China surpasses Russia serious breakthroughs in technology
I think this is extremly important for Pakistan, with China approach "technological independence" in weaponry R&D and production. Pak must make sure we are and shall remain in their good books as China is a reliable supplier.
http://www.newsmax.com/archives/arti...13/24549.shtml
China's Guochanhua (Reverse Engineering)
Dr. Alexandr Nemets and Dr. Thomas Torda
Thursday, June 13, 2002
Brief History of 'Guochanhua'
The July 1960 break in the Sino-Soviet alliance definitely wasn't a one-time event. The Chinese leaders understood the inevitability of separation by 1958 and did their best to accumulate by all means available - including direct theft - thousands and thousands of sets of the most-advanced Soviet technologies, i.e., weapons know-how, dual-use goods and heavy machinery.
After July 1960, China proclaimed the general course of "basing on our own forces" and concentrating forces on reproducing (reverse engineering, or "guochanhua" in Chinese) the Soviet technology.
China abandoned this autarchy and reinstated ties with the "outer world" after the start of the Great Reform in December 1978. And it appeared that, by the early 1980s, China had completed the reverse engineering of Soviet weapons and heavy machinery.
Generally, it is possible to claim that by about 1984, China acquired the capability to produce - and really master production of, sometimes in single copies - entire sets of Soviet weapons and dual-use products belonging to 1960-61 standards. This in particular included the following (Soviet name first, Chinese name in parentheses):
· First-generation ICBM R-7 (DF (Dongfeng)-5) as well as first generation IRBM (intermediate-range ballistic missile);
· First-generation satellite (Dongfanghong);
· First-generation nuclear strategic submarine (Xia class);
· First-generation nuclear attack submarine (Han class);
· Second-generation diesel-electric submarine (Ming class);
· First- and second-generation destroyers, frigates and patrol craft;
· Second-generation fighter MiG-21 (J-7) and first-generation bomber TU-28 (H-6);
· First-generation air-defense missile system S-75 (HQ (Hongqi)-2), etc.
Ground troops weaponry of all kinds was not inferior to Soviet levels of 1961-65.
Not surprisingly, at the first Chinese military parade in 25 years, on Oct. 1, 1984, in Beijing, it appeared that China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) was as good as the Soviet army in 1959-61. The same was evidently true for China's defense industry.
Among the reverse-engineered heavy machinery one can mention 300,000-kilowatt generators, mastered by production in 1958 in the USSR and in 1978-80 in China.
Why did it take so long for China to reproduce Soviet military and dual-use technology? That's because China's industrial-technological base was very weak and obsolete in this period. For example, manufacturing the MiG-21 jet engine required a precision level, in metal processing, of 3 microns. China's best machinery plants obtained this technology only in 1979. Generally, in the first half of the 1980s, China's technological gap with the USSR was still greater than 20 years.
A new large-scale cycle of guochanhua was launched in 1984-85. Deng Xiaoping produced the following directive here: (a) importation of foreign machinery, electronics, other high-tech goods (easy); (b) guochanhua (rather difficult but possible); (c) improvement (very difficult); (d) development of principally new products and technologies (in practice, impossible in the Chinese environment).
This time, not the weaponry but high-grade consumer goods - color TVs, tape recorders, refrigerators, washing machines, etc. - became the major objects of guochanhua. The share of Chinese parts in 14-inch color TVs reached 75 percent. This is how the base of the Chinese electronics industry was established. Of course, the broad access to Western non-military technology facilitated these processes.
By the early 1990s, China was capable of producing and even exporting, in millions of units, almost all modern consumer electronics and electrical consumer goods and, what is very important, all their modules and spare parts – except, probably, for integrated circuits (ICs), which China still imported. The lag behind international standards in this technological sector became minimal and even negligible.
During the 1990s, China acquired new successful experience in guochanhua of advanced personal computers (except for large ICs) and their peripherals; heavy trucks, modern cars, vans and motorcycles; U.S. McDonnell Douglas-series large passenger aircraft (except for engines and, probably, avionics) and French helicopters; and VCRs, DVDs, audio systems, air conditioners, large-screen color TVs, etc.
Newly accumulated economic and technological potential permitted an increase in the "guochanhua level" (Chinese-made share of the components) up to 75 percent to 90 percent – without loss of quality. Only the most sophisticated parts and modules - too costly to produce in China or belonging to the "leading edge" of world technology - were still coming from abroad.
Weaponry Guochanhua in 1996-2001
In 1996, China started a new cycle of military modernization. Already by 1999 (as was clearly demonstrated in the Beijing military parade on Oct. 1, 1999), the PLA had acquired much new weaponry - both purchased in Russia or Chinese-made or, more exactly, based on Russian technology and manufactured with the use of Russian kits and spare parts.
