuclear attack on Japan, the soldier leaders of the empire reevaluated their fight to the death position. Did the bomb give the Japanese permission to surrender and live? It obviously played a military role, a political role, and a peacemaking role. How close was the mindset of the Samurai culture to the Islamic culture? Did David Ben-Gurion take note and wonder if the same would work for Israel?2 Could Israel find the ultimate deterrent that would convince her opponents that they could never, ever succeed? Was Israel's ability to cause a modern holocaust the best way to guarantee never having another one?

The use of unconventional weapons in the Middle East is not new. The British had used chemical artillery shells against the Turks at the second battle of Gaza in 1917. They continued chemical shelling against the Shiites in Iraq in 1920 and used aerial chemicals in the 1920s and 1930s in Iraq.3

Israel's involvement with nuclear technology starts at the founding of the state in 1948. Many talented Jewish scientists immigrated to Palestine during the thirties and forties, in particular, Ernst David Bergmann. He would become the director of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission and the founder of Israel's efforts to develop nuclear weapons. Bergmann, a close friend and advisor of Israel's first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, counseled that nuclear energy could compensate for Israel's poor natural resources and small pool of military manpower. He pointed out that there was just one nuclear energy, not two, suggesting nuclear weapons were part of the plan.4 As early as 1948, Israeli scientists actively explored the Negev Desert for uranium deposits on orders from the Israeli Ministry of Defense. By 1950, they found low-grade deposits near Beersheba and Sidon and worked on a low power method of heavy water production.5

The newly created Weizmann Institute of Science actively supported nuclear research by 1949, with Dr. Bergmann heading the chemistry division. Promising students went overseas to study nuclear engineering and physics at Israeli government expense. Israel secretly founded its own Atomic Energy Commission in 1952 and placed it under the control of the Defense Ministry.6 The foundations of a nuclear program were beginning to develop.

II. 1948-1962: With French Cooperation

It has always been our intention to develop a nuclear potential.

- Ephraim Katzir7

In 1949, Francis Perrin, a member of the French Atomic Energy Commission, nuclear physicist, and friend of Dr. Bergmann visited the Weizmann Institute. He invited Israeli scientists to the new French nuclear research facility at Saclay. A joint research effort was subsequently set up between the two nations. Perrin publicly stated in 1986 that French scientists working in America on the Manhattan Project and in Canada during World War II were told they could use their knowledge in France provided they kept it a secret.8 Perrin reportedly provided nuclear data to Israel on the same basis.9 One Israeli scientist worked at the U.S. Los Alamos National Laboratory and may have directly brought expertise home.10

After the Second World War, France's nuclear research capability was quite limited. France had been a leading research center in nuclear physics before World War II, but had fallen far behind the U.S., the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and even Canada. Israel and France were at a similar level of expertise after the war, and Israeli scientists could make significant contributions to the French effort. Progress in nuclear science and technology in France and Israel remained closely linked throughout the early fifties. Israeli scientists probably helped construct the G-1 plutonium production reactor and UP-1 reprocessing plant at Marcoule.11 France profited from two Israeli patents on heavy water production and low-grade uranium enrichment.12 In the 1950s and into the early 1960s, France and Israel had close relations in many areas. France was Israel's principal arms supplier, and as instability spread through French colonies in North Africa, Israel provided valuable intelligence obtained from contacts with sephardic Jews in those countries.

The two nations collaborated, with the United Kingdom, in planning and staging the Suez Canal-Sinai operation against Egypt in October 1956. The Suez Crisis became the real genesis of Israel's nuclear weapons production program. With the Czech-Egyptian arms agreement in 1955, Israel became worried. When absorbed, the Soviet-bloc equipment would triple Egyptian military strength. After Egypt's President Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran in 1953, Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion ordered the development of chemical munitions and other unconventional munitions, including nuclear.13 Six weeks before the Suez Canal operation, Israel felt the time was right to approach France for assistance in building a nuclear reactor. Canada had set a precedent a year earlier when it had agreed to build a 40-megawatt CIRUS reactor in India. Shimon Peres, the Director-General of the Defense Ministry and aide to Prime Minister (and Defense Minister) David Ben-Gurion, and Bergmann met with members of the CEA (France's Atomic Energy Commission). During September 1956, they reached an initial understanding to provide a research reactor. The two countries concluded final agreements at a secret meeting outside Paris where they also finalized details of the Suez Canal operation.14

For the United Kingdom and France, the Suez operation, launched on October 29, 1956, was a total disaster. Israel's part was a military success, allowing it to occupy the entire Sinai Peninsula by 4 November, but the French and British canal invasion on 6 November was a political failure. Their attempt to advance south along the Suez Canal stopped due to a cease-fire under fierce Soviet and U.S. pressure. Both nations pulled out, leaving Israel to face the pressure from the two superpowers alone. Soviet Premier Bulganin and President Khrushchev issued an implicit threat of nuclear attack if Israel did not withdraw from the Sinai.

On 7 November 1956, a secret meeting was held between Israeli foreign minister Golda Meir, Shimon Peres, and French foreign and defense ministers Christian Pineau and Maurice Bourges-Manoury. The French, embarrassed by their failure to support their ally in the operation, found the Israelis deeply concerned about a Soviet threat. In this meeting, they substantially modified the initial understanding beyond a research reactor. Peres secured an agreement from France to assist Israel in developing a nuclear deterrent. After further months of negotiation, agreement was reached for an 18-megawatt (thermal) research reactor of the EL-3 type, along with plutonium separation technology. France and Israel signed the agreement in October 1957.15 Later the reactor was officially upgraded to 24 megawatts, but the actual specifications issued to engineers provided for core cooling ducts sufficient for up to three times this power level, along with a plutonium plant of similar capacity. Data from insider reports revealed in 1986 would estimate the power level at 125-150 megawatts.16 The reactor, not connected to turbines for power production, needed this increase in size only to increase its plutonium production. How this upgrade came about remains unknown, but Bourges-Maunoury, replacing Mollet as French prime minister, may have contributed to it.17 Shimon Peres, the guiding hand in the Israeli nuclear program, had a close relationship with Bourges-Maunoury and probably helped him politically.18

Why was France so eager to help Israel? DeMollet and then de Gaulle had a place for Israel within their strategic vision. A nuclear Israel could be a counterforce against Egypt in France's fight in Algeria. Egypt was openly aiding the rebel forces there. France also wanted to obtain the bomb itself. The United States had embargoed certain nuclear enabling computer technology from France. Israel could get the technology from America and pass it through to France. The U.S. furnished Israel heavy water, under the Atoms for Peace program, for the small research reactor at Soreq. France could use this heavy water. Since France was some years away from nuclear testing and success, Israeli science was an insurance policy in case of technical problems in France's own program.19 The Israeli intelligence community's knowledge of past French (especially Vichy) anti-Semitic transgressions and the continued presence of former Nazi collaborators in French intelligence provided the Israelis with some blackmail opportunities.20 The cooperation was so close that Israel worked with France on the preproduction design of early Mirage jet aircraft, designed to be capable of delivering nuclear bombs.21

French experts secretly built the Israeli reactor underground at Dimona, in the Negev desert of southern Israel near Beersheba. Hundreds of French engineers and technicians filled Beersheba, the biggest town in the Negev. Many of the same contractors who built Marcoule were involved. SON (a French firm) built the plutonium separation plants in both France and Israel. The ground was broken for the EL-102 reactor (as it was known to France) in early 1958.

Israel used many subterfuges to conceal activity at Dimona. It called the plant a manganese plant, and rarely, a textile plant. The United States by the end of 1958 had taken pictures of the project from U-2 spy planes, and identified the site as a probable reactor complex. The concentration of Frenchmen was also impossible to hide from ground observers. In 1960, before the reactor was operating, France, now under the leadership of de Gaulle, reconsidered and decided to suspend the project. After several months of negotiation, they reached an agreement in November that allowed the reactor to proceed if Israel promised not to make nuclear weapons and to announce the project to the world. Work on the plutonium reprocessing plant halted. On 2 December 1960, before Israel could make announcements, the U.S. State Department issued a statement that Israel had a secret nuclear installation. By 16 December, this became public knowledge with its appearance in the New York Times. On 21 December, Ben-Gurion announced that Israel was building a 24-megawatt reactor “for peaceful purposes.”22

Over the next year, relations between the U.S. and Israel became strained over the Dimona reactor. The U.S. accepted Israel's assertions at face value publicly, but exerted pressure privately. Although Israel allowed a cursory inspection by well known American physicists Eugene Wigner and I. I. Rabi, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion consistently refused to allow regular international inspections. The final resolution between the U.S. and Israel was a commitment from Israel to use the facility for peaceful purposes, and to admit an U.S. inspection team twice a year. These inspections began in 1962 and continued until 1969. Inspectors saw only the above ground part of the buildings, not the many levels underground and the visit frequency was never more than once a year. The above ground areas had simulated control rooms, and access to the underground areas was kept hidden while the inspectors were present. Elevators leading to the secret underground plutonium reprocessing plant were actually bricked over.23 Much of the information on these inspections and the political maneuvering around it has just been declassified.24

One interpretation of Ben-Gurion's “peaceful purposes” pledge given to America is that he interpreted it to mean that nuclear weapon development was not excluded if used strictly for defensive, and not offensive purposes. Israel's security position in the late fifties and early sixties was far more precarious than now. After three wars, with a robust domestic arms industry and a reliable defense supply line from the U.S., Israel felt much more secure. During the fifties and early sixties a number of attempts by Israel to obtain security guarantees from the U.S. to place Israel under the U.S. nuclear umbrella like NATO or Japan, were unsuccessful. If the U.S. had conducted a forward-looking policy to restrain Israel's proliferation, along with a sure defense agreement, we could have prevented the development of Israel's nuclear arsenal.

One common discussion in the literature concerns testing of Israeli nuclear devices. In the early phases, the amount of collaboration between the French and Israeli nuclear weapons design programs made testing unnecessary. In addition, although their main efforts were with plutonium, the Israelis may have amassed enough uranium for gun-assembled type bombs which, like the Hiroshima bomb, require no testing. One expert postulated, based on unnamed sources, that the French nuclear test in 1960 made two nuclear powers not one—such was the depth of collaboration.25 There were several Israeli observers at the French nuclear tests and the Israelis had “unrestricted access to French nuclear test explosion data.”26 Israel also supplied essential technology and hardware.27 The French reportedly shipped reprocessed plutonium back to Israel as part of their repayment for Israeli scientific help.

However, this constant, decade long, French cooperation and support was soon to end and Israel would have to go it alone.

III. 1963-1973: Seeing the Project to Completion

To act in such a way that the Jews who died in the gas chambers would be the last Jews to die without defending themselves.

- Golda Meir28

Israel would soon need its own, independent, capabilities to complete its nuclear program. Only five countries had facilities for uranium enrichment: the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China. The Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation, or NUMEC, in Apollo, Pennsylvania was a small fuel rod fabrication plant. In 1965, the U.S. government accused Dr. Zalman Shapiro, the corporation president, of “losing” 200 pounds of highly enriched uranium. Although investigated by the Atomic Energy Commission, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other government agencies and inquiring reporters, no answers were available in what was termed the Apollo Affair.29 Many remain convinced that the Israelis received 200 pounds of enriched uranium sometime before 1965.30 One source links Rafi Eitan, an Israeli Mossad agent and later the handler of spy Jonathan Pollard, with NUMEC.31 In the 1990s when the NUMEC plant was disassembled, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission found over 100 kilograms of plutonium in the structural components of the contaminated plant, casting doubt on 200 pounds going to Israel.32

The joint venture with France gave Israel several ingredients for nuclear weapons construction: a production reactor, a factory to extract plutonium from the spent fuel, and the design. In 1962, the Dimona reactor went critical; the French resumed work on the underground plutonium reprocessing plant, and completed it in 1964 or 1965. The acquisition of this reactor and related technologies was clearly intended for military purposes from the outset (not “dual-use”), as the reactor has no other function. The security at Dimona (officially the Negev Nuclear Research Center) was particularly stringent. For straying into Dimona's airspace, the Israelis shot down one of their own Mirage fighters during the Six-Day War. The Israelis also shot down a Libyan airliner with 104 passengers, in 1973, which had strayed over the Sinai.33 There is little doubt that some time in the late sixties Israel became the sixth nation to manufacture nuclear weapons. Other things they needed were extra uranium and extra heavy water to run the reactor at a higher rate. Norway, France, and the United States provided the heavy water and “Operation Plumbat” provided the uranium.

After the 1967 war, France stopped supplies of uranium to Israel. These supplies were from former French colonies of Gabon, Niger, and the Central Africa Republic.34 Israel had small amounts of uranium from Negev phosphate mines and had bought some from Argentina and South Africa, but not in the large quantities supplied by the French. Through a complicated undercover operation, the Israelis obtained uranium oxide, known as yellow cake, held in a stockpile in Antwerp. Using a West German front company and a high seas transfer from one ship to another in the Mediterranean, they obtained 200 tons of yellow cake. The smugglers labeled the 560 sealed oil drums “Plumbat,” which means lead, hence “Operation Plumbat.”35 The West German government may have been involved directly but remained undercover to avoid antagonizing the Soviets or Arabs.36 Israeli intelligence information on the Nazi past of some West German officials may have provided the motivation.37

Norway sold 20 tons of heavy water to Israel in 1959 for use in an experimental power reactor. Norway insisted on the right to inspect the heavy water for 32 years, but did so only once, in April 1961, while it was still in storage barrels at Dimona. Israel simply promised that the heavy water was for peaceful purposes. In addition, quantities much more than what would be required for the peaceful purpose reactors were imported. Norway either colluded or at the least was very slow to ask to inspect as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) rules required.38 Norway and Israel concluded an agreement in 1990 for Israel to sell back 10.5 tons of the heavy water to Norway. Recent calculations reveal that Israel has used two tons and will retain eight tons more.39

Author Seymour Hersh, writing in the Samson Option says Prime Minister Levi Eshkol delayed starting weapons production even after Dimona was finished.40 The reactor operated and the plutonium collected, but remained unseparated. The first extraction of plutonium probably occurred in late 1965. By 1966, enough plutonium was on hand to develop a weapon in time for the Six-Day War in 1967. Some type of non-nuclear test, perhaps a zero yield or implosion test, occurred on November 2, 1966. After this time, considerable collaboration between Israel and South Africa developed and continued through the 1970s and 1980s. South Africa became Israel's primary supplier of uranium for Dimona. A Center for Nonproliferation Studies report lists four separate Israel-South Africa “clandestine nuclear deals.” Three concerned yellowcake and one was tritium.41 Other sources of yellowcake may have included Portugal.42

Egypt attempted unsuccessfully to obtain nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union both before and after the Six-Day War. President Nasser received from the Soviet Union a questionable nuclear guarantee instead and declared that Egypt would develop its own nuclear program.43 His rhetoric of 1965 and 1966 about preventive war and Israeli nuclear weapons coupled with overflights of the Dimona rector contributed to the tensions that led to war. The Egyptian Air Force claims to have first overflown Dimona and recognized the existence of a nuclear reactor in 1965.44 Of the 50 American HAWK antiaircraft missiles in Israeli hands, half ringed Dimona by 1965.45 Israel considered the Egyptian overflights of May 16, 1967 as possible pre-strike reconnaissance. One source lists such Egyptian overflights, along with United Nations peacekeeper withdrawal and Egyptian troop movements into the Sinai, as one of the three “tripwires” which would drive Israel to war.46 There was an Egyptian military plan to attack Dimona at the start of any war but Nasser vetoed it.47 He believed Israel would have the bomb in 1968.48 Israel assembled two nuclear bombs and ten days later went to war.49 Nasser's plan, if he had one, may have been to gain and consolidate territorial gains before Israel had a nuclear option.50 He was two weeks too late.

The Israelis aggressively pursued an aircraft delivery system from the United States. President Johnson was less emphatic about nonproliferation than President Kennedy-or perhaps had more pressing concerns, such as Vietnam. He had a long history of both Jewish friends and pressing political contributors coupled with some first hand experience of the Holocaust, having toured concentration camps at the end of World War II.51 Israel pressed him hard for aircraft (A-4E Skyhawks initially and F-4E Phantoms later) and obtained agreement in 1966 under the condition that the aircraft would not be used to deliver nuclear weapons. The State Department attempted to link the aircraft purchases to continued inspection visits. President Johnson overruled the State Department concerning Dimona inspections.52 Although denied at the time, America delivered the F-4Es, on September 5, 1969, with nuclear capable hardware intact.53

The Samson Option states that Moshe Dayan gave the go-ahead for starting weapon production in early 1968, putting the plutonium separation plant into full operation. Israel began producing three to five bombs a year. The book Critical Mass asserts that Israel had two bombs in 1967, and that Prime Minister Eshkol ordered them armed in Israel's first nuclear alert during the Six-Day War.54 Avner Cohen in his recent book, Israel and the Bomb, agrees that Israel had a deliverable nuclear capability in the 1967 war. He quotes Munya Mardor, leader of Rafael, the Armament Development Authority, and other unnamed sources, that Israel “cobbled together” two deliverable devices.55

Having the bomb meant articulating, even if secretly, a use doctrine. In addition to the “Samson Option” of last resort, other triggers for nuclear use may have included successful Arab penetration of populated areas, destruction of the Israeli Air Force, massive air strikes or chemical/biological strikes on Israeli cities, and Arab use of nuclear weapons.56

In 1971, Israel began purchasing krytrons, ultra high-speed electronic switching tubes that are “dual-use," having both industrial and nuclear weapons applications as detonators. In the 1980s, the United States charged an American, Richard Smith (or Smyth), with smuggling 810 krytrons to Israel.57 He vanished before trial and reportedly lives outside Tel Aviv. The Israelis apologized for the action saying that the krytrons were for medical research.58 Israel returned 469 of the krytrons but the rest, they declared, had been destroyed in testing conventional weapons. Some believe they went to South Africa.59 Smyth has also been reported to have been involved in a 1972 smuggling operation to obtain solid rocket fuel binder compounds for the Jericho II missile and guidance component hardware.60 Observers point to the Jericho missile itself as proof of a nuclear capability as it is not suited to the delivery of conventional munitions.61

On the afternoon of 6 October 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel in a coordinated surprise attack, beginning the Yom Kippur War. Caught with only regular forces on duty, augmented by reservists with a low readiness level, Israeli front lines crumbled. By early afternoon on 7 October, no effective forces were in the southern Golan Heights and Syrian forces had reached the edge of the plateau, overlooking the Jordan River. This crisis brought Israel to its second nuclear alert.

Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, obviously not at his best at a press briefing, was, according to Time magazine, rattled enough to later tell the prime minister that “this is the end of the third temple,” referring to an impending collapse of the state of Israel. “Temple” was also the code word for nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Golda Meir and her “kitchen cabinet” made the decision on the night of 8 October. The Israelis assembled 13 twenty-kiloton atomic bombs. The number and in fact the entire story was later leaked by the Israelis as a great psychological warfare tool. Although most probably plutonium devices, one source reports they were enriched uranium bombs. The Jericho missiles at Hirbat Zachariah and the nuclear strike F-4s at Tel Nof were armed and prepared for action against Syrian and Egyptian targets. They also targeted Damascus with nuclear capable long-range artillery although it is not certain they had nuclear artillery shells.62

U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was notified of the alert several hours later on the morning of 9 October. The U.S. decided to open an aerial resupply pipeline to Israel, and Israeli aircraft began picking up supplies that day. Although stockpile depletion remained a concern, the military situation stabilized on October 8th and 9th as Israeli reserves poured into the battle and averted disaster. Well before significant American resupply had reached Israeli forces, the Israelis counterattacked and turned the tide on both fronts.

On 11 October, a counterattack on the Golan broke the back of Syria's offensive, and on 15 and 16 October, Israel launched a surprise crossing of the Suez Canal into Africa. Soon the Israelis encircled the Egyptian Third Army and it was faced with annihilation on the east bank of the Suez Canal, with no protective forces remaining between the Israeli Army and Cairo. The first U.S. flights arrived on 14 October.63 Israeli commandos flew to Fort Benning, Georgia to train with the new American TOW anti-tank missiles and return with a C-130 Hercules aircraft full of them in time for the decisive Golan battle. American commanders in Germany depleted their stocks of missiles, at that time only shared with the British and West Germans, and sent them forward to Israel.64

Thus started the subtle, opaque use of the Israeli bomb to ensure that the United States kept its pledge to maintain Israel's conventional weapons edge over its foes.65 There is significant anecdotal evidence that Henry Kissinger told President of Egypt, Anwar Sadat, that the reason for the U.S. airlift was that the Israelis were close to “going nuclear.”66

A similar Soviet pipeline to the Arabs, equally robust, may or may not have included a ship with nuclear weapons on it, detected from nuclear trace emissions and shadowed by the Americans from the Dardanelles. The Israelis believe that the Soviets discovered Israeli nuclear preparations from COSMOS satellite photographs and decided to equalize the odds.67 The Soviet ship arrived in Alexandria on either 18 or 23 October (sources disagree), and remained, without unloading, until November 1973. The ship may have represented a Soviet guarantee to the Arab combatants to neutralize the Israeli nuclear option.68 While some others dismiss the story completely, the best-written review article concludes that the answer is “obscure.” Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev threatened, on 24 October, to airlift Soviet airborne troops to reinforce the Egyptians cut off on the eastern side of the Suez Canal and put seven Soviet airborne divisions on alert.69 Recent evidence indicates that the Soviets sent nuclear missile submarines also.70 Aviation Week and Space Technology magazine claimed that the two Soviet SCUD brigades deployed in Egypt each had a nuclear warhead. American satellite photos seemed to confirm this. The U.S. passed to Israel images of trucks, of the type used to transport nuclear warheads, parked near the launchers.71 President Nixon's response was to bring the U.S. to worldwide nuclear alert the next day, whereupon Israel went to nuclear alert a third time.72 This sudden crisis quickly faded as Prime Minister Meir agreed to a cease-fire, relieving the pressure on the Egyptian Third Army.

Shimon Peres had argued for a pre-war nuclear demonstration to deter the Arabs. Arab strategies and war aims in 1967 may have been restricted because of a fear of the Israeli “bomb in the basement,” the undeclared nuclear option. The Egyptians planned to capture an eastern strip next to the Suez Canal and then hold. The Syrians did not aggressively commit more forces to battle or attempt to drive through the 1948 Jordan River border to the Israeli center. Both countries seemed not to violate Israel proper and avoided triggering one of the unstated Israeli reasons to employ nuclear weapons.73 Others discount any Arab planning based on nuclear capabilities.74 Peres also credits Dimona with bringing Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem to make peace.75 This position was seemingly confirmed by Sadat in a private conversation with Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman.76

At the end of the Yom Kippur War (a nation shaking experience), Israel has her nuclear arsenal fully functional and tested by a deployment. The arsenal, still opaque and unspoken, was no longer a secret, especially to the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union.

IV. 1974-1999: Bringing the Bomb up the Basement Stairs

Never Again!

- Reportedly welded on the
first Israeli nuclear bomb77

Shortly after the 1973 war, Israel allegedly fielded considerable nuclear artillery consisting of American 175 mm and 203 mm self-propelled artillery pieces, capable of firing nuclear shells. If true, this shows that Dimona had rapidly solved the problems of designing smaller weapons since the crude 1967 devices. If true, these low yield, tactical nuclear artillery rounds could reach at least 25 miles. The Israeli Defense Force did have three battalions of the 175mm artillery (36 tubes), reportedly with 108 nuclear shells and more for the 203mm tubes. Some sources describe a program to extend the range to 45 miles. They may have offered the South Africans these low yield, miniaturized, shells described as, “the best stuff we got.”78 By 1976, according to one unclassified source, the Central Intelligence Agency believed that the Israelis were using plutonium from Dimona and had 10 to 20 nuclear weapons available.79

In 1972, two Israeli scientists, Isaiah Nebenzahl and Menacehm Levin, developed a cheaper, faster uranium enrichment process. It used a laser beam for isotope separation. It could reportedly enrich seven grams of Uranium 235 sixty percent in one day.80 Sources later reported that Israel was using both centrifuges and lasers to enrich uranium.81

Questions remained regarding full-scale nuclear weapons tests. Primitive gun assembled type devices need no testing. Researchers can test non-nuclear components of other types separately and use extensive computer simulations. Israel received data from the 1960 French tests, and one source concludes that Israel accessed information from U.S. tests conducted in the 1950s and early 1960s. This may have included both boosted and thermonuclear weapons data.82 Underground testing in a hollowed out cavern is difficult to detect. A West Germany Army Magazine, Wehrtechnik, in June 1976, claimed that Western reports documented a 1963 underground test in the Negev. Other reports show a test at Al-Naqab, Negev in October 1966.83

A bright flash in the south Indian Ocean, observed by an American satellite on 22 September 1979, is widely believed to be a South Africa-Israel joint nuclear test. It was, according to some, the third test of a neutron bomb. The first two were hidden in clouds to fool the satellite and the third was an accident—the weather cleared.84 Experts differ on these possible tests. Several writers report that the scientists at Los Alamos National Laboratory believed it to have been a nuclear explosion while a presidential panel decided otherwise.85 President Carter was just entering the Iran hostage nightmare and may have easily decided not to alter 30 years of looking the other way.86 The explosion was almost certainly an Israeli bomb, tested at the invitation of the South Africans. It was more advanced than the “gun type” bombs developed by the South Africans.87 One report claims it was a test of a nuclear artillery shell.88 A 1997 Israeli newspaper quoted South African deputy foreign minister, Aziz Pahad, as confirming it was an Israeli test with South African logistical support.89

Controversy over possible nuclear testing continues to this day. In June 1998, a Member of the Knesset accused the government of an underground test near Eilat on May 28, 1998. Egyptian “nuclear experts” had made similar charges. The Israeli government hotly denied the claims.90

Not only were the Israelis interested in American nuclear weapons development data, they were interested in targeting data from U.S. intelligence. Israel discovered that they were on the Soviet target list. American-born Israeli spy Jonathan Pollard obtained satellite-imaging data of the Soviet Union, allowing Israel to target accurately Soviet cities. This showed Israel's intention to use its nuclear arsenal as a deterrent political lever, or retaliatory capability against the Soviet Union itself. Israel also used American satellite imagery to plan the 7 June 1981 attack on the Tammuz-1 reactor at Osiraq, Iraq. This daring attack, carried out by eight F-16s accompanied by six F-15s punched a hole in the concrete reactor dome before the reactor began operation (and just days before an Israeli election). It delivered 15 delay-fused 2000 pound bombs deep into the reactor structure (the 16th bomb hit a nearby hall). The blasts shredded the reactor and blew out the dome foundations, causing it to collapse on the rubble. This was the world's first attack on a nuclear reactor.91

Since 19 September 1988, Israel has worked on its own satellite recon- naissance system to decrease reliance on U.S. sources. On that day, they launched the Offeq-1 satellite on the Shavit booster, a system closely related to the Jericho-II missile. They launched the satellite to the west away from the Arabs and against the earth's rotation, requiring even more thrust. The Jericho-II missile is capable of sending a one ton nuclear payload 5,000 kilometers. Offeq-2 went up on 3 April 1990. The launch of the Offeq-3 failed on its first attempt on 15 September 1994, but was successful 5 April 1995.92

Mordechai Vanunu provided the best look at the Israeli nuclear arsenal in 1985 complete with photographs.93 A technician from Dimona who lost his job, Vanunu secretly took photographs, immigrated to Australia and published some of his material in the London Sunday Times. He was subsequently kidnapped by Israeli agents, tried and imprisoned. His data shows a sophisticated nuclear program, over 200 bombs, with boosted devices, neutron bombs, F-16 deliverable warheads, and Jericho warheads.94 The boosted weapons shown in the Vanunu photographs show a sophistication that inferred the requirement for testing.95 He revealed for the first time the underground plutonium separation facility where Israel was producing 40 kilograms annually, several times more than previous estimates. Photographs showed sophisticated designs which scientific experts say enabled the Israelis to build bombs with as little as 4 kilograms of plutonium. These facts have increased the estimates of total Israeli nuclear stockpiles (see Appendix A).96 In the words of one American, “[the Israelis] can do anything we or the Soviets can do.”97 Vanunu not only made the technical details of the Israeli program and stockpile public but in his wake, Israeli began veiled official acknowledgement of the potent Israeli nuclear deterrent. They began bringing the bomb up the basement stairs if not out of the basement.

Israel went on full-scale nuclear alert again on the first day of Desert Storm, 18 January 1991. Seven SCUD missiles were fired against the cities of Tel Aviv and Haifa by Iraq (only two actually hit Tel Aviv and one hit Haifa). This alert lasted for the duration of the war, 43 days. Over the course of the war, Iraq launched around 40 missiles in 17 separate attacks at Israel. There was little loss of life: two killed directly, 11 indirectly, with many structures damaged and life disrupted.98 Several supposedly landed near Dimona, one of them a close miss.99 Threats of retaliation by the Shamir government if the Iraqis used chemical warheads were interpreted to mean that Israel intended to launch a nuclear strike if gas attacks occurred. One Israeli commentator recommended that Israel should signal Iraq that “any Iraqi action against Israeli civilian populations, with or without gas, may leave Iraq without Baghdad.”100 Shortly before the end of the war the Israelis tested a “nuclear capable” missile which prompted the United States into intensifying its SCUD hunting in western Iraq to prevent any Israeli response.101 The Israeli Air Force set up dummy SCUD sites in the Negev for pilots to practice on—they found it no easy task.102 American government concessions to Israel for not attacking (in addition to Israeli Patriot missile batteries) were:

Allowing Israel to designate 100 targets inside Iraq for the coalition to destroy,
Satellite downlink to increase warning time on the SCUD attacks (present and future),
“Technical parity with Saudi jet fighters in perpetuity.”103
All of this validated the nuclear arsenal in the minds of the Israelis. In particular the confirmed capability of Arab states without a border with Israel, the so-called “second tier” states, to reach out and touch Israel with ballistic missiles confirmed Israel's need for a robust first strike capability.104 Current military contacts between Israel and India, another nuclear power, bring up questions of nuclear cooperation.105 Pakistani sources have already voiced concerns over a possible joint Israeli-Indian attack on Pakistan's nuclear facilities.106 A recent Parameters article speculated on Israel's willingness to furnish nuclear capabilities or assistance to certain states, such as Turkey.107 A retired Israeli Defense Force Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Amnon Shahak, has declared, “all methods are acceptable in withholding nuclear capabilities from an Arab state.”108

As the Israeli bomb comes out of the basement, open discussion, even in Israel, is occurring on why the Israelis feel they need an arsenal not used in at least two if not three wars. Avner Cohen states: “It [Israel] must be in a position to threaten another Hiroshima to prevent another holocaust.”109 In July 1998 Shimon Peres was quoted in the Jordan Times as saying, “We have built a nuclear option, not in order to have a Hiroshima, but to have an Oslo,”110 referring to the peace process.

One list of current reasons for an Israeli nuclear capability is:

To deter a large conventional attack,
To deter all levels of unconventional (chemical, biological, nuclear) attacks,
To preempt enemy nuclear attacks,
To support conventional preemption against enemy nuclear assets,
To support conventional preemption against enemy non-nuclear (conventional, chemical, biological) assets,
For nuclear warfighting,
The “Samson Option” (last resort destruction).111
The most alarming of these is the nuclear warfighting. The Israelis have developed, by several accounts, low yield neutron bombs able to destroy troops with minimal damage to property.112 In 1990, during the Second Gulf War, an Israeli reserve major general recommended to America that it “use non-contaminating tactical nuclear weapons” against Iraq.113 Some have speculated that the Israelis will update their nuclear arsenal to “micronukes” and “tinynukes” which would be very useful to attack point targets and other tactical or barrier (mining) uses.114 These would be very useful for hardened deeply buried command and control facilities and for airfield destruction without exposing Israeli pilots to combat.115 Authors have made the point that Israeli professional military schools do not teach nuclear tactics and would not use them in the close quarters of Israel. Many Israeli officers have attended American military schools where they learned tactical use in crowded Europe.116

However, Jane's Intelligence Review has recently reported an Israeli review of nuclear strategy with a shift from tactical nuclear warheads to long range missiles.117 Israel always has favored the long reach, whether to Argentina for Adolph Eichmann, to Iraq to strike a reactor, Entebbe for hostages, Tunisia to hit the PLO, or by targeting the Soviet Union's cities. An esteemed Israeli military author has speculated that Israel is pursuing an R&D program to provide MIRVs (multiple independent reentry vehicles) on their missiles.118

The government of Israel recently ordered three German Dolphin Class 800 submarine, to be delivered in late 1999. Israel will then have a second strike capability with nuclear cruise missiles, and this capability could well change the nuclear arms race in the Middle East.119 Israeli rhetoric on the new submarines labels them “national deterrent” assets. Projected capabilities include a submarine-launched nuclear missile with a 350-kilometer range.120 Israel has been working on sea launch capability for missiles since the 1960s.121 The first basing options for the new second-strike force of nuclear missile capable submarines include Oman, an Arab nation with unofficial Israeli relations, located strategically near Iran.122 A report indicates that the Israel Defense Ministry has formally gone to the government with a request to authorize a retaliatory nuclear strike if Israel was hit with first strike nuclear weapons. This report comes in the wake of a recent Iran Shihab-3 missile test and indications to Israel that Iran is two to three years from a nuclear warhead.123 Israeli statements stress that Iran's nuclear potential would be problem to all and would require “American leadership, with serious participation of the G-7 . . . .”124

A recent study highlighted Israel's extreme vulnerability to a first strike and an accompanying vulnerability even to a false alarm.125 Syria's entire defense against Israel seems to rest on chemical weapons and warheads.126 One scenario involves Syria making a quick incursion into the Golan and then threatening chemical strikes, perhaps with a new, more lethal (protective-mask-penetrable) Russian nerve gas if Israel resists.127 Their use would drive Israel to nuclear use. Israeli development of an anti- missile defense, the Arrow, a fully fielded (30-50128) Jericho II ballistic missile, and the soon-to-arrive strategic submarine force, seems to have produced a coming change in defense force structure. The Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz, quotes the Israeli Chief of Staff discussing the establishment of a “strategic command to . . . prepare an adequate response to the long term threats. . . ”129

The 1994 accord with Jordan, allowing limited Israeli military presence in Jordanian skies, could make the flying distance to several potential adversaries considerably shorter.130 Israel is concerned about Iran's desire to obtain nuclear weapons and become a regional leader, coupled with large numbers of Shiite Moslems in southern Lebanon. The Israeli Air Force commanding general issued a statement saying Israel would “consider an attack” if any country gets “close to achieving a nuclear capability.”131 The Israelis are obviously considering actions capable of stopping such programs and are buying aircraft such as the F-15I with sufficient operational range. At the first delivery of these 4,000 kilometer range fighters, the Israeli comment was, “the aircraft would help counter a growing nuclear threat.”132 They consider such regional nation nuclear programs to be a sufficient cause for war. Their record of accomplishment is clear: having hit the early Iraqi nuclear effort, they feel vindicated by Desert Storm. They also feel that only the American and Israeli nuclear weapons kept Iraq's Saddam Hussein from using chemical or biological weapons against Israel.133

