H Khan
12-01-2001, 10:29 PM
National security at lower cost
By Dr Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha
While the current strategic developments around Pakistan seem to be have altered the country’s military-strategic environment, the changing situation also makes it possible to effect major reductions in the annual defense outlays — provided the policymakers muster sufficient political will. In fact, a strategic restructuring of the defence sector could make possible a reduction of the current annual defense spending by 35-41 percent. However, this is not possible without a complete overhauling and revamping of defense planning and the defense sector in the country.
Even using conservative estimates Pakistan could achieve a net saving of about Rs 55-64.5 billion without compromising national security. This money could in fact be diverted to socioeconomic development especially in the education sector. Clearly, such investment would save the country from acquiring additional debt burden in the form of loans from multilateral agencies for improving the current educational system.
The other option could be for the governments (this or successive) to re-invest these captured resources in obtaining the much-needed weapons technologies to gear up for Pakistan’s role as a nuclear weapon state. But before getting into the details of how resources could be saved in the defense sector and what changes are to be made, let us briefly evaluate the strategic developments and how these are linked with Islamabad’s current defense spending and the military expenditure reduction debate.
The near end of the war in Afghanistan and the American victory against the Taliban forces will most certainly impact the future role of Pakistan’s armed forces, especially the army. The restructuring of Afghanistan’s political system is bound to reduce the role of Pakistan army and some of its vital agencies that were embroiled in the conflict for the past twenty years. Since the early 1980s, a huge proportion of the intelligence agencies’ manpower and budget (as also some of army’s budget) has remained tied up with Afghanistan. This included, first, helping the Afghans fight the battle against the Soviet occupation and, later, creating a situation favorable to Pakistan’s security interests in that region.
The end of the 1980s also witnessed the inflammation of the Kashmir issue. The war waged by the Kashmiri mujahideen also increased pressure on the Pakistan army. Groups fighting for the control of Afghanistan against those that were being supported by states inimical to Pakistan’s interests also created inevitable linkages with Kashmiri mujahideen. However, with the current international focus on terrorism, the possibility of pursuing the Kashmir issue through means other than diplomatic and political is likely to reduce. American impatience with Pakistan getting involved in any activity provoking cries of “terrorism” from India was quite obvious during General Pervez Musharraf’s recent visit to the US. This is indeed a time when the Pakistani military’s top brass need to re-evaluate their strategic options and decide on how to use this opportunity to contribute proactively towards socioeconomic development and growth.
It is interesting to note that all the plans conceived by the present regime so far are a bid to generate revenues, not to undertake any major expenditure reduction. This is particularly true of the defense sector. Like other dimensions of the defence sector, the changing strategic milieu also provide Pakistan with an opportunity to strengthen the nuclear deterrence option that cannot be left undeveloped, besides exposing the armed forces to the much-needed concept of revolution in military affairs (RMA). RMA, which refers to revolutionary changes in defense technologies and relevant strategies, is presently non-existent in Pakistan’s military. One of the major reasons for this is the dearth of resources.
The key areas where resources can be conserved relate to: (a) non-auditable programs, excluding the nuclear program, (b) defense industry, (c) weapons and spares procurement, (d) manpower planning and (e) supplies of military stores. The first item on the list is directly linked with the huge budget of various intelligence agencies that consume about nine to ten percent (Rs. 14.1-15.7 billion) of the annual defense allocation. Of course, this would call for redefining the role of military intelligence agencies, besides altogether eliminating the domestic political role played by these organisations. Given the current situation, this budget could easily be brought down to 3-4 percent (Rs. 4.7-6.3 billion) without undermining the agencies’ intelligence-gathering capacity.
Similarly, reorganization of the defence industry and restricting its activities to certain key areas could save another 10 percent (Rs. 15.75 billion). This would mean bringing down the budget from the current 28 percent (Rs. 44.1 billion). In fact, all organizations in the defence industry that are not contributing towards national security effectively could be wound up. The other alternative is to adopt the Chinese option of asking these organizations to generate their own resources and incrementally reducing their budget. This would not only reduce wastage but also make these institutions more efficient. It must be noted that poor inventory, work and human resource planning and contracting leads to huge wastages in the defense industry. The import of raw materials and piling up of raw material and other items also increase the cost of production. Interestingly, these wastages never come to light because of secrecy and other reasons.