PLA modernization in 2000-2001 was characterized by the broad introduction of "Chinese" weapons and dual-use products, with significant use of Russian (as well as Ukrainian and Belarusian) parts. Only the most important products of this kind are listed below:
· J-11 (improved copy of SU-27 SK) fighter, assembled at the Shenyang Aircraft Corp.; by the end of 2001, only engines, radars and some other avionics came from Russia.
· J-10 and FC-1 fighters, prepared by late 2001 for serial production at Chengdu Aircraft Corp. Both use Russian engines and radars.
· FBC-1 (Flying Leopard) fighter-bomber, assembled at the Xian Aircraft Corp.; uses engines from Rolls Royce Corp. in the UK (the Russian side couldn't provide engines of the necessary level).
· Solid-fuel, road-mobile DF-31 ICBM and its submarine-launch variety, the JL-II, prepared by early 2002 for serial production in Sichuan province. This ICBM is based on Soviet technology and evidently uses some Russian and Belarusian components.
· In November 1999 and February 2001, China launched a manned spacecraft prototype, Shenzhou, with a LM (Long March)-F2 missile booster. Both are based on Russian technology and use some Russian-made modules.
· Hongniao (HN)-series long range land-attack cruise missiles, whose production was mastered in 1998-2001 in Langfang city, near Beijing, with the use of Russian technology and components.
· Improved Song and "Super-Kilo" diesel-electric submarines, which came to the PLA navy in 1999-2001, use a great amount of Russian Kilo-type submarine high-tech and components.
· The Luhai-class missile destroyer, the best of Chinese-made naval vessels, uses Ukrainian engines and evidently some technology of Russia's Sovremenny-class destroyer.
· The "093" class nuclear attack submarine and "094" class strategic submarine, presently under production in Huludao, Liaoning province, are entirely based on Russian technology and use key Russian-made components.
· The FT-2000 long-range anti-radar air-defense missile (ADM), serially produced in 2000-2001, is almost a copy of Russia's S-300 ADM. Besides, by late 2001, the Chinese-made "slightly improved copies" of Russia's S-300 PMU-1 long-range ADM, Tor-M1 medium-range ADM, and short-range Tunguska air-defense missile-artillery system, were mastered in serial production or close to this stage. And all of them used some Russian components.
· The type-98 tank and other mobile weapons for ground troops are based on "Russian technology, Ukrainian engines and Belarusian chassis" (according to Taiwanese sources).
Technological Breakthroughs of 2002
By early 2002, China had reached a new level of economic-technological development, significantly surpassing Russia's. This allowed China to accomplish several serious breakthroughs and approach "technological independence" in weaponry R&D and production. Only the major facts are given below:
1. In March 2002, aircraft industry enterprises in Zhuzhou, Hunan province, completed development of the first Chinese turbofan engine, to be used in the K-8 fighter-trainer (earlier it used Ukrainian turbofan engines). And in May 2002, Shenyang Jet Engine Research Institute concluded development of the much more advanced "Kunlun" turbofan engine.
According to a description, this is evidently an improved copy of Russia's AL-31 turbofan engine, used with some varieties of the aforementioned SU-27, SU-30, J-11 and J-10 fighters. China's domestic share of the components (the "guochanhua level") in the J-10 and J-11 fighters thus automatically rose from 70 percent or 75 percent to 90 percent or more. This, in practice, means technological independence in manufacturing fourth-generation fighters, at a comparatively low cost.
2. In late March 2002, China successfully launched the unmanned Shenzhou-3 spacecraft, much more advanced than the aforementioned Shenzhou-1 and the Shenzhou-2. According to several reports in the Chinese media, this time the Shenzhou spacecraft and its LM-F2 missile booster were made entirely or almost entirely of Chinese components.
China acquired technological independence in R&D and manufacturing of large spacecraft and missile boosters for them. And this opens the way for Chinese space station construction.
3. According to statements of Chinese nuclear industry experts, by March 2002 this industry mastered the technology for making 600-megawatt thermal nuclear power generating sets and became capable of designing and manufacturing 1000-megawatt thermal nuclear power generators. This means that China's lag behind the Russian and, generally, the world nuclear industry has fallen to a minimum. That's for both civilian and military products.
4. In January-March 2002, one or two microelectronics enterprises in Shanghai began production of large-scale ICs with a minimal feature size of 0.18 micron (it is called 0.18-micron technology level; by the way, Russia has nothing of this kind). The same enterprises intend to master, within two years, the manufacturing of ultra-large-scale ICs of 0.13-micron technological level; this is currently the best level in world microelectronics.
What is probably even more important: Introduction of ultra-large-scale ICs greatly expands the combat abilities of any modern weapon system.
5. In short, China has approached technological independence in a broad range of weapon systems and dual-use products. This is a fact of ultimate importance.