Israel, like Iran, has desires of regional power. The 1956 alliance with France and Britain might have been a first attempt at regional hegemony. Current debate in the Israeli press considers offering Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and perhaps Syria (after a peace agreement) an Israeli nuclear umbrella of protection.134 A nuclear Iran or Iraq might use its nuclear weapons to protect some states in the region, threaten others, and attempt to control oil prices.135

Another speculative area concerns Israeli nuclear security and possible misuse. What is the chain of decision and control of Israel's weapons? How susceptible are they to misuse or theft? With no open, frank, public debate on nuclear issues, there has accordingly been no debate or information on existing safeguards. This has led to accusations of “monolithic views and sinister intentions.”1360 Would a right wing military government decide to employ nuclear weapons recklessly? Ariel Sharon, an outspoken proponent of “Greater Israel” was quoted as saying, “Arabs may have the oil, but we have the matches.”137 Could the Gush Emunim, a right wing religious organization, or others, hijack a nuclear device to “liberate” the Temple Mount for the building of the third temple? Chances are small but could increase as radicals decry the peace process.138 A 1997 article reviewing the Israeli Defense Force repeatedly stressed the possibilities of, and the need to guard against, a religious, right wing military coup, especially as the proportion of religious in the military increases.139

Israel is a nation with a state religion, but its top leaders are not religious Jews. The intricacies of Jewish religious politics and rabbinical law do affect their politics and decision processes. In Jewish law, there are two types of war, one obligatory and mandatory (milkhemet mitzvah) and the one authorized but optional (milkhemet reshut).140 The labeling of Prime Minister Begin's “Peace for Galilee” operation as a milchemet brera (“war of choice”) was one of the factors causing it to lose support.141 Interpretation of Jewish law concerning nuclear weapons does not permit their use for mutual assured destruction. However, it does allow possession and threatening their use, even if actual use is not justifiable under the law. Interpretations of the law allow tactical use on the battlefield, but only after warning the enemy and attempting to make peace. How much these intricacies affect Israeli nuclear strategy decisions is unknown.142

The secret nature of the Israeli nuclear program has hidden the increasing problems of the aging Dimona reactor and adverse worker health effects. Information is only now public as former workers sue the government. This issue is now linked to continued tritium production for the boosted anti-tank and anti-missile nuclear warheads that Israeli continues to need. Israel is attempting to obtain a new, more efficient, tritium production technology developed in India.143

One other purpose of Israeli nuclear weapons, not often stated, but obvious, is their “use” on the United States. America does not want Israel's nuclear profile raised.144 They have been used in the past to ensure America does not desert Israel under increased Arab, or oil embargo, pressure and have forced the United States to support Israeli diplomatically against the Soviet Union. Israel used their existence to guarantee a continuing supply of American conventional weapons, a policy likely to continue.145

Regardless of the true types and numbers (see Appendix A) of Israeli nuclear weapons, they have developed a sophisticated system, by myriad methods, and are a nuclear power to be reckoned with. Their nuclear ambiguity has served their purposes well but Israel is entering a different phase of visibility even as their nuclear capability is entering a new phase. This new visibility may not be in America's interest.146 Many are predicting the Israeli nuclear arsenal will become less useful “out of the basement” and possibly spur a regional arms race. If so, Israel has a 5-10 year lead time at present before mutual assured destruction, Middle East style, will set in. Would regional mutual second strike capability, easier to acquire than superpower mutual second strike capability, result in regional stability? Some think so.147 Current Israeli President Ezer Weizman has stated “the nuclear issue is gaining momentum [and the] next war will not be conventional.148

Appendix A

Estimates of the Israeli Nuclear Arsenal





Notes

1. Hersh, Seymour M., The Samson Option. Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1991), 223.

2. Aronson, Slomo and Brosh, Oded, The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East, the Opacity Theory, and Reality, 1960-1991-An Israeli Perspective (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1992), 20.

3. Karsh, Efraim, Between War and Peace: Dilemmas of Israeli Security (London, England: Frank Cass, 1996), 82.

4. Cohen, Avner, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 16.

5. Cordesman, Anthony, Perilous Prospects: The Peace Process and the Arab-Israeli Military Balance (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), 118.

6. Pry, Peter, Israel's Nuclear Arsenal (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1984), 5-6.

7. Quoted in Weissman, Steve and Krosney, Herbert. The Islamic Bomb: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East. (New York, New York: Times Books, 1981), 105.

8. “Former Official Says France Helped Build Israel's Dimona Complex.” Nucleonics Week October 16, 1986, 6.

9. Milhollin, Gary, “Heavy Water Cheaters.” Foreign Policy (1987-88): 101-102.

10. Cordesman, 1991, 127.

11. Federation of American Scientists, “Israel's Nuclear Weapons Program.” 10 December 1997, n.p. On-line. Internet, 27 October 1998. Available from http://www.fas.org/nuke/hew/Israel/Isrhist.html.

12. Nashif, Taysir N., Nuclear Weapons in Israel (New Delhi: S. B. Nangia Books, 1996), 3.

13. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 48-49.

14. Bennett, Jeremy, The Suez Crisis. BBC Video. n.d. Videocassette and Raviv, Dan and Melman, Yossi. Every Spy a Prince. The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community. (Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990), 63-69.

15. Weissman and Krosney, 112.

16. “Revealed: The Secrets of Israel's Nuclear Arsenal” (London) Sunday Times No. 8,461, 5 October 1986, 1, 4-5.

17. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 57-59.

18. Peres, Shimon, Battling for Peace. A Memoir (New York, New York: Random House, 1995), 122.

19. Pry, 10.

20. Loftus, John and Aarons, Mark, The Secret War Against the Jews. How Western Espionage Betrayed the Jewish People (New York, New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 1994), 287-303.

21. Green, Stephen, Taking Sides. America's Secret Relations with a Militant Israel (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1984), 152.

22. Cohen, Avner, “Most Favored Nation.” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 51, no. 1 (January-February 1995): 44-53.

23. Hersh, The Samson Option, 196.

24. See Cohen, Avner, “Israel's Nuclear History: The Untold Kennedy-Eshkol Dimona Correspondence.” Journal of Israeli History, 1995 16, no. 2, 159-194 and Cohen, Avner, Comp. “Recently Declassified 1963 Correspondence between President Kennedy and Prime Ministers Ben-Gurion and Eshkol.” Journal of Israeli History, 1995 16, no. 2, 195-207. Much of the documentation has been posted to http:\\www.seas.gwu.edu/nsarchive/israel.

25. Weissman and Krosney, op. cit.,114-117

26. Cohen, op. cit., Israel and the Bomb, 82-83.

27. Spector, Leonard S., The Undeclared Bomb (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishers, 1988), 387 (n.22).

28. Quoted in Stevens, Elizabeth. “Israel's Nuclear Weapons—A Case Study.” 14 pages. On line. Internet, 23 October 1998. Available from
http://infomanage.com/nonproliferati...raelinucs.html.

29. Green, Taking Sides, 148-179 and Raviv, Dan and Melman, Yossi, 1990, 197-198.

30. Weissman and Krosney, 119-124.

31. Black, Ian and Morris, Benny, Israel's Secret Wars. A history of Israel's Intelligence Services (New York, New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991), 418-419.

32. Hersh, 257.

33. Green, Stephen, Living by the Sword: America and Israel in the Middle East, 1968-1987 (London: Faber, 1988), 63-80.

34. Cordesman, 1991, 120.

35. Weissman and Krosney, 124-128 and Raviv, Dan and Melman, Yossi, 1990, 198-199.

36. Spector, The Undeclared Bomb, 395(n. 57).98-199

37. Raviv, Dan and Melman, Yossi, 1990, 58.

38. Milhollin, 100-119.

39. Stanghelle, Harold, “Israel to sell back 10.5 tons.” Arbeiderbladet, Oslo, Norway, 28 June 1990 in: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Nuclear Developments,” 28 June 1990, 34-35; on-line, Internet 22 November 1998, available from http://cns.miis.edu.

40. Hersh, op. cit., 139.

41. Center for Nonproliferation Studies. “Israeli Friends,” ISIS Report, May 1994, 4; on-line, Internet 22 November 1998, available from http://cns.miis.edu.

42. Abecasis, Rachel, “Uranium reportedly offered to China, Israel.” Radio Renascenca, Lisbon, 9 December 1992 quoted in Center for Nonproliferation, “Proliferation Issues,” 23 December, 1992, 25; on-line, Internet 22 November 1998, available from http://cns.miis.edu.

43. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, op. cit., 231-232 and 256-257.

44. Nordeen, Lon O., Nicolle, David, Phoenix over the Nile (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1996), 192-193.

45. O'Balance, Edgar, The Third Arab-Israeli War (London: Faber and Faber, 1972), 54.

46. Brecher, Michael, Decision in Crisis. Israel, 1967 and 1973 (Berkley, California: University of California Press, 1980), 104, 230-231.

47. Cohen, Avner. “Cairo, Dimona, and the June 1967 War.” Middle East Journal 50, no. 2 (Spring 1996), 190-210.

48. Creveld, Martin van. The Sword and the Olive. A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force (New York, New York: Public Affairs, 1998), 174.

49. Burrows, William E. and Windrem, Robert, Critical Mass. The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World (New York, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 282-283.

50. Aronson, Shlomo, Israel's Nuclear Options, ACIS Working Paper No. 7. Los Angeles, California: University of California Center for Arms Control and International Security, 1977, 3, and Sorenson, David S., “Middle East Regional Studies-AY99,” Air War College: Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, 542.

51. Hersh, op. cit., 126-128.

52. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, op. cit., 210-213.

53. Spector, Leonard S., “Foreign-Supplied Combat Aircraft: Will They Drop the Third World Bomb?” Journal of International Affairs 40, no. 1(1986): 145 (n. 5) and Green, Living by the Sword, op. cit., 18-19.

54. Burrows and Windrem, op. cit., 280.

55. Cohen, op. cit., Israel and the Bomb, 237.

56. Ibid., 273-274.

57. Milhollin, op. cit., 103-104.

58. Raviv, Dan and Melman, Yossi, Friend in Deed: Inside the U.S.-Israel Alliance (New York New York: Hyperion, 1994), 299.

59. Burrows and Windrem, op. cit., 464-465 and Raviv, Dan and Melman, Yossi, op. cit., 1990, 304-305.

60. Spector, The Undeclared Bomb, op. cit., 179.

61. Dowty, Alan. “Israel and Nuclear Weapons.” Midstream 22, no. 7 (November 1976), 8-9.

62. Hersh, op. cit., 217, 222-226, and Weissman and Krosney, op. cit., 107.

63. Green, op. cit., Living by the Sword, 90-99.

64. Loftus and Aarons, op. cit., 316-317.

65 Smith, Gerard C. and Cobban, Helena. “A Blind Eye To Nuclear Proliferation.” Foreign Affairs 68, no. 3(1989), 53-70.

66. Hersh, op. cit., 230-231.

67. O'Balance, Edgar, No Victor, No Vanquished. The Yom Kippur War (San Rafael, California: Presido Press, 1978), 175.

68. Ibid., 234-235 and Aronson, S, op. cit., 15-18.

69. Spector, The Undeclared Bomb, op. cit., 396 (n. 62); Garthoff, Raymond L., Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1994), 426, n76 and Bandmann, Yona and Cordova, Yishai. “The Soviet Nuclear Threat Towards the Close of the Yom Kippur War.” Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 1980 5, no. 1, 107-9.

70. Cherkashin, Nikolai, “On Moscow's Orders.” Russian Life, 39, no. 10 (October 1996), 13-15.

71. Brownlow, Cecil. “Soviets poise three-front global drive. Nuclear weapons in Egypt, artillery buildup at Guantanamo, Communist concentrations in Vietnam aimed at political gains.” Aviation Week and Space Technology 99, no. 19 (5 November 1973), 12-14; Holt, Robert. “Soviet Power Play.” Aviation Week and Space Technology 99, no. 19 (5 November 1973), 7 and Gur-Arieh, Danny, “A non-Conventional Look at Israel During '73 War.” IsraelWire Tuesday, October 6, 1998 17, 23; on-line, Internet 20 November 1998, available from http://www.israelwire.com/new/981006/9810068.html.

72. Hersh, op. cit., 321-235.

73. Creveld, 1998, op. cit., 220-221.

74. Evron, Yair, Israel's Nuclear Dilemma (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Publishing, 1994), 62-74.

75. Cohen, Avner, “Peres: Peacemaker, Nuclear Pioneer.” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 52, no. 3 (May/June 1996), 16-17 and Aronson, S, op. cit., 11-12.

76. Karsh, op. cit., 86.

77. Quoted in Hersh, op. cit., 180 and Stevens, op. cit., 1-14.

78. Hersh, op. cit., 216, 276 and Kaku, Michio. “Contingency Plans: Nuclear Weapons after the Cold War.” In Altered States: A Reader in the New World Order, Bennis, Phyllis and Moushabeck, Michel, Eds. (New York, New York: 1993), 66.

79. Weissman and Krosney, op. cit., 109.

80. Gillette, Robert, “Uranium Enrichment: Rumors of Israeli Progress with Lasers.” Science 183, no. 4130 (22 March 1974), 1172-1174.

81. Barnaby, Frank, The Invisible Bomb: The Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris, 1988), 25.

82. “Israel: The Covert Connection.” Frontline, PBS Network, May 16, 1989, quoted in Spector, Leonard S., and McDonough, Mark G., with Medeiros, Evan S., Tracking Nuclear Proliferation. A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1995 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995).

83. Nashif, Taysir N., Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East: Dimensions and Responsibilities (Princeton, New Jersey: Kingston Press, 1984), 22-23.

84. Hersh, op. cit., 216.

85. Barnaby, Frank, “Capping Israel's Nuclear Volcano,” Between War and Peace. Dilemmas of Israeli Security, edited by Efraim Karsh (London, England: Frank Cass, 1996), 98.

86. Hersh, op. cit., 271-275.

87. Nashif, op. cit., 32.

88. Gaffney, Mark, Dimona: The Third Temple? The Story Behind the Vanunu Revelation (Brattleboro, Vermont: Amana Books, 1989), 100-101.

89. Pedatzur, Re'uven, “South African Statement On Nuclear Test Said to Serve Israel,” Ha'aretz, 29 July 1997. On line: Internet, 22 November 1998 and Kelley, Robert. “The Iraqi and South African Nuclear W”ôNuclear Abstracts," 1 March 1996, or on-line, Internet, 22 November 1998, both available from http://cns.miis.edu.

90. “Was there a Nuclear Test near Eilat?” IsraelWire, 16 June 1998, or on line Internet, 22 November, 1998, available from http://www.israelwire.com and “Deputy Defense Minister Denies Israeli Nuclear Testing.” Israeli Wire, June 18, 1998, or on-line. Internet, 13 October 1998, available from http://www.israelwire.com/New/980618/9806184.html.

91. McKinnon, Dan. Bullseye One Reactor. The Story of Israel's Bold Surprise Air Attack That Destroyed Iraqi's Nuclear Bomb Facility (Shrewsbury, England: Airlife Publishing Ltd., 1987).

92. “Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, Report on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Moscow, 1993.” Journal of Palestine Studies XXII, no. 4 (Summer 1993): 135-140; Creveld, Martin van, Nuclear Proliferation and the Future Of Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1993), 105; and Clark, Philip. “ôThird successful Israeli satellite launch.” Jane's Intelligence Review 7, no. 6 (June 1995), 25-26.

93. Sunday Times, London, op. cit., 1,4-5.

94. Toscano, Louis, Triple Cross: Israel, the Atomic Bomb and the Man Who Spilled the Secrets (New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1990).

95. Green, Living by the Sword, op. cit., 134.

96. Spector, The Undeclared Bomb, op. cit., 165-166.

97. Hersh, op. cit., 291.

98. Levran, Aharon, Israeli Strategy after Desert Storm: Lessons from the Second Gulf War (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 1-10.

99. Burrows and Windrem, op. cit., 278.

100. Cohen, Avner and Miller, Marvin, Nuclear Shadows in the Middle East: Prospects for Arms Control in the Wake of the Gulf Crisis (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1990), 10.

101. Aronson and Brosh, op. cit., 276.

102. Raviv and Melman, op. cit., 399.

103. Burrows and Windrem, op. cit., 297n and Creveld, 1998, op. cit., 321-322.

104. Levran, op. cit., 8-10.

105. Ahmar, Moonis, “Pakistan and Israel: Distant Adversaries or Neighbors?” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 1996, 20, no.1, 43-44.

106. “Nuclear proliferation didn't start in 1998 . . .and not in Pakistan nor with Islam,” Middle East Realities, or on-line, Internet, 21 September 1998, available from http://www.middleeast.org/1998_06_28.htm.

107. Garrity, Patrick J. “The Next Nuclear Questions.” Parameters, XXV, no. 4 (Winter 1995-96), 92-111.

108. Cohen, Eliezer. Israel's best defense: the First Full Story of the Israeli Air Force, (New York, New York: Random House, 1993), 495.

109. Cohen and Miller, op. cit., 18.

110. “Before Meeting with King, Peres Claims Israel's Nuclear Arsenal was built for Peace,” Jordan Times, July 14, 1998. Quoted in Sorenson, op. cit., 542.

111. Beres, Louis Rene, “Israel's Bomb in the Basement: A revisiting of `Deliberate Ambiguity' vs. `Disclosure', Between War and Peace: Dilemmas of Israeli Security, edited by Efraim Harsh (London, England: Frank Cass, 1996), 113-133.

112. Hersh, op. cit., 319.

113. Amos, Deborah, Lines in the Sand: Desert Storm and the Remaking of the Arab World (New York, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 105.