Human resource planning is another area needing immediate attention. The military, particularly the army, continues to be labor-intensive. In the past 12 to 15 months the army has added five infantry divisions and about 40, 000 personnel to counter the growing Indian military-technological capacity. But while numbers have been added, the technological capacity of the army remains qualitatively inferior. Experts say that with about 2, 320 obsolescent tanks and old M-113 armored personnel carriers, the army cannot really compete with the adversary. It is therefore debatable whether increase in manpower alone can add to the army’s punch vis-à-vis India.
Clearly, a better option would be to improve technology, which is presently not possible because of the huge personnel cost the army has to bear. The service spends about 41 percent of its budget on meeting expenditure on personnel (Rs. 26.4 billion). There is need therefore to develop a leaner but (technologically) more efficient force and achieve this objective in a phased manner.
According to a recent study, increasing conscription could reduce the budget by Rs. 70 billion annually (about 44 percent). Even if this budget could be reduced by 15 percent, it would still mean a substantial saving (approximately Rs. 23.6 billion). Of course, this would amount to an increased pension bill in the short term, but its financial benefits in the medium- to long-term are clear. The army can consider various models for conscription. The best in this case would be the one currently practiced in the army in the form of short-term, 4-year commission. To increase the capability of the fighting force the service could increase the level of education at the time of induction and gradually build the reserve force through introducing a database. The idea is to build a system on scientific lines.
The alteration of the financial allocation system by making it project-oriented rather than tying it up with the financial year will also reduce wastage in the procurement of weapons, spares and other supplies drastically. A conservative estimate is that through better management in these areas, the government could save up to a minimum of 5-7 percent (Rs. 7.9-11 billion) of the budget. The wastage is not only caused through deliberate mismanagement or kickbacks, but also because of the use of obsolete system of accountability and checks and balances. One of the areas requiring immediate attention, which is completely outdated, relates to the process of weapons and spares procurement. Traditionally, weapons have been acquired without spending sufficient time on generating the requirement. Moreover, none of the three services uses a project management approach to procurement. Even militaries like that of the United Arab Emirates uses a similar concept, thus enhancing the total cost and increasing industrial and other dividends. Another 3-5 percent (Rs. 4.7-7.9 billion) could be saved through improving management in other areas and stopping financial wastage especially resources that are leaking into the military’s business ventures or money excessively spent on various military organizations including the training institutes
The Friday Times, November 30, 2001
By Dr Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha
While the current strategic developments around Pakistan seem to be have altered the country’s military-strategic environment, the changing situation also makes it possible to effect major reductions in the annual defense outlays — provided the policymakers muster sufficient political will. In fact, a strategic restructuring of the defence sector could make possible a reduction of the current annual defense spending by 35-41 percent. However, this is not possible without a complete overhauling and revamping of defense planning and the defense sector in the country.
Even using conservative estimates Pakistan could achieve a net saving of about Rs 55-64.5 billion without compromising national security. This money could in fact be diverted to socioeconomic development especially in the education sector. Clearly, such investment would save the country from acquiring additional debt burden in the form of loans from multilateral agencies for improving the current educational system.
The other option could be for the governments (this or successive) to re-invest these captured resources in obtaining the much-needed weapons technologies to gear up for Pakistan’s role as a nuclear weapon state. But before getting into the details of how resources could be saved in the defense sector and what changes are to be made, let us briefly evaluate the strategic developments and how these are linked with Islamabad’s current defense spending and the military expenditure reduction debate.
The near end of the war in Afghanistan and the American victory against the Taliban forces will most certainly impact the future role of Pakistan’s armed forces, especially the army. The restructuring of Afghanistan’s political system is bound to reduce the role of Pakistan army and some of its vital agencies that were embroiled in the conflict for the past twenty years. Since the early 1980s, a huge proportion of the intelligence agencies’ manpower and budget (as also some of army’s budget) has remained tied up with Afghanistan. This included, first, helping the Afghans fight the battle against the Soviet occupation and, later, creating a situation favorable to Pakistan’s security interests in that region.
The end of the 1980s also witnessed the inflammation of the Kashmir issue. The war waged by the Kashmiri mujahideen also increased pressure on the Pakistan army. Groups fighting for the control of Afghanistan against those that were being supported by states inimical to Pakistan’s interests also created inevitable linkages with Kashmiri mujahideen. However, with the current international focus on terrorism, the possibility of pursuing the Kashmir issue through means other than diplomatic and political is likely to reduce. American impatience with Pakistan getting involved in any activity provoking cries of “terrorism” from India was quite obvious during General Pervez Musharraf’s recent visit to the US. This is indeed a time when the Pakistani military’s top brass need to re-evaluate their strategic options and decide on how to use this opportunity to contribute proactively towards socioeconomic development and growth.