China to Buy 8 More Russian Submarines
China to Buy 8 More Russian Submarines
$1.6 Billion Deal Would Aid a Blockade of Taiwan, Challenge U.S
By John Pomfret
Washington Post Foreign Service
Tuesday, June 25, 2002; Page A15
BEIJING, June 24 -- China has begun negotiations with Russia to buy eight more submarines in a $1.6 billion deal that will significantly boost its ability to blockade Taiwan and challenge U.S. naval supremacy in nearby seas, Western and Russian sources said.
Four Russian producers are bidding to build the diesel-powered Project 636 Kilo-class vessels, which will be equipped with Klub long-range, anti-ship missile systems, defense experts said.
China has already purchased four Kilo-class subs from Russia, including two Project 636 models. The deal for additional submarines is part of a $4 billion weapons package that Russia has committed to provide China over the next four to five years. Included in the package are two more Sovremenny-class destroyers, adding to a pair China has already received, a new batch of S300 PMU2 anti-aircraft missiles and 40 Su-30MKK fighter-bombers.
The $4 billion sale cements Russia's place as China's biggest military trading partner, far ahead of Israel and such former Soviet states as Ukraine. It also cements China's place as the world's biggest weapons importer, underscoring its race with Taiwan for military supremacy across the Taiwan Strait.
China became the world's biggest importer of weapons in 2000, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. It maintained the No. 1 position last year, mostly through purchases of ships and combat aircraft worth close to $3 billion, more than twice any other buyer's acquisitions.
The United States is Taiwan's main military supplier. In April 2001, the Bush administration approved a multibillion dollar package that included eight diesel submarines, 30 AH-64D Apache Longbow attack helicopters, 12 P-3C submarine-hunting aircraft, four Kidd-class destroyers, long-range radar systems and Patriot III missiles. The U.S. submarine deal is uncertain, however, because the United States no longer makes or designs diesel-powered subs and two nations that do, Germany and the Netherlands, have refused to allow the United States to use their designs or manufacturers.
The Chinese submarine deal will "very significantly enhance [the Chinese] navy's ability to influence events in the East China Sea," said Bernard Cole, an expert on the Chinese navy at the National War College in Washington, "first, by enforcing a blockade against Taiwan, if Beijing adopts that course of action, and also by posing a serious problem for opposing naval forces attempting to operate in the area."
The deal reflects China's double-barreled military modernization strategy. On one hand, the strategy seeks to enable its army to recover Taiwan by force, if necessary. On the other, it wants to deter any intervention by the United States, which has committed itself to Taiwan's defense under the vaguely worded Taiwan Relations Act.
Two U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups faced down Chinese threats to the island in 1996 after China fired missiles across the strait during training exercises. Assuming China could detect the U.S. carriers in the future, such a response would be riskier once the new submarines are operational, defense experts said.
The deal, first reported on June 7 by the Kanwa Intelligence Review, a publication based in Canada and focused on the Chinese military, has prompted competition among Russian manufacturers to win the contract, although China's desire to have swift delivery means that work will occur at several plants simultaneously.
Russian press reports have identified the contenders as the Admiralteyskie Verfi shipbuilding plant based in St. Petersburg, the Komsomolsk-on-Amur shipbuilding plant, the Krasnoye Sormovo shipbuilding plant in Nizhny Novgorod and the Sevmash shipbuilding plant based in Severodvinsk.
China's own submarine manufacturing program has encountered difficulty, especially a multibillion dollar program to develop the Song class guided-missile submarine. China tried to develop the Song to replace its 1962-vintage Romeo-class attack submarines.
According to Jane's Defense Weekly, the first Song, built with assistance from Israel and others, started sea trials in 1995, but proved a failure. A second substantially modified Song began sea trials in early 2000, but analysts say these are far behind schedule and have yet to be completed.
"If Beijing is going to buy eight additional Kilos, it means that their domestic program to build Songs is, in fact, in trouble, which would certainly not surprise me," Cole said.
A second problem associated with China's purchase of the Kilos concerns its ability to use the submarines properly. China bought four Kilo-class submarines during the 1990s, two of the export version and two of the more capable Project 636 version produced by Russia for its own navy. The Chinese navy has experienced operating problems because of initially inadequate crew training, and more consistently because of certain material problems, such as troublesome batteries.
The new Kilo will be equipped with an anti-ship missile system with a range of 140 miles. But China would need to develop the ability to see "over the horizon" to use the weapons properly, defense experts said. Most submarines can only "see" a few miles without the aid of satellites, other submarines, airplanes or ships.
"China still cannot find ships at sea," a senior U.S. defense official said. "Over-the-horizon targeting escapes them. The United States built an open ocean surveillance capability in the 1960s. China has all the tools to build its own but it has not."
© 2002 The Washington Post Company