114. Dowler, Thomas W. and Howard II, Joseph H., “Countering the threat of the well-armed tyrant: A modest proposal for small nuclear weapons,” Strategic Review, XIX, no. 4 (Fall 1991), 34-40.

115. Beres, Louis Rene, “Israel's bomb in the basement: A revisiting of `Deliberate Ambiguity' vs. `Disclosure.' ” In Karsh, Efraim, op. cit., Editor, Between War and Peace: Dilemmas of Israeli Security (London, England: Frank Cass, 1996), 116.

116. Cordesman, op. cit., 1996, 265.

117. Hough, Harold, “Israel reviews its nuclear deterrent,” Jane's Intelligence Review 10, no.11 (November 1998), 11-13.

118. Creveld, op. cit., 1993, 105.

119. Burrows, and Windrem, op. cit., 311-312 and “Israel begins test of nuclear missile submarines,” The Irish Times, July 2, 1998, or on-line, Internet, 24 December 1998, available from http://www.irish-times.com/irish-tim...702/wor13.html.

120. Melman, Yossi, “Swimming with the Dolphins,” Ha'aretz, Tuesday, June 9, 1998, and “Report: Israel to get Subs with Nuclear Strike Capability,” Jerusalem Post, I July 3, 1998, 3 and Sorenson, op. cit., 543.

121. Raviv, Dan and Melman, Yossi, op. cit., 1990, 344-345, 422-423.

122. Shahak, Israel, Open Secrets: Israeli Nuclear and Foreign Policies (London: Pluto Press, 1997), 72-73.

123. Davis, Douglas, “Defense Officials Said Urging Nuclear Second-Strike Capability,” Jerusalem Post, 6 August 1998, 3; or on-line, Internet, 22 November 1998, available from http://cns.miis.edu.

124. Inbar, Efraim, “Israel's security in a new international environment,” in Karsh, Efraim, Editor, Between War and Peace: Dilemmas of Israeli Security (London, England: Frank Cass, 1996), 41.

125. Hough, Harold, “Could Israel's Nuclear Assets Survive a First Strike?” Jane's Intelligence Review, September 1997, 407-410.

126. Terrill, W. Andrew, “The Chemical Warfare Legacy of the Yemen War.” Comparative Strategy, 10 (1991), 109-119.

127. Boyne, Sean, “Across the Great Divide. Will Assad go for the Golan?” Jane's Intelligence Review, 10, no. 4 (April 1998), 21-24 and Cordesman, 1996, op. cit., 254.

128. Cordesman, op. cit., 1996, 243.

129, Harel, Amos and Barzilai, Amnon, “Mordechai says Arrow alone cannot protect against missiles,” Ha'aretz, 13 January 1999, or on-line, Internet, 13 January 1999, available from http://www3.haaretz.co.il/eng/htmls/3_9.htm

130. Shahak, op. cit., 78-79.

131. Chubin, Shahram, “Does Iran Want Nuclear Weapons?” Survival 37, no. 1 (Spring 1995), 91-93.

132. O'Sullivan, Arich, “New F-15I Warplanes Expand Israel's Reach,” The Jerusalem Post, 19 January 1997, or on-line, Internet 22 November 1998, available from http://www.jpost.co.il.

133. Karsh, op. cit., 9.

134. Shahak, op. cit., 4-5.

135. Garrity, op. cit., 92-111.

136. Dowty, op. cit., 8.

137. Gaffney, op. cit., 165.

138. Ibid., 37-38 and Friedman, Robert I. Zealots for Zion: Inside Israel's West Bank Settlement Movement (New York, New York: Random House, 1992), 132-52.

139. Blanche, Ed, “Is the Myth Fading for the Israeli Army? — Part 1.” Jane's Intelligence Review, 8, no. 12 (December 1996), 547-550 and Blanche, Ed. “Is the myth fading for the Israeli Army? — Part 2,” Jane's Intelligence Review 9, no. 1 (January 1997), 25-28.

140. Cohen, Stuart A., The Scroll or the Sword? Dilemmas of Religion and Military Service in Israel (Amsterdam, Netherlands: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1997), 11-24.

141. Creveld, op. cit., 1998, 298.

142. Broyde, Michael J., “Fighting the War and the Peace: Battlefield Ethics, Peace Talks, Treaties, and Pacifism in the Jewish Tradition,” or on-line, Internet, 20 November 1998, available from http://www.jlaw.com/Articles/war3.html.

143. Hough, Harold, op. cit., 1998, 11-12 and Berger, Julian, “Court Fury At Israeli Reactor.” Guardian, 13 October 1997, in Center for Nonproliferation, “Nuclear Abstracts,” 13 October 1997, or on-line, Internet, 22 November 1998, available from http://cns.miis.edu.

144. Creveld, op. cit., 1998, 252.

145. Valry, Nicholas, “Israel's Silent Gamble with the Bomb,” New Scientist (12 December 1974), 807-09.

146. Harden, Major James D., Israeli Nuclear Weapons and War in the Middle East, Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, December 1997.

147. Dowdy, op. cit., 20.

148. Aronson, Geoffrey, “Hidden Agenda: US-Israeli Relations and the Nuclear Question,” Middle East Journal, 46, no. 4 (Autumn 1992), 619-630.

149. Data from Time, 12 April 1976, quoted in Weissman and Krosney, op. cit., 107.

150. Burrows and Windrem, op. cit., 280 and Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, op. cit., 273-274.

151. Tahtinen, Dale R., The Arab-Israel Military Balance Today (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1973), 34.

152. “How Israel Got the Bomb.” Time, 12 April 1976, 39.

153. Burrows and Windrem, op. cit., 302.

154. Kaku, op. cit., 66 and Hersh, op. cit., 216.

155. Valéry, op. cit., 807-09.

156. Data from CIA, quoted in Weissman and Krosney, op. cit., 109.

157. Ottenberg, Michael, “Estimating Israel's Nuclear Capabilities,” Command, 30 (October 1994), 6-8.

158. Pry, op. cit., 75.

159. Ibid., 111.

160. Data from NBC Nightly News, quoted in Milhollin, op. cit., 104 and Burrows and Windrem, op. cit., 308.

161. Data from Vanunu quoted in Milhollin, op. cit., 104.

162. Harkavy, Robert E. “After the Gulf War: The Future of the Israeli Nuclear Strategy,” The Washington Quarterly (Summer 1991), 164.

163. Burrows and Windrem, op. cit., 308.

164. Albright, David, Berkhout, Frans and Walker, William, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996. World Inventories, Capabilities, and Policies (New York: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute And Oxford University Press, 1997), 262-263.

165. Hough, Harold, “Israel's Nuclear Infrastructure,” Jane's Intelligence Review 6, no. 11 (November 1994), 508.

166. Ibid., 262-263.

167. Spector, and McDonough, with Medeiros, op. cit., 135.

168. Burrows and Windrem, op. cit., 283-284.

169. Cordesman, op. cit., 1996, 234.

170. Ibid., 234.

171. Ibid., 230, 243.

172. Brower, Kenneth S., “A Propensity for Conflict: Potential Scenarios and Outcomes of War in the Middle East,” Jane's Intelligence Review, Special Report no. 14, (February 1997), 14-15.

173. Albright, Berkhout, and Walker, op. cit., 262-263.

USAF Counterproliferation Center

The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established in 1998 to provide education and research to the present and future leaders of the USAF, and thereby help them better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction.

Barry R. Schneider, Director
USAF Counterproliferation Center
325 Chennault Circle
Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427k

(334) 953-7538 (DSN (493-7538)

Email: Barry.Schneider@maxwell,af.mil

New Reports of Israeli-South African Nuclear Collaboration
April 21, 1997

According to a report published in the Israeli daily paper Ha'aretz on Sunday
April 20, 1997. Israel assisted South Africa in developing nuclear weapons in
the early 1980s. The paper based its report on interviews with South African
officials, including Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad, and retired Gen.
Constand Viljoen, who was South African chief of staff from 1980-1985, the
period during which nuclear weapon development took place.

Speculation about such cooperation has been rife since the detection of a
suspected nuclear test over the South Atlantic in 1979 (never tied to any
country). Firm information about at least indirect nuclear cooperation
between the two countries has been available since South Africa declassified
its weapon program in 1993. South Africa has previously revealed receiving
gram quantities of tritium, a critical material for advanced weapons, from
Israel but authoritative reports of direct collaboration in weapon development
has so far been lacking.

Pahad, however, told Haaretz that Israeli and South African scientists
cooperated "on very specific equipment" designed for military use. "The
nuclear issue was top secret and many documents were destroyed," Pahad said.
He could not be reached by the Associated Press for further comment. However,
aides said that the deputy foreign minister has made similar statements in
the past.

Viljoen, was quoted as saying, "We wanted to get nuclear knowledge from whoever
we could, also from Israel."

Haaretz also cited past reports that Israel purchased 550 tons of uranium from South
Africa for its own nuclear plant in Dimona. In exchange, Israel supplied South Africa
with nuclear know-how and material to increase the power of nuclear warheads, the
newspaper said.

(Reports from Associated Press were used in preparing this article.)

Israel is believed to possess the largest and most sophisticated arsenal outside of the five declared nuclear powers. Israel has never admitted possessing nuclear weapons, but abundant information is available showing that the capability exists.

A short essay on the history of Israel's nuclear weapons program
April 1997 revelations about Israeli-South African nuclear collaboration
The center of Israel's weapons program is the Negev Nuclear Research Center near the desert town of Dimona (the center is usually identified simply as "Dimona"). A nuclear reactor and plutonium production facility was built by France at this facility in the late 1950s and early 60s. All of the production and fabrication of special nuclear materials (plutonium, lithium-6 deuteride, and enriched and unenriched uranium) occurs at Dimona although the design and assembly of nuclear weapons occurs elsewhere.

October 1997 news stories about workers health and safety at Dimona

Click on images for close-ups
This is an image of the Dimona facility taken by a US Corona spy satellite in 1971 (Mission 1115-2, 29 September 1971, Frame: 52, 53). It is physically impossible to take a similar image within the atmosphere as Israel jealously protects the airspace above Dimona. In the 1960s an Israeli Airforce Mirage was shot down when it accidentally ventured too close to Dimona.
A closeup of the same Corona frames.
Side-by-side comparison of a Corona image and the much lower resolution SPOT commercial imaging satellite. The SPOT image lables the Dimona nuclear reactor dome and Machon 2 which houses the plutonium separation plant.
Satellite images courtesy John Pike at the Federation of American Scientists, see the FAS Intelligence Resource Program page. The SPOT Image was acquired and exploited by Peter Zimmerman.


The Dimona Reactor Dome (courtesy Mordechai Vanunu) (34 K)

Mordechai Vanunu (17 K)

The most specific and detailed information to be made public about its nuclear program came from a former mid-level nuclear technician named Mordechai Vanunu. Vanunu had worked at the Machon 2 facility, where plutonium is produced and bomb components fabricated, for 9 years before his increasing involvement in left wing pro-Palestinian politics led to his dismissal in 1986. Due to lax internal security, prior to his departure he managed to take about 60 photographs covering nearly every part of Machon 2.

Mordechai Vanunu (35 K)

After travelling around the world for several months in Bohemian style, he converted to Christianity in Australia. The religious group he associated with has an activist anti-nuclear bent and he soon decided to make public his knowledge of Israel's nuclear weapons capability. He made contact with the London Sunday Times which flew him to London and began preparing an exclusive news story. Unfortunately for Vanunu, the Israeli government had found out about his activities and the Mossad arranged to kidnap him and bring him back to Israel for trial.

Mordechai Vanunu revealing details of his capture (39 K)

For an even bigger image (57 K) click here.

He was successfully lured into a trap by a female Israeli agent named Cheryl Bentov operating under the name of "Cindy". His sudden disappearance before the publication of the Sunday Times story was mysterious at the time. The story was finally published several days later on 5 October 1986. A few motnhs later Vanunu's status as a prisoner of the Israeli government was confirmed when it was revealed that he would stand trial. Despite being essentially incommunicado, Vanunu managed to reveal details of his capture in dramatic fashion when he wrote the information on the palm of his hand, and held it up for news photographers as he was being whisked away from the courthouse.

As described by Vanunu, the Dimona complex has nine buildings ("Machons", Hebrew for "facility") including to the reactor building. The plant employs 2700 people.

Control room of the Machon 2 plutonium separation plant (courtesy Mordechai Vanunu) (31 K)

Machon 1 is the reactor building with its 60 foot silver dome.
Machon 2 is where Vanunu worked, along 150 other people. From outside, Machon 2 is a nondescript two story windowless building 80 feet wide and 200 feet long. The above-ground structure houses an air filtration plant, some offices, storage space, and a worker's canteen. Also in the structure is the entrance to limited access elevators that transport people to the six underground levels, extending eightly feet below the surface. This hidden area houses an automated Purex plutonium separation plant, plutonium fabrication and reclamation shops, and fabrication shops for bomb components made out of lithium deuteride and beryllium. The separation plant is housed in a production hall (called "The Tunnel" that occupies the first four levels. Level 5 is the fabrication area for plutonium, lithium deuteride, and beryllium. The Tunnel normally operates one 34 week long "production campaign" each year, being closed for servicing and refurbishment the rest of the year.
Machon 3 is a chemical plant that produces lithium-6 deuteride and also processes natural uranium and fabricates reactor fuel rods.
Machon 4 is a waste treatment plant for the radioactive effluent from the plutonium extraction process in Machon 2 . This plant presumably converts the waste products for convenient disposal, and may also separate the uranium for reuse.
Machon 5 coats the uranium fuel rodes with aluminum.
Machon 6 is the physical plant for Dimona, providing power and other services.
Machon 8 (there is no Machon 7) contains a laboratory for testing and process development. This building houses Unit 840, which operates gas centrifuges for enriching uranium.
Machon 9 houses a laser isotope enrichment plant, also for enriching uranium.
Machon 10 produces depleted uranium metal for anti-armor ammunition use.
Bomb components made of plutonium, lithium-6 deuteride, and beryllium are fabricated in level 5 of Machon 2. They are transported by convoys of unmarked cars to the warhead assembly facility, operated by Rafael north of Haifa.

The principal uncertainty in evaluating Israel's weapon production capability is the actual power level of the Dimona reactor. It has long been believed that Israel has upgraded the reactor repeatedly to increase its plutonium production. Vanunu claimed that Israel possessed 100-200 nuclear weapons (implying some 400-800 kg of plutonium) and can produce 40 kg of plutonium a year. This production figure indicates an average operating power of 150 MW thermal. Analysts generally discount figures this high, and the consensus is that it was initially operated at 40 MW and was upgraded to 70 MW sometime before 1977. A 1996 study by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) produced a somewhat lower range of estimates, concluding that Israel has produced 330-580 kg of plutonium through 1995, enough for a stockpile of 80-150 efficient weapons (the extreme estimate range was 190 to 880 kg).

Vanunu provided information indicating that the uranium fuel is subjected to burnups of 400 MW-days/tonne, a figure similar to that used by the US early in its weapons production program. This results in a high grade plutonium with a Pu-240 content of 2%. According to Vanunu 140 fuel rods are irradiated for periods of about three months before discharge for plutonium extraction. At 70 MW the Dimona reactor would consume some 48 tonnes of fuel a year and produce about 18 kg of plutonium.

Vanunu also claimed that Israel possessed fusion boosted weapons, and has developed hydrogen bomb technology. He provided information about both lithium-6 and tritium production. He stated that initially tritium was produced by a facility in Machon 2 called Unit 92 by separating it from the heavy water moderator where it is produced in small amounts as a by-product. In 1984 production was expanded when a new facility called Unit 93 was opened to extract tritium from enriched lithium that had been irradiated in the reactor. The large scale production of tritium by Israel has been confirmed by South Africa, which received a shipments of tritium totalling 30 g during 1977-79. This clearly indicates tritium production on a scale sufficient for a weapon boosting program. It is difficult to find any other rationale for such a large tritium production capability except some sort of thermonuclear weapon application.

Mock-up of an Israeli Bomb (courtesy Mordechai Vanunu) (46 K)

It is quite difficult to develop gas fusion boosting technology like that used in US weapons and weapons tests are probably essential. Although radiation implosion weapons could be developed without testing, they would tend to be large and heavy and would perhaps be incompatible with Israel's available delivery systems. It is quite possible then that a Sloika/Alarm Clock type system has been developed using lithium-6 deuteride fuel surrounding the plutonium core (in fact a weapon mock-up photographed by Vanunu appears to be this type of weapon). Tritium could be used to spike the fusion fuel and boost the yield, just as the Soviets did with the 400 Kt "Joe-4".

Bomb components made of plutonium, lithium-6 deuteride, and beryllium are fabricated in level 5 of Machon 2. They are transported by convoys of unmarked cars to the warhead assembly facility, operated by Rafael north of Haifa.

Hersh reports (without any stated source) that Israel has developed an extensive array of tactical nuclear weapons: efficient compact boosted fission bombs, neutron bombs (allegedly numbering in the hundreds by the mid-eighties), nuclear artillery shells, and nuclear mines. With an arsenal that is quite possibly in excess of 100 weapons it is likely that some of the nuclear materials would be applied tactical weapons. Boosted bombs are doubtful, as are neutron bombs, due to problems with development in the absence of a significant testing program. Neutron bombs also require very large amounts of tritium (20-30 g per weapon) which would impact the production of plutonium quite seriously (each gram of tritium displaces 80 grams of plutonium production). Artillery shells are also doubtful due to their wastefulness in plutonium. Tactical weapons are probably aircraft or missile delivered, or are pre-emplaced mines.