It is interesting to note that all the plans conceived by the present regime so far are a bid to generate revenues, not to undertake any major expenditure reduction. This is particularly true of the defense sector. Like other dimensions of the defence sector, the changing strategic milieu also provide Pakistan with an opportunity to strengthen the nuclear deterrence option that cannot be left undeveloped, besides exposing the armed forces to the much-needed concept of revolution in military affairs (RMA). RMA, which refers to revolutionary changes in defense technologies and relevant strategies, is presently non-existent in Pakistan’s military. One of the major reasons for this is the dearth of resources.
The key areas where resources can be conserved relate to: (a) non-auditable programs, excluding the nuclear program, (b) defense industry, (c) weapons and spares procurement, (d) manpower planning and (e) supplies of military stores. The first item on the list is directly linked with the huge budget of various intelligence agencies that consume about nine to ten percent (Rs. 14.1-15.7 billion) of the annual defense allocation. Of course, this would call for redefining the role of military intelligence agencies, besides altogether eliminating the domestic political role played by these organisations. Given the current situation, this budget could easily be brought down to 3-4 percent (Rs. 4.7-6.3 billion) without undermining the agencies’ intelligence-gathering capacity.
Similarly, reorganization of the defence industry and restricting its activities to certain key areas could save another 10 percent (Rs. 15.75 billion). This would mean bringing down the budget from the current 28 percent (Rs. 44.1 billion). In fact, all organizations in the defence industry that are not contributing towards national security effectively could be wound up. The other alternative is to adopt the Chinese option of asking these organizations to generate their own resources and incrementally reducing their budget. This would not only reduce wastage but also make these institutions more efficient. It must be noted that poor inventory, work and human resource planning and contracting leads to huge wastages in the defense industry. The import of raw materials and piling up of raw material and other items also increase the cost of production. Interestingly, these wastages never come to light because of secrecy and other reasons.
Human resource planning is another area needing immediate attention. The military, particularly the army, continues to be labor-intensive. In the past 12 to 15 months the army has added five infantry divisions and about 40, 000 personnel to counter the growing Indian military-technological capacity. But while numbers have been added, the technological capacity of the army remains qualitatively inferior. Experts say that with about 2, 320 obsolescent tanks and old M-113 armored personnel carriers, the army cannot really compete with the adversary. It is therefore debatable whether increase in manpower alone can add to the army’s punch vis-à-vis India.
Clearly, a better option would be to improve technology, which is presently not possible because of the huge personnel cost the army has to bear. The service spends about 41 percent of its budget on meeting expenditure on personnel (Rs. 26.4 billion). There is need therefore to develop a leaner but (technologically) more efficient force and achieve this objective in a phased manner.
According to a recent study, increasing conscription could reduce the budget by Rs. 70 billion annually (about 44 percent). Even if this budget could be reduced by 15 percent, it would still mean a substantial saving (approximately Rs. 23.6 billion). Of course, this would amount to an increased pension bill in the short term, but its financial benefits in the medium- to long-term are clear. The army can consider various models for conscription. The best in this case would be the one currently practiced in the army in the form of short-term, 4-year commission. To increase the capability of the fighting force the service could increase the level of education at the time of induction and gradually build the reserve force through introducing a database. The idea is to build a system on scientific lines.
The alteration of the financial allocation system by making it project-oriented rather than tying it up with the financial year will also reduce wastage in the procurement of weapons, spares and other supplies drastically. A conservative estimate is that through better management in these areas, the government could save up to a minimum of 5-7 percent (Rs. 7.9-11 billion) of the budget. The wastage is not only caused through deliberate mismanagement or kickbacks, but also because of the use of obsolete system of accountability and checks and balances. One of the areas requiring immediate attention, which is completely outdated, relates to the process of weapons and spares procurement. Traditionally, weapons have been acquired without spending sufficient time on generating the requirement. Moreover, none of the three services uses a project management approach to procurement. Even militaries like that of the United Arab Emirates uses a similar concept, thus enhancing the total cost and increasing industrial and other dividends. Another 3-5 percent (Rs. 4.7-7.9 billion) could be saved through improving management in other areas and stopping financial wastage especially resources that are leaking into the military’s business ventures or money excessively spent on various military organizations including the training institutes
The Friday Times, November 30, 2001