Burrows and Windrem claim (without indicating a source) that Israel has produced 300 warheads, including those that have since been dismantled. They place the current arsenal at about 200 weapons.

Several reports have surfaced claiming that Israel has some uranium enrichment capability at Dimona. Vanunu asserted that gas centrifuges were operating in Machon 8, and that a laser enrichment plant was being operated in Machon 9 (Israel holds a 1973 patent on laser isotopic enrichment). According to Vanunu the production-scale plant has been operating since 1979-80. The scale of a centrifuge operation would necessarily be limited due to space constraints, and might be focused toward enriching depleted reactor fuel to more efficiently use Israel's uranium supply. A laser enrichment system, if developed to operational status, could be quite compact however and might be producing weapon grade material in substantial quantities. If highly enriched uranium is being produced in substantial quantities, then Israel's nuclear arsenal could be much larger than estimated solely from plutonium production.

Reports that Zalman Shapiro, the American owner of the nuclear fuel processing company NUMEC, supplied enriched uranium to Israel in the 1960s seems to have been authoritatively refuted by Hersh.

Israel produces uranium domestically as a by-product of phosphate mining near the Dead Sea but this amounts to only 10 tons a year, and is grossly insufficient for its needs. Israel has addressed this shortfall by reprocessing the low burnup spent fuel to recover uranium (which most nations do not do). It is also known to have purchased at least 200 tons of natural uranium on the world market under an alias. A major source though was some 600 tons of uranium provided by South Africa in a quid pro quo for Israel's assistance on its weapons program. Combined with uranium recycling, and the possible use of enrichment to stretch the uranium supply, these quantities may be sufficient to account for Dimona's fuel supply to the present date (1997).

Israel can undoubtedly deploy nuclear weapons using its capable air force. The aircraft and crews dedicated to nuclear weapons delivery are located at the Tel Nof airbase. Originally the F-4 Phantom II acquired in 1969 was probably the designated carrier, today it would be the F-16. The F-16 has an unrefueled radius of action of 1250 km, extending out to western Iran, the shores of the Black Sea, Riyadh, or the Libyan border. With refueling it can travel much farther of course, and an unrefueled one-way mission could take it as far as Moscow.

Israel also possesses medium-range ballistic missiles: the Jericho-1 (Ya-1 "Luz") with a 500 kg payload, and a range of 480-650 km (operational since 1973); and the Jericho 2 (either Ya-2 or Ya-3) with a 1000 kg payload and a range of over 1500 km (operational since 1990). Under development is the Jericho-2B with a range of 2,500 km. These missiles were almost certainly developed specifically as nuclear delivery systems (although chemical warheads cannot be ruled out). About 50 Jericho-1s and 50 Jericho-2s are believed to have been deployed. Israel also has a 100 or more US supplied Lance tactical missiles, with a range of 115 km (72 miles). Although these were supplied with conventional warheads, they could have been outfitted with nuclear or chemical ones.

Jericho 1
This is believed to be named Luz and designated YA-1 by Israel. It is based on the French missile MD-600 built by Dassault and was developed during the 1960s.

Specifications
Length: 10 m
Width 1.0 m
Launch weight 4500 kg
Propulsion: Two stage solid propellant
Range: 500 km
Payload: 500 kg


Jericho 2
Jericho-2 development is indigenous, and started soon after the Jericho-1 was deployed. Test launches began in 1986 and the first two had ranges of 465 km (1986) and 820 km (1987). The Jericho-2 shares the first two stages of the civilian Shavit (Comet) space launch vehicle, which has launched Israel's four satellites, the Offeq-1, 2, and 3 reconnaissance satellites, and the Amos communications satellite.

Shavit space launch vehicle, Offeq-2 launch on 3 April 1990 (13 K)


Specifications
Length: 12 m
Width 1.2 m
Launch weight 6500 kg
Propulsion: Two stage solid propellant
Range: 1500 km
Payload: 1000 kg


The Jericho 1 and 2 are deployed near Kfar Zachariah and Sderot Micha in the Judean foothills, about 23 km east of Jerusalem (and about 40 km southeast of Tel Aviv). Located a few kilometers to the northwest is Tel Nof air base. Images of the missile complex made by commercial satellites have been published in recent years, and September 1997 Jane's Intelligence Review published a 3-D analysis of high resolution pictures taken by the Indian IRS-C satellite.

The complex is compact - smaller than 6 km x 4 km. The missiles are mobile, being deployed on transporter-erector-launchers (TELs), and are based in bunkers tunneled into the side of the limestone hills. There are no signs of missile silos. TELs require firm, accurately leveled ground in order to launch, and maximum missile accuracy requires pre-surveyed launch points. Consequently there are a number of prepared launch pads (paved culs-de-sac) connected to these bunkers by paved roads. Images of an actual Jericho 2 TEL indicate that it is about 16 m long, 4 m wide, and 3 m high. It is accompanied by three support vehicles (probably a power supply vehicle, a firing control vehicle, and a communications vehicle). The Zachariah missile base was enlarged between 1989 and 1993 during the Jericho-2 deployment. A few kilometers north of Tel Nof is the Be'er Yaakov factory where the Jericho missiles and the Shavit are believed to have been manufactured.

From its deployment location in central Israel the Jericho-1 missile can reach such targets as Damascus, Aleppo, and Cairo. The Jericho-2 can reach any part of Syria or Iraq, and as far as Teheran, and Benghazi, Libya. The Jericho-2B will be able to reach any part of Libya or Iran, and as far as southern Russia. The short range of the Lance limits it mainly to battlefield use, although the Syrian capital of Damascus is in range from much of northern Israel. According to Jane's World Air Forces, Israel has three Jericho-equipped missile squadrons.

Also located at the site are a group of 21 bunkers thought to contain nuclear gravity bombs. Five of the larger ones are about 15 m wide and 20 m long, and rise 6 m above ground.

Israel has taken active steps to prevent nations that are officially at war with it from acquiring nuclear capabilities. The bombing of the Osiraq reactor in Iraq in 1981 is the most famous case, but an earlier sabotage of the reactor core in France prior to shipment is probably attributable to Mossad.

Israel's official policy is that it will not be the first nation to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. In contrast to the coy hinting of some undeclared weapon's states, Israel thus actively denies possessing nuclear weapons. Its obvious capability in this regard has thus established de facto deterrence, while minimizing (but not eliminating) domestic and international controversy.

JERUSALEM (AFP) Feb 02, 2004
The upcoming release of Mordechai Vanunu, the whistleblower jailed for exposing Israel's nuclear arsenal, was never going to be an easy pill to swallow but it comes at a difficult time for the Jewish state, under growing pressure to come clean about its atomic weapons programme.
Vanunu, who worked as a technician at the Dimona nuclear facility in southern Israel, was sentenced to 18 years in prison in 1986 after giving details about Israel's secret weapons programme to Britain's Sunday Times.

Israeli agents subsequently lured Vanunu from London to Italy, where he was kidnapped and brought to Israel. Tried in secret, he was sentenced to 18 years in prison.

But his upcoming release, scheduled for April 21, comes at a difficult time for Israel which is facing increasing diplomatic pressure following a recent declaration by Libya that it would renounce its non-conventional weapons programme.

A month earlier, Iran said it would suspend its uranium enrichment programme and allow nuclear inspections, turning the spotlight firmly onto the monitoring of non-conventional weapons in the Middle East.

Although Israel has firmly adhered to a policy of "nuclear ambiguity", never confirming or denying it possessed nuclear weapons, foreign experts believe the Jewish state holds at least 200 atomic warheads.

With Vanunu's release likely to draw unwelcome additional attention to Israel's undeclared arsenal, Israel's security establishment is planning to use drastic measures to curb his freedom, the Yediot Aharonot daily said Monday.

"The security establishment is almost certain that if Vanunu is allowed to go on his way, he will leave Israel and begin to sing. To prevent this problem ... the justice ministry and defence ministry are examining a number of possibilities, all based on emergency regulations," the paper reported.

The "package of restrictions" could include putting Vanunu in administrative detention, stopping him from leaving the country and restricting his movement inside Israel.

Under administrative detention regulations, the authorities can detain a suspect for renewable periods of six months without charges or trial. It is a practise frequently used to detain suspected Palestinian militants.

Moreover, Vanunu's correspondence would be monitored and he would be required to regularly check in with police, the paper said.

Under such regulations "if he against lets his tongue loose, he can be tried and thrown into jail".

Security officials claim the tough measures are necessary, as Vanunu has declared his intention in numerous letters to reveal new secrets about Israel's nuclear weapons programme upon his release.

Although it was impossible to know whether or not Vanunu still had "dangerous" information, his forthcoming release would put Israel in a difficult position because it will focus attention back on the nuclear agenda, a former senior military official said.

"It will be very inconvenient because Israel's interest is, of course, to keep this issue as quiet as possible," he told AFP, speaking on condition of anonymity.

"One has to assume that he will going on telling whatever he knows," he said.

Asked whether he believed Vanunu still knew information that could damage Israel's security, the source said: "It's quite possible that he does."

Despite Vanunu's revelations to the Sunday Times, there was quite a lot of information available about Israel and its nuclear capability, and his actions did not actually damage the state's policy of ambiguity, he said.

Dan Yakir, chief legal counsel for the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, said Vanunu would have little recourse to fight any surveillance measures or restrictions taken against him.

"Unfortunately, there are ways to restrict a person administratively under the Emergency Defence Regulations of 1945 and other legal instruments," he said, referring to a draconian set of laws drafted during the British mandate, but still used by Israel in the Palestinian territories.

He said any appeal against the planned restrictions would have to be fought in the Supreme Court.

"The 1945 Emergency Defence Regulations are currently being used in the occupied territories but its use against Israelis is very rare," Yakir said.

The former security official said although such restrictive measures would have to be legally sanctioned, it was highly possible they could successfully prevent Vanunu from leaking further information.

"In 1986, he had nothing to lose, now he will have his freedom to lose," he said. "Everything is relative in life. There is a big difference between being in a prison cell and being free in Israel."

For those who just a few days ago said "Don't worry this will blow over, and wait and see how this things blows up in Europe and Japan." And for those who have seemed to find a new terminology of calling people who view negative news as negative, PARANOID and those who view negative news as positive as REALIST I thought I'd search for first news that comes on all the world wires. Now this is not Pakistani "crazy" journalist, who have nothing btter to do, though where noted you'll find some links to that as well. But anyways here goes.

North Korea Launched Nuclear Program Under Deal With Pakistan:Report

Britian Profoundly Concered Over Nuclear Scandal In Pakistan

US Helps Pakistan Safeguard Nuclear Material

Pakistan Pledges IAEA Cooperation

Tip Of Iceberg

Pakistan Leaks Prompts Western Resolve

US Program To Protect Pakistan's Arsenal

Annan Calls Pakistan Pardon For Nuke Scientist Odd


Reading op-eds from Washingont Post and NY Times and others further makes one wonder whether these two schools of thought (amongst our members) or perceptions around these news stories are either of paranoia (one school) or one emblematic of "a head in sand (the other school.)"

Some interesting news items to read:
Go to: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4201930/ and click on video by pressing the LAUNCH button. Watch Andrea Mitchell's report.

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3340268/ (Go to item 5 - on Sub-continental swap)

Stephen Cohen Interview: Good Read
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4201689/

Did anybody did see Jim Lehrer News Hour segment with Ray Suarez in which Amb. Qazi appeared a few days. If so can you post a transcript or brief summary of the salient points. Thnx

By Philip Blenkinsop

MUNICH, Germany, Feb 8 (Reuters) - Pakistan's foreign minister said on Sunday he knew the names of "lots of Europeans" involved in the illicit transfer of secrets to countries seeking to develop nuclear weapons.

"Why is there this unhealthy focus on Pakistan? What about others?" Khursheed Mehmood Kasuri told delegates at a security conference in the German city of Munich.

"I know the names. I don't want to spill them... names given to us by the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), by Iran. There are lots of Europeans involved, but there seems to be a focus on Pakistan," he added.

In a televised confession, Pakistan's top nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan said on Wednesday he had acted independently in leaking secrets as head of the country's nuclear programme from the 1970s.

The next day, the country's military president, Pervez Musharraf, pardoned the man revered as the father of Pakistan's atomic bomb, while rebuffing calls for an independent inquiry into the military's role.

Many analysts say Khan could not have acted without the knowledge of the military.

Kasuri said it was important to stress that the leaks had not been recent and were mainly during Pakistan's early days of nuclear development when few people were aware of the project.

"Yes our programme was covert. Because it was covert there was a danger of this sort of thing," he said.

Khan had been removed when initial intelligence reports indicated smoke even if "fire had not been discovered." Moreover, while Pakistan had not joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it was committed to fulfilling the non-proliferation requirements, Kasuri said.

It was, he said, not in Pakistan's interests to share its nuclear secrets with others.

Many Pakistanis nevertheless believe Musharraf and top military officers were complicit in the illicit nuclear transfers to Iran, Libya and North Korea.

"It is not something that is in our interests... There has to be a motive, but there was none whatsoever," Kasuri said.

He also said the uranium enrichment technology which Khan appeared to have provided was only part of the know-how required to make nuclear weapons.

"Our nuclear experts tell me you need about 24 different technologies or processes to make nuclear weapons and then to deliver them. Only one of them is the uranium-enrichment process," Kasuri said.



02/08/04 09:55 ET

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by jkhan

For those who just a few days ago said "Don't worry this will blow over, and wait and see how this things blows up in Europe and Japan." And for those who have seemed to find a new terminology of calling people who view negative news as negative, PARANOID and those who view negative news as positive as REALIST I thought I'd search for first news that comes on all the world wires. Now this is not Pakistani "crazy" journalist, who have nothing btter to do, though where noted you'll find some links to that as well. But anyways here goes.

---

And..........??? what do we do? Is it a news to you Jkhan? Did you ever and I repeate ever noticed any positive reporting about Pakistan from west? If you have seen positive reporting by them and now it is all negetive then It should worry every one, but it is a routine for every one so again, I say, calm down and let the dust settle and yes I still think people are paranoid/over reacted when it comes to news like above. :o

not to pick on jkhan but in President's press conf he mentioned about Pakistani attutude of feeling miserable and always looking for a reason to feel sorry for themselves, thats the very same attitude we are witnessing here.

I am sick and tired of these negative attitude and thats why don't respond to them.

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by SyedA

not to pick on jkhan but in President's press conf he mentioned about Pakistani attutude of feeling miserable and always looking for a reason to feel sorry for themselves, thats the very same attitude we are witnessing here.

I am sick and tired of these negative attitude and thats why don't respond to them.

---

Thank you Syed. I will do the same. By the way President's news conference was really two thumbs up.

:cool:

Looks like the mullahs in Iran are back-peddling and trying desperately to save their relationship with Pakistan. Which is on a steep slide, from what I am hearing. Pakistan is specifically PA is extremely angry with Iran.

http://jang.com.pk/thenews/feb2004-d...main/main6.htm

If I was the president I will tell them no more military cooperation of any sense.
They should be taught a lesson and dealt with harsh attitude. Iranian embassy should be sent a notice also and President should call himself and give a piece of his mind.

:mad:

http://www.pakdef.info/forum/showthr...3298#post43298

Indian involvement.

so basically Iranians went to all the nuclear states and bribed the retired or working scientists. Wonder if Irani intelligence had anything to do with it or they went through the "mafia" and mafia was in contact with all these scientists?

PHUKET, Thailand, Feb 9 (Reuters) - Pakistan is not the only country whose scientists have spread nuclear weapon knowledge and the international community must act to end the black market, Indian Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha said.

"There are so many other countries which are running this racket and they are from the Western world and there are others," Sinha told Reuters Television late on Sunday on the sidelines of a regional trade meeting on the southern Thai island of Phuket.

"I would like to say what it clearly demonstrates is that there is a flourishing black marKet in nuclear technology. It is not Pakistan alone which needs to be blamed for this," he said late on Sunday without naming names.

"It's not an India-Pakistan issue," he said. "This is the issue for the entire international community."

"The international community needs to look at this flourishing black market in nuclear technology and something will have to be done to stop this black market, especially now because the entire international community is threatened with a danger of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists."



02/08/04 21:06 ET


I think Mr. Sinha is building grounds for Bharat and rest of the world that soon that Bharati Dr. Do people are also involved in nuclear black market

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by SyedA

so basically Iranians went to all the nuclear states and bribed the retired or working scientists. Wonder if Irani intelligence had anything to do with it or they went through the "mafia" and mafia was in contact with all these scientists?

---

They are pretty pathetic, since they still couldn't make out of what they got and how to build anything? they went every where and try to buy every thing just to get on their knees infornt of usa and give them everything they got. Same goes for libyan, I don't think they even deserve any technology of any kind of weapons since they will give them all to usa when asked. ;)

I have lost all the respect for the Iranians that I might have had in the past.

Iranians are now saying they did not reveal any names but only the companies where they bought the toys. The companies in turn pointed finger in our direction....

SEOUL, Feb 10 (Reuters) - North Korea dismissed on Tuesday an admission by Pakistan's top nuclear scientist that he sold nuclear weapons technology to the North and other states as "nothing more than sordid false propaganda" spread by the United States.

The statement by a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman, published by Pyongyang's official KCNA news agency, said Washington had fabricated revelations by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan in order to isolate North Korea in six-country nuclear talks later this month. It was Pyongyang's first reaction to the Pakistan news.



02/09/04 22:53 ET

Assalam oa laukum,

very good article. Someone had posted another article along the same line from some Pakistani newspaper....



Libya was given crude bomb blueprint: Pakistan ran two N-programmes - NYT


By Our Correspondent

NEW YORK, Feb 9: American and European investigators have determined that the nuclear weapon blueprints found in Libya were of a relatively crude type of bomb from Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan - not the more advanced models that the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission developed and successfully tested - the New York Times said on Monday.

The investigators also told the paper "they feared that Dr Khan and his network of shadowy middlemen might have peddled the crude weapon blueprints to other nations in deals that have not yet come to light. They also said the Libyan findings gave new credence to what was apparently an attempt by Dr Khan, more than a decade ago, to sell a nuclear weapon design to Iraq."

The paper said that analysis of the blueprints, which establish a new link between Dr Khan and the underground nuclear black market now under global scrutiny, had heartened investigators in Europe and the United States because his design was seen as less threatening in terms of the spread of nuclear weapons.

"If you had to have a design circulating around the world, we'd be worse off if it was a design other than Khan's," an American weapons expert who is familiar with the Libyan case told the paper.

"To the amazement of inspectors, the blueprints discovered in Libya were wrapped in plastic bags from an Islamabad dry cleaner," one expert told the paper.

"The Libyans said they got it as a bonus," an official said of the plans. The centrifuge equipment and warhead designs from Dr Khan's laboratories in Pakistan were discovered in Libya after the country's leader, Col Muammar Qadhafi, agreed to dismantle his secret nuclear programme, opening it to United States and United Nations nuclear officials.

Late last month, a 747 aircraft was chartered by the United States government for the sole purpose of carrying the small box with the warhead designs from Libya to Dulles airport near Washington. They are now undergoing analysis.

The American weapons expert said Western analysts, while relieved to find that the blueprint was of Dr Khan's design, were not overjoyed. "A bad bomb is still a nuke," he said. "It can still do pretty terrible things to your city."

The paper noted that "Dr. Khan is known in Pakistan as the father of the Pakistani bomb or the founder of its nuclear weapons programme, but Western experts say the credit is not all his. A metallurgist, he is an expert at building centrifuges - hollow metal tubes that spin very fast to enrich natural uranium in its rare U-235 isotope, which is an excellent bomb fuel. His mastery of the difficult art proved vital to Pakistan's acquiring a nuclear arsenal."

But other Pakistani scientists, Western experts said, had far greater success in turning the enriched uranium into nuclear warheads. To develop the armaments, the American expert told the Times, Pakistan ran "two parallel weapons programmes, one good and one bad; Khan ran the bad one."

Dr Khan's weapon was inferior in terms of such as things as size, power and efficiency. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, the nation's official authority for nuclear development, ran the more successful programme. All Pakistan's atom bombs resemble designs that China tested in the late 1960s and passed on to Pakistan decades ago, European and American experts said.

So too, Pakistan's atom bombs all use a relatively advanced means to detonate bomb fuel known as implosion. The weapon that destroyed Hiroshima in 1945 used a simpler detonation method known as a "gun-type system," in which conventional explosives sped a uranium projectile through a cannon barrel into a uranium target, creating a critical mass and a gargantuan blast.

By contrast, experts said, Pakistan's designs used the more advanced principle of implosion, as did the bomb dropped on Nagasaki. It works by having a sphere of conventional explosives squeeze inward to crush a ball of bomb fuel, creating the critical mass. Implosion uses much less fuel than detonations from the gun-type system, making the bombs far cheaper and lighter.

Even so, Dr Khan's design is "vanilla flavoured and very old in concept," a European weapons expert told the paper. Analysts said the Libyan episode gave new life to the case of a middleman claiming to represent Dr Khan who in 1990, on the eve of the Gulf War, offered to have the Pakistani help Iraq build its own nuclear weapon.

David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington, told the paper that Iraqi documents, coupled with the Libyan developments, raised the possibility that Dr. Khan's network operated for more than a decade to offer atomic blueprints not only to Libya and Iraq but to countries like Iran, Syria and North Korea. Global investigators must now carefully examine that possibility, he said.

Wrapping plans for a not well designed nuke in dry cleaners wrapping from islamabad?
I wonder if musharraf's dry cleaning bill was in the wrapping as well?

If this stuff was gonna get out of pakistan, it might have been prudent to hide it as well as possible. Whoever had that job didnt think about it all that much.

To all the Ghadafi lovers: are you ready to rename the Ghadafi Stadium yet?
Iqbal

Israel and Pakistan have no history of conflict whatsoever. In all probability, the lay Pakistani will never set eyes on an Israeli or even a token Jew in his lifetime. The Ummah, if there be such a beast, sells Pakistan up the river at the first chance, so obviously it is not some mythical religious brotherhood with the Arabs that is in the way. In that context, Gen. Gul's statement about the Pakistani bomb being a threat to Israel makes no sense to me. Should'nt someone tell the General to put a lid on it?

By JAE-SUK YOO
.c The Associated Press

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) - North Korea said Tuesday that it has received support from China for its proposal to freeze its nuclear weapons programs in return for free oil and other economic concessions from the United States.

China signaled its support at a meeting in Beijing between North Korea's vice foreign minister, Kim Kye Gwan, and top Chinese officials including Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing.

The Chinese side ``recognized the rationality'' of Pyongyang's proposal to help end the nuclear dispute, a North Korean foreign ministry spokesman told KCNA.

The United States, North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia are scheduled to begin talks on Feb. 25 over U.S. demands that North Korea dismantle its nuclear weapons programs in a ``complete, irreversible and verifiable manner.''

North Korea has proposed to freeze all its nuclear activities, as a first step to resolving the nuclear dispute if the United States provides free oil shipments, lifts economic sanctions and removes the Communist country from its list of countries that sponsor terrorism.

The Bush administration insists North Korea begin dismantling its nuclear programs before it makes concessions.

China cautioned against expecting a swift resolution of the standoff, saying all sides should have ``realistic'' expectations about the upcoming talks.

``The question is a very complicated one ... and we have different views about the issue,'' Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue said Tuesday. She added that the sides ``should not expect to solve the issue within one or two rounds of talks.''

Earlier Tuesday, North Korea denied receiving nuclear weapons technology from Pakistan, and accused the United States of spreading false rumors.

``This is nothing but a mean and groundless propaganda,'' a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman told KCNA.

Abdul Qadeer Khan, the founder of the Pakistan's nuclear program, was forgiven by Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf on Thursday after admitting that he had spread nuclear secrets to Iran, Libya and North Korea through an international black market.

North Korea runs a nuclear weapons program using plutonium. But U.S. officials also believe North Korea has a separate program based on enriched uranium, possibly using technology imported from Pakistan. North Korea has denied the allegation.

North Korea accused the United States of ``hyping'' the transfer of Pakistan's nuclear technology as a way to scuttle the six-nation talks.

The nuclear dispute flared in October 2002 when U.S. officials said North Korea admitted running the uranium-enriching program in violation of international agreements.



02/10/04 22:31 EST

Pakistan has put a stop to proliferation, says US


By Masood Haider
NEW YORK, Feb 10: The US State Department said categorically on Monday that "the President of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf has indeed stopped the (nuclear proliferation) activity that was going on."

At a press briefing in Washington, spokesman Richard Boucher asserted "the Pakistani government, both through the president and the foreign ministry statements, has made clear that they're going to find out everything they can and share that information with the International Atomic Energy Agency."

Mr Boucher also noted that "the president of Pakistan has made clear that the pardon is conditional that there be no activity from this particular individual, and that they are continuing to investigate the others who might have been involved in this activity so that they do get to the bottom of it."

When asked about the pardon of Dr Khan, whether it was conditional, Mr Boucher said "I haven't followed every single statement the Pakistani government has made. I don't think it was said in that particular one. But I think that has been, to some extent, the understanding all along was that this pardon, or whatever, was being given so that - provided they did not participate in any sort of activities like this in the future."

He added "but I'd leave it to them. That was the understanding, basic understanding, I think we all had."

When asked to comment on the visit to Pakistan recently by US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Mr Boucher said: "The subject of non-proliferation in Pakistan has been one that he (Armitage) has worked on since the beginning of the administration and discussed in various terms many times with the Pakistani government.

"It's always been important to us that Pakistan take action against possible proliferation. And we've seen the commitments and we've seen action now," he added.

On the question about Pakistan's cooperation with the US on the new US forces' spring offensive inside Afghanistan, Mr Boucher said "there is indeed cooperation on both sides of the border. There's tripartite cooperation between the United States, Pakistan and Afghanistan in the border areas to try to make sure that we all do our part in tracking down the remnants of Al Qaeda and the Taliban that may be in those areas, and making sure that they are rooted out, that the government authority is established in those areas where, for a long time, there was not much authority, and that we take care of the problem together."

Quote:

---

Originally Posted by punekar

In that context, Gen. Gul's statement about the Pakistani bomb being a threat to Israel makes no sense to me. Should'nt someone tell the General to put a lid on it?

---

Many Israelis see the pakistani bomb as a direct threat to them ... I am not sure what Gen. Gul has said, but it might be in that context ... can you provide the article?

Remarks by President Bush on Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation


WASHINGTON, Feb. 11 /PRNewswire/ -- The following is a transcript of remarks by President Bush on weapons of mass destruction proliferation:

Fort Lesley J. McNair - National Defense University

Washington, D.C.

2:30 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: Thanks for the warm welcome. I'm honored to visit the National Defense University. For nearly a century, the scholars and students here have helped to prepare America for the changing threats to our national security. Today, the men and women of our National Defense University are helping to frame the strategies through which we are fighting and winning the war on terror. Your Center for Counterproliferation Research and your other institutes and colleges are providing vital insight into the dangers of a new era. I want to thank each one of you for devoting your talents and your energy to the service of our great nation.

I want to thank General Michael Dunn for inviting me here. I used to jog by this facility on a regular basis. Then my age kicked in. (Laughter.) I appreciate Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, from Germany. Mr. Ambassador, thank you for being here today. I see my friend, George Shultz, a distinguished public servant and true patriot, with us. George, thank you for coming; and Charlotte, it's good to see you. I'm so honored that Dick Lugar is here with us today. Senator, I appreciate you taking time and thanks for bringing Senator Saxby Chambliss with you, as well. I appreciate the veterans who are here and those on active duty. Thanks for letting me come by.

On September the 11th, 2001, America and the world witnessed a new kind of war. We saw the great harm that a stateless network could inflict upon our country, killers armed with box cutters, mace, and 19 airline tickets. Those attacks also raised the prospect of even worse dangers -- of other weapons in the hands of other men. The greatest threat before humanity today is the possibility of secret and sudden attack with chemical or biological or radiological or nuclear weapons.

In the past, enemies of America required massed armies, and great navies, powerful air forces to put our nation, our people, our friends and allies at risk. In the Cold War, Americans lived under the threat of weapons of mass destruction, but believed that deterrents made those weapons a last resort. What has changed in the 21st century is that, in the hands of terrorists, weapons of mass destruction would be a first resort -- the preferred means to further their ideology of suicide and random murder. These terrible weapons are becoming easier to acquire, build, hide, and transport. Armed with a single vial of a biological agent or a single nuclear weapon, small groups of fanatics, or failing states, could gain the power to threaten great nations, threaten the world peace.

America, and the entire civilized world, will face this threat for decades to come. We must confront the danger with open eyes, and unbending purpose. I have made clear to all the policy of this nation: America will not permit terrorists and dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most deadly weapons. (Applause.)

Meeting this duty has required changes in thinking and strategy. Doctrines designed to contain empires, deter aggressive states, and defeat massed armies cannot fully protect us from this new threat. America faces the possibility of catastrophic attack from ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction. So that is why we are developing and deploying missile defenses to guard our people. The best intelligence is necessary to win the war on terror and to stop proliferation. So that is why I have established a commission that will examine our intelligence capabilities and recommend ways to improve and adapt them to detect new and emerging threats.

We're determined to confront those threats at the source. We will stop these weapons from being acquired or built. We'll block them from being transferred. We'll prevent them from ever being used. One source of these weapons is dangerous and secretive regimes that build weapons of mass destruction to intimidate their neighbors and force their influence upon the world. These nations pose different challenges; they require different strategies.

The former dictator of Iraq possessed and used weapons of mass destruction against his own people. For 12 years, he defied the will of the international community. He refused to disarm or account for his illegal weapons and programs. He doubted our resolve to enforce our word -- and now he sits in a prison cell, while his country moves toward a democratic future. (Applause.)

To Iraq's east, the government of Iran is unwilling to abandon a uranium enrichment program capable of producing material for nuclear weapons. The United States is working with our allies and the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure that Iran meets its commitments and does not develop nuclear weapons. (Applause.)

In the Pacific, North Korea has defied the world, has tested long-range ballistic missiles, admitted its possession of nuclear weapons, and now threatens to build more. Together with our partners in Asia, America is insisting that North Korea completely, verifiably, and irreversibly dismantle its nuclear programs.

America has consistently brought these threats to the attention of international organizations. We're using every means of diplomacy to answer them. As for my part, I will continue to speak clearly on these threats. I will continue to call upon the world to confront these dangers, and to end them. (Applause.)

In recent years, another path of proliferation has become clear, as well. America and other nations are learning more about black-market operatives who deal in equipment and expertise related to weapons of mass destruction. These dealers are motivated by greed, or fanaticism, or both. They find eager customers in outlaw regimes, which pay millions for the parts and plans they need to speed up their weapons programs. And with deadly technology and expertise going on the market, there's the terrible possibility that terrorists groups could obtain the ultimate weapons they desire most.

The extent and sophistication of such networks can be seen in the case of a man named Abdul Qadeer Khan. This is the story as we know it so far. A. Q. Khan is known throughout the world as the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. What was not publicly known, until recently, is that he also led an extensive international network for the proliferation of nuclear technology and know-how.

For decades, Mr. Khan remained on the Pakistani government payroll, earning a modest salary. Yet, he and his associates financed lavish lifestyles through the sale of nuclear technologies and equipment to outlaw regimes stretching from North Africa to the Korean Peninsula.

A. Q. Khan, himself, operated mostly out of Pakistan. He served as director of the network, its leading scientific mind, as well as its primary salesman. Over the past decade, he made frequent trips to consult with his clients and to sell his expertise. He and his associates sold the blueprints for centrifuges to enrich uranium, as well as a nuclear design stolen from the Pakistani government. The network sold uranium hexafluoride, the gas that the centrifuge process can transform into enriched uranium for nuclear bombs. Khan and his associates provided Iran and Libya and North Korea with designs for Pakistan's older centrifuges, as well as designs for more advanced and efficient models. The network also provided these countries with components, and in some cases, with complete centrifuges.

To increase their profits, Khan and his associates used a factory in Malaysia to manufacture key parts for centrifuges. Other necessary parts were purchased through network operatives based in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. These procurement agents saw the trade in nuclear technologies as a shortcut to personal wealth, and they set up front companies to deceive legitimate firms into selling them tightly controlled materials.

Khan's deputy -- a man named B.S.A. Tahir -- ran SMB computers, a business in Dubai. Tahir used that computer company as a front for the proliferation activities of the A. Q. Khan network. Tahir acted as both the network's chief financial officer and money launderer. He was also its shipping agent, using his computer firm as cover for the movement of centrifuge parts to various clients. Tahir directed the Malaysia facility to produce these parts based on Pakistani designs, and then ordered the facility to ship the components to Dubai. Tahir also arranged for parts acquired by other European procurement agents to transit through Dubai for shipment to other customers.

This picture of the Khan network was pieced together over several years by American and British intelligence officers. Our intelligence services gradually uncovered this network's reach, and identified its key experts and agents and money men. Operatives followed its transactions, mapped the extent of its operations. They monitored the travel of A. Q. Khan and senior associates. They shadowed members of the network around the world, they recorded their conversations, they penetrated their operations, we've uncovered their secrets. This work involved high risk, and all Americans can be grateful for the hard work and the dedication of our fine intelligence professionals. (Applause.)

Governments around the world worked closely with us to unravel the Khan network, and to put an end to his criminal enterprise. A. Q. Khan has confessed his crimes, and his top associates are out of business. The government of Pakistan is interrogating the network's members, learning critical details that will help them prevent it from ever operating again. President Musharraf has promised to share all the information he learns about the Khan network, and has assured us that his country will never again be a source of proliferation.

Mr. Tahir is in Malaysia, where authorities are investigating his activities. Malaysian authorities have assured us that the factory the network used is no longer producing centrifuge parts. Other members of the network remain at large. One by one, they will be found, and their careers in the weapons trade will be ended.

As a result of our penetration of the network, American and the British intelligence identified a shipment of advanced centrifuge parts manufactured at the Malaysia facility. We followed the shipment of these parts to Dubai, and watched as they were transferred to the BBC China, a German-owned ship. After the ship passed through the Suez Canal, bound for Libya, it was stopped by German and Italian authorities. They found several containers, each forty feet in length, listed on the ship's manifest as full of "used machine parts." In fact, these containers were filled with parts of sophisticated centrifuges.

The interception of the BBC China came as Libyan and British and American officials were discussing the possibility of Libya ending its WMD programs. The United States and Britain confronted Libyan officials with this evidence of an active and illegal nuclear program. About two months ago, Libya's leader voluntarily agreed to end his nuclear and chemical weapons programs, not to pursue biological weapons, and to permit thorough inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. We're now working in partnership with these organizations and with the United Kingdom to help the government of Libya dismantle those programs and eliminate all dangerous materials.

Colonel Ghadafi made the right decision, and the world will be safer once his commitment is fulfilled. We expect other regimes to follow his example. Abandoning the pursuit of illegal weapons can lead to better relations with the United States, and other free nations. Continuing to seek those weapons will not bring security or international prestige, but only political isolation, economic hardship, and other unwelcome consequences. (Applause.)

We know that Libya was not the only customer of the Khan network. Other countries expressed great interest in their services. These regimes and other proliferators like Khan should know: We and our friends are determined to protect our people and the world from proliferation. (Applause.)

Breaking this network is one major success in a broad-based effort to stop the spread of terrible weapons. We're adjusting our strategies to the threats of a new era. America and the nations of Australia, France and Germany, Italy and Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom have launched the Proliferation Security Initiative to interdict lethal materials in transit. Our nations are sharing intelligence information, tracking suspect international cargo, conducting joint military exercises. We're prepared to search planes and ships, to seize weapons and missiles and equipment that raise proliferation concerns, just as we did in stopping the dangerous cargo on the BBC China before it reached Libya. Three more governments -- Canada and Singapore and Norway -- will be participating in this initiative. We'll continue to expand the core group of PSI countries. And as PSI grows, proliferators will find it harder than ever to trade in illicit weapons.

There is a consensus among nations that proliferation cannot be tolerated. Yet this consensus means little unless it is translated into action. Every civilized nation has a stake in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. These materials and technologies, and the people who traffic in them, cross many borders. To stop this trade, the nations of the world must be strong and determined. We must work together, we must act effectively. Today, I announce seven proposals to strengthen the world's efforts to stop the spread of deadly weapons.

First, I propose that the work of the Proliferation Security Initiative be expanded to address more than shipments and transfers. Building on the tools we've developed to fight terrorists, we can take direct action against proliferation networks. We need greater cooperation not just among intelligence and military services, but in law enforcement, as well. PSI participants and other willing nations should use the Interpol and all other means to bring to justice those who traffic in deadly weapons, to shut down their labs, to seize their materials, to freeze their assets. We must act on every lead. We will find the middlemen, the suppliers and the buyers. Our message to proliferators must be consistent and it must be clear: We will find you, and we're not going to rest until you are stopped. (Applause.)

Second, I call on all nations to strengthen the laws and international controls that govern proliferation. At the U.N. last fall, I proposed a new Security Council resolution requiring all states to criminalize proliferation, enact strict export controls, and secure all sensitive materials within their borders. The Security Council should pass this proposal quickly. And when they do, America stands ready to help other governments to draft and enforce the new laws that will help us deal with proliferation.

Third, I propose to expand our efforts to keep weapons from the Cold War and other dangerous materials out of the wrong hands. In 1991, Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar legislation. Senator Lugar had a clear vision, along with Senator Nunn, about what to do with the old Soviet Union. Under this program, we're helping former Soviet states find productive employment for former weapons scientists. We're dismantling, destroying and securing weapons and materials left over from the Soviet WMD arsenal. We have more work to do there.

And as a result of the G-8 Summit in 2002, we agreed to provide $20 billion over 10 years -- half of it from the United States -- to support such programs. We should expand this cooperation elsewhere in the world. We will retain [sic] WMD scientists and technicians in countries like Iraq and Libya. We will help nations end the use of weapons-grade uranium in research reactors. I urge more nations to contribute to these efforts. The nations of the world must do all we can to secure and eliminate nuclear and chemical and biological and radiological materials.

As we track and destroy these networks, we must also prevent governments from developing nuclear weapons under false pretenses. The Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty was designed more than 30 years ago to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons beyond those states which already possessed them. Under this treaty, nuclear states agreed to help non-nuclear states develop peaceful atomic energy if they renounced the pursuit of nuclear weapons. But the treaty has a loophole which has been exploited by nations such as North Korea and Iran. These regimes are allowed to produce nuclear material that can be used to build bombs under the cover of civilian nuclear programs.

So today, as a fourth step, I propose a way to close the loophole. The world must create a safe, orderly system to field civilian nuclear plants without adding to the danger of weapons proliferation. The world's leading nuclear exporters should ensure that states have reliable access at reasonable cost to fuel for civilian reactors, so long as those states renounce enrichment and reprocessing. Enrichment and reprocessing are not necessary for nations seeking to harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The 40 nations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group should refuse to sell enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to any state that does not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants. (Applause.) This step will prevent new states from developing the means to produce fissile material for nuclear bombs. Proliferators must not be allowed to cynically manipulate the NPT to acquire the material and infrastructure necessary for manufacturing illegal weapons.

For international norms to be effective, they must be enforced. It is the charge of the International Atomic Energy Agency to uncover banned nuclear activity around the world and report those violations to the U.N. Security Council. We must ensure that the IAEA has all the tools it needs to fulfill its essential mandate. America and other nations support what is called the Additional Protocol, which requires states to declare a broad range of nuclear activities and facilities, and allow the IAEA to inspect those facilities.

As a fifth step, I propose that by next year, only states that have signed the Additional Protocol be allowed to import equipment for their civilian nuclear programs. Nations that are serious about fighting proliferation will approve and implement the Additional Protocol. I've submitted the Additional Protocol to the Senate. I urge the Senate to consent immediately to its ratification.

We must also ensure that IAEA is organized to take action when action is required. So, a sixth step, I propose the creation of a special committee of the IAEA Board which will focus intensively on safeguards and verification. This committee, made up of governments in good standing with the IAEA, will strengthen the capability of the IAEA to ensure that nations comply with their international obligations.

And, finally, countries under investigation for violating nuclear non- proliferation obligations are currently allowed to serve on the IAEA Board of Governors. For instance, Iran -- a country suspected of maintaining an extensive nuclear weapons program -- recently completed a two-year term on the Board. Allowing potential violators to serve on the Board creates an unacceptable barrier to effective action. No state under investigation for proliferation violations should be allowed to serve on the IAEA Board of Governors -- or on the new special committee. And any state currently on the Board that comes under investigation should be suspended from the Board. The integrity and mission of the IAEA depends on this simple principle: Those actively breaking the rules should not be entrusted with enforcing the rules. (Applause.)

As we move forward to address these challenges we will consult with our friends and allies on all these new measures. We will listen to their ideas. Together we will defend the safety of all nations and preserve the peace of the world.

Over the last two years, a great coalition has come together to defeat terrorism and to oppose the spread of weapons of mass destruction -- the inseparable commitments of the war on terror. We've shown that proliferators can be discovered and can be stopped. We've shown that for regimes that choose defiance, there are serious consequences. The way ahead is not easy, but it is clear. We will proceed as if the lives of our citizens depend on our vigilance, because they do. Terrorists and terror states are in a race for weapons of mass murder, a race they must lose. (Applause.) Terrorists are resourceful; we're more resourceful. They're determined; we must be more determined. We will never lose focus or resolve. We'll be unrelenting in the defense of free nations, and rise to the hard demands of dangerous times.

May God bless you all. (Applause.)

END

3:07 P.M. EST

SOURCE White House Press Office

CO: White House Press Office; International Atomic Energy Agency; National Defense University

ST: District of Columbia, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya

SU: EXE FOR LEG EGV

Web site: http://www.whitehouse.gov

http://www.prnewswire.com

02/11/2004 16:24 EST

By MATT KELLEY
.c The Associated Press

WASHINGTON (AP) - The black-market network that supplied nuclear weapons technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea relied on European businessmen convicted or investigated in the 1980s for selling similar equipment to Pakistan, U.S. officials say.

The evidence developed by the United States points to at least two college friends of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist who admitted being the mastermind of the scheme, according to the officials familiar with the intelligence and to proliferation experts assisting the international effort. All spoke to The Associated Press only on condition of anonymity.

One of the friends, Henk Slebos of the Netherlands, was convicted there in 1985 of trying to sell equipment to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Slebos' wife told the AP this week he would not talk to reporters.

Some evidence came from Khan himself and from admissions that Iran made to U.N. inspectors, while other intelligence was developed during a covert CIA operation aimed at cracking the smuggling ring, the officials said.

Khan last week admitted selling nuclear secrets and equipment. He was pardoned by Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf.

U.S., international and Pakistani investigations continue into the extent of Khan's network and whether it provided equipment or information to anyone outside the three countries already named. President Bush said Wednesday the United States would ``find the middlemen, the suppliers and the buyers'' and stop them.

That black market figures already suspected of smuggling in the 1980s re-emerged to play a role in Khan's effort has alarmed some weapons experts.

``This should serve as a wake-up call for the need for much more alert and aggressive efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and materials to terrorists and other states,'' said Graham Allison, a Harvard professor and former top Pentagon arms control official under President Clinton.

CIA Director George Tenet said agents worked for years to penetrate Khan's nuclear network; their efforts paid off in the October seizure of a ship full of nuclear components headed for Libya. That seizure helped prompt Libya to reveal - and renounce - its nuclear weapons program in December.

The network Khan set up to peddle his nuclear knowledge became a comprehensive one-stop-shopping venue for countries wanting their own atomic bombs, experts from the United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agency and U.S. agencies have said.

From the high-speed centrifuges needed to make uranium bomb fuel to designs for the bomb itself, Khan's network provided the know-how, the materials, even 24-hour technical support if problems cropped up, diplomats and intelligence officials have said.

He even had glossy brochures - complete with his own photo - with color pictures and specifications of some of the centrifuge parts for sale.

The network provided Libya and Iran with equipment and know-how to make a large centrifuge plant to separate bomb fuel from ordinary uranium. Libya also got a relatively unsophisticated but workable nuclear warhead design from Pakistan, U.S. intelligence officials and diplomats allege.

The network evolved after Khan's black-market deals to supply Pakistan's nuclear program in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. The enterprise started with Khan stealing centrifuge designs while he worked in the early 1970s for Urenco, a European uranium enrichment consortium. He was convicted in absentia in the Netherlands for stealing the designs but the conviction was overturned because Khan was not properly served with court papers.

Several of the European businessmen Pakistan tapped for nuclear help also are believed to have aided Libya and Iran, according to senior U.S. intelligence officials and outside nuclear experts.

One of the businessmen was Slebos, who was convicted in 1985 of trying to ship high-tech equipment to Khan's laboratory in Pakistan. The U.S. officials said evidence points to Slebos as a participant in the Khan network that helped supply Libya with nuclear weapons equipment in the 1990s.

Slebos now runs a company called Slebos Research, which was a corporate sponsor of a conference organized by Pakistan's Khan Research Laboratories last year. Dutch officials have said they intercepted five shipments to Pakistan from Slebos Research and another company in 1998.

The Slebos Research Web site says it offers ``solutions for unusual problems'' and boasts, ``We find hard to get objects for customers all over the world.''

Slebos did not respond to telephone and e-mail messages left at his firm. A woman who answered Slebos' home telephone and identified herself as his wife said Slebos would not talk to reporters.

Iran identified to the IAEA three German businessmen among five middlemen who were sources for some of its centrifuge technology. The U.N. nuclear watchdog has not made their names public.

The U.S. officials and outside experts say they included two former executives, Otto Heilingbrunner and Gotthard Lerch, of a company that made centrifuge components. German prosecutors investigated them in the 1980s for allegedly selling equipment and blueprints to Pakistan's nuclear program.

The two men worked in the 1980s for Leybold AG, which got nuclear-related designs from Urenco while bidding on a centrifuge contract for the uranium enrichment consortium. Leybold has publicly acknowledged it also sold nuclear equipment directly to Iraq and Iran in the 1980s.

Heilingbrunner, reached by telephone at his home near Cologne, said he was involved in selling aircraft engine parts to Iran in the 1980s but denied any involvement with nuclear sales.

``I have nothing to do with Libya, Iraq, North Korea or any others,'' he said.

Lerch could not be located for comment.

Another German supplier named by Iran, the late Heinz Mebus, also was a college friend of Khan. Mebus worked in the early 1980s for Albrecht Migule, who was convicted in the former West Germany of selling equipment to Pakistan to help its uranium enrichment program.

Khan's network also used at least five factories in Malaysia and other countries to make centrifuge components, the U.S. officials and outside nuclear experts said.

The most sophisticated factory was near Malaysia's capital, Kuala Lumpur, owned by Scomi Precision Engineering, or SCOPE. The majority owner of SCOPE's parent company Scomi Group is Kamaluddin Abdullah, the only son of Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi.

Scomi officials have said they did not know that the precision parts they made were destined for uranium centrifuges. Centrifuge parts made by SCOPE were aboard the ship bound for Libya seized in Italy last October.

The middleman for that deal was B.S.A. Tahir, a Sri Lankan based in the United Arab Emirates port of Dubai, which is a hub for Khan's network, Bush said Wednesday. Malaysian authorities have questioned Tahir, Bush said.

Tahir ordered the centrifuge parts beginning in 2001 on behalf of a company called Gulf Technical Industries LLC, which calls itself a dealer in specialty steel products. The multi-million-dollar contract made GTI Scomi's biggest customer in fiscal 2002, according to Scomi's public financial reports.

Associated Press writers Tony Czuczka in Berlin, Toby Sterling in Amsterdam and John Solomon in Washington contributed to this report.



02/11/04 18:26 EST

By Carol Giacomo

WASHINGTON, Feb 11 (Reuters) - President George W. Bush on Wednesday moved to close a loophole that has allowed nuclear programs to flourish but experts said while it may be an important step more is needed to stop atomic arms spreading.

In an election year speech Bush shifted the focus from the war that failed to turn up weapons of mass destruction in Iraq to diplomacy that has begun to unravel an international nuclear black market and put the brakes on programs in Iran and Libya.

Arms control experts pushed Bush to go farther, even as they praised him for taking the initiative.

"This speech has a number of good ideas which could get the support of the international community and hopefully the administration will put its diplomatic muscle behind it," said Lee Feinstein of the Council on Foreign Relations.

That effort will be made more difficult by U.S. plans to shore up its own nuclear arsenal by building a new generation of weapons, experts said.

David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security said while Bush was finally addressing an international non-proliferation regime that had become ineffective his approach had an element of unfairness.

"Certain (developing) countries are being asked to give up a lot and the United States and other nuclear weapons states are not being asked to give up anything," he said.

NPT BARGAIN

Bush's most far-reaching proposal would have the Nuclear Suppliers Group -- 40 nations that sell nuclear technology -- stop this trade with states like Iran and North Korea, which Bush once branded part of an "axis of evil."

He also wants the NSG to make technology sales for civilian nuclear programs contingent on client states agreeing to snap inspections by the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency.

Under a bargain struck when the cornerstone nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty took effect 30 years ago, most countries pledged never to acquire nuclear weapons.

In return, they were promised that the five declared nuclear weapons states -- the United States, Russia, France, China and Britain -- would help them acquire nuclear technology for peaceful uses in nuclear power plants.

It has been a lucrative market for countries and companies engaged in the trade.

But as has become increasingly clear, some NPT signatories -- namely Iran, North Korea and Libya -- exploited the pact to acquire technology and move closer to nuclear arms production.

It remains to be seen which states will be allowed to keep nuclear fuel-making capability and how states that have nearly acquired this capability can be kept from going further.

Iran has acknowleged a nuclear enrichment program that Washington says is geared toward making arms. U.S. ally Japan also makes fuel for nuclear power plants.

In addition to the five declared nuclear weapons states, India, Pakistan and Israel have nuclear weapons programs and U.S. officials say North Korea has at least two atomic arms. There is no indication Washington would interfere with the Israeli, Pakistani, Indian or Japanese programs.

Henry Sokolski of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center said the United States was "finally moving in the right direction toward more nuclear restraint." He was encouraged that Bush aimed to expand an informal arrangement under which countries agreed to interdict illicit arms transfers.

But he was concerned that Washington might let Iran, which many experts believe is bent on pursuing nuclear weapons, keep a nuclear power reactor at Bushehr that is being worked on with Russia.



02/11/04 19:49 ET

STRASBOURG: The European Union’s Irish presidency on Wednesday urged India, Israel and Pakistan to sign “unconditionally” the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Addressing the European Parliament, Irish Europe Minister Dick Roche welcomed the accession to the treaty by Cuba and East Timor in the past two years, which he said brought it closer to covering the whole world.

“However, there are three countries, India, Israel and Pakistan, that remain outside the regime and we continue to call upon them to accede unconditionally to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states,” he said.

“The EU has repeatedly stated that the NPT is the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament,” Roche added.

EU External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten expressed concern at last week’s admission by the father of Pakistan’s nuclear programme, AQ Khan, of his involvement in black-market operations trading in nuclear information.

“Recent revelations on the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea have highlighted the importance of maintaining and strengthening effective controls,” he told the Strasbourg assembly.

The Irish minister also restated the commitment of the EU, which includes nuclear powers Britain and France, to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

He said the EU urged all states with nuclear capability to abide by a moratorium on nuclear test explosions or any other nuclear explosions and refrain from any actions that are contrary to the CTBT. —AFP

Release the hounds


VIENNA, Feb 11 (Reuters) - The father of Pakistan's atom bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan, said last week he and scientists from his Khan Research Laboratory in Pakistan leaked nuclear secrets to other countries.

They are believed to have been part of a global nuclear black market organised to help countries under embargo such as Iran, North Korea and Libya skirt international sanctions and obtain nuclear technology that could be used to make weapons.

The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, described it as an atomic "supermarket" for states interested in nuclear weapons.

Many of the companies never knew their equipment was going to countries under embargo since the black marketeers went to great lengths to disguise the identities of the end users.

Following is a list of countries and how they might be linked to the IAEA's investigation of this illicit procurement network. Diplomats said the list will get longer.

PAKISTAN - Diplomats familiar with the IAEA investigation say Pakistani nuclear know-how and technology was leaked to Iran, Libya and North Korea. Iran may have acquired uranium enrichment centrifuge technology based on designs developed by British-Dutch-German firm Urenco directly from some Pakistanis.

Pakistan's government says Khan, who has already been pardoned, was working alone and without the knowledge of the government or military. Analysts and Western diplomats have said they find this hard to believe.

Khan worked at Urenco in the 1970s. Pakistan is known to have acquired and developed Urenco-based centrifuges as the basis of its uranium enrichment operation, which is the backbone of Pakistan's atomic weapons programme.

It is unclear whether Khan headed the well-organised black market, as is widely assumed. IAEA's ElBaradei said Khan was the "tip of an iceberg" and Western diplomats have said there may have been other experienced nuclear scientists overseeing it.

Khan or the people close to him are also suspected of selling Libya designs for nuclear weapons which Tripoli recently handed over to U.S., British and IAEA experts, diplomats said.

AUSTRIA - An Austrian firm is being investigated for possibly providing magnets that could be used in Urenco centrifuges.

BELGIUM - At least one Belgian company may have provided Iran with nuclear equipment.

CHINA - Supplied Iran with natural uranium, uranium hexafluoride -- the gas used in centrifuges to enrich uranium -- and numerous other items.

DUBAI (UNITED ARAB EMIRATES) - Diplomats in Vienna told Reuters the Dubai company Gulf Technical Industries LCC (GTI) may have been the black market's headquarters and handled orders, procurement and arranged shipping for its customers.

GTI is run by Sri Lankan businessman B.S.A. Tahir, who police said is cooperating with investigators and is not in custody. Tahir is believed to be close to Khan and the main middleman out of five identified by Iran, diplomats said.

GERMANY - Iran identified three Germans who it said may have been middlemen in its acquisition of uranium-enrichment technology. Two of them, Otto Heilingbrunner and Gotthard Lerch, were former senior employees of German vacuum technology maker Leybold Heraeus.

Today Leybold is a pared-down unit of the Swiss firm Unaxis AG, called Leybold Vakuum GmbH.

Heilingbrunner told Reuters that he had been named as a middleman though he denied ever helping Iran get nuclear technology. Lerch, who lives in Switzerland, has not been answering his telephone.

A third German named by Iran, Heinz Mebus, is dead.

In the 1980s, Heilingbrunner and Lerch were investigated by German authorities but proceedings halted in 1990 for lack of evidence.

Several other German firms may be investigated on suspicion of supplying parts for Iran's enrichment programme, diplomats said.

JAPAN - One Japanese company is being investigated for providing equipment to be used in Iran's enrichment programme. The company may not have known who the end user was.

MALAYSIA - Malaysian police are investigating B.S.A. Tahir, the Sri Lankan businessman who runs the Dubai-based GTI company, who ordered components to be manufactured by Scomi Precision Engineering Sdn Bhd (SCOPE), part of the Scomi Group Bhd, which is controlled by the Malaysian prime minister's son, Kamaluddin Abdullah, and two other investors.

SCOPE said it was told the dual-use components were for oil and gas equipment, not for centrifuges. The parts were seized by the United States en route to Libya in a German ship.

NETHERLANDS - Both Iran and Libya have technology developed by a Dutch unit of the uranium enrichment firm Urenco, where Khan worked in the 1970s. Khan was convicted in absentia of nuclear espionage though the conviction was later overturned on a technicality.

Urenco denies ever supplying Iran or any other country with its classified design information.

RUSSIA - A long-time, major supplier to Iran's nuclear programme, Russia is building Iran's Bushehr nuclear reactor.

It is still unclear what role Russian institutes and companies played in the nuclear black market, though diplomats say Russia was certainly involved.

SOUTH AFRICA - Several scientists from this former nuclear power are believed to have provided their technical expertise without government knowledge, diplomats said.

SOUTH KOREA - An export firm was found to have sold four South Korean-made dual-use balancing machines, used to balance centrifuges, to Libya in June 2002. The machines were discovered during an IAEA inspection of Libya in December 2003.

SPAIN - Diplomats told Reuters one or two Spanish companies were being investigated for possibly making and shipping equipment to Libya for its nuclear programme. They said the allegation concerned equipment that was not used in the enrichment programme and was therefore not extremely sensitive.

The company may not have known the identify of the end user of the components, shipped via Dubai.

SWITZERLAND - German-born Gotthard Lerch lives in Switzerland where he set up shop after leaving Leybold. He has been named by Iran as a middleman. One diplomat said Lerch could have been a "significant" player in the black market story.

According to David Albright, former U.N. weapons inspector and president of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), Swiss companies provided much of the equipment used in Iran's enrichment programme.

Suppliers also trained Iranians in the use of critical equipment, Albright said.

UNITED STATES - Some U.S. companies may have unwittingly provided nuclear equipment to Iran, diplomats said. It is unclear what sort of equipment and whether the orders were filled.



02/11/04 22:37 ET

This is THE top headline and story in today's Guardian (UK):


http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,38...103595,00.html

Briton key suspect in nuclear ring
Man accused of smuggling parts tells Guardian: 'I was framed'

Owen Bowcott, Ian Traynor in Zagreb, John Aglionby in Jakarta and Suzanne Goldenberg in Washington
Thursday February 12, 2004
The Guardian

A Middle East-based British businessman has emerged as a key suspect in a secret network supplying Libya, Iran and North Korea with equipment to build nuclear bombs.

Speaking for the first time yesterday, Paul Griffin denied that his company played any part in shipping prohibited material from the Far East.

He told the Guardian: "We have been framed."

His comments came as diplomatic sources and nuclear experts around the world stepped up their warnings of a growing proliferation crisis as atomic technology and expertise is increasingly traded on the black market.

Regulators have warned of a dangerous illegal "supermarket" in atomic know-how, spanning five countries.

Last night President George Bush added his voice to the growing chorus of alarm. He talked of the threat of black market dealers motivated by "greed, or fanaticism, or both".

For the first time Mr Bush publicly accused Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme, of being at the centre of a network supplying North Korea with the centrifuge technology that is needed to make highly enriched uranium for atomic bombs.

The names of individuals and companies supposedly involved in Dr Khan's clandestine network - including that of Mr Griffin - have been leaking slowly into the public domain. The US authorities have named a Dubai-based Sri Lankan businessman, BSA Tahir, as a key middle man in the nuclear proliferation network.

Mr Bush last night named Mr Tahir as Dr Khan's deputy and said he ran SMB computers, a business in Dubai. "Tahir used that computer company as a front for the proliferation activities of the AQ Khan network. Tahir ... was also its shipping agent, using his computer firm as cover for the movement of centrifuge parts to various clients."

The CIA director, George Tenet, last week named a Malaysian company, Scomi Precision Engineering, as the firm that manufactured 14 components for a nuclear centrifuge dispatched to Libya last year. The equipment was seized in a high-security operation in October when the container vessel carrying it, the German-owned BBC China, entered the Mediterranean. Intelligence agents persuaded the owners to divert the ship to the southern Italian port of Taranto, where the material was confiscated.

Pleading that it thought the components were destined for the oil or gas industry, Scomi in turn named British-owned and Dubai-based Gulf Technical Industries (GTI) as the company which placed the order.

GTI, which was established in 2000, is run by Mr Griffin and his father, Peter. Its registration form with the Dubai Chamber of Trade and Commerce describes it as trading in "pumps, engines, valves and spare parts". It is listed on another Middle East website as a steel trading company.

"The allegations are totally untrue," Mr Griffin told the Guardian from Dubai. "We trade in engineering products. The first I knew about the press release [from Scomi] was when I was telephoned about it at 7.15am on Tuesday.

"I was asked whether we had really bought $3.5m of equipment from Malaysia.

"It's total nonsense, rubbish. I'm trying to find out myself what [is supposed to have been going on]. I have approached the Malaysian consulate to find out how everything happened. I haven't bought anything from Malaysia at all.

"If I was going to buy high precision parts I would order them from Europe; you know what you are getting from there. I would notice if I had brought some precision-engineered parts. They are not something you go pick up at a supermarket."

Mr Griffin, 40, and originally from south Wales, said he had met Mr Tahir when GTI bought some computers from his company last year. GTI had also asked him to sort out a computer virus on his system. "That was it," Mr Griffin said.

Asked whether he knew Dr Khan, the metallurgist, Mr Griffin said that he had, coincidentally, met him at a wedding in Pakistan "about 18 years ago".

He added: "I went to a friend's wedding and he [Khan] was the local dignitary. I was introduced to him.

"I have never met him in Dubai or since then. I don't even know where he lives. I haven't had any [other] contact with him.

"If we were anything to do with [this smuggling], I would have thought British or US intelligence would have contacted me. The British embassy know me here. I haven't been contacted by the authorities here. If I was doing something dodgy, I would have been picked up."

The bill of lading with the German company, BBC Chartering and Logistic, which owned the BBC China, would show he had nothing to do with the centrifuge order, he said. "They have promised to send me the documentation. They told me they had never heard of us. It's all a mystery. The last time I saw Tahir was eight months ago. These allegations are all a load of bullshit." Mr Griffin, who has lived in Dubai on and off since 1986, said his father, Peter, had now retired to Paris. GTI was still tendering for work with the oil industry in the region.

GTI's registered office is in a low-rise building at the side of the eight-lane Sheikh Zayed Highway on the way to the UAE capital, Abu Dhabi.

On the ground floor, House of Cars sells four-wheel-drives to expatriates and Jebal Arafat Tailors caters to the Arab residents of the building.

Yesterday, the office smelled of paint and appeared to be in the process of being re-let. Mr Griffin lives in a single-storey villa in the smart Jumeirah area of the city, surrounded by palm trees. He told the Guardian his company had moved premises.

Malaysian security authorities said they did not know the whereabouts of Mr Tahir, who allegedly ordered the centrifuge parts from Scomi Precision Engineering, which is controlled by the son of Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi. A centrifuge is used to concentrate, or enrich, radioactive material. A police spokesman said investigators were keen to speak to him. "He is a crucial part of our ongoing investigation so we are keen to talk to him but we have yet to locate him," the spokesman said.

Mr Bush said that Mr Tahir, who has a Malaysian wife, "is in Malaysia, where authorities are investigating his activities".

Western diplomatic sources in Kuala Lumpur say they would like to see the investigation intensified but in reality it is losing momentum because Scomi has been cleared of any wrongdoing by Malaysian police. A police spokesman said: "Our investigation is still ongoing and we want to get to the bottom of the matter."

The Malaysian police chief, Mohd Bakri Omar, on Sunday absolved Scomi of any participation in the nuclear weapons trade. "So far, no wrongdoing has been committed," he said.

Scomi is continuing its operations. It insists it believed it was making equipment for the oil and gas industry.

A Scomi factory manager, Che Lokman Che Omar, told reporters during a tour of the site last week that the case was being blown out of proportion.

"It is not difficult to make," he said. "It could be one of thousands of parts used by the oil and gas industry. In fact, we have made more complex and difficult parts before." In its latest statement Scomi said it was making "generic items", not "sensitive parts" and that it "never knowingly manufactured" nuclear weapons parts.

The Foreign Office declined to comment about the allegations against GTI or Mr Griffin.

Investigators at the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency probing nuclear trafficking networks in at least a dozen countries believe Dubai is the centre for traders and middlemen running the black market.

The Americans hailed the seizure of the BBC China as a triumph for US intelligence that helped to persuade Colonel Muammar Gadafy of Libya to renounce his weapons of mass destruction pro grammes under the deal announced in December.

Other informed sources are convinced that, in fact, the boat was seized after the Libyans informed the CIA about it.

BBC Chartering and Logistic GmbH, the shipping company based at Leer in northern Germany which owns the BBC China, said: "This was a regular container transport from Dubai to Libya. We were surprised by the visits from the secret service and the [German] economics ministry. We're not involved at all in this story."

Rolf Briese, the company's managing director, said: "This is not so simple. We've made a declaration to the economic ministry and we have an agreement not to give any more information about it."

Investigation sources say the shipping company has been cleared of any suspicion in the incident and the BBC China is plying its business as usual.

While the IAEA investigators were denied access to the material on the BBC China by the Americans, the agency's inspectors found similar equipment in Libya during a visit in December.

According to diplomats in Vienna, the equipment bore stickers bearing the name KRL, referring to Khan Research Laboratories, the facility south of Islamabad at the heart of the Pakistani bomb project and named after Dr Khan.

The stickers found on the equipment in Libya explain why Dr Mohammed ElBaradei, the IAEA head, has taken to describing the clandestine nuclear trade as a "supermarket."

The disclosure of Dr Khan's smuggling network has been punctuated by heated claims and counter-claims about whether US and western intelligence agencies penetrated the hidden trade or completely missed its significance.


Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2004

By John Chiahemen

JOHANNESBURG, Feb 12 (Reuters) - Washington has sent investigators to South Africa, a former atomic power, to probe a possible link to an illicit network in nuclear technology following the arrest of a Cape Town man in the United States.

South African police said on Thursday Washington had asked for their help in investigating possible associates of Asher Karni, a former Israeli army officer accused by the U.S. government of conspiring to export 200 U.S.-made nuclear weapons detonators to Pakistan via South Africa.

Confirmation of the probe came a day after U.S. President George W. Bush called for an intensive global effort to stop a nuclear black market and referred to "procurement agents" in Africa.

Diplomats have named South Africa, which voluntarily dismantled its nuclear weapons capability when white minority rule ended in 1994, as a possible link in a global "nuclear supermarket."

They say several South African scientists are believed to have provided their technical expertise without government knowledge.

U.S. federal agents arrested Karni, 50, who has lived in South Africa for the last 18 years, when he arrived at Denver International Airport on January 1. He was released on bail last month but placed in home detention in Silver Spring, Maryland.

Prosecutors say Karni, using an American broker, acquired nuclear triggering devices from their manufacturer in the United States after falsely representing they were destined for a South African hospital.

Agents from the FBI and the U.S. Customs Service have since reinforced their offices in South Africa as they investigate a possible wider criminal web.

"The Americans have asked us to help them with investigations," South African police spokeswoman Mary Martins-Engelbrecht said, adding that police were ready to assist in raiding and searching suspected premises.

IAEA PROBES NETWORK

U.S. Justice Department official Channing Phillips said U.S. authorities had reason to believe Karni had other associates.

"If you look at the (charge) documents you will see the link between his domicile there with what he is alleged to have done and why we are really interested in his associations there in South Africa," he told Reuters by phone from Washington.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has stepped up its investigation of the illicit procurement network since the father of Pakistan's atom bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan, confessed this month to leaking nuclear secrets to other countries.

Karni's case has only added to South Africa's growing image as a magnet for international crime syndicates taking advantage of its world-class infrastructure and Third World law enforcement capabilities.

The activities of international syndicates from Israel, China, Nigeria, Bulgaria, Pakistan and India, dealing in everything from drugs and gold to human organs, are regularly headlined in South African newspapers.

"What you've got is a highly developed country -- infrastructure, banking, communications, transport. You can fly in and out on 50 plus different flights a day," said Keith Campbell of Pretoria-based Executive Research Associates.

"You've got all those positive things and then you've got... a weak state enforcement system...immigration controls are weak, law enforcement is overwhelmed, the justice system is overwhelmed," Campbell said.



02/12/04 08:18 ET

Quote:

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Originally Posted by Shoaib

I am not sure what Gen. Gul has said, but it might be in that context ... can you provide the article?

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Its the second article in this thread posted by HKhan.

Quote:

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Originally Posted by Shoaib

Many Israelis see the pakistani bomb as a direct threat to them

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Perhapsbecause they feared n-proliferation from Pakistan to states in their neighbourhood. That should not a concern anymore after recent developments I think. Musharaff has kind of turned off the tap on the proliferation if one is to believe the mandarins in I'bad.

Punekar,

Dr. Khan does not represent Pakistan nuclear program. He was a significant player in the over all nuclear weapons program. As I have alluded earlier wait and see and you will see a lot of other countries falling in the same catagory. Not one country is immune from this proliferation not one.

Pakistan may sign NPT if declared nuclear power

By Ansar Abbasi

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan may consider signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) if the world community formally recognises Islamabad as the sixth declared nuclear power, it is learnt.

A credible government source in a background interview told The News that Islamabad’s entering into the international treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as a non-nuclear state is out of question.

Against the backdrop of admissions that some Pakistani scientists led by Dr AQ Khan had proliferated nuclear technology to some foreign countries, including Iran, Libya and North Korea, Pakistan is expected to be pressurised by the international community to sign the NPT.

"There is no such pressure on Pakistan at this point of time," the source said, adding that declaring Islamabad as a recognised sixth world nuclear power might pave the way for country’s entering into the treaty. Presently the NPT acknowledges only five nations, including the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China as the nuclear weapon states. The treaty obligates these nations not to transfer nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive devices, or their technology to any non-nuclear state.

Except these five declared nuclear states, the rest of nations are recognised as non-nuclear weapon states, which under the treaty are required to undertake not to acquire or produce nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. Such nations, if they have signed and ratify the NPT, are also required to accept safeguards to detect diversions of nuclear materials from peaceful activities such as power generation, to the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Pakistan is still strictly following a policy of non-proliferation of its nuclear technology to any other country. It made conditional to India’s signing the treaty. New Delhi refused to sign asking for global de-nuclearisation. In the consequence of the latest international controversy on nuclear proliferation, the NPT issues had cropped up again for the non-signatory countries, including Pakistan and India.

The foreign ministers of Pakistan and India have already said in Munich last week that they would not sign the NPT. In the light of what the source confided to this correspondent, it is believed that Foreign Minister Kasuri’s refusal to sign the NPT was in Pakistan’s capacity as an undeclared nuclear state. Presently the provisions of the NPT do not bind Islamabad. It is said that if Pakistan signs the NPT as a globally recognised nuclear state it would not change the ground situation by any mean for Pakistan except that the country’s policy of non-proliferation would be then dictated by the provisions of the international treaty.

The News

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just a question to those member who have a much better understanding of the situation, could it be possible for the Pakistan government to sign the NPT if for example they are given a UNSC permanent member seat? would this have any advantges for us ? and could the Government achieve this?